EXPOSE Network Series
Part 1 : – Introduction to the EXPOSE Network and its Hub, the Open Information Partnership (OIP).
Part 2 : – Examining the role of the EXPOSE network and authenticating the supporting evidence.
Part 3 : – Looking at the Network Facilitator for the EXPOSE Network established by the Zinc Consortium.
Part 4 : – Research into the EXPOSE Network partners and the web of globalist institutions behind them.
Part 5 : – Continuing to look at the EXPOSE Network partners and the web of globalist institutions behind them.
EXPOSE Network – Quick Recap
Over the previous five posts we have exposed the EXPOSE Network. To those who have read them, I thank you for your time. If you haven’t, much of this post will prompt more questions than provide answers (hopefully).
In this concluding part we consider how, through a labyrinth of state initiatives, the EXPOSE Network sits within a cohesive, multinational, corporate & state run propaganda network. This is primarily a NATO/EU operation, led by the UK Government. Taking shape in 2018, it is obvious that Brexit has no impact upon its development. We’ve explored NATO (and U.S.) critical involvement in the EXPOSE Network. This post is concerned with the European Union’s.
When announcing the public facade of the EXPOSE Network, the Open Information Partnership, former UK Minister of State Alan Duncan stated:
“We have a regular dialogue with international partners on the challenge posed by hostile state disinformation…….The Foreign Secretary (then Jeremy Hunt) discussed disinformation at the EU Foreign Affairs Council on 21 January in the context of the European Commission’s ambitious Action Plan Against Disinformation…….by countering disinformation directed at the UK and its Allies from Russia…[with]..projects in a number of different countries that….. expose disinformation and share good practice with partner governments.”
[Note: Bracketed information added]
The EXPOSE Network sits within “the context of the European Commission’s ambitious Action Plan Against Disinformation.” Duncan’s statement alone is far from the only reason to believe this the case.
A few points are worth bearing in mind. Firstly the EXPOSE network targets mainly European nations, especially in Eastern Europe and the Balkans but also others in Central Eurasia, almost certainly with a view to expanding towards North & Central Africa and the Middle East. More precisely it targets both media coverage and news organisations in those nations in an attempt to influence their internal politics and international relations. The other objective is to control the West’s perception and understanding of news events unfolding in these infiltrated sovereign states.
Secondly, all the suggested fear and panic about Kremlin disinformation is based upon very little, if any, credible evidence, as we shall see. Given the lack of evidence the only possible conclusions are either that the entire apparatus of the combined western state is run by idiots (possible but unlikely) or Kremlin disinformation is merely the cover story to obscure a covert operation. The latter being by far the most plausible.
The EU in Action
The EU Action Plan Against Disinformation, endorsed by the EU in December 2018, makes interesting reading. All of it is predicated upon the concept of hostile disinformation. Defined as:
“….verifiably false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to intentionally deceive the public, and may cause public harm”
The meaning of public harm:
“…..includes threats to democratic processes as well as to public goods such as Union citizens’ health, environment or security.”
Once again, we see that definitions only ‘include’ certain elements, meaning others exist. We just don’t know what they are.
Much like the UK’s Prevent Duty these woolly rationales appear to be designed to allow sufficient wriggle room for additional strictures to be applied, as and when required. Nor is a threat to democracy specified. Does this mean attempts to physically stop voters getting to the polls or does it equally apply to criticising electoral systems?
What is clear is that anything deemed a threat to public health or the U.N’s Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals will be considered ‘disinformation.’ Again we are left in the dark to imagine what might constitute a threat. Though we can make an educated guess.
We have already explored the EXPOSE Network nexus between global corporations, governments, NGO’s and wealthy ‘donors.’ Vaccines currently represent a relatively small component of global pharmaceutical corporation’s profits. In 2017 the global Vaccine market was conservatively estimated to be worth $34.3 billion annually. The projected Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) was around 7%. However, recent moves towards compulsory vaccination has seen market confidence soar.
With revenue projected to reach an estimated $77.1 billion per annum by 2024, an increased estimated CAGR of 10.3% is an attractive proposition for venture capitalists the world over. Especially at a time when EU Central Bank (ECB) interests rates have slipped to -0.5%. This growth is all but guaranteed providing as many people as possible are vaccinated.
Similarly, an offered 12% yield on tax payer subsidised Climate Bonds, with plans to create a market worth a projected $100 trillion, is even better. As long as people believe they are about to be killed by the plant food they breath out, and are consequently willing to stump up the required subsidies.
Safe to say, questioning vaccine efficacy will definitely be considered ‘a threat to citizen’s health’ and failing to jump on the climate emergency bandwagon will mark you out as ‘a threat to the environment.’ In both cases you will be found guilty of peddling Kremlin disinformation.
This Russian disinformation claim is the whole basis for the EU’s wide-sweeping Internet regulations and the huge tax expenditure on STRATCOM operations.
It’s All Evidence Based
We have also looked at the difficulty EXPOSE Network ‘experts’, such as DFRLab, have encountered when attempting to provide some evidence to back up their claims of a huge Kremlin disinformation operation. So, what is the EU’s proof that Kremlin (Russian) disinformation is a real and present danger?
The EU Action Plan spells it out:
“The East Strategic Communications Task Force, has catalogued, analysed and put the spotlight on over 4,500 examples of disinformation by the Russian Federation, uncovering numerous disinformation narratives….”
The Easta StratCom Task Force’ (ESTF) main method for countering disinformation is ‘raising awareness’ about it in their weekly Disinformation Review. The full record of the Task Force’s work on disinformation is available on the ESTF’s own EUvsDisinfo website.
The work of EUvsDisinfo is central to the EU Action Plan. It provides the evidence which informs the EU’s assessment of the Russian disinformation threat. The influential U.S. think tank and policy advisors, the German Marshall Fund, wrote a policy paper in August 2019. They observed:
“EU vs Disinfo’s research and documentation efforts were instrumental in changing the debate about Russian disinformation and hybrid threats within the European Parliament and EU institutions.”
The full record of the 4,500 examples of disinformation, rather than emanating from academic or intelligence based assessments, are the sum of EUvsDisinfo’s OSINT informed ‘weekly reviews.’ For example their report on 24th October 2019 identified another 60 cases of Russian disinformation.
There were 12 cases of ‘enemy of the west’ narratives, 7 about western moral decay, 5 alleging NATO war preparations, 10 saying the Ukraine is bad and 11 protesting Russian innocence. Only 45 in total, of which only 31 were linked to alleged evidence.
Given the ESTF are referenced by the EU as providing over 4,500 hard evidence examples of Kremlin disinformation, it would be helpful to see all 60. Otherwise, how can we trust the figures?
Clicking on any of the 31 contextual links, such as “Neo-Nazis have outsized influence” takes you to a page like this. In every case the ‘evidence‘ consists of allegedly identified Russian disinformation, called a Summary. The response, or ‘Disproof,’ is then provided by an anonymous ESTF ‘actor.’ You can also view the source of the Summary claim. In this case it’s an episode of RT’s “Cross Talk” political discussion program.
The observation that Neo Nazi’s have an “outsized influence” was made during the program by Prof. Nicolai Petro, a professor of political science at the University of Rhode Island and a former special assistant to the U.S. State Department. He said:
“I would take a slightly different tack with respect to the right wing, neo-nazi element in Ukrainian politics. It exists, it has an outsized influence, but I don’t really think it is the thing that is preventing change right now.”
From this, the ESFT identified the following Kremlin disinformation:
“Recurring pro-Kremlin narrative casting Ukraine as a Nazi country.”
At no point in the “Cross Talk” discussion does anyone cast the Ukraine as a Nazi country. The identified ‘disinformation’ doesn’t exist in the example given.
Another example is the link to crime infested no go zones where the ESTF identify the disinformation as:
“Recurring pro-Kremlin disinformation narrative linking migrants and asylum seekers in the EU to violent crime.”
The ESTF quite rightly criticise RT for not citing the evidence to back up some of their claims. This is a common failing with the MSM. For example, when the UK Express newspaper wrote Europe’s No Go Zones they only provided a couple of links. When the Canadian national newspaper , the National Post, wrote on the same subject, they too could have offered more evidence, as could the U.S based Fox News.
Regardless of their quality, what these articles demonstrate is that there is no evidence of the claimed “pro-kremlin disinformation” in the cited example. Unless the ESFT believe that pretty much the entire western MSM is “pro-Kremlin.” I am not aware that they are.
You can search the ESFT database referenced by the EU. Time and time again, when you check the links alleging Russian disinformation, proof either doesn’t exist or is spuriously contrived from entirely subjective interpretations of mainly MSM content. Hard evidence, proving the scale of this fabled Russian disinformation operation, doesn’t exist.
In March 2018 the ESFT were forced to issue a retraction after three Dutch media outlets threatened to sue them for falsely labeling them as ‘disinformation.’ The ESFT acknowledged the Dutch were right and claimed they were “taking steps to further improve.”
In fact, the ESFT don’t seem to have much faith in their own investigations. Carefully adding a disclaimer to every ‘Disproof’ stating:
“This does not necessarily imply, however, that a given outlet is linked to the Kremlin or editorially pro-Kremlin, or that it has intentionally sought to disinform.”
Posing the question, if it implies that the story is neither linked to the Kremlin nor that it is pro-Kremlin and it doesn’t seek to intentionally ‘disinform’, how can it possibly be ‘Kremlin disinformation’?
In the referenced example, there is no evidence that the East StratCom Task Force gathered 60 examples of Russian disinformation. They only cite 31 and none of those checked were substantive.
There is no reason to place any credence at all in the EU’s assertion that, “The East Strategic Communications Task Force, has catalogued, analysed and put the spotlight on over 4,500 examples of disinformation by the Russian Federation.”
The evidence, or rather lack of it, demonstrates otherwise. Admittedly I haven’t trawled the whole database so perhaps there’s some evidence, somewhere of something. But it seems doubtful. At the very least, the EU need to revise their risible claim to “over 4,440.”
As with the EXPOSE Network, it seems the EU’s assertion, regarding the scale of Russian disinformation and the level of threat it presents, is fallacious. It is as if they are reading from the same script.
EXPOSE Network Drives The EU’s Action Plan Against Disinformation
In March 2019 an open letter by European Security Experts to the President of the European Commission requested more money for the East StratCom Task Force (ESTF). Their current budget comes from the EU Strategic Communication fund of €5 million per annum. They are part of the European External Action Service (EEAS) who stand to benefit considerably over the coming years from a planned €123 billion investment.
Such a sizeable tax funded budget would be an enticing prospect for any non governmental organisation or private intelligence contractor looking for opportunities to improve their revenue stream. For example, a consortium of private contractor with all the necessary experience and skills might consider applying for a few billion euros.
One of EXPOSE Networks ‘actors’ is the Institute for Public Affairs (Inštitút pre verejné otázky – IVO – named as prospective EXPOSE partners in the scoping document), based in Slovakia. They have confirmed their membership of the Open Information Partnership (OIP). Another appears to be the Union of Informed Citizens (UIC) working out of Armenia (also named in the scoping document). They recently received EU funding for “taking initiative” in “information gathering.” As EXPOSE Network ‘actors,’ they will be expected to report that information back to the Network Facilitator who will pass it on to the UK FCO and the CDMD.
The OIP web presence was created in order to give the EXPOSE Network a public air of respectability. The Zinc Network led consortium who form the Network Facilitator, based in the London Hub, described this in their technical proposal:
“……..the Network needs to be public-facing…… the strategy for public facing communications is based on minimum requirements, such as a static website……..The project could expand to build on this public facing component, promoting the network as a journalist integrity and disinformation network……Although the activities of specific Network Members will remain discrete……..The positioning of the project in the broader media development and integrity sector is essential to help mitigate reputational risks both to the FCO and to safeguard the interests of Network Members.
This allows EXPOSE Network ‘actors’ like the IVO and UIC, to manage their reputations by openly declaring their membership of the OIP. These declarations should be seen as distinct from the Hub activity operated in London. OIP membership, in this context, indicates only that they are CDMD run EXPOSE Network assets, not Network Facilitators.
IVO are ‘donor supported’ by the now familiar list of transatlantic funders such as NATO, the UNDP, the EU Commission, the NED, the Open Society Institute, the World Bank and so on, also enjoying wide support from a number of governments. As do the UIC.
We know that one of the EXPOSE Networks recommended ‘fact checkers’ is the Ukrainian based StopFake. They report:
“Britain is thought to be leading [the] EU in building a grassroots campaign against Russia’s attempts [disinformation]. The campaign is lead by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and executed by a communications agency called Zinc Network.”
[Note: Bracketed information added]
Certainly when we look at the EXPOSE Networks ‘actors’, that appears to be the case. Of these, perhaps one of the most influential is the European Values Center for Security Policy. Through them we can see how the transatlantic NATO/EU EXPOSE Network operates. Their two biggest funders are the Dutch government and the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
One of their projects is called Kremlin Watch which claims to tell you “everything you need to know about about Russian influence operations in Europe.” They also tell us quite a bit about the role of the EXPOSE Network in Europe. They state:
“Our team is the most active contributor to the EEAS East STRATCOM network (ESFT), which produces the Disinformation Review.”
[Note: Bracketed information added]
It seems the EXPOSE Network is providing the Russian disinformation analysis, via the East StratCom Task Force, which the European Union are using to justify draconian Internet regulations and planned tax expenditure of €123 billion over five years. The quality of that analysis appears to be so poor we might consider if it is itself ‘disinformation.’ The Action Plan builds upon the work of the ESTF, which is the work of the EXPOSE Network.
The EXPOSE Network is an operation of the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Program of the UK Government Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). It appears the UK Government are working with the European Union to create a €123 billion tax payer funded budget based upon their own highly questionable Kremlin disinformation analysis. A healthy return on an initial £10 million investment. What really matters is that the tax paying public believe the threat is real.
The EXPOSE Network ‘actor,’ the European Values Center for Security Policy, proudly announces on their website the myriad of major MSM news outlets who have shared their work. The BBC, CNN, The Guardian, BILD, Time Magazine, the New York Times, Newsweek and others have all spread their, and now the EXPOSE Network’s, message.
The EXPOSE Network’s Amorphous Blob
As we discussed in Part 1 we cannot be certain about the name the EXPOSE Network is operating under, only that it exists and is operational. If your business is covert then exposure is the last thing you need. Perhaps this is why on the 01/11/2019 and again on 12/11/2019 Zinc Network filed to be struck of the companies register. However, just as they existed for 6 years, prior to registering as a limited company, under the Breakthrough Media umbrella so their loss of separate company status means little. However it does mean, should Zinc Network continue to operate under that name, they won’t be required to file official accounts.
Language can also present a problem when tracking EXPOSE Network players. For example OIP partners Fundacja Reporterów from Poland are listed in the FCO’s EXPOSE Network scoping report. However, in English they are referred to as the Reporter’s Foundation. For example on 1st November 2019 the Guardian wrote how the Reporters Foundation (Fundacja Reporterów) were a consortium of investigative reporters who sent an undercover reporter called Katarzyna Pruszkiewicz to work inside a Polish troll farm.
While there, Katarzyna discovered some shocking things. People creating fake profiles, writing social media posts undermining confidence in the Polish purchase of Lockheed Martin F35 fighter jet and so on. These detail were echoed in a report published in the Investigate Europe website on the same day. Three days later Lisa Vaas, writing for the British Artificial Intelligence (A.I.) security software company Sophos, wrote almost the same article again. However, she also noted the “alleged tactics resemble those used by Russia and its infamous troll factory.”
Linking to the allegations that Russia hacked the 2016 U.S. elections, using its infamous troll factory, Lisa was seemingly right to spot a common strand running through the Guardian, Investigative Europe, her own story and the Russian troll factory claims. She just picked the wrong one.
None of them are based upon any verifiable evidence. There are no social media posts cited by Katarzyna to backup her tale. Nothing the reader can check to verify any of the claims made. All we have regarding Pruszkiewicz’ story is her word for it and all we have ‘proving’ Russian troll farm allegations are allegations.
Peter Pomerantsev, listed in the Zinc Consortium technical proposal as an Independent Consultant, was quoted in the Guardian article. Speaking about what all these unsubstantiated troll farm stories mean, he said:
“…..what it exposes is just how flimsy and ineffective our regulatory framework is.”
Peter was ‘lobbying to improve regulation’. This is a requirement of EXPOSE Network members, as stated in the FCO’s EXPOSE Network final scoping document.
There seems to be a lot of rebranding going on at the moment. Sut.am, a project of the Union of Informed Citizens UIC) in Armenia has just rebranded itself as the Fact Investigation Platform (FIP). They were listed in the EXPOSE Network scoping document as Sut.am. As a subsidiary of the UIC (members of the OIP) it seems highly likely they remain involved. As they say on their own website:
“We would like to inform you that the website has been renamed. The change is related to our new branding policy. It does not imply a change in the activity and nature of the website. Fight against disinformation and fact-checking will continue to be the objectives of the website. Hereinafter SUT.am will have the new name Fact Investigation Platform.”
What’s in a name? StopFake, also listed in the FCO’s scoping document, often publish the work of Roman Shutov calling him a journalist. Yet on his Facebook Page, he states he is also a Network Manager for the Open Information Partnership. Similarly Urve Eslas, listed in the the Zinc Network technical proposal as the Project Manager, calls herself a Network Manager for the Open Information Partnership.
The EXPOSE Network Fusion
The Fusion Doctrine is the enactment of the perpetual hybrid warfare proposed by Ronald Reagan nearly forty years ago. It deploys every sector of the state to fight the hybrid information war. In the 2018 National Security Capability Review (NSCR), then UK Prime Minister Theresa May wrote:
“….our national security is conditional……on our ability to mobilise most effectively the full range of our capabilities in concert to respond to the challenges we face…..we have agreed a new approach to the orchestration of our national security capabilities. Based on the new Fusion Doctrine…..Every part of our government and every one of our agencies has its part to play.”
The NSCR later states:
“Our international approach has entered a new era……we are using our soft power to project our values and advance UK interests….The world has become more uncertain and volatile, we are committed to deploying the full suite of our security, economic and influence capabilities to protect and promote our security, economic and influence interests”
The Fusion Doctrine’s “whole of government approach” represented a fundamental shift in the UK’s governance structure. It centralised power considerably, placing far more in the hands of senior civil servants. Especially those within the Cabinet and Prime Minister’s office.
The CDMD are funded via the Conflict, Security and Stability Fund (CSSF). Their CSSF budget allocation for the 2018/19 financial year was £20.1 Million in total, with £1 Million earmarked for Official Development Assistance (ODA) and £19.1 M allocated to Non-Official Development Assistance (Non-ODA). £2.7 M Of the Non-ODA was allocated to “engaging with audiences potentially vulnerable to disinformation.” This appears to be the bulk of the first year funding for the Network Facilitator of the EXPOSE Network.
In March 2019 the Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) issued a scathing report on the CSSF, finding it to be an opaque funding vehicle with unclear objectives, consequently unable to evidence effectiveness. It was noted that, since its inception in 2015, with annual budget of more than £1.3 billion, there was a risk that the CSSF was actually doing more harm than good. The report recommended:
“Programmes should demonstrate more clearly and carefully how they identify, manage and mitigate risks of doing harm.”
In their response to the ICAI, the UK government stated they were already working to remedy many of the highlighted problems. The CSSF works to priorities set by the UK government’s National Security Council (NSC.) The NSC are responsible for implementing the UK Strategic Defence and Security Review and the National Security Strategy that follows from it. Last reviewed in 2015.
Alex Aitken, the Executive Director for UK Government Communications and member of the UK National Security Council stated:
“Crucially, the Fusion Doctrine enshrines a place for strategic communications at the heart of national security issues……strategic communications are to be considered with the same seriousness as financial or military options.”
While military and financial threats are observable, quantifying STRATCOM threats or Kremlin disinformation rely upon subjective analysis. This means, in order to secure funding for your SRATCOM project, all you really need to do is spin information and convince elected policy makers of the danger. If the threat doesn’t exist, you can create it.
The NSC is largely a political body with various Cabinet Ministers and Committee members invited to join as appropriate, dependent upon the matter under discussion. The Chief of the Defence Staff and Heads of the Intelligence Agencies also attend when required.
The advisor to the NSC is the Permanent Secretaries Group chaired by the National Security Adviser, Mark Sedwill. He is also the current National Security Adviser to the Cabinet Office in addition to being the permanent secretary to the NSC, by virtue of being the head of the National Security Secretariat.
The EXPOSE Network, is a project of the CDMD, funded from the CSSF, which is set by the NSC. Ultimately it reports to the NSC and the National Security Secretariat headed by Mark Sedwill.
How can we possibly sum up the EXPOSE Network?
The EXPOSE Network is a transatlantic full spectrum, hybrid warfare project. It is run by the UK Government Foreign and Commonwealth Office under the direction of the Counter Disinformation and Media Development Program. It reports the analysis of harvested data back to the National Security Council who control its official budget via the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund.
Its dual purpose is firstly to infiltrate, monitor and control the media of targeted nations in order to promote the economic, political and geostrategic objectives of NATO and the European Union. Secondly, it seeks to control the western media’s news coverage of events for the same reason.
This is achieved by both control of information from its source and by manipulation of media reports via a network of embedded mainstream media journalists, infiltrated, coerced and controlled activists movements, cooperative Non governmental Organisations, global corporations, social media networks and individuals. Using the false justification of counter disinformation, it seeks out, identifies, undermines and disparages any and all who question NATO/EU policy decisions or actions. Working in partnership with search engines and social media giants it relegates unapproved information to obscurity to hide it from the public.
Its resources are not limited to official budgets and direct political oversight is limited. It partners with a huge network of global interests each seeking, both individually and collectively, to benefit from the EXPOSE Network’s capacity to influence NATO and EU policy. It is at the heart of the European Union’s STRATCOM policy and uses manipulated information to mislead, misdirect and misinform both policy makers and public alike.
Its existence is anti democratic and its activities demonstrate total disregard for the principles citizens in western democracies hold dear. If it is all it claims to be then it should not fear scrutiny. It should be as open and transparent as it promises on its single page website and genuinely engage with the public’s questions, born from the critical thinking it allegedly venerates.
Its is an immense threat to free speech and freedom of expression. Each an every one of us needs to exercise our rights, and demand the EXPOSE Network account for itself.
Well?
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I’ve just finished reading all six parts and find myself wanting to read it all again so I can get my head round the intricacies.
An amorphous blob is certainly apt as a descriptive noun/phrase for this organisation.
Thanks for writing this as its the best over view of shadow influence in the media landscape I have read.
I was wondering where all the MSM journos got hired and now I have a pretty good idea.
A disturbing read for sure
Glad you found it interesting. Yep, with the state is so deeply embedded in the media the 4th estate no longer exists in the MSM. There are a few notable exceptions but their voices are being squeezed out. Unfortunately the legislation being proposed will also marginalise the “alternative media.” We have to Lawfully fight to protect it.