

The Manchester Attack

"A gripping horror story for our times, The Manchester Attack exposes the covert state and then tears it apart."



THE MANCHESTER ATTACK

An Independent Investigation

Iain Davis

★★★★★ "Astonishing"

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INTRODUCTION

Thank you for taking the time to read this book. The information you are about to consume will not be easy to digest. You will need a strong stomach to confront some of the evidence offered herein and an open mind to consider some extremely challenging concepts.

Once you are finished with the book, you will be among the tiny minority of people who have an evidence-based appreciation of what happened—and what didn't happen—inside the foyer, also known as the City Room or the City Suite, of the Manchester Arena at approximately 22:31 hours on 22nd May 2017.

Perhaps you will arrive at the same startling conclusion I have—namely, that the so-called Manchester Arena Bombing was a hoaxed false flag. There was no bomb that exploded at the scene, and thus no one was killed or injured in the foyer that night.

Yet we are informed by representatives of the UK government and by the mainstream media that 22 people died and hundreds more were injured when a 22-year-old Islamist terrorist named Salman Abedi detonated a shrapnel-laden TATP suicide bomb inside the City Room that evening seven years ago. To question the official narrative, as this book unashamedly does, is said to be unthinkable, if not unconscionable.

Faced with such an uncomfortable paradox, you may find yourself left with more questions than answers. There is nothing wrong with that. No one should ever be afraid to ask questions, especially of one's government.

Alas, most of the UK populace—our relatives, friends, and neighbours—believe the official Manchester Arena account. Many say it is obscene to doubt or discount it. They argue that to question it is to disparage the memory of those who lost their lives. They even consider the journey you are about to embark on by reading this book a disgusting betrayal of the victims and their families.

Yet, despite their attempts to dismiss you, the actual physical evidence clearly reveals that the officially sanctioned story about events in the City Room that night is simply not true. It is not only improbable, but it is impossible.

What's more, there is no merit to the moral objections raised by the official story's avid defendants, who appear to be intent on stopping us from examining the crucial evidence.

Perhaps you're asking yourself: What is the morally right thing to do? Should I even start to question an event where so many people were said to have been killed and badly injured? If so, then please consider this analogy.

Imagine you are the sole witness to a man committing a murder. You see he is wearing a red coat. You notice another man, who is wearing a blue coat, also present at the scene. The murderer flees. The police arrive and arrest the man in the blue coat. He is tried for murder, a jury convicts him, and a judge sentences him to serve a long prison term.

The victim's bereaved relatives, convinced by the seemingly solid evidence presented at the trial, are satisfied with the verdict. They finally feel closure and are relieved that the guilty, blue-coated man has been brought to justice.

But you have seen contradictory evidence with your own eyes, and you firmly believe the man wearing the red coat was the real murderer. You are as certain as anyone can be that the guilty, red-coated man has gotten away with his crime. You are dismayed that an innocent man was imprisoned for a crime he didn't commit—and that justice has not been served for the victim and his family.

If you raise any objections, you will unavoidably cause emotional distress to the bereaved. You will reopen deep wounds that have only just started to heal. Many people will be offended if you raise your concerns. No one will thank you for bringing out the evidence which shows that the man in the red coat, not the man wearing blue, murdered the victim.

The victim's family and friends will accuse you of callous disregard for the loss they suffered. The mainstream journalists, who all reported the wicked crime of the blue-coated man, will attack you for your arrogant, even cruel, disrespect.

The authorities will vilify you—or, worse, threaten your livelihood, even your freedom—for bringing their judicial process into question. You will be shunned, marginalised, and lambasted by all.

Does any of that change the evidence you saw? Will you be sufficiently cowed to let an injustice to prevail? If so, are you showing respect to the

memory of the victim by passively allowing the real murderer to remain free?

Now let's consider the same scenario again. But this time, although you are just as certain about the evidence you saw, you are wrong. The blue-coated man *did* commit the murder, but your view of the crime was physically restricted.

From your vantage point, it looked like the man wearing red stabbed the victim to death, when, in fact, he was *defending* the slain man against the murderous lunges of the man in blue. You are mistaken, yet you remain convinced by the evidence you saw. You honestly believe the man wearing blue is innocent and the man in red the killer.

Does the fact that you are wrong alter your moral responsibility? Is your misplaced certainty a moral deficiency? If you speak out and say what you saw, does your error imply that you disrespect the memory of the victim and the loss suffered by the bereaved? Are you lying?

Do others have a legitimate, moral right to stop you from pointing toward the evidence you saw because they think you are wrong? Is their certainty so unshakable that it should never be challenged? Should your arguments be ignored, your concerns dismissed, and your ostensible evidence buried and left unexamined simply because the vast majority despise you for questioning what they consider the truth?

Regardless of whether your account is true or false, if you believe the evidence your own eyes saw, what is the morally right thing to do?

Our examination of the Manchester Arena evidence is not undertaken because we don't care about lives apparently lost. On the contrary, we think the evidence shows us that an injustice has occurred. The offence that some will probably take is regrettable but perhaps inevitable. Offence taken is not evidence of anything.

This book sets out to show that the Manchester Arena events are equivalent to the first scenario depicted above: the man in blue was not the murderer and the story we have been told about *what happened inside the foyer* is false. Although we cannot identify the man in red—the perpetrator of the Manchester hoax—we may have our suspicions.

But more important than pointing the finger at this culprit or that culprit, this book has been written in the hope that, one day, all the evidence relating to the Manchester Arena bombing will be tested and justice will finally be

served. Justice not only for the victims and their families—however painful reopening wounds may be—but for all of us who care about the truth and oppose deception.

The term “the state” is used extensively throughout this book. In common usage, it is a proper noun meaning “a country or its government.” That is not how it is used in this book.

“The state” is used by the author to describe the external use of constitutional social power. The use of “the state,” in this context, implies that the people do not govern themselves. Instead, a small group of elitists, having awarded themselves some form of constitutional title or position, claim to have sole sovereignty. That is, they assert their claimed constitutional right to rule over all others.

“The state” is not limited to the government. Rather, it is a public-private partnership between the government, the establishment, and the epistemic authorities. All these terms will be clarified in short order.

The book is dedicated to investigative journalist Richard D. Hall. He is the only journalist to have put his name to the reporting of most of the evidence presented in these pages. We will add some more evidence and will explore other relevant issues. But without the inquiring, enterprising, scrutinizing research of Richard D. Hall, we probably wouldn't have asked any questions about the Manchester Arena event in the first place.

Hall's own story has now become intertwined with the official narrative, though not because Hall chose to insert himself into the state's account. Rather, he is intertwined because we cannot examine the evidence showing what happened inside the City Room that night without considering what subsequently happened to the man who first reported it. The persecution of Richard D. Hall is part of the evidence we must consider if we genuinely want to understand what happened.

Ultimately, dear reader, it is up to neither this book's author nor the state nor anyone else to decide for you what happened in the City Room at approximately 22.31 on 22nd May 2017. That responsibility lies solely and squarely with you.

All any of us can do is examine the evidence we have at our disposal. All of it is in the public domain. None of it is hidden. It simply needs to be seen instead of ignored.

But just looking at the evidence is not enough. We need to think critically about what we see, hear, and read. As Richard D. Hall wisely observes at the end of every video report he offers to the public:

Believe none of what you hear and only half of what you see.

CHAPTER 1: The Manchester Arena Bombing

We are going to examine the observable physical evidence of what happened inside the foyer, otherwise known as the City Room or City Suite, of the Manchester Arena at approximately 22:31 on the 22nd May 2017. This moment in history is commonly referred to as the Manchester Arena bombing.

Before presenting the evidence, though, we first need to address a number of important issues affecting our ability to speak freely about that very evidence.

Unfortunately, we do not live in a society that permits us to openly express evidence-based concerns. Doing so often leads to unjustified repercussions. Irrational objections are raised and illegitimate accusations levelled against us when we publicly question official state narratives.

Regrettably, our right to exercise free speech is no longer respected nor valued as a democratic ideal. Thus, it is necessary for us to first expose the censorious state and denounce the unwarranted accusations it makes before we can proceed to discuss the evidence.

As you read, please take note: I have largely refrained from adding adjectives like "allegedly" and "supposedly" and "said to be" so as not to interfere with the official interpretation of events. Also, I am making a point of highlighting the number "22"—for reasons that will become clear later—by keeping "22" in numerals but, by contrast, writing out, in letters, all other numbers, except dates and times and ages, below 100.

The official Manchester Arena bombing narrative initially asserted the following as "fact."

On 22nd of May 2017, 22 people were killed and fifty-nine injured by 22-year-old Islamist terrorist Salman Abedi, who committed suicide when he detonated his TATP (triacetone triperoxide) backpack bomb at precisely 22.31.00. The bomb detonated just after Ariana Grande ended her set following the conclusion of her 22nd song.

In descending order of age, the 22 deceased victims were: Jane Twedde (51), Wendy Fawell (50), Michelle Kiss (45), Alison Howe (44), Lisa Lees (43), Elaine Mclver (43), Marcin Klis (42), Angelika Klis (39), Kelly Brewster (32), Philip Tron (32), Martyn Hett (29), John Atkinson (28), Liam Curry

(19), Courtney Boyle (19), Georgina Callander (18), Chloe Rutherford (17), Olivia Campbell-Hardy (15), Megan Hurley (15), Eilidh MacLeod (14), Mary Nell Jones (14), Sorrell Leczkowski (14), and Saffie-Rose Roussos (8).

Right after the event, fifty-nine people were reportedly injured. Among those struck by a bomb blast and shrapnel were Ruth Murrell and Martin Hibbert and his daughter Eve. Martin Hibbert was struck by 22 pieces of shrapnel.

But by 2018, the number of people who said they were injured had climbed from fifty-nine to more than 800. The majority suffered injury in the panicked stampede from the Arena. Among the vastly expanded list of injured were people psychologically traumatised either by what they witnessed or by what they experienced in and around the Arena that night.

Other than those deceased or dying, no more than thirty-eight survivors were left in the City Room after Salman Abedi detonated his suicide bomb. None of the civilians injured that night outside the foyer entered or re-entered that room after the bomb exploded.

In the immediate aftermath of the bombing, the only evidence offered to substantiate the official story—which nearly all of Britain accepts—was provided by what many people call the mainstream media (MSM).

Throughout this book we will refer to the MSM as the "legacy media" to distinguish the term from the "independent media." The Urban Dictionary defines legacy media^[1] this way:

The legacy media are part of the established, elite "Old Guard" of publishing and broadcasting in media. Legacy media groups are corporate owned. A handful of corporations own the bulk of the legacy media, or mainstream media, that is consumed daily by the public.

The legacy media stand in contrast to the genuine "independent media"—sometimes called alternative or alt media. According to the Civil Liberties Union for Europe:^[2]

Independent journalism, also called independent media, refers to any news media that is free from influence by the government or other external sources like corporations or influential people. This includes television, newspapers, radio and online journalism.

The UK's "established, elite Old Guard" legacy media, per the Urban Dictionary, represent the UK establishment.^[3]

The term "the establishment" was first coined in 1955 by journalist Henry Fairlie Hose to describe "[not] only the centres of official power—though they are certainly part of it—but rather the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised."

The UK legacy media often refer to themselves as "independent media," but they are by no stretch of the imagination independent! A handful of global corporations^[4] own and control legacy journalism, and the UK government oversees and regulates the information and news it reports.

Both the online and broadcast legacy media are regulated by UK state regulator Ofcom. Ofcom is also the "independent" regulator overseeing application of the UK government's Online Safety Act.^[5]

Ofcom is "directly accountable" to UK Parliament,^[6] is funded by many of the media corporations it currently regulates, and is "sponsored" by the UK Department of Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), among other government agencies and departments.

Ofcom board's declared register of interests^[7] reveals that, of its forty members (spread between Ofcom's executive, content and advisory boards), eleven have either former or current professional or financial ties to the BBC. And twenty-six of them are either currently or were formerly in government roles.

Other corporate interests represented by Ofcom board members include Google, GlaxoSmithKline (via the Wellcome Trust), Akamai (the global cybersecurity and content hosting giant), Sky, ITV, Channel 4, numerous media consultancy firms, and other commercial enterprises, all of whom stand to profit from favourable Ofcom "regulations."

Despite its protestations, Ofcom is not remotely independent from either the government or the corporate interests it purportedly regulates.

Unlike the independent media, which is almost entirely funded^[8] by reader and audience donations, the legacy online and broadcast media—overseen, as we've said, by Ofcom—are funded either directly, by virtue of government authority, or by corporate or government advertising. During the years of the pseudopandemic^[9]—or the Covid-19 global pandemic, as some choose to call it—the UK government emerged as the UK legacy media's leading advertiser.^[10]

Ofcom likes to call legacy media state broadcasters Public Service Broadcasters^[11] (PSB). The UK state broadcasters are those that provide

Channel 3 services (ITV, STV and UTV), the BBC, Channel 4, Channel 5, and S4C. While all state broadcasters are licensed by the state and regulated by Ofcom, all but the BBC are run on a solely commercial basis.

Like the real independent media, commercial state broadcasters need to generate revenue by carrying advertising. Unlike the independent media, however, the state license attracts way more corporate advertisers and institutional investors. The profit made by state media comes at the cost of regulation and control.

Take one example: state licensing lends weight to ITV plc's investor proposition.^[12] This entices investors to put their capital "in a trusted brand safe environment."

ITV plc's major shareholders^[13] include Vanguard and SEI. These global investment firms enable institutional investors, global "philanthropists," and other wealthy private investors to finance ITV's programming.

The ITV plc media "ecosystem" now offers a subscription-generating online streaming service called ITVX. This has boosted its advertising revenue,^[14] thus maximising its investors' return on investment (ROI).

As part of its commitment to investors, ITV plc states:^[15]

News is an important driver of viewing and our ITV News proposition is now fully embedded within ITVX, with News streaming hours up 20% year-on-year and we have launched exclusive 90-second ITV News bulletins, a new News category page on the service and regional short and long-form catch up. [. . .] To optimise Broadcast and maintain our USP [Unique Selling Proposition] of delivering mass audiences for advertisers, we will continue to invest in live content, such as [. . .] news.

It may seem pedantic to define such basic words as "news" and "journalism," but it is important to be very clear.

The word "news" means^[16] "information or reports about recent events." The word "journalism" means^[17] "the work of collecting, writing, and publishing news stories and articles in newspapers and magazines or broadcasting them on the radio and television."

ITV plc is a global investment opportunity where "news" is offered as a product. The journalism it produces needs to drive viewing figures and maximise its global investors' ROI. Its Channel 3 service, ITV, is regulated

by the state, via Ofcom, yet it benefits financially from this relationship with its supposedly unbiased, apolitical regulator.

Quite obviously, then, there is a huge conflict of private financial and multinational corporate interest at the heart of ITV plc's news reports. As a state broadcaster, it has a vested interest in maintaining its good standing with the state and its regulator.

None of this is acknowledged by Ofcom. Instead, it claims:

Public service broadcasting (PSB) has a long and proud tradition in the UK, delivering impartial and trusted news.

There is nothing "impartial" about state broadcasters like ITV. They are extremely unlikely to challenge state narratives to any significant extent. Nor are they likely to report anything that damages relationships with their global investors. The notion they are impartial and can be "trusted" is patently absurd.

A state media regulator's suggestion that we should "trust" state broadcasters is nothing more than empty rhetoric. True, it does not follow that state broadcasters' news coverage is inevitably biased or inaccurate. Nonetheless, we should all exercise due diligence before we automatically "trust" it.

The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) has an even closer relationship than does ITV plc with the UK state and its establishment.

The first claim in the BBC's mission statement^[18] is that it provides "impartial news and information to help people understand and engage with the world around them." The statement adds:

Trust is the foundation of the BBC. We're independent, impartial and honest.

The Oxford English Dictionary^[19] definition of "trust" is:

Firm belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of someone or something. [. . .] Acceptance of the truth of a statement without evidence or investigation.

The "trust" the BBC demands from its readers, listeners, and viewers is not based on thorough investigations of the evidence or objective reporting of the facts or balanced opinion—none of which is visible to this author. Rather, the BBC beseeches us to have faith in it as an organisation simply because it is the BBC.

The BBC is governed by Royal Charter.^[20] The Charter is full of promises about BBC independence, fairness, and impartiality. The question is: Who judges that "impartiality"?

Appointments to the "independent" BBC board are controlled by the Secretary of State for the Department for Digital, Media, Culture and Sport (DCMS). The UK foreign secretary also sets BBC objectives by stipulating annual reporting requirements. The Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland ministers are likewise "consulted."

Unlike its purely commercial state broadcaster counterparts, the BBC also receives revenue from the TV license fee. In its latest financial report,^[21] the BBC recorded income of approximately £3.8Bn from the license fee and a generated income of about £2.1Bn from its additional commercial activities. These ventures included the licensing of its intellectual property, the supply of production facilities to commercial media partners, and advertising revenue earned through its three commercial subsidiaries: BBC Studios, BBC Global News, and BBC Studio networks.

The license fee, providing more than 64 percent of the BBC's budget, is agreed to by the Secretary of State under the "Communications (Television Licensing) Regulations 2004." Obviously, the political establishment is literally the hand that feeds the BBC.

It is ridiculous to suggest the BBC is "independent." It is a state-run, state-managed broadcaster. Therefore, it is an overtly political organisation that very clearly serves the interests of the UK state. As for its claim to be "impartial and honest," well, given that the BBC is certainly not impartial, it evidently isn't honest either.

Most of the print legacy media runs at a loss.^[22] Supposed stalwarts of the UK media landscape, such as The Guardian, have all had to downsize considerably in their efforts to stay afloat.^[23] As a result, UK print news media now relies more on cut and paste journalism, or churnalism,^[24] than on investigative journalism or independent analysis of events.

In 2018, the independent Media Standards Trust found the BBC, The Telegraph, The Independent, The Guardian, and others, were simply taking government and news agency press releases and either cutting and pasting them directly into articles or running them through text spinners to at least give the impression of journalism while actually reporting little more than "churn."

This process further centralises control of news into the hands of a few global news agencies who feed stories to the wider legacy media via "newswires." The US-based Associated Press (AP), the French Agence France-Presse (AFP), and Reuters in London provide the bulk of the "press releases" that are then disseminated globally^[25] in countries around the world by national legacy media outlets.

Sad to say, the idea of an independent, pluralistic Western legacy media, free from government and corporate control and able to question power, is now an antiquated myth. Some stragglers, perhaps psychologically incapable of letting go, still cling to the myth.

In sum, the legacy media is little more than a tightly controlled state-aligned corporate propaganda machine.

It is no wonder the legacy media has been in decline for years.^[26] Consumers increasingly turn to online news. State broadcasters such as the BBC and Channel 4^[27] have been losing UK viewers by the millions.^[28]

As the independent media has chipped away at the state control of information, governments around the globe are growing ever more worried.

One of these governmental entities is the global intergovernmental organisation that calls itself the United Nations. The UN labels reports of information it doesn't approve of "fake news" or "misinformation" or "disinformation."

Here, the UN reveals the depth of its concern^[29] over its ability to maintain its control of information:

Information is the engine of development in the 20th and 21st century. This is fuelled by independent news media that can act as a trusted guardian of public interest. [. . .] But recent developments have put journalism under fire. Political, technological, economic and social transformations are inexorably reshaping the communications landscape and raising many questions about the quality, impact and credibility of journalism.

When the UN speaks of "independent news media" acting as "the trusted guardian of public interest," it is referring to the legacy media—not to the real independent media. Regardless of its claims, the UN isn't remotely concerned about the quality of journalism. Instead, it is deathly afraid of losing control of the narrative.

The UN's concern is transparent in its 2022 Information Mapping Report.^[30]

Access to quality information plays a critical role in public trust, democracy, peace and social cohesion. [. . .] As information becomes more accessible, it also becomes more open to influences from non-traditional actors in the infosphere — in most contexts anyone can create and disseminate information. As a consequence, the traditional actors and gatekeepers of information and news — established media and government institutions — are struggling to compete with this new reality.

The legacy media are the established "gatekeepers of information and news" whose role it is to maintain "public trust" in "government institutions." The legacy media and government are partners in this endeavour.

The genuine independent media, according to the UN, are the "non-traditional actors" who are polluting the "infosphere" by reporting information that undermines the cohesive churnalism given to us by the legacy media gatekeepers.

This upheaval and overturning by the upstart media is causing much consternation among governments the world over. Truth, objectivity, and accurate reporting of evidence do not appear to interest them in the least.

In the days and weeks that followed the Manchester Arena bombing, an official narrative was carefully constructed by the entire UK legacy media. It was fixed almost instantaneously and has changed little since.

At approximately 07.15 in the morning on 23rd May 2017, less than nine hours after the bomb reportedly detonated inside the City Room, the BBC provided the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing.

It said that a 23-year-old male detonated a suicide bomb in the City Room, killing 22 and injuring fifty-nine at 22.35 approximately. The [BBC stated](#):^[31]

Greater Manchester Police said the lone male attacker, who died in the blast, was carrying an improvised explosive device which he detonated. [. . .] The explosion happened in the arena's foyer shortly after the concert ended, close to the entrance to Victoria train and tram station.

Other than the fact that the alleged bomber, Salman Abedi, was 22 and, according to the official narrative, committed suicide at 22:31:00, this is pretty much the same version of events we are still being told to accept.

As we've just discussed, the BBC has considerable resources. It has many police contacts, paid informants, and local journalists it can deploy rapidly

anywhere in the country. Thus, if the BBC's account of the bombing is true, it is perfectly feasible that a BBC news crew could have nailed down the known facts very quickly.

If, on the other hand, the account is a lie, we must ask why the BBC was among the legacy media outlets pushing that lie from the very beginning.

Within twenty hours^[32] of the reported bombing, the BBC claimed to know the identity of the bomber and the details of three of the deceased victims: Saffie-Rose Roussos (8), Georgina Callander (18), and John Atkinson (28).

Correcting its earlier minor errors, the BBC reported that Salman Abedi was of Libyan descent, that he was 22 (not 23) years old, and that the shrapnel bomb, packed with nuts, bolts and screws, had supposedly exploded "shortly after 22:30."

The BBC also said:

Several people are still missing, including teenagers Laura MacIntyre and Eilidh MacLeod, from Barra in the Outer Hebrides, 15-year-old Olivia Campbell, Chloe Rutherford, 17, and Liam Curry, 19.

Sadly, of these missing people, we now know that only Laura MacIntyre reportedly survived.

The political establishment, like the BBC, knew what had happened almost immediately. At 06:36, just eight hours after the attack, the government published the statement of then-UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd:^[33]

This was a barbaric attack, deliberately targeting some of the most vulnerable in our society – young people and children out at a pop concert. [. . .] The great city of Manchester has been affected by terrorism before. Its spirit was not bowed; its community continued. This time it has been a particular attack on the most vulnerable in our society – its intention was to sow fear – its intention is to divide. But it will not succeed.

Again, given her role, it is not unreasonable that the home secretary would know that this was a terrorist attack and that a child and teenagers were killed. In light of what we now know about the investigation that night, it seems at least possible that Amber Rudd already knew Salman Abedi was the purported suicide bomber.

That is, assuming the story was true. If it was false, was the home secretary duped? Or was she part of the deception? Amber Rudd resigned less than a year later in the wake of the Windrush Scandal.^[34]

Rudd's early morning statement was followed, approximately twelve hours after the Manchester Arena bombing, with an official announcement from then-UK Prime Minister Theresa May.^[35]

It is now beyond doubt that the people of Manchester, and of this country, have fallen victim to a callous terrorist attack – an attack that targeted some of the youngest people in our society with cold calculation. [. . .] This was among the worst terrorist incidents we have ever experienced in the United Kingdom [. . .] and the worst ever to hit the north of England. [. . .] We now know that a single terrorist detonated his improvised explosive device. [. . .] All acts of terrorism are cowardly attacks on innocent people, but this attack stands out for its appalling, sickening cowardice – deliberately targeting innocent, defenceless children and young people. [. . .] I can tell you that in addition to the attacker, 22 people have died and fifty-nine people have been injured. The police and the emergency services [. . .] acted in accordance with the plans they have in place and the exercises they conduct to test those plans. [. . .] A large cordon [is] in place around Manchester Arena and Victoria Station, which will be in place for some time. The station is closed and will remain closed while a detailed forensic search is underway. [. . .] [T]he general election campaign has been suspended.

So, there we have it.

Within a few hours, the UK government told the nation that 22-year-old Salman Abedi was the terrorist who detonated his suicide bomb inside the City Room foyer of Manchester Arena and that he murdered 22 innocent men women and children and injured another fifty-nine.

This was reported to the nation and the world by the UK legacy media. And yet these gatekeepers of information and news had investigated *nothing*. They offered no evidence, beyond official statements, to substantiate *anything* they reported. They simply took state press releases and unquestioningly churned them out to a public who accepted the whole narrative as true.

From the morning of the 23rd May 2017, the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing was set in stone. Years of subsequent

investigation, trials, official reports, a public inquiry, and countless legacy media news stories would add considerable detail. But the essential official story, telling us what happened inside the City Room, would never be questioned again.

On that morning seven years ago, most of the verbiage spouted by the political class rang hollow. For instance, we were told that attempts to divide us wouldn't succeed and that fear wouldn't control us. And yet we were simultaneously informed that the government had cancelled national election campaigning as a direct response to the alleged terrorist attack.

Not only were we spoon-fed this authoritarian-style narrative, even the moral arguments for how we should regard the bombing were spelled out for us. Any doubts we may have expressed were rendered unacceptable. We were reminded again and again this was a "barbaric attack" that stood out for its "appalling, sickening cowardice – deliberately targeting innocent, defenceless children and young people."

If the story is true, then the callous barbarity of the terrorist attack is unquestionable. If it is false, then descriptions of horror only serve as a defence mechanism for the official account. Either way, the emotional impact of the narrative should never be an impediment to seeking the truth.

Those who dared to question anything we were told to believe were accused of committing an act of gross disrespect to murdered people and their grieving families. Doubt was considered tantamount to a defence of terrorism. What sort of sick freak would ever do such a thing?

Consequently, everyone believed the story they were given—not because they had any evidence to inform their opinion but because the state-controlled legacy media was reporting a tragic, heart-wrenching tale of a despicable crime that had inflicted unimaginable loss and suffering.

People believed then—and still believe—what they were told about *what happened* inside the City Room that night precisely because they have not looked at the observable physical evidence themselves.

Apparently, the news gatekeepers have looked at none of the physical evidence either. If they have made the effort to look, none of them have reported what the physical evidence actually shows.

Unless they have accessed the subsequent work of the independent journalist Richard D. Hall, who was the only investigative journalist to put his name to the reporting of the observable physical evidence, the public

and the establishment journalists still don't know what the real evidence is—and, worse, most aren't even aware it exists.

Both the general population and the legacy media have decided that they know what happened based not on any actual evidence but on two logical fallacies. The first is called "appeal to emotion," the second "appeal to authority."

Appeal to emotion:^[36]

An appeal to emotion is a type of argument or rhetorical technique that attempts to arouse the emotions of its audience in order to gain acceptance of a conclusion or bring about a change in behaviour. Such an appeal is fallacious when emotion bypasses or overwhelms the audience's reason, leading to irrational beliefs or behaviour.

Appeal to authority:^[37]

Appeal to authority, or *argumentum ad verecundiam*, is a form of argument in which the opinion of an influential figure [or acknowledged expert] is used as evidence to support an argument. The argument from authority is a logical fallacy and obtaining knowledge in this way is fallible.

Remember Prime Minister May's statement a few hours after the bombing? What she said at least told us something closer to the evident reality:

The police and the emergency services [. . .] acted in accordance with the plans they have in place and the exercises they conduct to test those plans.

In the upcoming chapters, we will examine the physical evidence that exposes what happened inside the City Room. As Theresa May's words seemed to indicate, our appreciation of the actual evidence might lead us to agree with the ultimate conclusion reported by Richard D. Hall:

The event was far more consistent with a staged attack than it was with a real terrorist attack where people were injured and died.

Note on Sources

Some of the cited references are to relatively lengthy reports, books, videos, audio recordings and other documents. Therefore, where appropriate, a link to one reference may be repeated. A different reference number will given to indicate to the reader the specific context in which the reference is cited.

Many of the key video, audio and other documents have been archived at the following links:

Barr footage, BBC footage, and Ruth Murrell Video: - <https://archive.org/details/jbplus-rm>
Bickerstaff Video: - <https://archive.org/details/bickerstaff-video>
External Video: - <https://archive.org/details/manc-panic>
Ruth Murrell Video: - https://archive.org/details/rm-video_202402
The movements of Michelle Kiss: - <https://archive.org/details/victim-movements>
Police Chatter Audio: - <https://archive.org/details/police-chatter>
Emergency Response: - <https://archive.org/details/emergency-response>
CCTV Redactions: - <https://archive.org/details/redactions>
Operation Manteline Video: - <https://archive.org/details/arena-damage>
Evidence of pyrotechnics: - <https://archive.org/details/Pyrotechnics>
The movements of Salman Abedi: - https://archive.org/details/movements_202406
Possible intelligence operatives: - https://archive.org/details/intelligence_202406
Audi pursuit: - https://archive.org/details/audi_20240613
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Richard D. Hall’s legal documents: - <https://www.richplanet.net/legaldocuments.php>
Kerslake Report: -
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Chapter 1: Sources

- [1] - <https://archive.ph/0qicK>
- [2] - <https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/independent-journalism/43789>
- [3] - <https://archive.ph/6P4EF>
- [4] - <https://archive.ph/hqIuI>
- [5] - <https://web.archive.org/web/20220307235542/https://www.ofcom.org.uk/about-ofcom/latest/features-and-news/ofcom-to-regulate-harmful-content-online>
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- [36] - <https://archive.ph/tETmD>
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Chapter 2: What Information Pollution?

Thanks to the investigative journalism of Richard D. Hall, we are now aware of the evidence that shows the Manchester Arena bombing was, in all likelihood, a hoaxed false flag.

The legacy media, led by the BBC, has responded to Hall's work by telling the British public that he is a “conspiracy theorist.”

Hall published his book and online documentary of the same name, *Manchester: The Night of the Bang*,^[1] in May 2020.

The BBC was already aware of Hall's journalistic endeavours at the time.

In 2019, then-Labour front bencher Barry Gardiner MP held Richard D. Hall's DVD on the Jo Cox assassination^[2] in his hand and waved it aloft in front of a national television audience. Gardiner misled the British public by inferring that a letter he read aloud—allegedly penned by someone he labelled “far right”—was written by Hall. That wasn't true.

Although the BBC knew of Hall's investigations into both the Cox murder and the Manchester Arena bombing, it didn't seek him out for an interview until more than two years after he published the Manchester hoax evidence. On 10th August 2022, the BBC assigned its first-ever social media and specialist disinformation correspondent, Marianna Spring, to email an interview request^[3] to Hall. Spring wrote:

I am getting in touch about speaking to you for an upcoming documentary & podcast series, which we're aiming to broadcast in a few months' time.

Believing the BBC to be a propaganda arm of the state, Hall declined the interview. But the BBC team continued to pursue Hall, who repeatedly asked them to desist. On 7th October 2022, the BBC doorstepped Hall at his indoor market stall. There, in public, Marianna Spring levelled numerous allegations against him. Here's a sampling:

Do you understand the harm that this can cause to the victims who are the survivors of these attacks who are at the heart of [your] theories, who are being targetted? [. . .] Is there anything I can say that will make you trust me? [. . .] You're profiting from the worst day of these people's lives [. . .] How does that make you feel?

Just a couple of weeks after this confrontation, on 24th October, the BBC aired a podcast series called "Disaster Trolls." This was followed, on 31st October, by an accompanying BBC Panorama documentary titled "Disaster Deniers." In both the podcast series and the documentary, Hall was accused of "harming" the Manchester victims. Unsurprisingly, neither presentation reported any of the relevant Manchester Arena evidence Hall had unearthed.

In December 2022, four months after the BBC first contacted Hall, lawyers for two of the reported Manchester Arena victims, Martin and Eve Hibbert, sent a [letter before claim](#)^[4] to Richard D. Hall, informing him of their intention to sue him for harassment and General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) breaches.

The Hibberts' legal team formally notified Hall of the High Court claim lodged against him in May 2023, approximately nine months after the BBC first contacted Hall.

But by that time, Hall was already aware that the claim had been filed. He was informed that the case had been lodged, not by the claimants or their legal representatives, but by the BBC. Marianna Spring wrote an email to Hall on 31st March 2023 informing him "Mr Hibbert's legal team have told us they have now filed a claim against you."

Following the BBC's evident campaign against Hall, the rest of the legacy media piled on. The UK Daily Mail, describing Hall as "twisted" and as "Britain's sickest man," [accused](#)^[5] Hall of being "a conspiracy theorist who claims that the Manchester terror attack did not happen."

The UK Guardian chimed in: "Survivors of the Manchester Arena bombing have launched a legal action against a conspiracy theorist who has falsely claimed the attack was faked."

Presumably, the Guardian is among the legacy media outlets to have examined all the evidence, thus enabling it to ascertain Hall's claims are "false." The Guardian did not report any of Hall's evidence to its readers.

A year later, again referring to Hall, the BBC wrote this incorrect headline:

Manchester Arena attack survivors win case against conspiracy theorist

Meanwhile, the Times asserted:

A conspiracy theorist [. . .] claimed that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoax. [. . .] After the BBC flagged up Hall's videos, YouTube removed his channel but some content can still be found in archive pages. [. . .] In 2020 he released a film and book about the Manchester bombing, which killed 22 people, suggesting that Salman Abedi, an Islamic state fanatic, was not behind the attack. Hall claims that the incident might have been a "stage-managed exercise involving scores of enlisted participants."

None of these legacy media stories reported any of the evidence Hall had presented to substantiate his theories. Instead, they scrupulously avoided the evidence and dismissed Hall by labelling him a "conspiracy theorist."

By not informing their readers about the reams of evidence Hall had doggedly accumulated and meticulously reported on, the legacy media were clearly inviting consumers of their news product to form an opinion about him, based on nothing more than the label "conspiracy theorist."

What does the term "conspiracy theorist" infer? What do we think is implied when the gatekeepers of information and news call anyone a "conspiracy theorist"?

The state-orchestrated false flag terror attack is a very difficult concept for many people to grasp. The implications are simply too far beyond belief for the majority to accept.

To acknowledge false flag terrorism is to concede that the state is willing to kill its own citizens—or equally innocent citizens of another country—to achieve various political objectives. Understandably, most people either can't or don't want to acknowledge this.

Unfortunately, history is littered with numerous examples of obvious state-run false flag operations. It has been proven that governments have killed both their own military personnel and their own civilians for political ends. In addition, governments have launched assaults in other countries, using either their own military or non-state proxy forces of some kind, but have covered their actions by blaming the attack on another state or non-state actor.

A false flag operation can be defined as^[6] an "act committed with the intent of disguising the actual source of responsibility and pinning blame on another party."

It seems likely the term “false flag” originated with the 16th-century naval warfare tactic of flying “false colours.” The attacking vessel would approach the targeted ship under a friendly flag. Shortly before launching the assault on the unprepared victim, the aggressor would hoist its “true colours.” The raising of true colours immediately prior to launching the assault was necessary to meet the minimum legal standards of naval warfare at the time.

Modern use of the term “false flag” is inseparable from propaganda and is highly politicised. For example, the Encyclopaedia Britannica defines “false flag” as follows:^[7]

False flag: harmful, often militant, event or action that is designed to appear as though perpetrated by someone other than the person or group responsible for it. [. . .] Because false flag operations are usually covert, the concept of false flag has often been co-opted by conspiracy theorists to explain away tragedies that challenge their values or worldview.

This is a political definition. Those who report the evidence of a false flag conspiracy are called conspiracy theorists. What are the values of these so-called conspiracy theorists? What is their worldview? Does such a defined group of people even exist? We will consider these questions carefully in due course.

Covert means “hidden or secret.” The aforementioned encyclopaedia definition acknowledges that false flags are covert but then claims that the people who research, analyse, and report on the evidence that potentially exposes these covert operations are “conspiracy theorists.”

It is ironic that these very individuals are often the historians, political scientists, and investigative journalists who examine and report the evidence exposing false flag operations to the public. “Conspiracy realist” or “conspiracy analyst” would be a more accurate label if one must be applied.

If we were to correct the second clause in the above Britannica definition, it would read:

Because false flag operations are usually covert, governments avoid acknowledging their own false flags by labelling those who report evidence of such an operation “conspiracy theorists.”

If you, dear reader, question the logic or legitimacy of my interpretation, then, before you dismiss it, let's explore the information environment within which today's term "conspiracy theorist" is firmly planted.

The United Nations (UN), the world's preeminent intergovernmental organisation and the seat of global governance, has introduced us to the frankly bizarre concept of "information pollution":

Information pollution is affecting the citizens' capacity to make informed decisions. Disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation together with the growth of hate speech and propaganda, especially online, are inciting social divisions and creating mistrust in public institutions.

The notion that information can be polluted is absurd. Information is either true or false. If we exercise critical thinking^[9] and apply it to all information that crosses our radar, then it doesn't make much difference whether the information is true or false. Using our critical thinking, we can determine its truth or falsity for ourselves.

A critical thinker never needs to be told by so-called authorities whether information is true or false. We should beware anyone who demands that we trust a certain information source and that we *not* trust another information source. They are attempting to deny and control our individual sovereignty, our agency, and our right to hold and voice our own opinions and beliefs.

Thus, "information pollution," as defined by the UN,^[9] has nothing to do with "citizens' capacity to make informed decisions." Quite the opposite. It is a deceptive rhetorical device designed to persuade us that we should trust *only* official sources and distrust our own research, intuition, reason, judgement, and critical thinking skills. According to the UN, information that undermines "trust" in it or in other official sources or that challenges the claims of the epistemic authorities—we'll expand on who the epistemic authorities are shortly—is called "information pollution."

From this description we can see—and feel—the global authorities' palpable fear of losing control of the narrative. That fear is what drives UN member states to protect and prop up their own country's legacy media, who act as gatekeepers of official information and news. Indeed, in each nation-state the legacy media's primary role is to be stenographers by dutifully and unthinkingly reporting official press releases. In so doing, the

legacy media either maintain or rebuild trust in the establishment and its institutions.

Bent on re-establishing control of information, the UN is currently attempting to define the meaning, the importance, and the efficacy of every piece of news that reaches us.

Hence, in the UN lexicon:

DISINFORMATION is "information that is false and deliberately created to harm a person, social group, organization or country."

MISINFORMATION is "information that is false, but not created with the intention of causing harm."

MALINFORMATION is "information that is based on real facts, but manipulated to inflict harm on a person, organization or country."

HATE SPEECH is "any kind of communication in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language about a person or a group based on who they are. [. . .]"

The Cambridge Online Dictionary offers further definitions for us to consider.

FAKE NEWS is "false stories that appear to be news, spread on the internet or using other media, usually created to influence political views or as a joke."

CONSPIRACY is "the activity of secretly planning with other people to do something bad or illegal."

THEORY means "ideas that are suggested to explain a fact or event."

CONSPIRACY THEORY, therefore, is "a belief that an event or situation is the result of a secret plan made by powerful people."

It is notable that Cambridge University Press has introduced the concept of "secrecy" into its definition of conspiracy theory. By describing something as "secret," Cambridge is suggesting that it is impossible for people not in on the secret—you and me—to decipher it. But the fact that plenty of conspiracies have come to light means that, far from being secret, they are known—discernible and decipherable.

Interestingly, the word "secrecy" is not found in the legal definition of conspiracy.

Take Black's Law Dictionary:^[10]

CONSPIRACY: In criminal law. A combination or confederacy between two or more persons formed for the purpose of committing, by their joint efforts, some unlawful or criminal act.

[Aside: Remember the above definitions, because these words and phrases crop up repeatedly in the sources we will reference throughout this book.]

Like Black's Law, I do not recognize the definition of conspiracies as "secret." Granted, I can't speak for anyone else, but as someone who is frequently labelled a conspiracy theorist, may I suggest that my experience is not atypical.

The whole point of the so-called conspiracy theorist's argument is that the conspiracies in question *can* be plainly discerned. Most of the evidence supporting the theory is already in the public domain and freely available. That is certainly the case with the Manchester Arena hoax.

Most often, people labelled "conspiracy theorists" are concerned with the denial or obfuscation of evidence. It is not that the evidence doesn't exist, rather that it either isn't reported at all or is hidden from the wider public. The public is often directed to ignore evidence by pejoratively labelling whoever reported it a "conspiracy theorist." To all intents and purposes, this hides the evidence but doesn't make it a "secret."

Let's redefine "conspiracy theorist," then, to mean someone who reports or references evidence that exposes a plan between two or more people to commit an illegal or nefarious act. And let's call a "conspiracy theory" simply an opinion or an argument whose merits are determined solely by the strength or weakness of the evidence offered to substantiate it.

Now let's compare those more accurate definitions to the off-the-wall definition offered up by Wikipedia:^[11]

A conspiracy theory is an explanation for an event or situation that asserts the existence of a conspiracy by powerful and sinister groups, often political in motivation, when other explanations are more probable. [. . .] A conspiracy theory is distinct from a conspiracy; it refers to a hypothesized conspiracy with specific characteristics, including but not limited to opposition to the mainstream consensus among those who are qualified to evaluate its accuracy, such as scientists or historians.

As we've already noted, a false flag terrorist operation is "covert." By its nature, a state orchestrated false flag operation, if it exists, must be a conspiracy. In order for the state to maintain operational secrecy, thereby rendering its conspiracy "covert," any evidence that exposes the false flag operation must be hidden from public scrutiny by the state.

The people called conspiracy theorists often highlight the evidence exposing state-run false flag operations and other conspiracies. When they do, Wikipedia asserts that "other explanations are more probable."

Whether the non-conspiratorial explanation is more probable or not depends on a full appraisal of *all* the available evidence. The likelihood that the non-conspiratorial explanation is closer to the truth cannot be legitimately asserted unless *all* the evidence is accounted for.

According to Wikipedia's definition, a real conspiracy, as opposed to a "conspiracy theory," is determined by "the mainstream consensus among those who are qualified to evaluate its accuracy, such as scientists or historians." This definition is common to nearly all academic literature on conspiracy theory and conspiracy theorists.

The state acknowledges a false flag operation, for example, only after "epistemic authorities" have approved it for discussion. If they have not sanctioned the false flag, then, regardless of the evidence, the conspiracy doesn't exist and remains "secret."

Bear in mind, as state-sponsored false flags are covert, they are rarely admitted by the state or any other involved personnel. If acknowledged at all, they are only officially disclosed once they have passed into the more distant and politically safer annals of history.

The exception is when one state accuses another of a false flag. This enables the false flag to be used in a different context.

For example, shortly before the Russian government entered the eight-year-long war in Ukraine, the US government accused the Russians of planning covert false flags.^[12] The US State Department claimed the Russians were intending to use false flags as a pretext for escalation of the conflict.

The people labelled "conspiracy theorist" today include those who point to the evidence of *current or recent* false flag events that are neither admitted nor alleged. And because all theories and arguments about current or

recent state operations are extremely politically sensitive, they aren't likely to be conceded by either the state or its legacy media gatekeepers.

The Manchester hoax was perpetrated seven years ago. But it is current in the sense that it's being used as purported justification for new state legislation. To acknowledge the evidence that exposes the hoax would cause significant political and social upheaval. For that reason, the Manchester case, like nearly every false flag attack, will only be officially recognised—if ever—after two or more generations have passed.

The Wikipedia definition of conspiracy theory continues [note that we have broken its long paragraphs into shorter, more-readable segments]:

[Conspiracy theories] are reinforced by circular reasoning: both evidence against the conspiracy and absence of evidence for it are misinterpreted as evidence of its truth.

Stephan Lewandowsky observes[,] "This interpretation relies on the notion that, the stronger the evidence against a conspiracy, the more the conspirators must want people to believe their version of events."

As a consequence, the conspiracy becomes a matter of faith rather than something that can be proven or disproven.

Studies have linked belief in conspiracy theories to distrust of authority and political cynicism.

Some researchers suggest that conspiracist ideation—belief in conspiracy theories—may be psychologically harmful or pathological. Such belief is correlated with lower analytical thinking, lower intelligence, psychological projection, paranoia, and Machiavellianism.

Psychologists usually attribute belief in conspiracy theories to a number of psychopathological conditions such as paranoia, schizotypy, narcissism, and insecure attachment, or to a form of cognitive bias called "illusory pattern perception". It has also been linked with the so-called Dark triad personality types, whose common feature is lack of empathy.

In a nutshell, what Wikipedia is saying is that someone labelled a conspiracy theorist by the state and its legacy media and epistemic authorities—and by psychologists in particular—is either stupid, psychologically disturbed, or both.

Further, it is claimed that a common characteristic of these ne'er-do-wells is their lack of empathy and that the harmful pathology of the conspiracy theorist manifests as mistrust of authority.

Wikipedia goes on to say that this failure to believe what one is told by the authorities is extremely dangerous:

Historically, conspiracy theories have been closely linked to prejudice, propaganda, witch hunts, wars, and genocides. They are often strongly believed by the perpetrators of terrorist attacks, and were used as justification by Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik, as well as by governments such as Nazi Germany. [. . .] They have been linked to outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases. Other effects of conspiracy theories include reduced trust in scientific evidence, radicalization and ideological reinforcement of extremist groups, and negative consequences for the economy.

If one were to believe Wikipedia, conspiracy theorists are a dime a dozen and are responsible for creating worldwide havoc. As Wikipedia puts it, their "unfounded belief in conspiracy is common across both historical and contemporary cultures" and their theories are "widespread around the world and are often commonly believed, some even held by the majority of the population."

Could Wikipedia be right?

Could a sizeable minority—perhaps even a majority—of the population be cruel, psychologically deranged, and bigoted zealots who hold extremist, fringe beliefs?

Are these theorists really at risk of radicalisation if they question the safety and efficacy of vaccines?

Are their opinions so outlandish and unfounded that they should be regarded as extremists, as fascists, as possible terrorists, as potential tyrants?

From my point of view, the answer to these questions is a categorical no.

A recent study commissioned by the BBC and conducted by the Policy Institute at King's College London [found](#):^[13]

Notable minorities of the UK public say they believe conspiracy theories about terror attacks including the Manchester Arena bombing.

[. . .]

A third (35%) say they don't think the official story [about a number of different terrorist attacks] has told us the whole truth, and one in five (19%) goes as far as saying they think the victims of terror attacks in the UK are not being truthful about what happened to them.

[. . .]

One in seven (14%) say it's definitely or probably true that the Manchester Arena bombing involved "crisis actors" who pretended to be injured or killed – but that people weren't really injured or killed.

[. . .]

A quarter (26%) of the public say it's definitely or probably true that the mainstream media and government officials are involved in a conspiracy to cover up important information about the attack at Manchester Arena.

Presently, the size of the UK voting population is about 48 million.^[14] The Kings College researchers reported that these "conspiracist" beliefs were more widely held by younger people and tended to diminish with age. That said, if we take the entire UK adult population, the Kings College results suggest that approximately 6.7 million British adults think "crisis actors" were involved in the reported Manchester Arena bombing and nearly 12.5 million people in the UK question the official Manchester account.

If nothing else, perhaps it comes as some relief to know we are far from alone in questioning the Manchester Arena narrative. We're joined by another 5.8 million (12.5 million Brits in total) who are said to be sceptical because they, like us, mistakenly mistrust authority.

Unfortunately, like us, their lack of faith in the state's Manchester Arena story is apparently the product of dangerous stupidity, of "paranoia, schizotypy, narcissism," and of all manner of insecurities.

In addition, it seems that we and millions of our fellow citizens are a threat to everyone else and to the economy—that we are all radicalised extremists and that some of us may turn to terrorism. Something should be done about us, to keep the rest of the population safe!

But the damage we're doing is *even worse* than that! Wikipedia implicitly warns that our polluted information spreads and infects more minds every time we spew our vile, hateful conspiracy theories online:

Conspiracy theories once limited to fringe audiences have become commonplace in mass media, the internet, and social media, emerging as a cultural phenomenon of the late 20th and early 21st centuries.

The academics at Kings College agree with Wikipedia's sentiment:

Belief in terror-related conspiracy theories is higher among younger people, as well as those who get much of their news from social media.

[. . .]

Those who get much of their information from other social networks, such as TikTok (32%), Instagram (29%), Twitter (28%) and WhatsApp (28%), are also more likely than the public as a whole to say they believe this conspiracy theory – in contrast to those who rely more on traditional news sources, such as newspapers and magazines (16%) and major TV and radio broadcasters (13%).

It seems the UN was right after all. As we the people turn away from the legacy media gatekeepers of information and news, our trust in the authorities and in the establishment's official narratives increasingly wanes.

Instead of relying on time-honoured news sources, we are now consuming, in ever-greater numbers, what the UN calls online disinformation, misinformation, malinformation, and fake news.

And now, driven by delusion after delusion, we are indulging in new levels of hate speech and are radicalising each other more than ever.

Won't someone please save us from ourselves?

Thankfully, help is at hand. The state is promising to keep us safe.

The UK's recent Online Safety Act^[15] (OSA) has created a brand-new offence—that of “sending false information intended to cause non-trivial harm.” Quite what “non-trivial harm” is supposed to mean isn't defined. The UK Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) certainly doesn't understand it:^[16]

Section 179(1) OSA 2023 creates a summary offence of sending false communications. The offence is committed if [. . .], at the time of sending it, the person intended the message, or the information in it, to cause non-trivial psychological or physical harm to a likely audience. [. . .] Non-trivial psychological or physical harm is not defined. [. . .] Prosecutors should be clear when making a charging decision about what the evidence is concerning the suspect's intention and how what

was intended was not “trivial”, and why. Note that there is no requirement that such harm should in fact be caused, only that it be intended.

It seems the UK state's own legal professionals can't quite grasp the implications of the new punishable offence the government has devised. Perhaps they still imagine they serve a functioning democracy?

The best we can say about the OSA is that at least the UK state is being transparent about the nature of its dictatorship.^[17]

These new criminal offences will protect people from a wide range of abuse and harm online, including [. . .] sending fake news that aims to cause non-trivial physical or psychological harm.

We can legitimately call this legislative move dictatorial. It is antithetical to everything we're told to believe about our so-called “representative democracies.”

Real democracy,^[18] as originally conceived by Athenian constitutionalist Cleisthenes (c. 570–500 BCE), rendered the decisions of policymakers subservient to the judgements of lawfully convened, randomly selected juries of the people. In a genuine democracy, juries have the ultimate power to “annul” any and all legislation. This is a power that still exists in common law jurisdiction, though to a very limited degree,^[19] because juries are directed by judges and are not told by these judges that they have the legal power to annul.

Thus “democracy” actually means governance by trial by jury. In a democracy, the legislature, in whatever form, is not the “supreme legal authority,” though entities like UK Parliament, for example,^[20] claim to be. Rather, the people are the ultimate authority, through a system of jury-led trials with the power to annul legislation. Voting for political representatives in elections has nothing to do with democracy.

So-called “representative democracy,” then, is not democracy. We are misled by the establishment into believing it is. There are, however, some democratic ideals, ostensibly common to “representative democracies,” that most of us value.

Sociologist T. H. Marshall, in his 1949 essay "Citizenship and Social Class,"^[21] described how these ideals are expressed through a functioning system of rights. They include the right to freedom of thought and expression, the right to free speech and to peaceful protest, the right to

equal access to justice, to equal opportunity and representation under the law, and so on.

Despite representative democracies not being real democracies, democratic ideals are said to underpin them. Regardless of what form we consider democracy to take, legislation that effectively empowers the state to define acceptable opinion and censor freedom of speech is undoubtedly undemocratic.^[22]

“Fake news” is whatever the state, the establishment, and its epistemic authorities say it is. What constitutes “non-trivial harm” is also an entirely subjective judgement made by the state. The selected Online Safety regulator, Ofcom, will decree the truth, and the state will punish those who dare to contradict its official proclamations.

Your punishable offence will be that you expressed an opinion or shared information that the UK Secretary of State told Ofcom to outlaw. Whether you actually *caused* anything that could ever be identified as “harm” is irrelevant. It is your possible intention to potentially cause something that the state specifies as “harm” that will establish your guilt.

For example, sharing anything online that questions the official account of Manchester Arena bombing will almost certainly be considered clear evidence of your possible intention to potentially cause undefinable “non-trivial harm.” This vague, evidence-resistant, and thus legally irrefutable subjective allegation should be good enough to see you prosecuted.

The umbrella term, used by the epistemic authorities, for information that intentionally causes alleged harm, and therefore contravenes the various additional laws supposedly designed to address it, is disinformation.

Despite the apparent modern obsession with disinformation, it isn't anything new. But the origin of the common usage of the word “disinformation” is disputed. It was evidently in use in the US during the 19th century.^[23] In the UK, Viscount Long, during a 1901 House of Commons debate^[24] concerning the 1899 Small Dwellings Acquisitions Act, accused local authorities of peddling “disinformation” to gain additional funding from the Treasury. He said: “Disinformation is limited to cases of applications by local authorities to the Board for sanction when loans are required for the purposes of the Act.”

A few decades later, a high-level Romanian defector to the US, General Ion Mihai Pacepa, alleged that the word “disinformation”^[25] came from the Soviet term “dezinformatsiya.” Certainly, in the early 1920s the Soviet

Politburo was concerned about the use of “dezinformatsiya” by their enemies. In response, the Politburo formed the Disinformation Bureau^[26] (Dezinfoburo), which aimed to “supply the enemy” with:

[c]ompilation [and] technical production of a whole series of false information, documents giving wrong ideas to opponents about the internal situation in Russia, about the organisation and state of the Red Army, about political work, about the leading party and Soviet bodies, about the work of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, etc.

Supplying—or leaking—false information to deceive one’s enemies—including domestic political opponents—is an information warfare strategy as old as civilisation itself. It is a common practice in public relations.^[27] To that extent, then, “disinformation” is simply a propaganda^[28] technique that all governments and other organisations routinely employ.

The advent of the internet has led governments and intergovernmental organisations to argue that disinformation now presents some sort of new or additional threat. This claim is itself “disinformation.” In reality, “disinformation” has been used throughout human history.

With the OSA, the UK state is leading the pack in the modern fight against disinformation, but the European Union (EU) is close on its heels with its very similar Digital Services Act (DSA). The EU has already started flexing its DSA muscles and has used it to launch formal proceedings against Meta (Facebook and Instagram) for alleged DSA breaches that include Meta’s suspected failure to address^[29] “the dissemination of [. . .] disinformation campaigns.”

The OSA and the DSA are both in keeping with the UN’s proposed Cybercrimes Treaty. If it is ratified, the UN’s envisaged “International Convention on Countering the Use of Information and Communications”^[30] will criminalise the sharing of information that “may have an adverse impact on states, enterprises and the well-being of individuals and society.”

The Chinese government is among those eager to ensure the treaty enables UN member states to prosecute those who engage in the “dissemination of false information.”^[31] What constitutes “false information” is decreed by the UN and its member states, such as China.

Questioning the accounts of the reported victims of terrorist attacks will certainly be viewed as having an adverse impact on the well-being of individuals and society. This is what the BBC’s Marianna Spring was trying

to promote when she accused Richard D. Hall of causing “harm.” At the global governance level, no matter what nation you live in, questioning state narratives about terrorist attacks will be verboten under the proposed UN treaty.

Richard D. Hall's reporting of the Manchester hoax evidence has already seen him subjected to private prosecution. The claim made against him is, in turn, likely to form the basis for additional legislation. Among the other legislative consequences of the reported Manchester Arena bombing, a UK law specifically criminalising investigative journalism that challenges the state's terror attack narratives is a distinct possibility.

If this legislative trajectory continues, it seems probable that in the near future publishing a book such as the one you are reading now will become illegal. You may well be guilty of a criminal offence if you share or discuss its contents on social media. Even the online platform that allows you to share or discuss forbidden topics will be punished.

If you think this all amounts to something that sounds suspiciously like the creation of “thought crimes,” you are right. That's *precisely* what it is.

Apparently, the state considers it important for the public to accept this draconian censorship legislation as a protection from the information pollution being spread by dangerous conspiracy theorists like me—and maybe you. After all, UN member states, including the UK, have everyone's best interests in mind, according to confirmed advocates for the state.

These “statists” insist governments are *not* seeking to retain narrative control—*not* trying to ensure that only approved legacy media gatekeepers of information and news can express the only approved opinion. And if you think they are, well, that very mistrust of authority means you're definitely a conspiracy theorist.

In August 2020, the UN launched its [#ThinkBeforeSharing](#)^[32] (TBS) campaign to “stop the spread of conspiracy theories.” Then, perhaps recognising how obvious it was that the “alliance” behind the TBS was just making stuff up, the UN hastily binned the TBS and “memory-holed” all its webpages. But this action came too late to prevent people from noticing what the UN was trying to establish. Of course, anyone who *did* notice and commented was called a conspiracy theorist by the UN.

The TBS campaign was led by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This body was created in 1945 by the forty-four “allied” nations present at the UN's two-week [London](#)

[Conference](#)^[33] held in November of that year. In fact, forming UNESCO was one of the fledgling UN's first acts.

The [UNESCO Constitution](#)^[34] declared:

[S]ince wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed[.] [. . .] [T]he states Parties to this Constitution, believing in full and equal opportunities for education for all, in the unrestricted pursuit of objective truth, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, are agreed and determined to develop and to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding[.]

Those noble-sounding aspirations are just words written on bits of paper. With the launch of its TBS campaign nearly eighty years later, UNESCO demonstrated that the UN is no longer interested in such principles—if it ever was.

The "unrestricted pursuit of objective truth" has been abandoned by the UN in favour of telling people what to think. The UN's target remains "the minds of men." The "free exchange of ideas and knowledge" it touted in 1945 has been firmly rejected.

The short-lived TBS was a [joint initiative](#)^[35] alliance between UNESCO, the European Commission, Twitter [now X], and the World Jewish Congress. Its stated intention was "to raise awareness of the existence and consequences of conspiracy theories"—theories that, it added, "undermine science, facts and trust in institutions and pose an immediate threat to individuals and communities."

Note the TBS' use of the word "facts." A "[fact](#),"^[36] per the Oxford English Dictionary (OED), is "a thing that is known or proved to be true." In relation to journalism, facts are "information used as evidence or as part of a report or news article."

"Proved to be true." What is [proof](#)?^[37] According to the OED, proof is the "evidence or argument establishing a fact or the truth of a statement."

So, then, facts and truth are discovered in two ways: by examining evidence and by exploring logical arguments that may provide the required proof.

Contrary to these accepted definitions, however, the #ThinkBeforeSharing social media packs approached the concept of "evidence" in a novel and highly unusual way.

For example, one of TBS's memes suggested six things conspiracy theories have in common.^[38] It listed one of those things, "supporting evidence," as a reason both to *identify* a "conspiracy theory" and consequently to *reject* that evidence. By what logic did the meme substantiate its premise that "supporting evidence" should be ignored? None other than that the evidence had been labelled as part of a "conspiracy theory" by that very same TBS alliance.

This peculiar concept popped up again in the TBS alliance's infographics.^[39] Apparently, "evidence that seems to support the conspiracy theory" isn't really evidence at all—presumably because the alliance said it wasn't. The TBS material claimed that "any 'evidence' is forced to fit the [conspiracy] theory."

What is this gibberish! Something is either evidence or it isn't. Evidence can't be forced to *fit* any theory. Rather, a theory is formed *from* the evidence.

If evidence suggests a theory is true, that may indeed be the case. But that theory must account for *all* the relevant evidence. If there is any evidence that contradicts the theory, then the theory remains doubtful and requires further investigation.

Remarkably, the UN revealed its intention, through its TBS alliance, to divorce so-called "facts" from actual evidence. The alliance rejected the idea that someone might discern the facts for themselves by examining the "supporting evidence" on their own, independent of the state's guidance. Instead, it insisted that all of us should rely on "facts" that are determined through an alternative—and frankly ridiculous—method.

The alliance asserted that a fact was established *only* if it was authorised by a qualified expert or an approved fact-checking site and *only* if it was reported with an objective "tone"—whatever that means. According to the alliance, therefore, only approved evidence was considered evidence. What a crazy and dangerous notion—that only officially authorised evidence counts.

As just discussed, Wikipedia fully embraced this preposterous idea. According to Wiki gatekeepers, a conspiracy theory is whatever theory

opposes “the mainstream consensus among those who are qualified to evaluate its accuracy, such as scientists or historians.”

This absurd definition is not even close to any kind of logical methodology for assessing evidence for the purpose of establishing the “facts.” Instead, it is a baseless assertion that some faceless, nameless “authority” has the right to determine the truth.

There exists no such right on the part of any “authorized” individual or institution. We should never trust any information source simply because it calls itself “authorized.” Nor, for that matter, should we dismiss information simply because we don’t like or agree with its purveyor—that is, the person or organisation reporting that information. Under all circumstances, though, we need to remain mindful of possible agendas that could bias the information we’re fed.

Wikipedia, like the legacy media, is a mouthpiece^[40] of the establishment. Among its many reliability problems is its sources of funding. Overseen by the Wikimedia Foundation, its major donors^[41] include Apple, Google, and Microsoft.

Google Cloud is a stakeholder partner^[42] of the UK government. Microsoft, meanwhile, is an investment partner^[43] of the UK government. It’s obvious that the Wikimedia Foundation will not allow anything to be reported on its site that seriously undermines or jeopardises the public-private partnerships, state contracts, and business relationships of its major donors.

Wikipedia defines “reliable sources”^[44] of information as whatever is reported by the legacy media, the press agencies, and the small group of global corporations that own the entire lot:

News sources often contain both factual content and opinion content. News reporting from well-established news outlets is generally considered to be reliable for statements of fact (though even the most reputable reporting sometimes contains errors). News reporting from less-established outlets is generally considered less reliable for statements of fact. Most newspapers also reprint items from news agencies such as Reuters, Interfax, Agence France-Presse, United Press International or the Associated Press, which are responsible for accuracy. The agency should be cited in addition to the newspaper that reprinted it.

In short, Wikipedia, as a “reliable” source of information, has as many conflicts of interest as the legacy media does. And, just like the legacy media, it tends to parrot state and news agency press releases. While Wikipedia is useful for names, dates, and some historical background, as a source of opinion or established facts it should be taken, like any information source, with a pinch (or sometimes a tonne) of salt.

Unsurprisingly, Wikipedia’s descriptions of conspiracy theories, and the people it labels conspiracy theorists, are almost identical to the definitions touted by the UN, its member states, and the legacy media.

This is the global information environment within which a conspiracy theorist is identified, labelled, and censured.

But is any aspect of what we are told constitutes a “conspiracy theorist” ever true? The only way to find out is to look at and critically evaluate the offered evidence.

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Chapter 3: The Conspiracism Myth

According to the state—that is, the establishment and legacy media and associated epistemic authorities—to question the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing is to indulge in conspiracy theory.

Broadly, the people dubbed "conspiracy theorists" are depicted as low IQ, psychologically disturbed, irrational individuals who don't understand how to think critically, can't evaluate evidence, and lack empathy.

The UN's 2020 #ThinkBeforeSharing (TBS) alliance claimed that so-called conspiracy theories could be refuted "with facts." TBS asserted that conspiracy theories themselves lacked any factual basis. It called conspiracy theories "part of a wider trend of increasing hate speech, and increased racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic attacks, which also target LGBTQ communities."

Because conspiracy theorists are viewed as being not only insane idiots but also hateful, racist, anti-humanitarian, antisemitic, and homophobic, the UN and its member states insist that anyone in the world who entertains conspiracy theories is dangerous.

To back up its claims with supporting evidence, the UN frequently proffers academic research. Indeed, an informal, multidisciplinary academic field of "conspiracy theory research" has emerged.

In 2020, for example, Prof. Stephan Lewandowsky, a cognitive scientist; John Cook, PhD, from George Mason University's Center for Climate Change Communication; and Prof. Dr. Michael Butter from Tübingen University joined forces to publish their "[Guide To Conspiracy Theories](#)."^[1] In it, they offered the now-standard academic definition of conspiracy theory:

Conspiracy theory: The belief that events are secretly manipulated behind the scenes by powerful forces. Conspiracy theories assume that nothing happens by accident, that nothing is as it seems, and that everything is connected. In other words, they claim that a group of evil agents, the conspirators, is secretly orchestrating everything that happens. They usually present the imagined conspirators as enemies of the people. Conspiracy theories thus firmly divide the world into good and evil, into Us vs. Them, leaving no room for doubt or complexity.

[. . .]

These assumptions put conspiracy theories at odds with the modern social sciences which stress the importance of coincidence, contingency and unintended consequences. Conspiracy theories suggest that historical events are always the result of deliberate plotting, rather than impersonal social forces and structural effects.

Prof. Lewandowsky is cited by Wikipedia in its definition of conspiracy theory. He is also quoted by the UN:^[2]

Conspiracy theories have adverse consequences on society. [. . .] [B]elief in conspiracies can harm or even kill people. It is therefore essential for the public to be informed about how to spot conspiracy theories so that they can be ignored.

The UN agrees with Prof. Lewandowsky that it is “essential” the public “ignore” whatever is labelled a conspiracy theory.

Under the Lewandowsky et al. academic definition of conspiracy theory, there are no “enemies of the people.” There is no such thing as good versus evil forces or “Us vs. Them.” Rather, “coincidence, contingency and unintended consequences” more accurately describe how power operates. UN member states apparently agree with this definition and assert that anyone who disagrees should be “ignored.”

Lewandowsky, Cook, and Butter and other academics who conduct “conspiracy theory research,” as we shall call it, pigeonhole conspiracy theorists. They contend that all conspiracy theorists believe: (1) there is no such thing as accidents or unforeseen consequences, (2) nothing is as it appears, (3) coincidence is impossible, and (4) every untoward event is connected to every other untoward event by the malevolent machinations of secretive, dark, conspiratorial forces.

Perhaps some conspiracy theorists *do* hold those rigid, extreme, and often-illogical positions. Well, so what if they do! All kinds of people—not just conspiracy theorists—believe all sorts of wild and wacky ideas.

Take, for example, the billions of people worldwide who blindly believed that a deadly pandemic was infecting the world and that wearing face masks would protect themselves and others from SARS-CoV-2 virus particles. Now, four years later, there persists only a tiny minority—in countries where mask-wearing wasn’t previously the norm—who still wear

their face masks. Clearly, no one else thinks this is necessary. There is no accounting for what some people believe.

We are told that conspiracy theorists represent a significant proportion of the population.

In 2018, the legacy media reported on a survey whose results suggested that 60 percent of the UK population^[3] “believe at least one conspiracy theory about how the country is run or the veracity of information they have been given.”

Recall, too, the King's College research, which concluded that more than one-quarter of the UK population believe in a Manchester Arena bombing conspiracy theory to some extent.

Are we really supposed to believe that *no* conspiracy theorist, so-called, thinks random events *ever* occur? That all they see is a constant stream of conspiracies everywhere? That they surmise everything bad reported on “the news” is the direct result of some dastardly scheme?

For Lewandowsky and his co-authors to make that assumption is ridiculous. Remember, these same academics also claim conspiracy theorists leave “no room for doubt or complexity.”

According to them, if you doubt the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing, you also imagine that chaos and unintentional errors and unintended mistakes are impossible—that they never occur.

To allege that a majority of the population potentially suffers from a psychological flaw called “conspiracism” or “conspiratorial mindset” or “conspiracy mentality” or “conspiracy ideation,” etc., etc., it appears these scholars must themselves hold inflexible and outlandish beliefs.

Their assumption-based, pseudoscientific approach to conspiracy theory research becomes even more farfetched when we consider studies that examine the demographics of so-called conspiracy theorists.

Let's look at some of those studies.

Prior to 2022, probably the largest demographic study of conspiracy theorists was undertaken by political scientists Joseph Uscinski and Joseph Parent for their 2014 book *American Conspiracy Theories*.^[4] Based on their research, the pair found it almost impossible to categorise conspiracy theorists.

They learned that ethnicity, gender, educational attainment, employment, economic status, and even political beliefs were not indicative of being a conspiracy theorist. The only firm trait they could isolate was that conspiracy theorists, so-called, tended to be slightly older than the population average—suggesting, perhaps, that scepticism of state narratives increases with more life experience.

In 2019, the BBC reported the academic opinion of Prof. Chris French, a University of London psychologist, who said:^[5]

When you actually look at the demographic data, belief in conspiracies cuts across social class, it cuts across gender and it cuts across age. Equally, whether you're on the left or the right, you're just as likely to see plots against you.

To be clear: the people labelled conspiracy theorists come from all walks of life, are found in every community, represent a significant portion of the population in any country, and don't share a single demographic trait.

Some are philosophers, some are political scientists. Some are theologians and people of faith, while others are agnostics or atheists. From housewives to sports heroes, from bricklayers to computer coders, from retail workers to Hollywood stars, from PhDs to college dropouts, from law enforcement officers to investigative journalists—every corner of society possesses its share of intelligent, rational believers in conspiracies.

The conclusions of Uscinski and Parent and, separately, French make a mockery of the false idea, presented by the UN and its member states, that "conspiracy theorists" represent some sort of identifiable threat. On the contrary, people considered conspiracy theorists have no identifiable—much less extreme—social, cultural, or political characteristics. They have no leadership, no cohesion, no specific political agenda. And they are not in the least bit organised, either on the grassroots level or top-down.

In March 2020, Lewandowsky and Cook published the "Conspiracy Theory Handbook".^[6] In it, they wrote:

Real conspiracies do exist. [. . .] The U.S. National Security Agency secretly spied on civilian internet users. [. . .] We know about these conspiracies through internal industry documents, government investigations, or whistleblowers.

So, Lewandowsky and Cook *do* admit that conspiracies exist. They even point to a known example of a government conspiracy. But they claim we

can only know about government conspiracies after official "government investigations" have been conducted. And although they admit that other evidence might come from industry documents or whistleblowers, curiously, they make no mention of, for example, the Obama Administration's aggressive use of counterespionage laws^[7] to silence whistleblowers and suppress document leaks in the US.

The pair continue:

Conspiracy theories [. . .] tend to persist for a long time even when there is no decisive evidence for them. Those conspiracy theories are based on a variety of thinking patterns that are known to be unreliable tools for tracking reality.

What on earth is "decisive evidence"?

It appears to be evidence authorised or conceded by the appropriate authorities. All other documents, witness testimony, video, audio, or forensic evidence are not "decisive" because the necessary "government investigations" haven't been undertaken. Therefore, the conspiracy theorists—point as they might to a wealth of evidence—have no factual basis for their claim but instead possess a "thinking pattern" that is delusional. Or at least so say the conspiracy theory research academics.

What else do they say?

Typically, conspiracy theories are not supported by evidence that withstands scrutiny[,] but this doesn't stop them from blossoming. For example, the widespread belief that the 9/11 terrorist attacks were an "inside job" has persisted for many years after the event. Decades after the fact, a vast majority of Americans believe that the government covered up the truth about the JFK assassination.

The problem with their line of reasoning is that no official "scrutiny" of the evidence offered by the so-called conspiracy theorists ever takes place. Officialdom flatly denies such evidence because it is labelled part of a conspiracy theory.

For example, the study^[8] by the US Department of Civil Engineering and the University of Alaska Fairbanks seems to show that the official account of 9/11 cannot possibly be true. The only way to determine whether the stories we have been told about 9/11 are true or not is to examine the evidence.^[9]

The logical exploration of evidence is the best way yet devised to find the truth. It has been acknowledged as such since at least Socrates' day. Inductive, deductive, and abductive^[10] reasoning all rely on this basic approach.

BBC Global News Ltd., a commercial company that is part of BBC Studios, generates income that the BBC says it reinvests in its "international journalism." It produces short online videos branded as BBC REEL.

In 2022, BBC REEL produced "The psychology behind conspiracy theories,"^[11] in which a number of conspiracy theory researchers were permitted to present their views. The BBC began its "investigation" by asking: "Are some people more vulnerable to conspiracy theories, or are we all at risk?"

We were immediately informed that our belief in conspiracy theories risks harming us, hence the BBC's declaration that we might all be "vulnerable" to the discourse of conspiracy theorists.

The BBC reported the comments of a man named Jonas Kaplan:

One of the things we see with conspiracy theories is that they are very difficult to challenge. [. . .] One of the advantages of having a belief system that's resistant to evidence is that the belief system is going to be very stable across time. If you have to constantly update your beliefs with new evidence, there's a lot of uncertainty. [. . .] Conspiracy theories are a way of making sense of an uncertain world.

As assistant research professor of psychology at—and co-director of—the University of Southern California's Dornsife Neuroimaging Center, Jonas Kaplan leads a team that studies the link between humans' neurological activity and their thoughts and emotions.

In 2016, Kaplan co-authored a paper^[12] based on a study that monitored neural activity in a region of the brain called the default mode network (DMN). He and his fellow researchers presented a cohort of forty people—each of whom had expressed strongly "liberal" political opinions—with so-called "counterevidence" that was supposedly intended to challenge the subjects' beliefs.

The team monitored the effect of this purported cognitive challenge upon the subjects' neural response. They observed specific neural activity, indicating that the DMN region of the brain, associated with identity, was stimulated whenever one's personal beliefs were allegedly challenged.

What they found was interesting, but from that point forward the research started to go wildly astray.

From their observations, Kaplan and his colleagues concluded that resistance to changing beliefs, in the face of “contradictory evidence,” was stronger for political beliefs than it was for non-political convictions. They consequently inferred that political opinions are more strongly associated with our sense of self than are other kinds of beliefs we hold.

Unfortunately, the researchers ignored the gaping hole in their own methodology. Actually, they *did* mention it but didn’t seem to grasp the full implications of what they had done.

Rather than genuinely “challenging” their subjects’ beliefs with real contradictory evidence, they decided to use deception. They even admitted:

In order to be as compelling as possible, the challenges often contained exaggerations or distortions of the truth.

For example, they told their test subjects that Russia had a larger nuclear arsenal than the US. This wasn’t simply a “distortion” of the truth; it was a deliberate false statement.

More importantly, the neuroscientists failed to ascertain whether the subjects *knew* the supposed facts were lies. In cases where the subject knew the information was false—and we don’t know how many did—their views had not actually been “challenged.”

That said, the researchers did discover something:

Our political participants may have been more likely to identify these distortions for the political issues, especially if they were more familiar with these issues. [. . .] We did find that participants who rated the challenges as more credible were more likely to change their minds, and it is well known that source credibility influences persuasion.

In other words, Kaplan et al. “discovered” that people were more likely to believe information if they considered it credible and, conversely, were less likely to believe information if it was evidently wrong—perhaps because the researchers had made it up.

This massive oversight utterly undermined the paper’s primary conclusions. Beyond stating the obvious, Kaplan et al. then delivered subjective findings that were not substantiated by their own experimental data:

Our data [. . .] support the role of emotion in belief persistence. [. . .] The brain's systems for emotion, which are purposed toward maintaining homeostatic integrity of the organism, appear also to be engaged when protecting the aspects of our mental lives with which we strongly identify, including our closely held beliefs.

The problem is that the researchers didn't know what those emotions were. People might simply have been angry or dismissive because they knew what they were told was wrong.

Kaplan and his colleagues did not establish that perceived resistance to changing a belief was the result of any defensive psychological mechanism. There was nothing in their research that distinguished between that possibility and the equally plausible explanation that the subjects rejected the "challenging information" because it was false.

The researchers' main finding—that the subjects' resistance to change in the face of counterevidence was linked to identity and therefore demonstrated an emotional attachment that could potentially overcome rational thought—was an assumption unsupported by their own experimental data. Kaplan et al. noted where neurological activity occurred but did not demonstrate what the associated cognitive processes were.

The press release^[13] that accompanied publication of the Kaplan et al. (2016) paper made no such clarification. It claimed, without cause, that Kaplan's research had effectively proven an alleged sociological and psychological truth:

A USC-led study confirms what seems increasingly true in American politics: People are hardheaded about their political beliefs, even when provided with contradictory evidence. [. . .] The findings from the functional MRI study seem especially relevant to how people responded to political news stories, fake or credible.

The above statement represents a huge leap of logic that the paper itself didn't justify. There was little to suggest that the study subjects had been "provided with contradictory evidence." They were given so-called "distortions" and highly questionable opinions. Their reasons for rejecting these false claims hadn't even been ascertained.

In the same press release, Kaplan declared:

Political beliefs are like religious beliefs in the respect that both are part of who you are and important for the social circle to which you

belong. [. . .] To consider an alternative view, you would have to consider an alternative version of yourself.

This is very similar to the statement Kaplan later made in the BBC REEL piece on the alleged psychology of conspiracy theorists. His opinion appeared to be based upon pseudoscience.

Anni Sternisko, PhD student in the Social Identity and Morality Lab at New York University, also appeared in the BBC REEL video. She referenced [the article](#)^[4] "Understanding Conspiracy Theories" by seven co-authors (Douglas et al. 2019). It offers us the standard précis of the definition of conspiracy theories agreed to by Lewandowsky, Cook, Butter, and many other conspiracy theory researchers:

Conspiracy theories are attempts to explain the ultimate causes of significant social and political events and circumstances with claims of secret plots by two or more powerful actors.

As I hope this book has made abundantly clear, the entire United Kingdom has given Richard D. Hall the dubious distinction of being a conspiracy theorist. His theory that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoax is deemed by the state, the establishment, and the legacy media to be a conspiracy theory. Yet Hall has never suggested that the reported hoax is a secret. Nor has he claimed that those behind it have concealed either the hoax or their possible involvement in it.

Hall should be seen as an investigative journalist who has reported the evidence that shows Manchester was a hoax. He has even named some of those he suspects of involvement in the plot. None of what he has placed in the public domain is "secret."

Equally, virtually "none"—we'll get to the couple of exceptions—of the evidence Hall reported has been acknowledged by the legacy media or the UK government. He has offered the evidence to the High Court, and in turn the High Court has issued a "summary judgement" barring Hall from presenting any of it in a UK court of law.

The refusal to consider evidence does not render it a "secret." A denial that evidence exists does not conceal the evidence. It remains hidden only if you believe those who deny it and refuse to look at the evidence yourself.

This ludicrous premise supposedly informs the universally accepted working definition of "conspiracy theory." It pervades nearly all academic research on the subject, including the alleged psychological studies of

those labelled “conspiracy theorists.” As demonstrated by the BBC, it is accepted unquestioningly and is incessantly promoted by the legacy media.

Much of the scientific evidence that informs conspiracy theory research is the product of experimental psychology. The American Psychological Association (APA) defines experimental psychology^[15] as:

The scientific study of behavior, motives, or cognition in a laboratory or other controlled setting in order to predict, explain, or influence behavior or other psychological phenomena. Experimental psychology aims at establishing quantified relationships and explanatory theory through the analysis of responses under various controlled conditions and the synthesis of adequate theoretical accounts from the results of these observations.

Typically, the subjects of experimental psychology are exposed to stimuli, asked questions, or sent surveys designed to measure psychological responses. From the results, observations are made, theories tested, and conclusions drawn. While the field of psychology has a solid empirical foundation, experimental psychology often falls short of basic scientific standards.

In 2015, the Open Science Foundation found that, of 100 published experimental psychology papers,^[16] results could be replicated in only thirty-nine of them. Just thirty-six of them produced findings from which any objective meaning could be drawn yet psychological claims were made on all 100. Such a high degree of subjectivity frequently leads to woolly conclusions—evidently the case in much of the so-called conspiracy theory research.

BBC REEL presented the expert opinion of Prof. Sarah Gorman, who said that “conspiracy theorists” are so irrational they can believe two contradictory conspiracy theories at the same time:

People will simultaneously believe that Princess Diana's death was staged, and that she's still alive and also that she was murdered. And, on the face of it this doesn't make much sense, but the underlying principle here is that they [conspiracy theorists] believe that something is just not right about the official story, and it almost doesn't matter exactly what the alternative is; just that there has to be an alternative that's being suppressed.

Prof. Gorman almost certainly formed her opinion as a result of one of the formative papers in the field of conspiracy theory research, titled "Dead and

Alive: Beliefs in Contradictory Conspiracy Theories," by three experimental psychologists (Wood et al. 2012).^[17]

The authors of that study asked their subjects to rate the plausibility of a series of deliberately contradictory "conspiracy theories." They then analysed and rated the subjects' responses using a Likert-type scale (1 – strongly disagree, 4 – neutral response, 7 – strongly agree).

For example, one arm of the study asked the subjects to indicate their level of agreement with the idea that Princess Diana was murdered as well as their level of agreement with the suggestion that she faked her own death. Similarly, another arm asked the subjects the extent of their agreement with the notion that Osama bin Laden was killed by US Navy SEALs but also that he was still alive in captivity.

The Wood et al. researchers collected the results and from them deduced:

While it has been known for some time that belief in one conspiracy theory appears to be associated with belief in others, only now do we know that this can even apply to conspiracy theories that are mutually contradictory. This finding supports our contention that the monological nature of conspiracism is driven not by conspiracy theories directly supporting one another but by the coherence of each theory with higher-order beliefs that support the idea of conspiracy in general.

It seems that Prof. Gorman, for one, is convinced by this pabulum and the BBC was willing to present it to its audience as if it were scientific fact. Alas, the study's conclusions, as apparently referenced by Gorman, were not supported by their own experimental results.

Had the Wood et al. participants been asked to consider exclusivity and had they subsequently indicated that they agreed with two or more contradictory theories, then the paper's conclusion would have been at least plausible. But they weren't, so it wasn't.

All that the participants were asked to do was to indicate their relative level of agreement. This Hobson's choice of a study design meant it was entirely possible and logical for a test subject of sound mind to agree strongly with one statement while agreeing somewhat with another, even if the two were "mutually contradictory."

To illustrate: The official account of Osama bin Laden's death asserts that he was assassinated by the US military. Yet there is no video or forensic or photographic evidence—not even witness testimony backing up that

assertion. Regrettably, some members of SEAL Team Six who were deployed to Pakistan for that operation have since died under suspicious circumstances. There isn't even any evidence of a corpse, because bin Laden was allegedly buried at sea. There is nothing beyond the proclamation of the US government to lend this tale any credibility at all.

Consequently, if you doubt the official account of bin Laden's death—and what sane person wouldn't—a whole range of possible scenarios exist. Which one you deem correct all depends upon your evaluation of the available evidence. That evidence, by definition, cannot come from the US state or from the legacy media, because neither have presented any evidence to support their claims.

In such circumstances, it is perfectly legitimate to agree strongly that bin Laden died in 2011 and simultaneously agree somewhat with the proposition that he was extraordinarily renditioned to a US black-ops site somewhere. Nothing can be ruled out. There is insufficient evidence to draw any firm conclusion.

Wood et al. did not ask the study participants to exclude contradictory accounts—only to rate such accounts on a scale of plausibility. Thus, the paper's conclusion—that the results of its experiment in psychology proved “the monological nature of conspiracism” and were driven by some assumed “higher-order” belief system—was pseudoscientific claptrap.

This didn't prevent the BBC from presenting Prof. Gorman's “expert” opinion as evidence that the people labelled as conspiracy theorists are delusional. Indeed, making such sweeping, unsubstantiated statements is standard fare for the BBC. Anyone who questions the state or its narratives is a deranged “conspiracy theorist,” as far as the BBC is concerned.

Subsequent research^[18] has highlighted how poor the Wood et al. “scientific conclusion” was. Yet, despite being roundly disproved, the erroneous assertion that conspiracy theorists believe contradictory theories simultaneously is repeated ad nauseam by the legacy media, politicians, and academics alike. It forms just one of the groundless truisms spouted by those who spread the “conspiracism” myth.

Illogical presupposition infests the conspiracy theory research world and leads to profound confusion. BBC REEL reported this comment by aforementioned PhD student Anni Sternisko:

Conspiracy theories are not necessarily irrational or wrong. And I think what we are talking about in society at the moment—what is

frightening us—are better explained, or better labelled, as conspiracy narratives; that is, ideas that are irrational to believe, or at least unlikely to be true—that are not necessarily theories, such that they are not falsifiable.

Sternisko appears to have been talking to her BBC interviewer about two completely different things: evidence-based arguments on one hand and irrational beliefs on the other.

Some ideas, labelled as conspiracy theories, are patently absurd. Among them: the world is flat (no, it isn't); the British Royal family are lizards (no, they're not); Donald Trump is waging a one-man war against the Illuminati (no, he isn't). Yet their absurdity doesn't stop some people from believing them. As the Yorkshire idiom goes, "There's nowt so queer as folk."

Other ideas, such as the notion that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag, do withstand "scrutiny" because they are evidence-based.

Sternisko's problem is that she lumps the rational and the irrational together and indiscriminately refers to both as "conspiracy theories." In searching for a unifying psychology to account for two diametrically opposed thought processes, the doctoral researcher appears to have been scabbling about for a suitable terminology acceptable to her peers.

Granted, Sternisko's conspiracy theory research colleagues have developed a definition of "conspiracy theory" and "conspiracy theorists" that is ridiculous. Consequently, this leaves PhD candidates like Sternisko floundering around with unworkable, nonsensical concepts. Again, we can look to the Douglas et al. (2019) paper to appreciate just how incoherent it is:

While a conspiracy refers to a true causal chain of events, a conspiracy theory refers to an allegation of conspiracy that may or may not be true. [. . .] To measure belief in conspiracy theories, scholars and polling houses often ask respondents—through surveys—if they believe in particular conspiracy theories such as 9/11, the assassination of JFK, or the death of Princess Diana.

The only benchmark these academics have for "measuring" what they call "conspiracy theory" is the extent to which the subject agrees or disagrees with the official account of any given event. As long as their test subjects unquestionably accept the official "narrative," they aren't considered to be "conspiracy theorists." If they do question it, they are.

Consequently, nearly all experimental psychology research on conspiracy theory is completely meaningless: the researchers never investigate whether what they call conspiracy theory is or is not true. There is no basis for their claim that “conspiracist ideation” is irrational, or even that it exists.

Without establishing the credibility of a propounded theory, psychologists, sociologists, and other researchers and scientists involved in this field of research have based it entirely on their own opinions. Their approach cannot be considered science.

In this light, Anni Sternisko’s statement at last reveals something about what the BBC called the “risk” of conspiracy theory. It seems that these alternative explanations of events are not dangerous to the conspiracy theorists themselves but rather to the surprisingly incurious academics like Sternisko, who find conspiracy theories “frightening.”

Questioning power is a fundamental democratic ideal, yet Sternisko is afraid to avail herself of that privilege—or, you might say, to fulfil that obligation. Since fear and the anxiety produced by fear can damage mental health, the BBC is in a strange sense right to highlight potential risks of fear-inducing conspiracy theories.

It’s just that the BBC and the groundless psychological theories it promotes are wrong about *who* is at risk. The risk isn’t to the purported “conspiracy theorists.” The risk is to whoever unquestioningly accepts the official accounts because they are frightened of where scepticism might lead them. They are the “vulnerable” ones.

Thus, what the BBC presented in its REEL segment was not an exploration of the psychology behind conspiracy theory. It was instead an exposé of the deep-rooted terror of those who dare not look at the evidence dredged up by non-establishment investigators like Richard D. Hall.

We should ask ourselves why people like Sternisko are petrified at the mere thought that their own government might be lying to them. Is it that they have been so brainwashed by the state to believe everything they’re told that they feel insecure and guilty if they question those sacrosanct beliefs?

There is something called the Comparative Analysis of Conspiracy Theories (COMPACT)^[19] programme. It is funded by the European Cooperation in Science and Technology (COST). COST is a project of the European Union^[20] (EU).

In January 2022, COMPACT published the results of its study of the political beliefs held by alleged conspiracy theorists in twenty-six European countries.^[21]

The researchers concluded that the "conspiracy mentality is associated with extreme left- and especially extreme right-wing beliefs."

This questionable theory, claiming that people called conspiracy theorists are extremists, presents us with a conundrum—namely, large-scale demographic surveys have consistently found that enormous numbers of people in countries around the world are "conspiracy theorists."

For example, the previously cited 2018 population survey revealed:

Sweden was the least credulous of conspiracy theories, with 52% believing one or more of the theories polled by the researchers, as opposed to 85% for Hungary. In the US that figure was 64% and in France 76%.

Therefore, if the COMPACT conspiracy theory researchers' claims are true, political moderates form a minority, even a small minority, everywhere in Europe. It seems that the majority of citizens (conspiracy theorists) are either extreme "far right" or, to a lesser extent, extreme "far left."

Based on those results, we must ask why political parties are obsessed with grabbing votes from "moderate voters" or the "middle ground." If some well-funded conspiracy theorist researchers are correct, they could garner more support by appealing to fascists and radical communists.

Of course, we need only consider our own views and the views of our family members and of pretty much everyone we know to realise that "far right" and "far left" political opinions are very much in the minority. There appears, then, to be something very wrong with the conspiracy theorist researchers' "findings."

The problem with the COMPACT report's conclusion is that it is based on the pseudoscientific claim that something called a "conspiracy mentality," a "conspiracy mindset," or "conspiracism" exists. It doesn't. A "conspiracy mentality" or "mindset" turns out to be largely the product of some experimental psychologist's imaginations.

To prove our point, let's look at this drivel from the COMPACT researchers:

[P]eople differ in their predisposition to explain events as conspiracies, which is sometimes referred to as 'conspiracy mentality' or the 'conspiracy mindset.'

[. . .]

[Conspiracy mentality] differs from concrete conspiracy beliefs in that it taps into the general propensity to suspect that conspiracies are at play, uncontaminated by concrete events, actors or contexts.

[. . .]

[W]e aggregated agreement with the diverse conspiracy theories in each country to tap into the general propensity to endorse specific conspiracy beliefs. This aggregate correlated substantially with our generic conspiracy measure that excludes any reference to concrete events or actors.

We see that the conspiracy theory researchers have drawn a distinction between what they call "conspiracy theory," which they say is a product of the alleged "conspiracy mindset," and an awareness of the real conspiracies, which they call "concrete events." The latter supposedly-more-rational worldview they call "concrete conspiracy belief."

We can turn again to one of the leading researchers in the field of conspiracy theory research, Joseph Uscinski, to understand how this alleged distinction between "conspiracy theory" and "concrete conspiracy belief" is made. In "The Study of Conspiracy Theories"^[22] Prof. Uscinski explains:

A conspiracy theorist is anyone who believes conspiracy theories, and polls over several decades suggest that all Americans, for example, are conspiracy theorists in this sense.

[. . .]

While conspiracy refers to a real, actual event, conspiracy theory refers to an accusatory perception which may or may not be true. The line separating conspiracy theory and conspiracy is unclear and has been hotly debated.

[. . .]

Everybody believes in at least one conspiracy theory, but rejects countless others. Therefore, people disagree on which theories

constitute “could-be-true” conspiracy theories and which constitute “are true” [concrete] conspiracies.

[. . .]

I demarcate between conspiracy theory and [concrete] conspiracy using the simple and consistent standard put forth by Neil Levy (2007). His premise is that properly constituted epistemic authorities determine the existence of [concrete] conspiracies.

Obviously, establishing whether a specific conspiracy theory is “true” or not depends entirely upon an examination of the evidence. If it’s “true,” says Uscinski, then it is not a conspiracy theory but rather a “concrete conspiracy belief.”

He reports that a “true” or “concrete” conspiracy is determined by “properly constituted epistemic authorities,” and he cites “Radically Socialized Knowledge and Conspiracy Theories” by Neil Levy as the definitive word on the subject.

For conspiracy theory researchers, the crucial differentiation between concrete conspiracies, which are acknowledged, and conspiracies that aren’t acknowledged—any discussion of which is called a conspiracy theory—depends on the application of Prof. Levy’s demarcation process. It works as follows.^[23]

The typical explanation of an event or process which attracts the label ‘conspiracy theory’ is an explanation that conflicts with the account advanced by the relevant epistemic authorities.

[. . .]

It is almost never rational to accept such a conspiracy theory.

[. . .]

Conspiracies are a common feature of social and political life, common enough that refusing to believe in their existence would leave us unable to understand the contours of our world.

[. . .]

A conspiracy theory that conflicts with the official story, where the official story is the explanation offered by the (relevant) epistemic authorities, is prima facie unwarranted.

[. . .]

Clearly, it is often rational to heavily discount the official stories offered by some authorities. In totalitarian countries, people learn to read the official news media with a jaundiced eye, and this attitude is often warranted.

[. . .]

Responsible believers ought to accept explanations offered by properly constituted epistemic authorities.

[. . .]

Intellectuals do not contemptuously dismiss a proffered explanation as 'just a conspiracy theory' when it conflicts, merely, with the government line.

[. . .]

It is because the relevant epistemic authorities – the distributed network of knowledge claim gatherers and testers that includes engineers and politics professors, security experts and journalists – have no doubts over the validity of the explanation that we accept it.

Here then, at last, we have the scientific definition of "conspiracy theory." Upon this definition, it would seem, rests the entire field of "conspiracy theory research."

The first thing to note about Levy's definition is the political belief system that underpins his concept of conspiracy theory. In countries he considers "totalitarian," he admits that scepticism of official accounts reported by the legacy media is wise. Not so in countries he presumably considers to be democratic. In other words, Levy appears to believe that the Western legacy media is free and pluralistic and exercises its duty to question power. He is apparently unaware that the establishment's media in the West is, in fact, the state's gatekeeper of information and news.

Levy recognises that it is impossible to understand the "contours of our world" if we don't appreciate that conspiracies, including possible government conspiracies, are a "common feature" of our "social and political life." In Levy's view, these concrete conspiracies are identified, investigated, exposed, and ultimately approved—or not—for public debate by the "epistemic authorities."

The epistemic authorities, he tells us, comprise, but are not limited to, academia, the intelligence agencies, the police, and the legacy media.

These authorities determine whether or not a concrete conspiracy has occurred or is underway.

By contrast, any theory about a possible conspiracy that is *not* recognised by the epistemic authorities is, by definition, a conspiracy theory. It doesn't matter what evidence the proponents of a conspiracy theory present. Unless that evidence is accepted or reported by the epistemic authorities, it is, in Levy's view, *not* evidence.

This explanation leads us into a discussion of the evidence unearthed by Richard D. Hall—evidence that reveals the official Manchester Arena bombing narrative to be false. None of his discoveries have been accepted as evidence by the epistemic authorities. Therefore, according to Levy, Uscinski, Lewandowsky, and all other conspiracy theory researchers, the evidence we are about to explore *does not exist*.

The fact that we will be considering and highlighting Hall's evidence signifies, to these researchers, that we are not “responsible believers.” If we were, we would believe whatever we are told by the “properly constituted epistemic authorities.” But because we question the official account, we are psychologically flawed and suffering from “conspiracism.”

That's it!

“Conspiracy theories,” and the arguments presented by the so-called “conspiracy theorists,” are defined by the state approved “epistemic authorities” based upon their application of two logical fallacies: personal incredulity^[24] and appeal to authority. Thus, if you hold anti-establishment opinions and question the relevant epistemic authorities, you are, according to those same “epistemic authorities,” a “conspiracy theorist.”

Acknowledging that conspiracies are common, conspiracy theory researchers proclaim that the state and the establishment—i.e., the network most commonly complicit in “concrete” conspiracies—is the only relevant epistemic authority capable of identifying said “concrete” conspiracies.

These conspiracy theory “scientists” assert that perfectly rational anti-establishment opinion is “prima facie unwarranted.” Questioning the biased pluralism of the state—we'll define “biased pluralism” in the next chapter—is therefore a conspiracy theory born of a “conspiracy mindset.”

It goes without saying that some of us who hold anti-establishment opinions, who question power, and who are therefore labelled “conspiracy

theorists” consider these researchers’ worldview monumentally naïve, if not irretrievably stupid.

Others who may share our anti-establishment traits possibly take the view that conspiracy theory scientists are part of the establishment’s “epistemic authorities” and thus must churn out propaganda.

No matter which viewpoint you hold and no matter how much research is conducted, the premise upon which all conspiracy theory “science” is constructed is nothing but a set of logical fallacies and self-contradictory assumptions. There are so many presumptions, suppositions, and unfounded claims in conspiracy theory research, it in no way can be considered a scientific endeavour. It is the epitome of junk science.

Conspiracy theory research is constructed almost entirely on claims of intellectual superiority. Only an intellectual snob would insist that questioning the state is a conspiracy theory and that we “ought to accept explanations offered by properly constituted epistemic authorities.” In fact, this condescending claptrap is stridently anti-democratic, unacceptably authoritarian, and unreservedly wrong.

If you, like me, are willing to commit the alleged thought crime of conspiracism, perhaps because you also believe that questioning authority is actually a fundamental democratic ideal, then you, dear reader, are ready to read on.

Chapter 3: Sources

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Chapter 4: Propaganda Labels

The propagandist's purpose is to make one set of people forget that certain other sets of people are human. By robbing them of their personality, he puts them outside the pale of moral obligation. Mere symbols can have no rights—particularly when that of which they are symbolical is, by definition, evil.

[Aldous Huxley, *Words and Behaviour*^[1] (1936)]

Over the years, efforts have been made to convince us that the establishment doesn't really exist—or that, even if it does, it is *not* our enemy. At the same time, we have been encouraged to believe that anti-establishment opinions are unwarranted and are contrary to our valued political and social traditions.

According to the widely used *New Fontana Dictionary of Modern Thought*,^[2] which Lord Alan Bullock co-edited with filmmaker Stephen Trombley, "the establishment" *does* exist but is presented as rather benign, representing tradition and quite normal social class structures. The New Fontana describes "the establishment" as:

A term, usually pejorative, for an ill-defined amalgam of those institutions, social classes and forces which represent authority, legitimacy, tradition and the status quo.

Alan Bullock was a senior BBC European Service correspondent during World War Two. Given that this was a British wartime overseas service, unsurprisingly the BBC called the European Service "insistently propagandist."^[3]

After the war, Bullock came to wider public attention in Britain as the result of his frequent radio appearances on the popular BBC panel discussion "The Brains Trust," which ran throughout the 1940s and '50s.

Julian Huxley was one of the original Brains Trust panellists, and Bullock often broadcast alongside him. The pair also co-authored *History: Civilization from Its Beginnings*.^[4] Huxley, an avowed eugenicist,^[5] was the founding Director General of the UN's Education, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).

In 1970, Bullock received the French award of the Chevalier, Legion of Honour. In 1972, he was knighted Sir Alan Bullock for his major

contributions to the Order of the British Empire. Four years later, he was made a life peer as Baron Bullock of Leafield in the County of Oxfordshire.

So, as we can see, Bullock was a rewarded member of the establishment and can be considered one of Britain's epistemic authorities.

As you may recall, in Chapter 1 we cited Henry Fairlie Hose's original, concise description of "the establishment." He said that power isn't merely exercised by the government but through "the whole matrix of official and social relations." Yet, even though it was clear what Hose meant, Lord Bullock—ever the propagandist—tried to persuade us that "the establishment" was an "ill-defined" term and inferred its "pejorative" use was illegitimate.

Even Wikipedia,^[6] of all questionable sources, defines "the establishment" correctly:

The establishment is a term used to describe a dominant group or elite that controls a polity or an organization. It may comprise a closed social group that selects its own members or entrenched elite structures in specific institutions. One can refer to any relatively small class or group of people who can exercise control as the establishment.

[. . .]

Anti-authoritarian anti-establishment ideologies question the legitimacy of establishments, seeing their influence on society as undemocratic.

Thus, irrespective of Lord Bullock's evident state propaganda, it's safe to say that most of us know what "the establishment" is. The UN and conspiracy theory researchers undoubtedly understand it, too.

Becoming a member of the epistemic authorities is by establishment invitation only. Not every academic or journalist is welcome. Journalists who work in the state-controlled, establishment-approved legacy media, such as the BBC's Marianna Spring, are deemed epistemic authorities. Investigative journalists working in the independent media, such as Richard D. Hall, are not welcome and are instead frowned upon as "conspiracy theorists."

Professors Piers Robinson, Tim Hayward, and Mark Crispin Miller study state propaganda. They are eminently qualified to do this research and always cite the evidence that substantiates their work. Nonetheless, the legacy media^[7] have found each of these academics guilty of promoting

conspiracy theories. Unsurprisingly, none of the three are considered epistemic authorities.

They are not the only professors whose independent thought causes the establishment to malign them. Another who has been similarly scorned is David Miller, a sociologist whose research speciality is the study of Islamophobia and propaganda. (He is no relation to the aforementioned Mark Crispin Miller of New York University.)

In 2021 Prof. Miller was dismissed from his lecturer post at the University of Bristol after allegations were made that he was both a conspiracy theorist and an antisemite.^[8] Miller had long criticised the political ideology of Zionism and the policies of the Zionist Israeli government. In 2019, a group of students decided his lectures were offensive. The legacy media caught wind of the controversy and expressed their view that Miller's work was reminiscent of "anti-Semitic language, tropes and conspiracy theories."

Although the allegation against Prof. Miller was that he failed to meet the university's standards, years later his name was cleared when an employment tribunal ruled that he had been unfairly dismissed.^[9] Needless to say, David Miller, like Robinson (University of Sheffield until 2019), Hayward (University of Edinburgh), and Mark Crispin Miller (NYU), is not a member of the epistemic authorities.

Other unwelcome scholars include two political science professors, Martin Gilens (Princeton University) and Benjamin I. Page (Northwestern University). In 2014, after conducting a multivariate analysis of nearly 1,800 policy decisions made by the US government, the two professors co-wrote a paper, "Testing Theories of American Politics," in which they laid out the four theoretical traditions of electoral representative democracy in political science.^[10]

1. MAJORITARIAN ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY suggests that policymakers respond to the will of the majority. Concerned for their electoral prospects, politicians make policies that address issues that are important to the public and that promote the values and interests of the majority.

2. MAJORITARIAN PLURALISM theory submits that policy is shaped by the competing influence of interest groups. As collectives, these interest groups carry more political weight than the individuals that comprise them. By combining their efforts, organisations and groups of citizens can lobby policymakers to promote specific interests, such as land rights.

Theoretically, this mechanism also expresses the will of the majority to policymakers but in a less direct way than does the majoritarian electoral democracy.

3. ECONOMIC-ELITE DOMINATION proposes that policies are made in the interests of those with significant economic and financial resources. By controlling the legacy media, the elites' propaganda campaigns can sway public opinion toward supporting their chosen politician. In order to enjoy electoral success, the politician's primary objective is to secure the favour of the "economic-elite" rather than represent the will of the people.

4. BIASED PLURALISM suggests that majoritarian pluralism is corrupted by the wealth, power, and influence of the economic-elite and the corporations they manage. Multinational corporations can marshal resources to effectively drown out other pluralist groups, such as a group of citizens seeking to assert their land rights. The economic-elite dominate the political lobbies. They bend—or bias—policymakers' decisions toward their own corporate interests and away from the peoples' interests, frequently to the detriment of wider society.

In light of those four traditions, Gilens' and Page's objective was to examine the various influences on US government policy decisions in order to understand, as they put it, "Who governs? Who really rules? To what extent is the broad body of US citizens sovereign, semi-sovereign, or largely powerless?"

They concluded:

Economic-elites and organized groups representing business interests have substantial independent impacts on US government policy, while average citizens and mass-based interest groups have little or no independent influence. The results provide substantial support for theories of Economic-Elite Domination and for theories of Biased Pluralism, but not for theories of Majoritarian Electoral Democracy or Majoritarian Pluralism.

It is all too easy to accept concepts foisted on us by the establishment, whose members consider themselves "the elite." In fact, most scholars, including Gilens and Page, accept the premise that a body called "the elite" exists.

The Cambridge English Dictionary defines "the elite" as "the richest, most powerful, best-educated, or best-trained group in a society."

In other words, “the elite” are usually immeasurably wealthy and are thus able to exert immense political and social authority—that is, power.

The word “elite” implies that they are in some way different from the rest of us—the chosen few, the special ones. The perception of their elevated status is not mere inference or imagination. It is the product of a wing of sociology and political science that studies “elite theory.” Unsurprisingly, the theory owes its origins and its continuance to “the elite” themselves, who—equally unsurprisingly—have benevolently provided the funding for such studies.

Plato, who taught philosophy in the middle of the fourth century BCE, argued that society consists of three social groups: the Artisans (producers), the Auxiliaries (military), and the Guardians (rulers). Plato was an aristocrat from an extremely wealthy and powerful family of rulers (Guardians). He thought the Guardians, including himself, were so special—so gifted in wisdom, intellect, and moral virtue—that they needed to receive the best education, be given immense advantage, and be afforded plenty of time to become the philosopher-rulers of everyone else.

In subsequent millennia, “elite theorists” such as Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), and C. Wright Mills (1916–1962) have essentially presented the same argument as Plato. They insist that rule by an economic-elite, who control access to all resources and effectively hold supreme political authority, is either inevitable or essential—or both. “Elite theory,” published by epistemic authorities, consistently justifies, even argues for, the rule of an oligarchy.^[11]

Other thinkers, though, such as Adam Smith (1723–1790), Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), Lysander Spooner (1808–1887), Leonard E. Read (1898–1983), and Friedrich A. Hayek (1899–1992), have suggested that the “elite theorists” are talking out of their hats. As they see it, society does not need the order the economic-elite oligarchy tries to impose. Society functions better, is healthier, more innovative, and flourishes more without the dictatorship of an oligarchy.

It is well understood that the US is ruled by the establishment, that the establishment is comprised of the aforementioned financial and economic “elite,” and that they govern in their own self-interest.

A similar “elite” class forms the establishment in—and governs, out of the same self-interest—nearly every nation-state on earth. The political system

favoured by these biased pluralist states is called representative democracy. But it is *not* real democracy.

Today, the establishment in each country has come together as never before to form an international establishment. It coalesces around the global “centres of official power”—most notably the UN itself. This planet-wide establishment operates through stakeholder^[12] “partnerships” in addition to the “social relationships” described by Fairlie. The globalist power structure, common to nearly every nation and within which biased pluralist power and economic-elite domination is exercised, can best be described as a global public-private partnership^[13] (G3P).

The system of democratic rights, outlined by T. H. Marshall (1893–1981) in his essay “Citizenship and Social Class,” such as equal access to justice, equal opportunity for all, and freedom of speech and expression do not and cannot exist in a state dominated by the establishment, no matter what the political system is called—capitalist, socialist, fascist, etc.

Anti-establishment opinion opposes rule by the establishment and argues in favour of democratic ideals. Those who are anti-establishment stand for individual sovereignty and for a functioning majoritarian electoral democracy that is open to possible genuine majoritarian pluralism. Anti-establishment opinion rejects the biased pluralism of an economic-elite as oppressive and undemocratic.

In the conspiracy theory research paper Enders et al (2022),^[14] the authors define an “anti-establishment orientation” as “deep-seated antagonism toward and suspicion of the political establishment, including mainstream parties, politicians, and media.”

It seems that to question the state—its epistemic authorities or its official narratives, or both—is considered antagonistic. The paper then asserts that “conspiracy theories and misinformation” (CTM) have become the same thing. In other words, a conspiracy theory is, at best, misinformation, and it is spread by people who hold psychologically unbalanced anti-establishment orientations. The authors write:

[W]e find that anti-social personality traits [and] anti-establishment orientations [. . .] are more strongly related to beliefs in CTM than traditional left-right orientations or other frequently posited factors, such as education, science literacy, and social media use.

According to Enders et al., anyone who dares suggest that power actually operates through the biased pluralism of an economic-elite should be castigated as a vile and dangerous “conspiracy theorist.”

The epistemic authorities have invented the term “Dark Triad,” which they attach to their fancied “conspiracy theory” label. Psychologists D. L. Paulhus and K. M. Williams define “Dark Triad” as follows:^[15]

The Dark Triad (DT) is a collection of three interrelated, malevolent personality constructs: narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism.

Experimental psychologists often refer to the Dark Triad as “dark traits.” As a result of their conspiracy theory research, Enders et al. (2022) found:

[T]he only anti-social personality trait that systematically appears to be unrelated to conspiracy beliefs, at least controlling for other factors, is Machiavellianism. Every single other factor is associated with conspiracy beliefs in some, if not most, models.

[. . .]

Dark traits and anti-establishment orientations seem to be the most important predictors of the CTM beliefs.

Psychologists define Machiavellianism as:^[16]

[. . .] a personality trait characterized by manipulativeness, deceitfulness, high levels of self-interest, and a tendency to see other people as means to an end. People who display especially elevated levels of Machiavellianism [. . .] lack empathy and take a cynical, unemotional view of the world.

We are given to understand that conspiracy theorists are narcissistic psychopaths with an antagonistic anti-establishment orientation and a lack of empathy . . . but also that they are really neither manipulative nor self-interested!

It seems pretty clear that experimental psychologists in the field of conspiracy theory research tend to produce never-ending self-contradictory drivel. Their proposed definition of “conspiracy theory” and the supposed traits of “conspiracy theorists” seem to constantly shift to suit the state’s objectives rather than making any consistent sense. Thus, it is not unreasonable to conclude that both terms have no epistemic meaning.

The problem for the UN's member states, including the UK government, is that they are rapidly losing their control over public opinion. The reach of legacy media propagandists is dwindling because the public increasingly sees them as merely gatekeepers of the state's—that is, the G3P establishment's—information and news. Now that the public has free access to the internet, they can find facts online that refute the state's narrative.

Remember Lewandowsky et al.'s 2020 "Guide to Conspiracy Theories," discussed in the previous chapter? It seems that its authors may have realised their suggestion—that someone who questions official narratives is a lunatic—was too authoritarian for the public to swallow. Perhaps this explains why their guide started to move away from simply claiming that conspiracy theorists are merely mad and began insinuating that they are also dangerous radicals:

In the past, belief in conspiracy theories was often associated with paranoia and other psychological problems. And while some individual conspiracy theorists might well be paranoid, belief in such theories is far too wide-spread to be explained in terms of abnormal psychology.

[. . .]

Conspiracy theories are an inevitable ingredient of political extremism, and therefore research on deradicalization provides some useful insights into how to combat conspiracy theories.

If “deradicalization” research provides “useful insights” into how to combat the “political extremism” of the conspiracy theorists, presumably the state and the establishment’s epistemic authorities have a pretty clear idea about the radicalisation process and how extremist conspiracy theories fit into it and, therefore, how to counter it.

But when we closely examine these assertions, they also collapse like a house of cards.

Following the tragic murder in 2021 of MP David Amess, the epistemic authorities reported that Ali Harbi Ali, the man subsequently convicted of murdering Mr Amess, was radicalised online.^[17] The BBC reported that Ali Harbi Ali presented us with an example of “textbook radicalisation.” This was quite an extraordinary claim, considering there is no such thing as “textbook radicalisation.”

The BBC claimed.^[18]

Harbi Ali's motives – made clear during police interviews and his trial – reveal a textbook study of radicalisation.

[. . .]

Harbi Ali told himself he could [. . .] join the ranks of home-grown attackers [. . .] on the basis of an instruction [through online videos] from an IS propagandist who played a major role in the spread of terrorism attacks in western Europe.

The story we are supposed to believe about Ali Harbi Ali's alleged path toward radicalisation is that he became a terrorist and a murderer because he watched YouTube videos and engaged in online groups that advocate terrorism. This tale is another legacy media fairy story.

In 2016, United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur Ben Emmerson issued a report^[19] to inform potential UN strategies to counter extremism and terrorism. Emmerson revealed there was neither an agreed-upon definition of “extremism” nor any cogent theory^[20] explaining the “radicalisation” process. He wrote:

[M]any programmes directed at radicalisation [are] based on a simplistic understanding of the process as a fixed trajectory to violent extremism with identifiable markers along the way.

[. . .]

There is no authoritative statistical data on the pathways towards individual radicalisation.

That UN report was followed, in 2017, with the publication of “Countering Domestic Extremism” by the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The NAS gave an account of a symposium discussion on how people come to adopt extremist ideologies.

The NAS highlighted^[21] the fact that:

[. . .] there is no “silver bullet” or profile of someone who will perpetrate violent extremism. [. . .] No single shared motivator for violent extremism has been found. [. . .] There is no profile of an extremist; there is no set of three or five warning indicators that we can give to a law enforcement officer.

In July 2018, a research team from Deakin University in Australia largely corroborated the Emmerson and NAS findings. Their peer-reviewed article,^[22] “The 3Ps of Radicalisation,” was based on a meta-analysis of all the

available academic literature on radicalisation. They identified three broad drivers that could potentially lead someone toward violent extremism: Push, Pull, and Personal factors.

“Push” factors are created by an individual’s perception of their social or political environment. Their awareness of state repression, structural deprivation, poverty, and injustice, for example, can lead them to feel resentment and anger.

“Pull” factors are unifying and aspirational elements of extremism that can appeal to a certain individual. The pull of ideological commitment, of group identity and a sense of belonging, of finding and fulfilling a purpose, of promises of justice, of eternal glory, and so on, win them over.

“Personal” factors are the aspects of an individual’s personality that may predispose them to being more vulnerable to Push or Pull influences. Examples can include mental health problems, growing up in a dysfunctional family, or deep-seated reactions to untoward life experiences.

Currently, the UN cites^[23] its own report, “Journey to Extremism in Africa,” as “the most extensive study yet on what drives people to violent extremism.” Building on the work we’ve just explained, the report concludes that radicalisation is the product of numerous factors that combine to lead an individual down a path to extremism and possible violence.

The UN states:^[24]

We know the drivers and enablers of violent extremism are multiple, complex and context specific, while having religious, ideological, political, economic and historical dimensions. They defy easy analysis, and understanding of the phenomenon remains incomplete.

Back to the BBC report: To claim that the story of Ali Harbi Ali is an example of “textbook radicalisation” is complete nonsense. Given that we have an “incomplete” understanding of the radicalisation process, identifying precisely how or why an individual is led to commit violent or terrorist acts defies “easy analysis.”

Everything we know about the radicalisation process reveals a convoluted interplay between social, economic, political, cultural, and personal factors. These various influences may combine to lead someone toward violent extremism and potential terrorism. In the overwhelming majority of cases, though, they do not.

It is extremely difficult to predict which individuals may become radicalised. Millions, if not billions, of people share the same Push, Pull and Personal beliefs and experiences, but only a minuscule minority turn to extremism and violence.

We can say that watching videos and hanging around in online chat groups could be part of the radicalisation process. Absent all the other contributory elements, however, it is in no way reasonable to assert that someone becomes a terrorist simply because he is “radicalised online.” Such a suggestion is pure rubbish.

Indeed, the absurdity of the claim was unintentionally emphasised by the UN in its June 2023 publication of its “Preventing Violent Extremism” strategy. In that report, the UN wrote^[25] that “deaths from terrorist activity have fallen considerably worldwide in recent years.”

During the same period, global internet use had increased by forty-five percent,^[26] from 3.7 billion people in 2018 to 5.4 billion in 2023. Quite clearly, if there is any correlation between internet use and terrorism—and there is little reason to think there is—it’s an *inverse* one.

Propagandist members of the epistemic authorities, such as the BBC’s specialist disinformation correspondent Marianna Spring, have been spreading falsehoods about online radicalisation for some time. Their apparent motive is to deceive the public into thinking that government legislation, such as the UK’s Online Safety Act (OSA), will do something to tackle the fictitious problem of online radicalisation.

In her January 2024 article “Young Britons exposed to online radicalisation following Hamas attack,” Spring wrote:^[27]

It is a spike in hate that leaves young Britons increasingly exposed to radicalisation by algorithm. [. . .] Algorithms are recommendation systems that promote new content to a user based on posts they engage with. That means they can drive some people to more extreme ideas.

“Radicalisation by algorithm” is a term Marianna Spring made up and it is meaningless. To this dross she added:

So what about all of the hate that sits in the middle? It’s not extreme enough to be illegal, but it still poisons the public discourse and risks pushing some people further towards extremes.

[. . .]

Responsibility for dealing with hateful posts – as of now – lies with the social media companies. It also lies, to some extent, with policy makers looking to regulate the sites, and users themselves. New legislation like the Online Safety Act does force the social media companies to take responsibility for illegal content, too.

To be clear: there is no reason to think that content that is “not extreme enough to be illegal” risks pushing anyone “towards extremes.” Even if a minority of people do adopt opinions some people might consider “extreme,” Spring’s assertion that “hateful posts”—whatever they are—need to be controlled by the Big Tech G3P stakeholder partners of the state is resoundingly based on nothing at all.

Her blurring of definitions, from “terrorist” to “hate” to “hateful posts” to “extremes,” is a meaningless word salad. This propaganda is evidently designed to convince the public that terrorists become terrorists because they watch YouTube videos or are influenced by the “hurty” words they read and share on social media. None of this nonsense is true.

Spring is clearly attempting to lend credibility to the state’s legislative push to silence all dissent online and censor legitimate public opinion. When she argues the state and its corporate partners need to assume “responsibility” for protecting the public from themselves, she is encouraging the public to accept oppressive legislation by trying to convince them the state is imposing it for their benefit.

The rhetorical tactic, used by Spring and her ilk, to scare everyone by suggesting that people who question the government or the establishment are either insane or dangerous is not working. If anything, the tactic is backfiring. Indeed, more and more people are questioning power and expressing doubts about the official account of events. That fact undoubtedly worries the biased pluralist state. It is fighting back by dispatching propagandists like Spring. Apparently she has been told to concoct the argument that censorship is a necessary evil if we are all to stay safe from dangerous conspiracy theorist extremists and, ultimately, from terrorists.

As a propaganda device, hyping the threat of conspiracy theorists—and calling them dangerous—is hardly new. The campaign to identify and label conspiracy theorists and equate them with violence and extremism began in the US after the Second World War. It has subsequently spread and is now a standard global propaganda practice.

If conspiracy theorists are no more than intellectual pygmies with wacky ideas, how come they get so much attention? Why do powerful people like prime ministers and presidents make a big deal about crazy conspiracy theorists in the middle of their most important speeches addressing worldwide audiences?

In the November 2001 speech George W. Bush gave at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), he said—and I quote:^[28]

We must speak the truth about terror. Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists themselves, away from the guilty. To inflame ethnic hatred is to advance the cause of terror.

Even if one accepts the official account of 9/11—and there are a lot of evidence-based reasons to doubt it^[29]—*how* does questioning the official account make one a supporter of terrorism or mark one as a racist? Bush's proposition was farcical. It was theatre. The fact that a US President said it illustrates that he was desperately seeking to silence all criticism of the government account by linking the challengers of that account to extremism and to terrorism.

The same intimidation tactic was put to good use by then-UK Prime Minister David Cameron when he spoke to the UNGA in 2014. Cameron said:^[30]

To defeat ISIL and organisations like it, we must defeat this ideology in all its forms.

[. . .]

It is clear that many of them were initially influenced by preachers who claim not to encourage violence, but whose world view can be used as a justification for it. We know this world view. The peddling of lies: that 9/11 was a Jewish plot or that the 7/7 London attacks were staged.

[. . .]

We must be clear: to defeat the ideology of extremism we need to deal with all forms of extremism – not just violent extremism. We must work together to take down illegal online material.

[. . .]

We must stop the so called non-violent extremists from inciting hatred and intolerance. We must speak the truth about terror. Let us never tolerate outrageous conspiracy theories concerning the attacks of September the 11th; malicious lies that attempt to shift the blame away from the terrorists, themselves, away from the guilty. To inflame ethnic hatred is to advance the cause of terror.

Cameron's and Bush's aims were identical. According to them and to other leaders of UN member states, the public must be stopped from exercising their democratic rights. What better way to achieve that end than to accuse anyone who entertains an original thought about terror events of being conspiracy theorists and then to tie that label first to "non-violent extremists" who incite "hatred and intolerance" and eventually to violent, murderous terrorists!

The BBC's Marianna Spring is among the legacy media members of the epistemic authorities who continue to peddle and embellish this propagandist myth.

In May 2024, Spring reported^[31] that UK MPs have been given a handbook about conspiracy theories. It was handed out to them by the Lord President of the Privy Council,^[32] Penny Mordaunt MP. Needless to add, Mordaunt is a stalwart of the establishment.^[33]

Spring claimed that the handbook would serve as "a reminder" to MPs that they were supposedly "grappling with the social media world." She also wrote that MPs needed the handbook as "an indication of the real-world harm [that] disinformation, conspiracy theories and hate on social media have caused in recent months and years." The handbook is all the evidence the MPs need, Spring insisted, before adding:

[Conspiracy theories] emerge up every time something major happens — whether a violent attack, a war, a disappearance. They're used to explain what's unfolding in the here and now, rather than historical events. And a committed conspiracy theory movement exists here in the UK. These conspiracy theories often exploit valid questions or go far beyond legitimate concerns — instead suggesting elaborate plots for which there is no evidence.

What Spring alleges is a "conspiracy theory movement" represents at least a quarter of the UK population. Almost none of the members of this so-called "movement" even know they are in a movement. They live in every community in the UK and don't share any identifiable demographic

characteristics. Such a movement simply does not exist, yet Marianna Spring and the BBC defy reality and insist that it does.

When Spring tells us “there is no evidence” to support any conspiracy theory, what she is doing is consistently ignoring and never reporting the evidence and thereby claiming it doesn’t exist.

The “handbook” distributed to MPs by Privy Councillor Mordaunt was written by the Antisemitism Policy Trust (APT), an organisation comprised of groups like the Institute for Strategic Dialogue (ISD) and so-called fact checkers such as the UK-based Full Fact. Mordaunt doled out the handbook to “educate” UK MPs about so-called conspiracy theories.

The ISD appears to be the lead author of the handbook. The ISD’s counter-extremism work and its other publications provide the bulk of the information used in the handbook. The ISD is the epitome of a global public-private partnership.

The ISD’s partners and funders^[34] include Google (Alphabet), Facebook (Meta), Microsoft, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Open Society Foundation (the Soros family), Chatham House (the Royal Institute for International Affairs policy think tank), and numerous Western governments (aka UN member states), plus the EU and of course the UN itself.

The ISD’s stated purpose is to respond to “extremism in all its forms.” This includes the “non-violent” form of extremism labelled “conspiracy theory” by David Cameron and Marianna Spring (and many others).

Here, ISD outlines how it operates:^[35]

ISD partners with governments, cities, businesses and communities, working to deliver solutions at all levels of society, to empower those that can really impact change. [. . .] We are always independent and maintain the highest standards of integrity.

But the ISD is *not* independent of the G3P network it represents. Like the BBC, its assertion of its independence is what the ISD itself, if it were being honest, would call disinformation! The ISD’s claim of integrity, therefore, is also highly questionable.

The ISD continues:

[The] ISD is uniquely able to turn research and analysis into evidence-based policy and action. Our research and insights shape our action programming on the front lines, and inform the training and policy

advisory work we provide to central and local governments, civil society, front line practitioners and international organisations.

[. . .]

Our counter-extremism and digital citizenship education programmes have been rolled out in 12 countries. From the first multi-media counter-extremism educational resources for schools, to our cutting edge digital citizenship programmes, our work builds the resilience of young people to hate speech, misinformation and extremism on and offline.

The ISD forms national government and local government policy through the partnerships it maintains with state institutions. It tells children and citizens around the world they need to worry about the alleged “hate speech” that the ISD itself defines.

The ISD adds:

The ISD has provided policy support and training to over 40 governments and hundreds of cities worldwide. [. . .] Beyond partnerships with institutions like the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, ISD has spearheaded and led inter-governmental initiatives in the domains of counter-extremism and digital regulation.

The ISD’s reach is global. It is deeply embedded in intergovernmental decision-making. It is an integral part of the G3P establishment’s creation of increasingly draconian digital regulation, the design of which the ISD “spearheaded and led.” The ISD and like organisations turn “research and analysis” into “policy and action.” Examples of their work include the UK’s Online Safety Act, the EU’s Digital Service Act, and the UN-proposed Cybercrimes Treaty.

You may be asking yourself: When did I elect the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the Open Society Foundation, Google, Meta, or, indeed, foreign governments to formulate policies that are directly impacting my life?

You never did, of course. Nor did I. But that doesn’t matter, because the ISD assures all of us that it is working to “push back the forces threatening democracy” and that we should unquestioningly trust it because its “work on safeguarding democracy” is vital.

Everything the ISD is and everything it does is inimical to the democratic ideals upon which our societies and political systems are supposedly

based. The form of “democracy” the ISD represents could not be further removed from the majority’s concept of democratic accountability.

The model of democracy the ISD safeguards is the biased pluralism of an establishment-controlled state, led by a misnamed economic “elite.” The ISD is not pushing back the “forces threatening democracy.” On the contrary, it is among the forces that have *ended* democracy.

The ISD has told the public, in its own words, what it is up to. If, however, you try to alert the wider public to what the ISD is doing, then you, my friend, are a conspiracy theorist engaging in conspiracy theory extremism.

According to Marianna Spring, the global public-private partnership (G3P) that is exerting its undemocratic would-be authority to control policy in countries around the world does not exist. It is no more than an “elaborate plot,” she insists. I guess she would also contend, if asked, that there is no evidence to support the existence of the ISD, either. Certainly, none of its published statements are real! And if you say they are, you are part of a dangerous conspiracy theory “movement” causing “real-world harm” by spreading “hate” and “disinformation.”

The Antisemitism Policy Trust (APT) [handbook](#),^[36] which the ISD played a major role in producing, is titled “Conspiracy Theories: A Guide for Members of Parliament and Candidates.” The “evidence” the handbook references to support its contentions is largely a collection of legacy media articles and so-called research reports from G3P organisations such as the ISD. With the exception of Prof. Uscinski, few academics or academic papers are cited directly.

Nonetheless, the handbook extols the pseudoscientific contentions of the conspiracy theory researcher scholars. Here’s a sample from the handbook:

There are numerous predicating factors that make believing in conspiracy theories more likely. These include personality traits, such as narcissism, [. . .] which was found to have a strong correlation with a tendency to endorse conspiracy theories. Suffering from anxiety [. . .] and believing in paranormal phenomena have also been found to predict conspiracy beliefs. Underlying psychological disorders, such as paranoid ideation and schizotypy are also strong predictors of a tendency to believe in conspiracy theories.

The gobbledygook goes on:

[E]xisting belief in one conspiracy theory is a very strong predictor for a belief in additional ones. As such, people who already believe in one conspiracy theory can be more easily persuaded to believe in increasingly more radical and hateful conspiracy theories, which may lead them to commit hate crimes and various forms of violent extremist behaviour.

This is a reference to conspiracism or the conspiracy mindset. Someone who possesses this alleged psychological predisposition is said to be likely to believe more than one conspiracy theory.

Let's pause a moment to consider this idiotic assertion.

Let's say you are told by the state and its epistemic authorities that you live in a free and open democratic society. They assure you that, as a voting citizen, you have democratic oversight over the policymakers you elect. You believe them. You never have a reason to question what they tell you.

Then you discover that some global policy think tank change agent you've never heard of actually formulates many of the policies you previously thought were decided by politicians. The government you elected does not make anywhere near as many independent policy decisions as you imagined. You realise you have far less democratic oversight than you were led to believe. You have been deceived.

So, the next time the state or members of the established epistemic authorities tell you to believe something, are you likely to be less or more sceptical? What the propagandists call a psychological predisposition the rest of us call common sense.

According to the APT handbook given to the MPs, your scepticism poses "a danger to democracies, public health, social cohesion, public safety and more" because your opinions "reduce trust in democratic institutions, in governments, and in mainstream, regulated media outlets." Even worse, your questioning of power supposedly means you are far more likely to engage in "violent hate crimes, terrorism, and abuse."

The handbook assures MPs that every word it contains is true. After all, it reminds them, conspiracy theory researchers have connected people who question power "to violent extremism and acts of terrorism." The researchers are clueless as to the causes of radicalisation—beyond a broad acknowledgement of the many factors involved that "defy easy analysis." Yet the APT and the ISD make these bold assertions as if they are absolute facts.

I have just outlined a conspiracy theory, dear reader. I have alleged an “elaborate plot” apparently—namely, that the ISD is part of the G3P establishment and, as such, is exerting undemocratic influence on and control over our polity.

Nowhere in my allegation have I suggested this is part of a Jewish plot to enslave humanity. First off, I don’t believe that to be the case. Secondly, there’s no evidence to suggest that it is.

But the APT insists I am hiding my bigotry, it pulls allegations of antisemitism from nowhere and attacks them full bore:

The common notion shared by many conspiracy theories, of a secret cabal that seeks world domination by controlling world events, promoting conflicts and financial instability, can find its roots in age-old antisemitism. Commonly-used phrases in conspiracy theories, for example, ‘Global Elite,’ have historically acted as code words for Jews. [. . .] References to a ‘Global Elite’, ‘cabal’, or ‘dark forces’ usually imply a Jewish conspiracy of control for a secret world order.

This is irredeemably false. The activities of the ISD are *not* a “secret.” The terms “ISD” and “economic-elite” and “G3P” have *not* been used here as “code words for Jews.”

I’m sure some so-called conspiracy theories *are* antisemitic. Likewise, some are homophobic, some racist, some Islamophobic, others misogynistic. That is because some *people* are antisemites, some *people* are racists, some *people* are Islamophobes, etc.

There is no evidence that the people collectively labelled “conspiracy theorists” are anything other than a wide cross section of the general population. Their uniqueness, if it can be called that, lies in the fact that, when warranted, they question the seats of power.

The ISD and the wider APT group use what is called a composition fallacy^[37]—“a type of argument when one claims that if something is true for the part then that is true for the whole or the group too.”

The APT’s purpose is to discredit every ostensible conspiracy theory by claiming they are all rooted in hate, bigotry and, in particular, antisemitism. According to the APT, if you question the Manchester Arena bombing, it is not because you find the evidence exposing the hoax compelling. Rather, in the APT’s eyes, it is because you are an antisemite or a racist hatemonger.

As historian Antony C. Sutton pointed out in his book^[38] *Wall Street and the Bolshevik Revolution*:

The persistence with which the Jewish-conspiracy myth has been pushed suggests that it may well be a deliberate device to divert attention from the real issues and the real causes. [. . .] What better way to divert attention from the real operators than by the medieval bogeyman of antisemitism?

Frankly, pretty much everything the APT and ISD have told UK MPs is without foundation. It is propagandist bilge designed to protect the interests of the biased pluralist state and the establishment. Sadly, most MPs will likely believe it. Sadly, too, the minority of MPs who know it is bunkum will probably still use it to justify the policy decisions they are instructed to make.

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Chapter 5: The Propaganda Construct

As we have already discussed, the definition of a conspiracy theory is any allegation of a conspiracy that the epistemic authorities reject. We also noted that conspiracy theory is nothing new. Nearly every single significant world event throughout history has been subject to conspiracy theorising.

In 117 CE, Roman Emperor Trajan died only two days after nominating his successor, Hadrian. All his reported symptoms suggested a stroke brought on by cardiovascular disease.

By the fourth century, allegations concerning Trajan's death were being discussed in *Historia Augusta*^[1]. These included claims that Trajan had been poisoned by three conspiracists: Hadrian; the praetorian prefect Attianus; and Trajan's wife, Plotina.

While we would call these historical interpretations "conspiracy theories" today, the term was not commonly used in any kind of pejorative or propagandist sense until the late 1960s. The earliest written reference to something approaching the modern concept of conspiracy theory appeared in the 1870s in the *Journal of Mental Science* Volume 16:^[2]

The theory of Dr. Sankey as to the manner in which these injuries to the chest occurred in asylums deserved our careful attention. It was at least more plausible that the conspiracy theory of Mr. Charles Beade.

This is perhaps the first time we see a published association made between "conspiracy theory" and implausibility. Yet the term wasn't widely interpreted that way. Throughout most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, "conspiracy theory," if used at all, usually denoted little more than an allegation of a criminal plot or malevolent act by a group.

After the Second World War, colloquial use of "conspiracy theory" was rare. However, academics were beginning to lay the foundations for the interpretation that has ultimately produced the propaganda label we are familiar with today.

The burgeoning idea was that the large numbers of people who questioned official accounts of events or orthodox historical interpretations were all delusional to some degree. Questioning the state or the epistemic authorities—and alleging that the state was responsible for criminal acts—was deemed to be an aberration of the mind.

In 1945, the philosopher Karl Popper published his political work *The Open Society and Its Enemies*. In it, Popper criticised historicism.^[3] He opined that historical events were vulnerable to misinterpretation by those who were predisposed to see conspiracies behind them.

He argued this was because historians suffered from cognitive dissonance^[4]—the uncomfortable psychological sensation of holding two opposing thoughts or beliefs simultaneously. They could not accept that tumultuous events could just happen through nothing more than a combination of error and chaotic circumstances.

In Popper's view, these historians were too quick to reject the possibility of random events influencing history, preferring unsubstantiated conspiratorial explanations—usually because they made better stories and thereby garnered more attention.

Popper formulated a concept he called the conspiracy theory of society.^[5] He believed that social sciences should concern themselves with the study of the *unintended* consequences of *intentional* human behaviour, not with conspiracy theories. Speaking of the conspiracy theory perspective, he wrote:

It must be admitted that the structure of our social environment is man-made. [. . .] But this does not mean that they are all consciously designed. [. . .] On the contrary, even those which arise as the result of conscious and intentional human actions are, as a rule, the indirect, the unintentional and often the unwanted byproducts of such actions.

Outlining his conspiracy theory of society, Popper continued:

[Conspiracy theory] is the view that an explanation of a social phenomenon consists in the discovery of the men or groups who are interested in the occurrence of this phenomenon (sometimes it is a hidden interest which has first to be revealed), and who have planned and conspired to bring it about. This view [. . .] arises, of course, from the mistaken theory that, whatever happens in society [. . .] is the result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups. [. . .] In its modern forms it is like modern historicism.

[. . .]

Conspiracies occur, it must be admitted. But the striking fact which, in spite of their occurrence, disproves the conspiracy theory is that few of these conspiracies are ultimately successful.

Popper's view, then, is more or less like Lewandowsky's, Gorman's and other conspiracy theory researchers' view: conspiracy theory is an all-encompassing belief system that accounts for everything that happens as the "result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups."

Sure, if one imagines that conspiracy theorists, so-called, actually think that way, then it's not unreasonable to consider them irrational. But isn't it odd that this same standard is never applied to those who propose *official* conspiracy theories?

For years, the establishment on both sides of the Atlantic accused Donald Trump of colluding with the Russian government to influence the outcome of the 2016 presidential election in his favour. When the official Mueller Report into the alleged conspiracy found no evidence of collusion^[6] by Trump, we didn't hear that Trump's accusers were conspiracy theorists, did we? No one denounced Hillary Clinton—a Trump detractor—as a "conspiracy theorist" who believes everything that happens in the US is the "result of direct design by some powerful individuals and groups."

Following the assassination of US President John F. Kennedy in 1963, alternative explanations of why and how he was murdered proliferated, largely because the official account seemed so implausible. Many Americans were legitimately concerned that elements within the federal government had staged a coup.

That US citizens doubted their own government's account of the assassination worried some people, such as prominent American historian Richard Hofstadter. Partly as a critique of McCarthyism but also in response to the Republican nomination loss of Nelson A. Rockefeller, Hofstadter suggested that people's inability to believe what they are told by their government was not based on their grasp of the evidence but rather was rooted in their own psychological failings.

He blamed these supposed failings on citizens' lack of education (thus their presumably limited knowledge of political events) as well as their political disenfranchisement and their unjustified sense of self-importance. He also suggested their dangerous opinions threatened to pollute the body politic.

Like Popper, Hofstadter did not identify "conspiracy theorists" directly. But he did construct the narrative that underpins the modern, widely accepted definition of conspiracy theory.

He wrote:^[7]

I call it the paranoid style simply because no other word adequately evokes the sense of heated exaggeration, suspiciousness, and conspiratorial fantasy that I have in mind.

[. . .]

It is the use of paranoid modes of expression by more or less normal people that makes the phenomenon significant.

[. . .]

Of course, there are highbrow, lowbrow, and middlebrow paranoids, as there are likely to be in any political tendency. But respectable paranoid literature not only starts from certain moral commitments that can indeed be justified but also carefully and all but obsessively accumulates “evidence.”

[. . .]

[The paranoid person] can accumulate evidence in order to protect his cherished convictions.

By emphasising what he called the paranoid's tendency to highlight the evidence, as if that were a failing, Hofstadter was making the deliberate choice to *not address* that evidence—or even *mention* it. Upon no basis whatsoever, he asserted that the evidence was not believable and that his readers should just take his word for it.

The Warren Commission^[8] report on JFK's assassination drew considerable criticism and was met with widespread disbelief. Its finding, that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone, contradicted numerous eyewitness accounts as well as substantial photographic, film, autopsy, and ballistic evidence.

Four of the seven Warren commissioners harshly criticised the report issued in their name. It was probably received with ridicule by the majority of those who read it. In the absence of any sensible and sane official account of the assassination, numerous other explanatory theories inevitably sprang up, both in writing and in public discourse.

In 1967, in response to the mounting criticism of the Warren report, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent an internal dispatch^[9] to all field offices called “Document 1035-960: Concerning Criticism of the Warren Report.” The dispatch, revealed in 1976 by a New York Times Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Request, is the first written record we have that

combines Karl Popper's "conspiracy theory of society" with Richard Hofstadter's "paranoid style" militancy. That combination is, in fact, the basis of our modern concept of conspiracy theory and, even more specifically, of the conspiracy theorist.

The CIA document states:

Conspiracy theories have frequently thrown suspicion on our organization, for example by falsely alleging that Lee Harvey Oswald worked for us. The aim of this dispatch is to provide material countering and discrediting the claims of the **conspiracy theorists**. [Emphasis added.]

The CIA's Document 1035-960 is the definitive origin of the weaponised term "conspiracy theorist." In it, the Agency recommends a set of techniques to be used to discredit all critics of the Warren Commission Report. Once readers familiarize themselves with these techniques, it becomes obvious that they are the exact strategies commonly deployed by the establishment today in its effort to dismiss every argument that casts doubt on official statements and narratives. Each strategy relies on a simple formula: slap the label of "conspiracy theorist" on anyone and everyone who ever questions those in power.

We will paraphrase the CIA's suggested strategies as follows:

1. — Deny any new evidence offered by the conspiracy theorist and cite only official reports. Do this by using phrases like "no new evidence has emerged." In the absence of definitive explanations that account for all the reported evidence, claim that it is safe to infer that the proposed conspiracy theory cannot possibly be true.
2. — Dismiss contradictory evidence, such as eyewitness statements, and focus on the existing official evidence reported by the epistemic authorities —approved ballistics, autopsy, and photographic evidence, for example.
3. — Do not initiate any discussion of the evidence. Instead, wherever the opportunity arises, plant seeds of doubt about conspiracy theorists by suggesting that large-scale conspiracies are impossible to cover up in an open and free democracy. Claim that there are too many variables that would need to be controlled for such a conspiracy to succeed without detection by the epistemic authorities.
4. — Accuse the conspiracy theorists of having an intellectual superiority complex. Assert that official investigations by the epistemic authorities are

wide-ranging and objective and that they take into consideration *all* the evidence.

5. — Claim that the alleged conspiracy is implausible based upon the epistemic authorities' determination of what constitutes acceptable evidence and their assessment of that evidence.

6. — Suggest that conspiracy theorists refuse to acknowledge their own errors and that their unwarranted speculation is hampering the investigation being led by the epistemic authorities. Point out that the conspiracy theorists are committing "information pollution."

7. — Dismiss any suspicious acts highlighted by the conspiracy theorists as nothing more than random events or perfectly normal occurrences.

8. — Always insist that the epistemic authorities are the only source of reliable information. Assert that any evidence that has not been examined or accounted for by the epistemic authorities is simply unworthy of consideration and does not need to be examined or accounted for. Encourage other members of the epistemic authorities to extol the claimed thoroughness and objectivity of their epistemic authority colleagues.

Furthermore, the dispatch recommended that CIA assets should make good use of "friendly elite contacts (especially politicians and editors)" and should "employ propaganda assets to [negate] and refute the attacks of the critics." It also advocated the use of legacy media feature articles to discredit the theories of anyone who does not toe the official line—who is, by default, a "conspiracy theorist."

In their published "Guide to Conspiracy Theories"—which the UN references as "scientific evidence"—professors Lewandowsky and Cook and Butter have this to say about CIA Document 1035-960:

There is a conspiracy theory that claims that the CIA invented the term "conspiracy theory" to disqualify criticism of the official version of the Kennedy assassination. [. . .] However, the CIA did not invent the term. The phrase is first used in its modern sense shortly after World War II by the philosopher of science Karl Popper, and since the 1960s it has been increasingly used in everyday discourse.

To say that Lewandowsky et al. offer a potted history of the etymology of the "conspiracy theorist" and "theory" labels is an understatement. By omitting the more complete history, their account appears deceptive. If we are being generous, perhaps we could say it is just wrong.

Today's pejorative use of “conspiracy theory” can be traced to Popper. As for the notion that only “paranoid” people believe conspiracy theories, it seems to have originated with Hofstadter. But it most assuredly was the CIA that combined the pejorative with the paranoid to “invent” the “conspiracy theory” and “conspiracy theorist” labels as they are “used in [the] modern sense.”

Both the theory and theorist terms are “used in [the] modern sense” to automatically discredit people like investigative journalist Richard D. Hall, who report evidence that the state and the establishment wish to conceal from the public. The state and the establishment obviously seek to conceal evidence about the Manchester Arena bombing—the subject of this book!

“Propaganda assets” exist within the ranks of the epistemic authorities. These assets are deployed “to [negate] and refute the attacks of the critics” who question official accounts.

In short, the “conspiracy theorist” label strategy, as it is used today, was first outlined by the CIA. That fact could not be more transparent.

Thus, it is not a “conspiracy theory”—despite what Lewandowsky et al. contend—to say that the CIA invented the “modern sense” of the term conspiracy theory. It is more than a theory; it is an historical fact. The irony is that Lewandowsky and his colleagues used the “conspiracy theory” label precisely as the CIA suggested!

By labelling the history of the term “conspiracy theory” *itself* a “conspiracy theory,” Lewandowsky et al., whether wittingly or not, were obfuscating facts and hiding evidence. Notably, while their “Guide to Conspiracy Theories” cites numerous articles, books, documents, and research papers, CIA Document 1035-960 is not among them. CIA Document 1035-960 is never mentioned, even once, by these conspiracy theory researchers in their assuredly *definitive* guide.

A number of experimental psychologists—who are, by definition, state-approved and establishment-approved members of the epistemic authorities—are engaged in the field of conspiracy theory research. It goes without saying that they have taken a propaganda construct directly from the intelligence agencies—including Document 1035-960—and come up with pseudoscientific jargon to lend the propaganda credibility. In truth, the whole “modern sense” of conspiracy theory is the artifice of state propagandists.

There is no such thing as conspiracy theory. What is dubbed the psychological affliction of “conspiracism” or “the conspiracy mindset” does not exist as any kind of plausible concept.

The accusation that someone is a conspiracy theorist is no more and no less than a propaganda device. It is designed to deter readers, listeners, and viewers from considering—that is, questioning, researching, analysing, weighing—the evidence that is being reported by the accused conspiracy theorist.

Demographic research has discovered that there are billions of people across the globe who are labelled “conspiracy theorists,” at one time or another, by their respective governments.

These billions are not an identifiable group by any stretch of the imagination. Anyone who questions power on any subject could be considered a “conspiracy theorist.” That does not mean the people labelled as conspiracy theorists all think that *everything* is a conspiracy. Nor does it mean they discount all random events, human error, unforeseen circumstances, or unanticipated outcomes. To say that they do is a propagandist myth—a myth based on junk science and on speculative theorising or simply on more propaganda.

Popper’s theory illustrates the fundamental difference between those labelled “conspiracy theorists” and those who, on the whole, defend the biased pluralist state and the establishment led by an economic-elite. For people who question power—the so-called conspiracy theorists—the evidence shows them that powerful forces *do* conspire, at least sometimes, to shape events, to control the flow of information, and to manipulate society. The evident deliberate engineering of society, which is highlighted by those who question power, is rejected by those who tend to *not* question power.

We are all individuals and no two people believe exactly the same thing but, broadly speaking, we can say there are people who tend to question power and there are others who don’t. The people who doubt authority still see the same chaotic mess in the world as those that don’t. But the more sceptical also see biased pluralism, economic-elite domination, and social engineering. This is not because they all have a psychological need or an underlying antagonistic belief system that stimulates their desire to see it, but because the evidence points to that reality.

Popper, Hofstadter, Lewandowsky, and others exaggerate the role of coincidence. Is this because they never question authority, is it indicative of possible naiveté? We can say that it is wrong to assume every travesty inflicted by the state and the establishment is a mistake. Not every abuse is beyond state control.

Currently, the Manchester Arena survivors are suing the UK's domestic intelligence agency (MI5) for its failure to stop the alleged bomber Salman Abedi. For reasons we'll discuss, it is widely known that the intelligence agencies were fully aware of Abedi in advance, and the evidence suggests they collaborated with him to some extent.

But, according to these same intelligence agencies and other epistemic authorities, to accuse the state of collaboration with terrorists is a conspiracy theory. Therefore, the lawsuit alleges "mistakes" rather than the state's deliberate facilitation of terrorism. The civil claim brought by those present in the Arena that night ensures the narrative stays controlled.

Thus, the pending court case frames the Overton window of permitted dissent. This can then be sold to the public by the legacy media.^[10] The extent to which the public is allowed to question the Manchester Arena bombing has been confined by the state and its epistemic authorities.

In reality, the Manchester Arena event was a hoaxed false flag—or, as the Americans would put it, a false flag hoax. It is very difficult to see how the hoax could have been perpetrated *without* the involvement of the state or, shall we say, of elements working within the state. History is littered with examples of the powerful using their influence to further their own interests at our expense,^[11] often costing people their lives.

It appears people like Popper, who reject the possibility that powerful groups often have malign intent and who maintain that power is invariably either benign or simply error-prone, reveal their own cognitive dissonance.

The Poppers of this world seem unable to even contemplate the possibility that the political, social, and economic power structures they believe in could ever deliberately harm anyone.

Theirs is an historically illiterate opinion. Those who maintain this opinion put faith in authority—a faith that is not shared by the people they label "conspiracy theorists."

Given that state-orchestrated false flag terrorism, both real and hoaxed, is relatively common, and given that there are numerous historical and recent

precedents, there is every reason to question the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing. Granted, the conversation that arises from this questioning may cause some to take offence. That cannot be helped.

An appreciation of the history of state-run false flag operations may go some way toward overcoming cognitive dissonance. We'll look at that history now, with the caveat that *history alone* is no proof that the Manchester Arena bombing was one of those false flags.

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Chapter 6: A Brief History of False Flags

Karl Popper wasn't alone in believing that large-scale conspiracies are rare events that tend to fail. The conspiracy theory researchers behind Douglas et al. (2019) agreed with Popper when they wrote:

Conspiracies such as the Watergate scandal do happen, but because of the difficulties inherent in executing plans and keeping people quiet, they tend to fail.

Then, citing Prof. Neil Levy, these researchers added:

When conspiracies fail—or are otherwise exposed—the appropriate experts deem them as having actually occurred (Levy, 2007).

Popper, Douglas, Levy, and others of like mind suggest that real, or “concrete,” conspiracies, exist only if they are officially acknowledged by the appropriate epistemic authorities. They contend that representative democracies are open societies with independent investigatory bodies and a free and pluralistic legacy media—all ready, willing, and able to question power.

These researchers refuse to recognise that representative democracies are biased pluralist societies dominated by an establishment—that is, led by an economic elite or oligarchy—whose controlled legacy media serves as the state gatekeeper of information and news. The researchers remain blind to this reality and cling tightly to the illusory society they imagine—one in which a large-scale state conspiracy would certainly be exposed as a result of inherent democratic safeguards. In actuality, these safeguards are very easy to overcome by those with sufficient influence and authority to ride roughshod over them. History proves that fact.

False flag terrorist attacks can only be committed by the state or with the connivance of the state—or elements working within it. The state is the only body that is officially allowed to attribute blame for false flag terrorist attacks. All state-orchestrated false flags serve the political interests of the state. This fact does not rule out the involvement of private contractors, who may also benefit from a false flag. But only the state and its epistemic authorities determine the alleged “facts” appertaining to the false flag attack, and only the state can cover them up.

If your definition of concrete state conspiracies relies upon the state admitting its guilt, it is extremely likely you will wrongly believe that the state rarely, if ever, conspires to commit a crime. Look at it this way: If defendants in criminal trials were considered not guilty by virtue of submitting a “not guilty” plea, no criminal would ever be convicted of any crime. Conspirators, like other criminals, rarely confess, unless under duress.

State-orchestrated false flag terrorism is, by definition, a conspiracy. The state must conspire with various actors, either public or private, to pull off the subterfuge. Additional conspirators, such as legacy media journalists and other members of the epistemic authorities, often need to be involved in order to maintain the deception after the terror event has taken place.

Another sticking point for people trying to understand false flag terrorism is the erroneous belief that thousands of people would need to be involved in, or aware of, the conspiracy for it to work. As the CIA pointed out in Document 1035-960 (see previous Chapter), those hoping to defend the official state account find it useful to claim that “conspiracy on the large scale often suggested would be impossible to conceal” in a supposedly open democratic society.

Some conspiracy theory research “science” has been produced to support the CIA’s arguments. For example, in 2016, Dr David Grimes^[1] produced a mathematical model^[2] that, he claimed, calculated the “failure probability for any given conspiracy.”

Like any mathematical model, its product was entirely dependent upon its parameters and its inputs. If the assumptions informing a model’s design are rubbish or if the data fed into it is rubbish, the output will be rubbish. In computer science this is referred to as “garbage in, garbage out”—GIGA,^[3] for short.

In addition to being a physicist and post-doctoral researcher at Oxford University, Dr Grimes is also a science journalist, a resident expert, and a commentator for the legacy media. Thus, his mathematical model—what we might call his “impossible conspiracy model”—was widely reported by the legacy media. For example, referring to his model, the BBC reported:^[4]

A conspiracy theory is very unlikely to be true because, sooner or later, one of the conspirators will blow its cover, a study suggests. [. . .] The research examines how long alleged conspiracies could “survive” before being revealed — deliberately or unwittingly — to the public at

large. [. . .] Dr Grimes's analysis suggests that if [. . .] conspiracies were real, most are very likely to [be] revealed.

The BBC either didn't know or didn't bother to report that Dr Grimes' model suffered from massive GIGA failings. Grimes assumed that everyone involved in the conspiracy would be aware that a conspiracy was in operation. In short, he seemed ignorant of how large-scale conspiracies operate and thus oblivious to the fact that many people can be part of a conspiracy but never know it.

Centralised, hierarchical compartmentalisation is used in many large organisations.^[5] Individuals within the organisation obey authority, and that authority increases with elevated rank. With higher rank and greater authority comes a more complete knowledge of how compartmental efforts cooperate to achieve organisational goals. A few people with sufficient authority have a comprehensive understanding of the overall organisational structure and its objectives, but most people working toward those goals do not.

For example, the Manhattan Project^[6] involved an estimated 130,000 people. The compartmentalised hierarchy was so tight that the majority of individuals involved had no idea what they were collectively trying to achieve.^[7] They simply obeyed orders, completed their given task, and worked on a need-to-know^[8] basis.

Not everyone with a high rank necessarily “needs to know,” though. In 1943, the US Senate Special Committee to Investigate the National Defence Program^[9] was led by then-Senator, future-US President Harry S. Truman. When this powerful government investigatory committee enquired about suspicious activity at a plant in Minneapolis that was linked to the Manhattan Project, the investigation was instantly shut down by Secretary of War Harry Stimson. He outranked Truman and had the authority to tell Truman to back off.^[10]

It is entirely possible that a few well-placed individuals within the establishment or some epistemic authorities, such as higher-ups in the intelligence agencies, are able to manipulate intelligence analysis or influence “counter terrorism” operations to control terrorist attacks or the response to them. But no one else need be involved in the plot. The complicity of a large number of people is *not necessary* for a conspiracy to succeed, though Grimes wrongly assumed it was.

Obedience to authority in a hierarchical compartmentalised structure, combined with tight control of information, ensures that only a small group of core conspirators are fully aware of a conspiracy. Proven conspiracies such as Operation Paperclip, Operation Mockingbird, The Iran-Contra Affair, Project MKULTRA, Project COINTELPRO, British intelligence collusion with Northern Ireland loyalist terrorists—all these and many other large-scale state conspiracies, involving far more people than would have been necessary to manage the Manchester Arena hoax, operated successfully for decades.

Another significant GIGA that Grimes overlooked and incorporated in his model was the mistaken assumption that the people who do speak out—that is, the whistleblowers—would: A) survive or avoid imprisonment, B) have their written or oral account reported by the legacy media or acknowledged by the state, and C) be believed by the general public.

Whistleblowers are either journalists or insiders who expose conspiracies. Some renowned whistleblowers include Gary Webb, Babita Deokaran, John Barnett, Li Wenliang, George Hunt, and David McBride. If whistleblowers aren't killed or locked up as political prisoners, they face years of verbal attacks by the epistemic authorities and the legacy media as they struggle to get their stories heard or reported. All too often their tales are not told, never get heard or read, and thus remain unknown.

For example, David McBride is a former British army major and Australian military lawyer who discovered evidence revealing that Australian special forces were engaged in the unlawful killing^[11] of unarmed men and children in Afghanistan. McBride knew he was breaking Australian law when he leaked sensitive documents that provided evidence of war crimes to the Australian legacy media.

In 2020, a subsequent Australian government inquiry produced “The Brereton Report.” It ignored McBride’s evidence of who the behind-the-scenes culprits were and instead blamed the killings entirely upon the platoon leaders and ordinary soldiers who murdered the non-combatants. According to the government account, all of these highly trained special forces soldiers were committing war crimes behind the backs of and absent any orders from their commanders:^[12]

The Inquiry has found no evidence that there was knowledge of, or reckless indifference to, the commission of war crimes, on the part of commanders at troop/platoon, squadron/company or Task Group Headquarters level, let alone at higher levels such as Commander

Joint Task Force (CJTF) 633, Joint Operations Command, or Australian Defence Headquarters. Nor is the Inquiry of the view that there was a failure at any of those levels to take reasonable and practical steps that would have prevented or detected the commission of war crimes.

Hoping to avoid prosecution, McBride sought to use Australia's so-called whistleblower protection laws, such as "Public Interest Disclosure Act 2013." In order to demonstrate that he was acting in the public interest, McBride submitted an affidavit in which he asserted:

Afghan civilians were being murdered and [. . .] Australian military leaders were at the very least turning the other way and at worst tacitly approving this behaviour. [. . .] Soldiers were being improperly prosecuted as a smokescreen to cover [the leadership's] inaction and failure to hold reprehensible conduct to account.

To establish his whistleblower status, McBride needed testimony from two expert witnesses who could support his public interest claim. But lawyers for the Commonwealth—the state—successfully quashed the expert testimony, citing national security as their alleged justification.^[13] That left the defenceless McBride facing criminal charges.

On 14th May 2024, David McBride was sentenced to a prison term of five years and eight months. What the Australian state calls its whistleblower protections were nonexistent.^[14]

This injustice is what we would expect from biased pluralist states dominated by an economic-elite-led establishment. When these elitist states stand accused of malfeasance, they close ranks and protect their own. The public interest is of *no interest* to them, even though such states may *call* themselves representative democracies.

In the UK, if the legacy media threatens to publish news that might be uncomfortable for or deleterious to the state, the government can slap what are commonly referred to as D-Notices^[15] on any story it wants to suppress. D-Notices, properly named Defence and Security Media Advisory Notices (DSMA notices), are issued as "requests" to editors that they withhold information.

Supposedly, D-Notices are not legally binding. However, the UK legacy media is owned by a handful of global corporations that have various contracts^[16] with government, so these notices achieve their intended results. That is why DSMA notices are issued^[17] whenever the UK state

wants to censor news, especially articles containing evidence against the state that is brought to light by whistleblowers.

Richard D. Hall is a journalist whistleblower who has reported the evidence that effectively *proves* the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag. Consequently, as an independent journalist or “non-traditional actor” in the “infosphere,” his journalism is currently beyond state regulated control. His work can only be suppressed either by discrediting it and him or by prosecuting him under some concocted pretext.

The legacy media gatekeepers have been dispatched to deploy by far the most common modern method of diverting public attention away from whistleblowers: Hall has been labelled a conspiracy theorist.

Grimes’ assumption and the BBC’s insinuation that the legacy media eagerly reports on whistleblowers is not based in reality. Once again, conspiracy theory research appears to be either monumentally naive or yet more calculated propaganda.

Elsewhere, the BBC informs us:^[18]

A false flag is a political or military action carried out with the intention of blaming an opponent for it. Nations have often done this by staging a real or simulated attack on their own side and saying the enemy did it, as a pretext for going to war. [. . .] False flag attacks have a long and ignoble history.

Indeed, they *do* have a long and ignoble history. What the BBC neglects to mention is that states don’t just kill their own troops, they also kill their own *civilians*. Nor does the BBC think the British public needs to know that states commit false flag terror attacks in their *own countries*—not just in other countries.

False flags, either military or terrorist, can broadly be split into three distinct categories.

(1) Make it happen on purpose (MIHOP) attacks occur when the state uses its military or proxy forces—including the various terrorist groups that states work with—to attack either a military or civilian target. The attack is either blamed on another state or group or, as is apparently the case with the Manchester Arena attack, a deployed terrorist asset is identified to deny state collaboration. Invariably the terrorist asset “dies” thus making any further questioning impossible.

(2) Let it happen on purpose (LIHOP) attacks are false flags by virtue of the fact that the state deliberately spurns every opportunity it has to thwart the attack. As with MIHOP, it is not uncommon for terrorists used in LIHOP attacks on civilians to have been trained or otherwise assisted by the state.^{19]} LIHOP false flags usually involve the purposeful suppression of intelligence or the misdirection of security forces. Left unchecked, the institutions of the state usually tasked with protecting the public might otherwise intervene and stop the attack. But their efforts are stymied by the LIHOP conspirators.

(3) The hoaxed false flag, called a false flag hoax in the US, is the third type of attack. Unlike MIHOP or LIHOP attacks, in hoaxes no people are killed at the scene. The reported Manchester Arena bombing is evidently a hoaxed false flag.

(Author's Note: We will be discussing the video evidence filmed at the Manchester Arena. Our citations will reference archived videos.)

Legacy media reports of what happened in false flag attacks are essential if the state wants to convince the public and politicians and other policymakers of its "official" narrative. Legacy media's initial gatekeeping task is to eschew any investigation of the evidence and restrict reporting to the churn of official statements and press releases.

For example, a video report from the independent news outlet UK Column shows a hoaxed terrorist attack being staged in Iraq in 2016.^[20] We see the supposed terrorist vehicle parked by a wall in a deserted area. A man appears to place something in the car before walking briskly away and driving off. A device explodes, setting the car alight. No one is killed or injured.

A number of people then enter the scene and lie on the floor near the burning vehicle. Emergency services, either real or fake, join the staging of the hoaxed terror event. The paramedics pretend to treat the fake bomb victims. The staged aftermath of the hoaxed false flag, probably falsely attributed to Islamic State, was videoed for subsequent distribution to the legacy media news agencies.

In this instance, the global news agency Associated Press (AP) issued the press release reporting the hoaxed false flag as a car bombing^[21] and told the public that it "hit a popular fruit and vegetable market near a school in the northwestern Hurriyah [Baghdad] area." AP reported that the hoaxed

false flag killed ten people and seriously injured thirty-four. Obviously, this wasn't true.

This hoax was then reported as a real terrorist attack by legacy media outlets around the world. For instance, the UK Daily Mail and the Seattle Times reported that Islamic State “claimed responsibility” for the so-called terrorist attack.^[22] The legacy media gatekeepers investigated nothing. They merely parroted AP's press release and “reported” a number of other terrorist shootings and bombings in and around Baghdad. We don't know which of these shootings and bombings, if any, were real.

A few years earlier, in 2013, a BBC film crew, including then-BBC reporter Ian Pannell and cameraman Darren Conway, were driven to various locations in Syria by the Islamist terrorist group Ahrar al-Sham (AS). At the time, AS was affiliated with Islamic State (IS), which enabled Pannell and Conway to pass through IS check points unmolested.^[23]

The timing of these events in Syria varies depending on which news outlet is doing the reporting. In its resulting “documentary,” *Saving Syria's Children*, the BBC falsely alleged that the Syrian government dropped a “napalm type” substance on a school playground in the Atareb district of Aleppo on the 26th August 2013.^[24]

The victims were all depicted as seriously burned or suffering from a combination of physical injuries and shock. The BBC “documentary” showed some of the purported victims writhing in apparent agony. When we look at the footage, it is patently obvious that these “victims” start behaving in this manner on BBC cue.

Independent investigative journalist Robert Stuart revealed the event to have been a hoax. The evidence Stuart placed in the public domain includes a reported statement from a commander of the Syrian government opposition Al-Tawhid Brigade,^[25] who said: “We were present in this region in August 2013 and we did not meet any air strike with the substance of Napalm [. . .] and we deny the cheap fabrication of the BBC.” Doctors who observed the BBC's footage stated that the alleged victims “were able to sit down, be touched by others and even talk. This is not how a severe burn victim would present.”

Stuart's exposure of the BBC's complicity in the hoax element of the story resulted in the kind of tit-for-tat exchanges between states who accuse each other of various false flags. When the Russian state broadcaster RT

accused the BBC of falsification, the UK state responded by instructing Ofcom to publicly censure RT.^[26]

The people who participate in hoaxed terror attacks are collectively referred to as “crisis actors.” They may be political activists who participate for intentional propaganda purposes. Or they may be simply unwitting volunteers who think they are assisting the state to deliver essential terror training drills. We might speculate that some crisis actors consider it a hobby.

There are a number of companies around the world that train crisis actors and provide them for disaster simulations. Strategic Operations,^[27] for example, is a US-based “tactical training service” that specialises in providing “hyper-realistic” training scenarios to the military and other front-line services. Similar companies, such as UK-based CrisisCast,^[28] provide what they call “real-play actors specially trained in disaster and crisis management.”

Terrorist attack drills are among the training scenarios offered by these private contractors. Not only the military, but also public and private security services and emergency services, as well as non-military government contractors, hire crisis actors. It is safe to say that the crisis actor and disaster simulation business is a global industry.

The UK government used more than 800 crisis actors to simulate a fake suicide bombing in Manchester’s Trafford Shopping Centre almost exactly one year before the Manchester Arena incident. In the shopping centre simulation, injury makeup called mouflage^[29] was applied to make the crisis actors appear to be severely injured, dead, or dying.

At the time of that drill, the UK legacy media reported.^[30]

A mock terrorist attack has been carried out at one of the UK’s busiest shopping centres. [. . .] As part of the drill a fake suicide bomber detonated an explosive device in a packed food court at the shopping centre. The volunteers [. . .] screamed out as if they were in pain as the training exercise unfolded.

Some crisis actors are professionals. Among them are amputees who are often used to add extra mouflage realism. CrisisCast calls this “casualty simulation,” or CAS SIM.^[31]

We provide professionally trained amputee actors and film grade makeup specialists. CrisisCast amputee actors have many years of

experience in hyper-real, immersive training for key learning outputs and are regularly featured in film and television productions. [. . .] Utilizing the unique combination of our realistic prosthetics and expert CAS SIM effects, our role players will expertly and appropriately use their skills, experiences and simulated injuries to mimic the emotions and actions of a casualty, resulting in realistic and very definitive clinical training delivery. We call this realistic simulation.

What CrisisCast is describing here are drills—exercises that both participants and viewers know are not real. But what we are talking about when we say “false flags” or “hoaxed false flags” are events where the actual parties who plan them and carry them out are unknown, and their true motives are concealed from the public—possibly even from the crisis actors themselves.

False flag attacks, be they MIHOP, LIHOP or hoaxed, are employed by states, or elements within states, for a variety of reasons. They are used to justify domestic and foreign policy decisions or future military actions or for some propaganda purpose or another. In each case, the common goal is to convince the public or policymakers that the attack is whatever the state says it is. Because the true agenda is hidden, hoaxed false flags have been among the most damaging in terms of their social and political impact—and even their economic impact when wars result.

On 4th August 1964 the destroyer USS Maddox and her escort, the USS Turner Joy, were reportedly attacked by North Vietnamese Navy (NVN) motor torpedo boats in international waters some twenty-eight miles off the North Vietnamese coast. Both ships fired back at, what were assumed, NVN targets. US fighter jets were dispatched to respond. However, the pilots of these jets found no evidence of any NVN boats. Captain Herrick, who commanded the Destroyer Division on the Maddox, began to question the authenticity of the reported NVN attack within twenty-four hours. He doubted his instrument readings and sent a cable stating:

Review of action makes many reported contacts and torpedoes fired appear doubtful. Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. No actual visual sightings by Maddox. Suggest complete evaluation before any further action taken.

Captain Herrick made the mistake abundantly clear to his superiors straightaway. There was no evidence that his ship's sonar readings had

been falsified. He could attribute the confusion only to human error under difficult circumstances in heavy seas.

From that point forward, however, the truth stopped and fabrication on the part of the US government started.

Herrick's report was ignored by the military and political chain of command. A mythical "intelligence" analysis was created to claim, falsely, that the attack had occurred. Only in 2005 did we learn from National Security Agency (NSA) documents the extent of the hoax.^[32]

The signal intelligence (SIGINT)—the recording that intercepted Vietnamese communications—was doctored to falsely substantiate the attack on the Maddox. Approximately ninety percent of the relevant SIGINT was withheld. Unrelated SIGINT reports were inserted into the NSA summary to support the assertion that an attack occurred. Vital communication intercepts were deliberately mistranslated,^[33] and other NVN communications were taken out of context then spliced back together before being reinserted into the report to create the hoaxed "incident."

Three days later, in response to the alleged "unprovoked attacks," the US Congress passed the "Gulf of Tonkin Resolution," which empowered US President Lyndon B. Johnson to take all measures he deemed necessary to repel the supposed aggression by the North Vietnamese. This hoax allowed the Johnson administration to escalate military action. It led directly to Operation Rolling Thunder^[34] and the start of a full-scale war that ultimately killed more than three million people.

In short, the Vietnam War started with a hoaxed false flag we now call the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.^[35]

LIHOP and MIHOP false flag terrorist attacks kill and injure people. They are not hoaxes—not invented out of whole cloth.

Events like the one that occurred at the Manchester Arena could be arranged by the state to be either LIHOP or a MIHOP operations. States have already proven themselves indifferent to killing their own civilians. So, then, why would they bother to go through all the trouble of carrying out a hoaxed attack?

One possibility is that a LIHOP or MIHOP leaves bereaved people who may not be satisfied with the state's description of events. Some families of the 9/11 victims are still pursuing the US government—not to examine alleged

“failures” of intelligence but to ascertain what actually happened and who was really responsible.^[36]

While hoaxing intelligence to fake a military encounter doesn't risk raising too many questions—after all, the public expects military intelligence to keep secrets—hoaxing a terrorist attack is likely to draw more attention.

Evidence of a hoaxed false flag—or, more likely, *lack* of evidence of a real terror event—may well lead independent investigative journalists and other researchers to speculate about the reported deaths and injuries. If the state plants tell-tale signatures at the scene and into the official account—something we'll discuss in the concluding chapter—inevitably, independent investigators will ask what happened to the deceased victims if they didn't die in the circumstances described.

We have seen high-profile court cases on both sides of the Atlantic where all the attention is focused on the controversial claim that no one died in a terror event. In these cases, the public is wholeheartedly convinced—usually by the legacy media—that denying deaths occurred is a despicable stain on the memories of those who are said to have perished in the attack. Consequently, juries and benches are predisposed to find these journalists guilty of defamation or harassment.^[37]

These rulings, in turn, secure considerable public support for the state's assertion that measures need to be taken to stop the so-called “conspiracy theorists” from making outrageous claims and spreading supposed disinformation and “hatred.”

For these reasons, we must ask: Is the hoaxed false flag an effective honey trap?

It is hard to imagine that a hoaxed false flag is run solely to lure the independent media into legal disputes, just to generate propaganda that can be used as claimed justification for censorship legislation, but it isn't beyond the realm of possibility. Perhaps the legal honey trap aspect is an additional bonus that warrants the risk states take when they create these hoaxes.

In truth, we don't know the states' motives. Decent human beings find it impossible to rationalise the Machiavellian aims and actions of anyone who considers killing innocent people a justifiable way to get what they want.

LIHOP operations, often costing hundreds and sometimes thousands of lives, have certainly been used for propaganda purposes.

In 1914, following the outbreak of WWI, US President Woodrow Wilson declared US neutrality. In Britain, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill was alarmed by the US stance and sought to encourage America's entry into the war.

The British had established a naval blockade of Germany, capitalising on British naval dominance and heavily mining the North Sea. Unable to compete in conventional naval warfare, Germany retaliated using submarines—the infamous U-boats.

Initially, Germany obeyed the "Cruiser Rules."^[38] Prior to attacking any merchant ship, the U-boat commanders would surface, alerting the crew of the targetted vessel and allowing them time to deploy lifeboats before sinking the ship.

Not wishing to draw the US into the war, the German government was wary of attacking US vessels and tended to strike only those ships known to be carrying munitions or other essential supplies for the British war effort. Under no circumstances would the German government contemplate sinking a US passenger liner. British strategists, including Churchill, set about to change that.

The British created "Q-ships."^[39] These were secretly-armed merchant ships with hidden armaments often disguised as shipping containers or other seemingly innocuous items of cargo or onboard equipment. When a U-boat surfaced, the hidden weapons on the Q-ships were revealed and fired on the German submarines. A number of U-boats were sunk before the German Navy could adapt and come up with its own new tactics.

Unable to differentiate between armed and unarmed vessels, the Germans subsequently declared a war zone around the British Isles and announced that *all* ships, military and commercial, were liable to be attacked. This was a deliberate psychological and strategic trap engineered by the British to imperil every vessel, especially US ships, in an attempt to draw the US into the war. Churchill wrote to Walter Runciman, president of the Board of Trade, and told him it was^[40] "most important to attract neutral shipping to our shores, in the hope especially of embroiling the United States with Germany."

Woodrow Wilson's ambassador to Britain was Walter Hines Page, a close friend and associate of Sir Edward Grey.^[41] Page was receiving payments (a private annual stipend of \$25,000) from US arms manufacturer Cleveland Dodge. In other words, war was in Page's personal financial

interest. On 2nd May 1915, Page wrote to his son, “If a British liner full of American passengers be blown up, what will Uncle Sam do? That’s what’s going to happen.”

Wilson also sent his closest adviser, Edward Mandell House, as his emissary to Britain. On the morning of 7th May 1915, House met with Sir Edward Grey. House wrote his recollection of the conversation:

We spoke of the probability of an ocean liner being sunk, and I told him if this were done, a flame of indignation would sweep across America, which would in itself probably carry us into the war.

Later that same day, Grey and House met with King George V at Buckingham Palace. In House’s official biography, “The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,” he recounted their discussion:^[42]

We fell to talking, strangely enough, of the probability of Germany sinking a trans-Atlantic liner. [. . .] He [the king] said, “Suppose they should sink the Lusitania, with American passengers on board?”

The Lusitania had set sail from New York six days earlier, on 1st May 1915, carrying 694 crew members and 1,265 passengers bound for Liverpool. In addition, the cruise ship carried a huge cargo of munitions and explosives. The placement of war supplies on a passenger liner had prompted the Lusitania’s captain, Daniel Dow, to resign in protest. He was replaced by Captain William Turner.

The Germans were fully aware of the Lusitania’s cargo and could not allow her to reach British shores. The Imperial German Embassy in the US posted notices in US newspapers informing the public that the Lusitania would be attacked and warning passengers not to board her for the transatlantic crossing.^[43]

The British had already cracked the German encryption codes and could monitor their transmissions. While the technology of the day did not allow them to pinpoint the precise location of U-boats, the British knew the identity and general movements of the various patrolling submarines. As the Lusitania sailed into the Irish Sea on Friday, 7th May 1915, the British Admiralty knew of the presence of Germany’s U-20, a U-boat that had already sunk a number of British vessels.

To protect supply vessels, the British Navy usually escorted the more vulnerable merchant ships through dangerous waters. Four destroyers

were moored in Milford Haven but were not tasked to escort the Lusitania. This was a flagrant contravention of standard practice.

Following protocol and unaware of the LIHOP plan, the Royal Navy sent HMS Juno to rendezvous with the Lusitania before she entered the deadly Irish Sea. When the Admiralty—led by Churchill—learned that HMS Juno was bound for the Lusitania, she was ordered to return to port.

Vice-Admiral Charles Henry Coke, commanding Irish Sea defences from his Queenstown headquarters in Ireland, requested permission to reroute the Lusitania to avoid the danger but received no confirmation from the Admiralty and couldn't act on his fears.

The conspiracy to make the Lusitania a LIHOP target was successful. The U-20's torpedo caused an initial explosion, which then ignited much larger detonations of the explosives packed in the Lusitania's hold. Of the 1,198 people who died, 128 were US citizens—the targets of the core LIHOP conspirators.

Wilson's administration initially maintained its neutrality. But, as was foreseen by the conspirators, the sinking of the Lusitania shifted US public opinion. What had been overwhelming opposition to US involvement in Europe's war changed as the arguments of US politicians, such as Theodore Roosevelt, who sought US entry into WWI, were strengthened.^[44] The US entered WWI in April 1917.

The sinking of the Lusitania was effectively a British state-sponsored LIHOP false flag operation. "Flame of indignation" propaganda was the British state's objective. To achieve that end, killing British and US citizens was considered necessary.

MIHOP false flags are the most common. The operation itself and the subsequent propaganda narrative can be more easily controlled in MIHOPs.

There are countless examples of state-orchestrated MIHOP false flag attacks.

(1) We'll start with the Mukden Incident.^[45] It occurred in 1931 when Japanese soldier Lt. Suemori Kawamoto planted a bomb along Japan's South Manchurian Railway. The explosion was blamed on Chinese dissidents. Japan used it as a pretext to invade China's northeastern province of Manchuria.

(2) Another well-known MIHOP is the Lavon Affair.^[46] It involved the Israeli state's use of Egyptian Jewish operatives to plant bombs in American-owned and British-owned cinemas, libraries, and other civilian targets in Cairo and Alexandria. The attacks were then blamed on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt with the objective of convincing Western powers to retain their military presence in defence of the Suez Canal.

(3) In September 1999, a series of apartment bombings wracked Russia. In just seventeen days, the highly coordinated and well-planned operation killed 317 Russian men, women, and children and injured approximately 630 others. The response by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin to the bombings burnished his image and convinced the Russian people to support both him and the Second Chechen War that began in August 1999 and lasted for a decade.

The Russian state and its legacy media blamed the attacks on Chechen Islamist terrorists. One of the reported masterminds behind the bombings, Ibn al Khattab, denied any involvement. If he was responsible, his denial made no sense.

Khattab had previously made a threat that Russians would face explosions "blasting through their cities." Taking responsibility for the apartment bombings would have demonstrated his ability to deliver on his threats. Yet, far from glorifying his great victory, Khattab said.^[47]

We would not like to be akin to those who kill sleeping civilians with bombs and shells.

Khattab's reply may suggest another reason for the hoaxed false flag. As bizarre as it sounds, terrorist assets might not be willing to participate in MIHOP attacks that undermine their public image.

Obviously, the point of terrorism is to terrorise the population. That said, genuine terrorist groups aren't oblivious to the value of public relations. As we've already discussed, according to the epistemic authorities, terrorist groups use propaganda to attract support and potential recruits. While terrorists certainly do kill indiscriminately, they usually have political objectives.

The group Jabhat Fateh al Sham (JFS) was formerly known as the Al-Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra (alias Al-Qa'ida in Syria, or Al-Qa'ida in the Levant). It subsequently merged with Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, Liwa al-Haqq, and the Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement to form Hay'at Tahrir

al-Sham (HTS), or the Levant Liberation Front. The political objective of JFS (now HTS) is to create an Islamic state in the Levant.

According to the UK government's listing of proscribed terrorist groups,^[48] HTS "should be treated as [an] alternative name [for] Al Qaeda."

In 2016, the BBC broadcast its interview with al Qaeda's director of Foreign Media Relations, Mostafa Mahamed. The BBC gave him ample airtime to layout al Qaeda's propaganda.^[49]

A common feature of the hoaxed terrorist attacks we have discussed is that they supposedly target playgrounds or schools, or take place near schools. The Manchester Arena hoaxed false flag was also reportedly aimed at children. While this amplifies the horror felt by the public, being seen to deliberately target children isn't likely to serve the terrorists' political objectives.

Many Russians expressed surprise that the supposed terrorists, allegedly responsible for the apartment bombings, were deliberately killing poorer, working-class Russian families. The Chechen Islamist extremists had hitherto struck only Russian government or military targets.

On the night of 22nd September 1999, local police found and disarmed another bomb planted in the basement of an apartment block in the central Russian city of Ryazan. The bomb was found to have been constructed using the same Hexogen (RDX) explosives used in the other apartment bombings and, like the others, was similarly situated to inflict significant structural damage and maximise civilian casualties.

Police and the local Federal Security Service—Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti (FSB)—locked down the city and launched a manhunt for the suspected terrorists. The Ryazan police located and detained two of the suspects. No arrests were made because they immediately discovered that the pair were Moscow FSB officers. The police were ordered to release the FSB agents, and the Russian government confirmed that its agents planted the Ryazan bomb.^[50]

The Ryazan incident ended the so-called terrorist campaign. Why Chechen terrorists would conclude their successful terror campaign following the brief detention of some FSB agents has never been explained. Over the next few years, the Russian state changed its original narrative about the bombings many times. All evidence relating to the Ryazan incident was sealed as an official state secret for seventy-five years.^[51] The evidence

clearly indicates that the Russian apartment bombings were a Russian state-orchestrated, domestic MIHOP false flag operation.^[52]

(4) During “the troubles” that saw decades of deadly terrorist attacks in Ireland, in Northern Ireland, and on the UK mainland, both Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups were extensively infiltrated by the British security and intelligence agencies.

Following the terrorist murder of the lawyer Patrick Finucane in 1989, it became clear that one of the perpetrators was a Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) special branch agent called William Stobie. Subsequent concerns about the extent to which British agents were involved in acts of terrorism led to the Stevens Inquiry.

After a fourteen-year-long investigation, Sir John Stevens released his Final Recommendations Report^[53] in 2003. Stevens stated:

I conclude there was collusion in both murders and the circumstances surrounding them. Collusion is evidenced in many ways. This ranges from the wilful failure to keep records, the absence of accountability, the withholding of intelligence and evidence, through to the extreme of agents being involved in murder.

[. . .]

The unlawful involvement of agents in murder implies that the security forces sanction killings.

[. . .]

Informants and agents were allowed to operate without effective control and to participate in terrorist crimes.

British agents were committing acts of MIHOP false flag terrorism. The public believed the attacks were carried out by loyalist terrorists. It is unlikely they would have occurred without the orchestration conducted by the British state.

Other examples included the UK state forcing individuals to become unwilling suicide bombers by taking their families hostage and threatening to kill them. No security service agents have ever been prosecuted in connection with the enforced suicide bombings.^[54] These attacks were attributed to republican terrorists.

(5) In 2014, the Turkish government banned access to YouTube in their country. A leaked audio recording of a conversation between the Head of

Turkish Intelligence Hakan Fidan and the Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu had been discovered on the site. In it, the two men were openly discussing a planned false flag attack.^[55]

Four men were to be sent from Syria to commit attacks on Turkish soil, thus providing the alleged justification for Turkey to launch a war against Syria.^[56] Turkish officials said the leaked recording was ""partially manipulated." They also declared the reporting of their plan an assault on Turkish national security.

(6) The use of false flag attacks during the conflict in Syria was prolific. There is overwhelming evidence that between 2013 and 2018 a series of false flag attacks were passed off as having been instigated by the Syrian government. They included chemical weapons atrocities.^[57]

Far from being rare or unusual events, hoaxed, LIHOP, and MIHOP false flag operations represent a reasonably common strategy. Biased pluralist states around the world often use the "strategy of tension," generated by false flag attacks, to control public opinion and subsequent behaviour.

This manipulation of the public became abundantly clear as a result of the investigations and inquiries that led to the exposure of perhaps the most well-documented examples of state-orchestrated, domestic false flag terrorism.

Collectively, these ostensible NATO-led MIHOP false flag terrorist attacks formed a sustained, decades-long false flag campaign that raged across an entire continent: Operation Gladio.

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Chapter 7: Operation Gladio

Let's face it, the notion of state-orchestrated false flag terrorism is a hard pill for most people to swallow. Legacy media outlets like the BBC confine the conversation about false flags to military history in order to maintain the illusion that domestic state-orchestrated false flag attacks never happen. The mere suggestion that they do is pejoratively labelled "conspiracy theory," and any evidence highlighting the possibility is instantly ruled "secret" by the epistemic authorities.

For the general public, the misapprehension that their own state would never commit horrific crimes against them is perhaps a matter of psychological self-preservation. We like to imagine that we elect our political "leaders," and we envision them acting in our best interests, making important decisions for us. This illusion is shattered, not by the ravings of malevolent conspiracy theorists, but by documented historical fact.

The biased pluralist state serves the economic-elite-led establishment, not us. Elected governments are merely "partners" within the collective that forms the state. Such states are not averse to slaughtering their own citizens for various political and strategic ends. Regardless of what anyone might want to believe, we can, and must, appreciate that Operation Gladio happened.^[1]

Evidence, not opinion, shows that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag. We will discuss possible reasons why a hoax, rather than a LIHOP or MIHOP false flag, was preferred. For now, we'll simply *assume* no one died or was injured inside the City Room. A full explanation is forthcoming.

We do not know the fate of the deceased Manchester victims. They may have been killed by the core conspirators but by other means and at other times and places. This apparent contradiction, as we'll see, does not rule out that the Manchester attack was a hoax. It is certainly not beyond the capacity of a biased pluralist state to kill its own citizens.

Once we have an overview of Operation Gladio, we can begin to understand how and why governments—and agencies controlled by or in cahoots with governments—can contemplate cold-blooded attacks on their own populations. The very institutions whose most vital function is to

protect and serve their citizenry are fully capable of turning against that very citizenry, as Gladio demonstrates.

Thus, to grasp the mindset of the state elements behind the Manchester Arena hoax, we first need to consider the motivation, and perhaps even the ideology, of those responsible for Operation Gladio.

Whatever else Operation Gladio demonstrates, it reveals the politicians we elect are not the supreme decision-makers. Other organs of the state wield autonomous authority over and above the political class. They can and they do act in pursuit of their own agendas, regardless of the will of either the people or the politicians the people favour.

In March 1962, the tactical use of MIHOP, LIHOP, and hoaxed false flag attacks was discussed in a US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meeting. Weighing their “Project Cuba” options, they explored a number of ways they could manufacture justification for US military intervention in Cuba. The now-infamous “Operation Northwoods” report from that meeting presented a variety of false flag options, including:^[2]

- Blowing up US ships in Guantanamo Bay and blaming it on the Cuban state.
- Supporting the establishment of a Cuban terrorist campaign in the Miami area or in other Florida cities—or perhaps in Washington, D.C.
- Appearing to sink a ship full of Cubans in route to Florida; this operation could be real or hoaxed.
- Creating a diplomatic incident to convince people that a Cuban aircraft had shot down an American chartered civil airliner.
- Using the US legacy media to stoke a wave of national indignation by reporting the false flags as atrocities committed by Cuba.

The man who signed off on the proposal was General Lyman Louis Lemnitzer. Subsequently, in November 1962, Gen. Lemnitzer was overlooked for a second possible term as Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was, instead, appointed commander of the US European Command by President John F. Kennedy and thus became the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO in Europe.

General Lemnitzer remains unique as the only US general to have served as US Army Chief of Staff, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Supreme Allied Commander for NATO. As the effective author of the “Operation Northwoods” plan, Lemnitzer was a keen advocate of false flag terrorism.

From 1963 to 1969,^[3] Lemnitzer was the nominal commander of Operation Gladio. While his six-year tenure represented a relatively brief period in the near forty-year history of Gladio, it occurred at a crucial time for the operation. We'll get to that in a moment.

Titularly under the auspices of NATO, Operation Gladio was a decades-long continental-scale false flag terrorism campaign. In this campaign, far-right terrorists were directed by Gladio operatives to commit attacks that were then blamed—usually with the assistance of the legacy media—on far-left terrorist groups. In addition to the victims slaughtered in Turkey—under Gladio-B^[4]—and in North Africa, thousands of European citizens were murdered by groups aligned to their own states.

The enormous continental scope of Operation Gladio is hard to comprehend. It went by different codenames in each European country:

Austria: OWSGV

Belgium: SDRA8

Denmark: Absolon

Germany: TD BDJ

Greece: LOK

Luxembourg: Stay-Behind

Netherlands: I&O

Norway: ROC

Spain: Red Quantum

Sweden: AGAG

Switzerland: P26

Turkey: Özel Harp Dairesi

It is estimated that between April 1961 and April 1962 the Gladio-linked far-right Organisation Armée Secrète^[5] (OAS) alone killed approximately 2,000 people in Algeria and mainland France in a series of terrorist attacks and assassinations.^[6] The 1978 kidnapping and assassination of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro and five of his staff; the Oktoberfest Bombing in Munich in 1980 that killed thirteen and injured 211; and the series of Brabant Massacres that took place in Belgium between 1982 and 1985, killing

twenty people and injuring more than forty—all were false flag attacks perpetrated by Operation Gladio terrorist assets.

How on earth did such an unimaginable state crime ever come to pass? What possessed the core conspirators behind Gladio to imagine that slaughtering innocent people—their own fellow citizens—was a viable tactic just to achieve their political and strategic ambitions?

Following the end of WWII, both the US and British intelligence agencies were concerned about the possible invasion of Western Europe by Soviet Russia. Building upon their experience of supporting resistance cells who fought against German occupation during the war, the US Office of Strategic Services^[7] (OSS)—the forerunner of the CIA—and the British Special Operations Executive^[8] (SOE)—eventually absorbed by Britain's foreign military intelligence agency MI6—formed a number of clandestine military units throughout Europe.

Some of these “stay behind” paramilitary units were built around resistance groups that were already formed. These pre-existing groups were more commonly found in Scandinavian countries. Elsewhere, new units were created, drawing upon local assets and activists, often including far-right extremists. The OSS and the SOE favoured using neo-Nazi terrorists as operatives.

The OSS's and SOE's use of stay-behind units predated the formation of NATO in 1949. The subsequent Gladio false flag terrorist attack plan was evidently conceived by the intelligence agencies, specifically the CIA and MI6. Other national intelligence agencies were also involved, notably the Italian's Servizio Informazioni Difesa (SID), which was reconfigured in 1977; the French SDECE, reformed in 1982; and the infamous Portuguese secret police, the Polícia Internacional e de Defesa do Estado (PIDE).

In 1947, the US National Security Act created the CIA and handed control of “espionage and counter-espionage operations abroad” to the new CIA director, Rear Admiral Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter. The subsequent National Security Council (NSC) Directive on the Office of Special Projects stated:^[9]

[C]overt operations are understood to be all activities (except as noted herein) which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized

persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.

When the NCS directive speaks of plausibly disclaiming responsibility, it is referring to “plausible deniability.” This is a disingenuous ploy common to all biased pluralist states led by an economic-elite-led establishment. It is achieved and maintained by using hierarchical compartmentalisation, which works this way: So-called representative democracies unleash their attack dogs but then use compartmentalised “national security” and related information silos to enable the establishment to wash their hands of any wrongdoing should state crimes be uncovered. Plausible deniability remains a central tenet of covert or “clandestine”—and always highly compartmentalised—operations to this day.

The NSC directive went on to list the form these covert, plausibly deniable operations would take:

Activities related to: propaganda, economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world.

NSC Directive 4 and 4-A added:^[10]

The present world situation requires the immediate strengthening and coordination of all foreign information measures of the US Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries in a direction favorable to the attainment of its objectives initiating and developing [. . .] specific plans and programs designed to influence foreign opinion.

And in something called "Enclosure 5" of the directive, the NSC clarified why these psychological warfare operations *must* be run:

The National Security Council [. . .] has determined that, in the interests of world peace and U.S. national security, the foreign information activities of the U.S. Government must be supplemented by covert psychological operations. The similarity of operational methods involved in covert psychological and intelligence activities and the need to ensure their secrecy and obviate costly duplication renders the Central Intelligence Agency the logical agency to conduct such operations. Hence [. . .] the National Security Council directs the

Director of Central Intelligence to initiate and conduct, within the limit of available funds, covert psychological operation.

Whenever and wherever it perceived a security threat, the CIA was authorised by the US state to conduct covert psychological operations overseas. The CIA combined propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, subversion, support for political opposition groups, and armed resistance “guerrillas” as means of manipulating the actions of other states and their populations.

Under the NATO umbrella, US and UK intelligence continued to build on the close—if sometimes tetchy—working relationship they firmly established during World War Two. Winston Churchill oversaw the SOE's nurturing of the stay-behind units throughout that war. Towards the end of the war, in 1944, Washington and London agreed to use covert operations to defend Europe against the spread of communism.

The plausibly deniable psychological warfare that was Operation Gladio, *always* committed “in the interests of world peace,” *always* resulted in the violent deaths of innocents.

One of the first operations took place on 3rd December 1944 in Athens during the Greek Dekemvriana (December events) protests. The protests were violently suppressed. Twenty-eight people, including children, were killed and 148 wounded. Left-wing protestors were slaughtered when the British army, working with Greek far-right militias led by Georgios Grivas, opened fire on the demonstrators.^[11]

It is worth pausing here to consider an aspect of, what appears to be, an ideology underpinning Operation Gladio. This ideology assumes that certain nations, or elements governing those nations, have the right to intervene in the affairs of other nations. Of course, all governments conduct overseas operations to protect their international interests. But, as we shall see, the evident arrogance of some of the leaders of Operation Gladio took them far beyond anything that one could consider “protection” of foreign interests.

Much has been written about “American exceptionalism,”^[12] the idea that the US polity is somehow unique, or of higher moral calibre. But the US is not exceptional in believing in its exceptionalism! The same hubris can be observed in all advocates of empire throughout history. A political, social, religious and even cultural air of superiority is commonly adopted by

imperialists who have sufficient authority to deploy the ferocity of the state for one alleged cause or another.

The false belief that your actions are necessary to serve some greater good—a greater good only *you* define—can serve as self-justification for any megalomaniac crimes you want to commit. Such delusions can readily be turned against those you have marked as the enemy. You can kill indiscriminately and imagine yourself noble for doing so.

Under such a form of self-justification, the use of far-right “anti-communist elements” in allegedly “threatened countries” became a prominent feature of Operation Gladio. After the first far-right death squad was employed in Athens in 1944, the scale of Gladio's state crimes escalated horrendously.

In 1948, the Western Union Clandestine Committee (WUCC) was created by the French state to coordinate secret “unorthodox warfare.” When NATO was formed in 1949, the WUCC was integrated into NATO’s “Clandestine Planning Committee” (CPC).

The CPC was overseen by NATO's Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). In 1958, NATO replaced the CPC with the Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC). Originally located in France, the ACC's oversight of Gladio violence and its destabilisation of European states, including France, was about to cause significant political upheaval.

The French Gladio operation called “Plan Bleu” was first acknowledged by French Interior Minister Edouard Depreux in 1947.^[13] The name “Plan Bleu” was consequently dropped. The “La Rose des Vents” and the “Arc-en-ciel” networks took its place. These Gladio operations were under the national command of French intelligence (SDECE) agent François de Grossouvre.

^[14]

In 1961, French President Charles de Gaulle agreed to an Algerian self-determination referendum resulting in the 1962 Évian Accords and Algerian independence. As a result, some former Plan Bleu Gladio operatives joined the far-right Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS), whose founding members included Yves Guérin-Sérac.^[15]

The French External Documentation and Counter-Espionage Service (SDECE) was the French foreign intelligence agency, equivalent to the CIA and MI6. It was reconfigured in 1982 to become the Directorate-General for External Security (DGSE). Guérin-Sérac was a member of the 11^e régiment parachutiste de choc (11 Choc) parachute regiment, an elite unit that served as an SDECE strike team.

In 1966, France under President de Gaulle withdrew from NATO. The French state ordered all NATO facilities and units to either come under direct French authority or to leave French soil immediately. The political rationale for de Gaulle's decision was complex and is still debated.^[16] Whatever other considerations may have influenced the withdrawal, de Gaulle was certainly aware of Gladio. The OAS had already instigated an attempted coup in Algeria, and Gladio planners were lining up the OAS as a replacement for de Gaulle's government.^[17]

Forced to set up new headquarters in Brussels in 1967, NATO's Allied Clandestine Committee (ACC) was codenamed SDRA 11. The ACC was overseen by the US Supreme Allied Commander in Europe and reported directly to the Pentagon. General Lemnitzer was tasked with relocating Gladio HQ—SDRA 11 (ACC). He had to manage the fallout from the French decision while maintaining both the covert nature of Gladio and plausible deniability.

Meanwhile, in Portugal, the leading Gladio operative was self-confessed fascist, SDECE agent, avowed anti-Gaullist, and OAS founder Yves Guérin-Sérac. Under the assumed name of Jean-Robert de Guernadec, he established the Lisbon-based Aginter Press in 1966. Outwardly portrayed as a press agency, Aginter Press was a front for the storage and distribution of arms shipments and for the dissemination of propaganda. It was also a Gladio terrorist training centre. The Portuguese secret military police (PIDE) greatly assisted the Aginter Press.^[18]

In 1974, a dispatch originally written in 1969 came to light. Titled "Our Political Activity" it was published by Guérin-Sérac's Aginter Press. It read:

Our belief is that the first phase of political activity ought to be to create the conditions favouring the installation of chaos in all of the regime's structures. This should necessarily begin with the undermining of the state economy so as to arrive at confusion throughout the whole legal apparatus. This leads on to a situation of strong political tension, fear in the world of industry and hostility towards the government and the political parties. [. . .] In our view the first move we should make is to destroy the structure of the democratic state, under the cover of communist and pro-Chinese activities. Moreover, we have people who have infiltrated these groups and obviously we will have to tailor our actions to the ethos of the milieu – propaganda and action of a sort which will seem to have emanated from our communist adversaries [. . .]. That will create a feeling of

hostility towards those who threaten the peace of each and every nation, and at the same time we must raise up a defender of the citizenry against the disintegration brought about by terrorism and subversion.

“Our Political Activity” advocated precisely the kind of false flag operations envisaged by the US NSC in 1947. The rationale for Gladio’s offensive, covert psychological warfare operations, which included providing assistance to “anti-communist elements” in the “free world,” was clearly understood in the Western intelligence community as early as the 1940s.

Thus, vicious neo-Nazi extremists, like Yves Guérin-Sérac, were authorised to act under the protection of their respective states. True, a few senior political figures, such as de Gaule, were opposed to Gladio. But, as a result of the internal state fiefdoms created by compartmentalised hierarchy, that opposition didn’t translate into the political power to stop Operation Gladio.

Further evidence that potentially demonstrates the intentional use of domestic false flag terrorism is found in a disputed but damning document: the 1970 US Army Field Manual 30-31b. While the CIA has remained largely silent on the issue of Gladio, it has been at pains to deny the authenticity of the 30-31b, alleging the Manual to be a Russian forgery.

That’s possible, especially considering that some of its available versions don’t look like other US Army field manuals of the time. This fact is highlighted by those who doubt its origins.

Still, the CIA’s forgery claim is questionable. For one thing, the CIA is known to have circulated the document. Why would the CIA pass on a forged Soviet document to its own Gladio agents and operatives? In addition, the Soviets would certainly have already had their own copies of US field manuals, so why would they go to the lengths of creating a forgery that supposedly doesn’t even look genuine?

Contrary to official CIA denials, the manual’s likely authenticity was further supported by the CIA’s former Deputy Director Ray S. Cline, who said:^[19]

Well, I suspect it [Manual 30-31b] is an authentic document. I don’t doubt it. I never saw it but it’s the kind of special forces military operations that are described. On the other hand you gotta recall, that the defense department and the president don’t initiate any of those orders, until there is an appropriate occasion.

While Cline was evidently sticking to the “plausible deniability” mantra, his argument that presidents don’t “initiate any of those orders” again highlights that even the most powerful “elected” political leaders lacked the authority to control Gladio.

It is understandable why the CIA would break its customary silence on Gladio to distance itself from Field Manual 30-31b. The manual states:^[20]

There may be times when HC [Host Country] Governments show passivity or indecision in the face of communist subversion and according to the interpretation of the US secret services do not react with sufficient effectiveness. Most often such situations come about when the revolutionaries temporarily renounce the use of force and thus hope to gain an advantage, as the leaders of the host country wrongly consider the situation to be secure. U.S. Army intelligence must have the means of launching special operations which will convince Host Country Governments and public opinion of the reality of the insurgent danger and of the necessity for counteraction. To this end, U.S. Army intelligence should seek to penetrate the insurgency by means of agents on special assignment, with the task of forming special action groups among the more radical elements of the insurgency. When the kind of situation envisaged above arises, these groups, acting under U.S. Army intelligence control, should be used to launch violent or non-violent actions according to the nature of the case.

Yves Guérin-Sérac was a “radical” Gladio “agent” engaged in “special assignments.” He was among those who formed a number of “special action groups,” such as the OSA and Aginter Press, which engaged in “violent” actions, like false flag terrorism, and “non-violent” actions, including the dissemination of propaganda. The Aginter Press was coordinating these activities across Europe, ostensibly at the behest of NATO.

With the aim of destroying “the structure of the democratic state,” the Aginter Press dispatch, “Our Political Activities,” continued:^[21]

Two forms of terrorism can provoke such a situation: blind terrorism (committing massacres indiscriminately which cause a large number of victims), and selective terrorism (eliminate chosen persons). [. . .] This destruction of the state must be carried out under the cover of “communist activities.” After that, we must intervene at the heart of the military, the juridical power and the church, in order to influence

popular opinion, suggest a solution, and clearly demonstrate the weakness of the present legal apparatus. Popular opinion must be polarized in such a way, that we are being presented as the only instrument capable of saving the nation.

All that Gladio operatives like Guérin-Sérac needed as self-justification for “committing massacres indiscriminately” was a belief that “popular opinion” needed to be “polarised.” This made him a useful asset for the Gladio core conspirators as they sought to “influence attitudes” and turn the population “in a direction favorable to the attainment of [their] objectives.”

In comparison to Operation Gladio, convincing the British people that an Islamist extremist murdered 22 people at a pop concert in Manchester is relatively straightforward. Still, carrying off the Manchester hoax was a complex endeavour, just as Gladio’s operations were.

The larger point is that the objectives and belief system underpinning the Manchester attack were identical to those fuelling Gladio operations. The purpose of each terrorist program—one lasting four decades, the other only one evening—was to convince citizens that they face a threat only the state can protect them from.

Just like Gladio, the Manchester attack was essentially a psychological warfare operation. The specific name we can give to the use of domestic false flag terrorism to generate fear in the population is “the strategy of tension.”

In May 1972, three Carabinieri (Italian police officers) were killed when a suspicious car they were investigating exploded. The legacy media blamed the far-left Red Brigade for the murders that resulted from the Peteano bombing.^[22]

Though no trial took place, explosives expert Marco Morin submitted a report that claimed the explosives used were the same as those previously employed by the far-left Red Brigade terror group. This was deemed sufficient for the Italian authorities to crack down on the Red Brigade and on other known communists and left-wing groups. A series of raids took place, and more than 200 left-wing activists were arrested. The Italian people were relieved that the state was doing something to keep them safe.

It wasn’t until 1984, when Italian judge Felice Casson reopened the investigation into the Peteano bombing, that the anomalies in the case became evident. Casson discovered that there had been no investigation of

the scene of the bombing and that Morin's explosives report was a forgery. Casson's investigation showed the explosive used was the military-grade high explosive C4.

In this regard, the parallels between the Peteano bombing false flag and the Manchester Arena hoaxed false flag are striking. Manipulation of the so-called investigation into the attacks is common to both.

Casson uncovered another incident in 1972, where the Carabinieri had found a weapons cache in Trieste containing C4. The find was kept quiet by Italian authorities. This led Casson to identify a national network of hidden Gladio arms, explosives, and munitions stockpiles. The C4 used at Peteano came from an arsenal concealed in Verona.^[23]

Consequently, Casson ordered the arrest of Gladio terrorist Vincenzo Vinciguerra.^[24] Vinciguerra was a member of the neo-Nazi paramilitary groups Avanguardia Nazionale (National Vanguard) and Ordine Nuovo (New Order). Also arrested was bomb expert Marco Morin, who falsified the explosives evidence in 1972. He, too, was a member of Ordine Nuovo.

Vinciguerra's subsequent testimony described the Gladio network of terrorist cells, coordinated by the security and intelligence services. He admitted responsibility for the Peteano bombing and said he had been assisted by the Italian SID, which had protected their Gladio terrorist asset by smuggling him into Spain following the murders.

While it is wise to be cautious about claims made by terrorists, Vinciguerra's statements have been corroborated by others, such as the Italian Parliament and the European Parliament, and are supported by both physical and documentary evidence.

Vinciguerra is not known to have been a senior figure within the Gladio hierarchy. Nonetheless, he was apparently well-informed, and his statements were consistent with both the official disclosures and the investigation of Operation Gladio by others, including the judiciary and parliamentarians.

Vinciguerra said that from the Piazza Fontana bombing in Milan in 1969, which killed seventeen people, to the massacre of eighty-five people at Bologna railway station in 1980, Gladio operatives had been fully involved. These attacks were falsely blamed on the far-left but were carried out by far-right Gladio units.

In his testimony in front of Casson, Vinciguerra said.^[25]

You had to attack civilians, the people, women, children, innocent people, unknown people far removed from any political game. The reason was quite simple. They were supposed to force these people, the Italian public, to turn to the state to ask for greater security. This was precisely the role of the right in Italy. It placed itself at the service of the state, which created a strategy aptly called the "Strategy of Tension" in so far as they had to get ordinary people to accept that at any moment over a period of 30 years, from 1960 to the mid-eighties, a state of emergency could be declared. So, people would willingly trade part of their freedom for the security of being able to walk the streets, go on trains, or enter a bank. This is the political logic behind all the bombings. They remain unpunished because the state cannot condemn itself.

The "strategy of tension,"^[26] which was revealed by Vinciguerra and was described by Yves Guérin-Sérac's Aginter Press as the manufacturing of political tension causing "fear in the world," was evidently behind the Gladio attacks from the 1960s onwards—and probably before. It seems likely that soon after going operational in the 1940s, Operation Gladio moved away from being a defensive counter-measure—to be used in the event of Soviet occupation—to an offensive psychological warfare campaign designed to manipulate public opinion.

Regardless of precisely when the "strategy of tension" was first adopted, Italian investigators firmly identified it as being an integral element of Gladio. Both violent means, such as terrorism and assassinations, and non-violent means, such as propaganda and economic warfare, were used to create a state of fear and uncertainty among the populace.

The purpose was to convince the public of the "reality of the insurgent danger." In truth, citizens were being murdered, maimed, impoverished, and deceived by their own state or by foreign states—considered allies—or by elements within those states.

Operation Gladio was formally revealed in 1990 by Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti in an official statement to the Italian parliament. By then, Gladio had already been exposed, but Andreotti's "official" revelations confirmed the unpalatable truth. Innocent European civilians were murdered by elements within their own states aligned to NATO.

The Italian political class was forced to admit the existence of Gladio as a result of the investigations into the "Years of Lead"^[27] conducted by Casson and others. Numerous criminal prosecutions were made in relation to a

series of domestic false flag terrorist atrocities that had taken place in Italy over four decades—at least from the 1950s through the 1980s.

In November 1990, the European Parliament published its “[Resolution on the Gladio Affair](#).”^[28] This document stated a number of known facts relating to four decades of covert false flag terror operations. While each national operation had its own “covert” codename, they all collectively came under the umbrella of Operation Gladio:

— “[I]n certain Member States military secret services (or uncontrolled branches thereof) were involved in serious cases of terrorism and crime as evidenced by various judicial inquiries.”

— “[T]hese organizations operated and continue to operate completely outside the law since they are not subject to any parliamentary control and frequently those holding the highest government and constitutional posts are kept in the dark as to these matters.”

— “[V]arious ‘Gladio’ organizations have at their disposal independent arsenals and military resources which give them an unknown strike potential, thereby jeopardizing the democratic structures of the countries in which they are operating or have been operating.”

This is about as far as the official narrative goes. The European Parliament charged its member states with rooting out the Gladio networks and asked NATO to shut down the operation.

Although the official proclamation clarifies the existence of Operation Gladio, it is extremely short on detail. There is much more known about the activities of the Gladio network than the European Parliament was willing to publicly air.

Once we recognise the lengths to which the biased pluralist state is willing to go to control our opinions and ultimately our behaviour, the cognitive dissonance that obstructs our view of what Dr Neil Levy called “the contours of our world” can be wiped away.

The notion presented by the European Parliament that Gladio operatives were “involved in serious cases of terrorism” was correct, but it told only half the story. It neglected to mention that Gladio operatives were involved in countless serious cases of false flag terrorism.

The resolution recommended that European governments “dismantle all clandestine military and paramilitary networks.” By referring to Gladio as

nothing more than a “clandestine intelligence and operation network,” the European Parliament’s resolution was a mealy-mouthed document.

The European Parliament claimed that European governments “[p]rotest vigorously at the assumption by certain US military personnel at SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe) and in NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) of the right to encourage the establishment in Europe of a clandestine intelligence and operation network.”

But that protest doesn’t appear to have been very vigorous at all. To date, only Belgium, Italy, and Switzerland have launched any related inquiries.

Response from NATO, the CIA, and MI6 to the European Parliament resolution was muted. Although their refusal to talk about Gladio was on the grounds of alleged national security and military secrecy, the agencies left unchallenged the Italian and other European court findings and the European Parliamentary resolution.

Initially, speaking from SHAPE headquarters in Belgium, NATO spokesman Jean Marcotta said, “NATO has never contemplated guerilla war or clandestine operations.” The next day, a different NATO spokesperson admitted that Marcotta should not have said anything—that NATO’s policy was not to comment on operational matters—but he confirmed that Marcotta’s statement was false.^[29]

In the 1990s, legacy media journalism was marginally more reputable than it is today. At that time, the UK Guardian was willing to publish an article reporting Vinciguerra’s recollections:^[30]

The terrorist line was followed by camouflaged people, people belonging to the security apparatus, or those linked to the state apparatus through rapport or collaboration. I say that every single outrage that followed from 1969 fitted into a single, organised matrix. Avanguardia Nazionale, like Ordine Nuovo, were being mobilised into the battle as part of an anti-communist strategy originating not with organisations deviant from the institutions of power, but from within the state itself, and specifically from within the ambit of the state’s relations within the Atlantic Alliance [NATO, CIA, MI6].

In 1992, even the BBC broadcast a series of three “Timewatch” investigatory documentaries on Operation Gladio.^[31] The first episode was introduced to a national television audience with a quote from J.J. Angleton—who served as the head of CIA Counter-Intelligence from 1954 to 1974—in which he said: “[D]eception is a state of mind and the mind of the state.”

The likelihood of the BBC broadcasting such a documentary today is nil. Now the BBC, like its counterparts in the legacy media, is nothing more than a state-controlled gatekeeper of information and news. Its journalists no longer question power—no longer question, period.

Operation Gladio provides yet more evidence that state-sponsored domestic false flag terrorism is a matter of historical fact and not a “conspiracy theory.” People’s inability and refusal to even look at the evidence does not alter the truth.

Over the last couple of chapters, we have discussed a short selection of the many historical examples of state-run MIHOP, LIHOP, and hoaxed false flags that have been perpetrated over the years. These examples represent a reasonably standard model of false flag operations. There is no evidence that a decision has ever been made by any state to stop using either the false flag terrorist attack or the resultant strategy of tension.

Given MI6’s leading Gladio role and the UK state’s involvement in acts of false flag terrorism during “the troubles,” it is obvious that the UK false flag terrorist operations revealed in the Stevens Inquiry report bear all the hallmarks of a yet-to-be admitted branch of Operation Gladio.

Less than two years after the Stevens Inquiry released its findings, the British government, clearly unhappy with independent inquiries that actually investigated potential state crimes, enacted the 2005 Inquiries Act.^[32] This legislation gives the UK state extensive control over so-called independent public inquiries.

The Inquiries Act came too late to conceal the UK state’s use of domestic false flag terrorism during “the troubles.” Consequently, in 2015, British Prime Minister David Cameron admitted the state’s collusion with loyalist paramilitaries and announced another state-led investigation of itself.^[33]

The Saunders Inquiry into the Manchester Arena bombing heard testimony from Abdalraouf Abdallah. He was a member of the “Tripoli Brigade” of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). He fought alongside Salman Abedi’s father, Ramadan Abedi, in Libya and was an associate of Salman Abedi—the alleged Manchester Arena bomber—who, he said, was in his “circle.”

Based in Manchester’s Islamist terrorist community, Abdallah was injured while fighting with the “17 February Martyrs Brigade” in Libya. Abdallah was jailed in 2016 for facilitating the shipment of munitions and Islamist extremist fighters to Syria, some of whom fought with the proscribed terrorist organisation, Islamic State.

During his testimony, Abdallah said that he and his Islamist extremist comrades were “trained by NATO.”^[34] There is every reason to believe Abdallah. It is likely that Salman Abedi, the alleged Manchester Arena bomber, was also trained by NATO or representatives of NATO-aligned states.

For example, in 2013 the US state, nominally “led” by President Obama, began the “Timber Sycamore” training programme. Other NATO member states, such as the UK, Turkey, and France, assisted in the training, arming, and equipping of Islamists extremist groups that were being deployed as proxy forces in Syria.^[35]

While there is nothing firmly tying Salman Abedi to the Timber Sycamore programme, his close relationship with Western intelligence agencies—we’ll cover this in Chapter 12—and Abdallah’s comments make the likelihood of Salman Abedi receiving similar “NATO” training high.

Nearly all the evidence we are about to examine exposing the Manchester Arena hoax was reported to the Saunders Inquiry by Richard D. Hall. He sent copies of his investigation directly to Sir John Saunders and four members of the Inquiry panel team.

The Saunders Inquiry into the Manchester Arena bombing was established under the 2005 Inquiries Act. Before we accept any state narrative about an alleged terrorist attack, such as the Manchester Arena bombing, we should first rule out the possibility, if not the likelihood, that it was, in fact, a state-orchestrated false flag. History—including the subject of this chapter—teaches us that this is by no means an unreasonable suspicion.

The UK High Court has ruled that Richard D. Hall cannot present any of the evidence he has reported to show that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag. In his ruling, High Court Master Davison said that Hall’s staged attack—hoaxed false flag—hypothesis was “implausible.”

No, Hall’s hypothesis is not at all implausible. The opinion Master Davison expressed is historically illiterate.

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Chapter 8: The Trial of Richard D. Hall

To be governed is to be watched over, inspected, spied on, directed, legislated at, regulated, docketed, indoctrinated, preached at, controlled, assessed, weighed, censored, ordered about, by men who have neither the right, nor the knowledge, nor the virtue. [. . .] To be governed is to be at every operation, at every transaction, noted, registered, enrolled, taxed, stamped, measured, numbered, assessed, licensed, authorized, admonished, forbidden, reformed, corrected, punished. It is, under the pretext of public utility, and in the name of the general interest, to be placed under contribution, trained, ransomed, exploited, monopolized, extorted, squeezed, mystified, robbed; then, at the slightest resistance, the first word of complaint, to be repressed, fined, despised, harassed, tracked, abused, clubbed, disarmed, choked, imprisoned, judged, condemned, shot, deported, sacrificed, sold, betrayed; and, to crown all, mocked, ridiculed, outraged, dishonoured. That is government; that is its justice; that is its morality.

— Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1851)

“General Idea of the Revolution in the Nineteenth Century,”^[1] p.294

Richard D. Hall currently faces a civil claim brought against him by Martin Hibbert and Eve Hibbert. Both father and daughter were reportedly injured inside the City Room of the Manchester Arena at 22:31:00 precisely on 22nd May 2017.

Mr Hibbert was said to have been hit by 22 pieces of shrapnel, some of which struck his spine and paralysed him from the waist down. Eve apparently sustained brain damage when shrapnel was blown through her head. Thankfully, Eve has reportedly recovered remarkably well, although she still has a life-limiting injury.

[Henceforth, Martin and Eve Hibbert will be collectively referred to as the claimants.]

In March 2023, the claimants submitted their claim to the UK High Court. In it, they stated.^[2]

The Claimants seek damages, an injunction and other remedies against the Defendant [Richard D. Hall] under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997, the Data Protection Act 2018 and in misuse of

private information. The Claimants' claims are based upon conduct by the Defendant, including publication by him, related to the Claimants' status as victims of the bombing of Manchester Arena in May 2017.

The cause of the Hibberts' civil claim is the book^[3] Richard D. Hall has written and the accompanying documentary^[4] he has produced on the Manchester Arena case.

The book, titled *Manchester: The Night of the Bang*, was published on 27th March 2020. The claimants informed Hall of their intention to file a claim against him almost three years later—in December 2022.

Their claim against Hall averred that the publication of his Manchester Arena investigation constituted harassment and that Hall had breached General Data Protection Regulations (GDPRs). Hall issued his rebuttal argument, denied most of the points made in the claim, and responded by outlining his intended defence.^[5]

Hall cited Section 1(3)(c)^[6] of the “Protection from Harassment Act 1997” (PfH 1997), which states that a claim of harassment cannot be upheld if the defendant can show “that in the particular circumstances the pursuit of the course of conduct was reasonable.” Further, Hall cited PfH 1997 1(3)(a), which states that a claim for harassment cannot stand if the defendant's course of action was “pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime.”

In his written defence, Hall also noted that it is an offence under Section 35 (2) and/or (3) of “the Inquiries Act 2005” to distort or otherwise alter any evidence presented to an inquiry, prevent evidence from being submitted to an inquiry or intentionally suppress or conceal evidence or documents that should reasonably be made available to an inquiry. Thanks to Hall's investigative journalism, we know that crucial evidence should have been examined at the inquiry but was not. Hence, a suspicion that possible offences have been committed seems reasonable.

Hall's defence was quite straightforward.

As the claim against him was based almost entirely upon his investigation of the evidence and his subsequent published work on the reported Manchester Arena bombing, under Section 1(3)(c) of PfH 1997, Hall argued that, by engaging in investigative journalism, his “course of conduct was reasonable.” He also offered a defence, under Section 1(3)(a) of PfH 1997, that his investigative journalism was “pursued for the purpose of preventing or detecting a crime.”

To defend himself against the claim, Hall needed to establish two key facts to the satisfaction of the High Court: (1) he was an investigative journalist digging into a story of immense public interest and, (2) as such, he had conducted himself in a professional manner and hadn't harassed anyone or improperly stored personal data relating to anyone. In short, he had conducted himself in keeping with the UK National Union of Journalists (NUJ) code of conduct.^[7]

The only way Hall could demonstrate his legitimate activity as a journalist was to show the court the product of his investigative journalism. So, he set about outlining the evidence he had uncovered in his investigation, in which he demonstrated that Manchester was a hoaxed false flag.

Hall presumably hoped he could prove to the court that the story he investigated was "overwhelmingly in the public interest" and that he was focused on reporting evidence with the intention of "preventing or detecting crime." In accordance with the NUJ code of conduct, Hall couldn't always obtain evidence "by straightforward means." But when he had to resort to means deemed less than straightforward, it did *not* amount to "harassment," he argued—not least of all because he was acting in his professional capacity as an investigative journalist.

Having filed the claim against Hall in March 2023 and having Hall's rebuttal in hand, on 9th November 2023 the claimants' legal team applied to the High Court of Justice for a "summary judgment." They were seeking a ruling from High Court Justice Master Davison to effectively strike out Richard D. Hall's defence in its entirety.

If it were to issue a summary judgment,^[8] the High Court could "dispose of all or part of a case without a trial." This would avoid the need to examine Hall's evidence in court. The whole lot could be thrown out by asserting Hall's defence had "no real prospect of success."

On the 29th of January 2024, in the UK High Court of Justice, Richard D. Hall offered a brief outline of the evidence he had investigated, accumulated, and reported to the public. Having submitted his evidence in full in his legal bundle, Hall argued that the High Court could not rule on the harassment and GDPR breaches claim unless it considered the evidence that showed he was an investigative journalist reporting on a story of overwhelming "public interest."

Essentially, Hall offered a verbal outline of the evidence we are about to discuss. He contended that this evidence, once submitted to the High

Court, would give him every “prospect of success” in denying the claimants’ harassment and GDPR breach claims in a trial.^[9]

High Court of Justice Master Davison issued his ruling on 8th February 2024. Davison identified “the Issues” that were disputed by Hall:^[10]

- i) On 22 May 2017, 22 innocent people were murdered in a bomb explosion carried out by a terrorist at the Manchester Arena at the conclusion of a concert performed by Ariana Grande;
- ii) The claimants were present at the Manchester Arena at the time of the bombing;
- iii) They were severely injured, rendering [claimant] Martin Hibbert paralysed from the waist down and [claimant] Eve Hibbert brain-damaged; and
- iv) The cause of these injuries was the explosion of the bomb.

This was a fair summation of the points Hall disputes. As the evidence he uncovered showed that Salman Abedi, the alleged terrorist, did not detonate a shrapnel laden suicide bomb inside the City Room, Hall inferred that the claimants, had they been present, could not have been injured in the manner they described at the time and location they claimed.

As, in a civil claim, the defendant can challenge any part of a claim made against them, Hall argued that the evidence he had in his possession must be heard by the court. This would show, he reasoned, that the claimants’ accounts could not possibly be true.

When Hall first published his initial report of the evidence, the so-called public inquiry—the Saunders Inquiry—had yet to issue any findings. Hall continued to investigate new evidence as it emerged and produced further investigative reports. Importantly, Hall highlighted the evidence that had *not* been examined by the inquiry. By the time the civil proceedings against him were underway, Hall had been investigating the Manchester Arena hoax for four-and-a-half years.

Beyond claims made by the epistemic authorities and by one of the claimants—Martin Hibbert—Hall found no evidence placing the claimants in the City Room of the Manchester Arena at 22:31 on the night in question. Consequently, Hall disputed that the claimants were present when the hoax transpired.

In his summary judgment, Master Davison laid out what he considered to be the compelling evidence proving the claimants were, in fact, present:

[T]he claimants have provided a witness statement from the first claimant, Martin Hibbert, that confirms that they were, indeed, there. That witness statement refers to Mr Hibbert's evidence to the police and to the Saunders Inquiry, which were to the same effect. (He was able to review stills of the CCTV evidence when preparing that evidence. The stills showed him and Eve immediately before the detonation of the bomb.) Mr Hibbert has provided the invoice for the tickets to the concert. Mr Terry Wilcox, a solicitor who was instructed on behalf of two victims' families, and who was able to review the CCTV footage on terms of strict confidentiality (because the footage was too graphic for public release) has provided a witness statement in which he confirms from the CCTV that Martin and Eve Hibbert were both present at the Arena on 22 May 2017 and were observed both before and after the detonation of the explosive device. [. . .] Lastly, Hashem Abedi was convicted of attempted murder of persons who included the claimants.

Let's review Master Davison's statement.

First, the claimants *said* they were in the City Room.

Second, their own solicitor, Mr Terry Wilcox, *said* the same.

Third, the claimants *said* they had seen still images—shown to them at the Saunders Inquiry—taken from Manchester Arena CCTV footage, placing them at the scene.

Fourth, their solicitor, Mr Terry Wilcox, *said* that he, too, had seen those images. (The CCTV footage was also reportedly seen by an unnamed family liaison officer.)

Fifth, neither the footage nor the stills had been seen by anyone else, including Master Davison, because they were apparently too graphic and thus disturbing for anyone to look at. (Note: *Why* the still images of people taken inside the City Room *before* the alleged bomb exploded would be too graphic for viewing was not made clear.)

Sixth, the claimants had presented an invoice for the Arianna Grande tickets they bought.

Seventh, Hashem Abedi was convicted of murder and attempted murder—complicity in the reported bombing. (Hashem is the younger brother of Salman.)

Thus, according to Master Davison, all these points amounted to solid proof that the claimants were at the scene and were injured in the bombing.

Hall's defence challenged the claimants to prove they were injured in the City Room by a bomb detonated by Salman Abedi at 22:31:00 on 22nd May 2017. But the effect of securing a summary judgment was that the claimants were not required to offer any further evidence to substantiate their claims.

It is worth noting that the still images presented at the Saunders Inquiry were heavily redacted. Richard D. Hall examined every single one^[11] of those 806 images and reported that the claimants could not be identified in any of them.^[12]

Furthermore, none of the CCTV video footage or images purportedly featuring the claimants was shown at the Saunders Inquiry. To date, only the claimants, their solicitor, and the anonymous family liaison officer have ever reportedly seen this evidence.

In other words, everything Master Davison relied on in determining this aspect of his summary judgment was pure hearsay.

Because the claimants are suing him on the basis of that hearsay, Hall requested that the CCTV footage the claimants referred to be entered into evidence. He also requested medical evidence showing that the claimants were injured in a bombing on 22nd May 2017.

In the summary judgment, Master Davison reasoned:

[. . .] the claimants have provided medical evidence in the form of medical reports from Mr BM Soni, who is Mr Hibbert's treating consultant, dated 14 February 2020 and a short-form medical report from Dr Rajpura who is Eve's GP. Both reports were produced for the purpose of the claimants' claims to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. The reports describe the injuries sustained by the claimants. Mr Soni (who had access to the hospital medical records) ascribes the injuries to the bombing. The GP report is silent on causation of Eve's injuries. But Martin Hibbert's witness statement confirms how she came by those injuries and the claimants have also provided a witness

statement dated 16 November 2023 from Eve's mother, Sarah Gillbard, providing the same confirmation.

No medical evidence was provided showing that Eve Hibbert was injured inside the City Room on the night in question. Instead, it was simply *said* by others that this was the case.

Martin Hibbert's doctor provided a medical report written three years after the Manchester Arena bombing occurred. Dr Soni *said* Mr Hibbert's injuries were sustained in the bombing.

Given that he was defending himself against "claims," Richard D. Hall invested considerable time and financial resources to submit formal court applications for the release of evidence to the High Court. In addition to the CCTV evidence, Hall and his legal team requested documented, contemporaneous medical report evidence—such as the hospital records Dr Soni could apparently "access"—to prove the claimants' injuries were sustained at 23:31 on the 22nd May 2017. This evidence was not provided, and Hall's request to see it was denied.

Given that the CCTV evidence had not been made public or seen by the Court, given that direct medical evidence demonstrating where and when the claimants injuries were sustained was not seen by the Court, and given Hall's high level of doubt that the claimants were present, Davison's ruling on the matter seemed odd.

As this was a civil proceeding, Master Davison was concerned only with the balance of probability. "Beyond all reasonable doubt" is not required in judging civil claims. It would have been very inexpensive and easy for Davison to have provided the relevant video clips, CCTV stills, and medical proof. Doing so would have shown whether the claimant's hearsay account of being injured in the City Room were true "beyond all reasonable doubt"—far beyond the balance of probability. Yet, Davison denied all of Hall's requests for evidence.

What seems stranger still is that it was Hall, and not the claimants' legal team, who requested this evidence be submitted and examined in the trial. Surely the claimants would have wanted to submit the footage, stills, and medical proof into evidence themselves? Doing so would have enabled them to prove "beyond all reasonable doubt" that Hall's Manchester hoax hypothesis was completely unfounded. Instead, the claimants' legal team secured a summary judgment, which they knew would prevent the purported evidence from being viewed by anyone.

In explaining his rationale for not allowing the CCTV or medical evidence to be examined, or even to be seen by the High Court, Davison made a peculiar argument. Regardless of the legal merits of Davison's ruling, which I am not questioning, from a healthy anti-establishment perspective, or even a mildly sceptical perspective, the explanation Davison offered was hard to fathom. He wrote:

If summary determination of the Issues is unavailable, the defendant will use the trial as a vehicle to advance and test his "staged attack" hypothesis. This intention is plainly evident from his witness statement. At many points in that statement, he calls for further investigation and inquiry.

What Davison said about the defendant was true. Richard D. Hall, having reported the evidence exposing the Manchester Arena hoax and now facing a potentially damaging legal claim for doing so, has naturally sought to have the evidence he reported tested in a court of law. He has had no option *but* to advance his hypothesis of a staged attack—a hoaxed false flag—as the only way to defend himself.

Davison wrote further:

[Hall] has also issued (so far) two applications [to see the CCTV evidence and the claimants' medical proof]. If the Issues can only be dealt with at trial, that will actively serve and promote the defendant's interests (including, it is fair to assume, his financial interests). But the claimants will face a long drawn-out process in which their credibility, bona fides and, to some extent, their privacy will be under an attack which they maintain should never have been made in the first place and which has no real prospect of success.

But Richard D. Hall did not instigate the claim. The claimants and their legal team, and quite possibly others—we'll discuss who in a moment—were the ones who instigated it. Interestingly, Master Davison opined that if the CCTV and medical evidence were submitted at the trial, they would "actively serve and promote" Hall's interests.

The claimants said they had suffered harassment by virtue of Hall publishing evidence that brought their account of events into question. The "long drawn-out process" of a subsequent trial that might cause the claimants further distress, as they put it, was a legal process *started by the claimants*, not by Hall.

Obviously, as an investigative journalist, Richard D. Hall earns a living by reporting stories of public interest. Nevertheless, it is hard to understand how Hall was seeking to make money by defending himself, at considerable cost, against a claim that seeks £50,000 in damages. If he loses, he faces potential financial ruin.

The case has attracted national media attention. The legacy media reporters have cast Hall as some sort of monster. By calling him a "conspiracy theorist," using the phrase as a pejorative, they have consistently undermined his credibility as an investigative journalist. So, again, what Hall can possibly hope to gain financially or professionally merely by defending himself—a financial gain that Davison suggested is Hall's motive—is truly incomprehensible.

Justifying his decision to issue a summary judgment and deny Hall access to the CCTV and medical evidence, Davison said:

[. . .] These factors point strongly to the conclusion that the Issues are suitable issues for summary judgment.

To be clear: Davison ruled that the fact that Hall "called for further investigation and inquiry" of the Manchester Arena hoax, combined with the claimants embarking upon a legal process that could cause them further distress, was sufficient reason to determine that none of Hall's evidence could be heard and to deny Hall the right to see the evidence that supposedly substantiates a significant part of the claim made against him.

Davison's reference to the Hashem Abedi trial as proof that the Manchester bombing took place was also interesting. There are many questions we might ask about that court ruling.

That Davison relied upon previous judicial findings is standard practice in the UK legal system, where "precedence" often holds sway. But that doesn't automatically make reliance on precedence either reasonable or just. Miscarriages of justice are all too common in UK courts.^[13]

When he was arrested in 2019, Hashem Abedi—the aforementioned younger brother of the reported Manchester suicide bomber—denied all charges in a written statement. But he reportedly remained silent when interrogated by the police. The start of his trial was subsequently delayed because Abedi's defence tried to get the whole case thrown out. They claimed Hashem's arrest in Libya and extradition to the UK had been illegal. When this defence argument failed, Hashem apparently sacked his entire legal team and continued to maintain his silence.^[14]

Hashem Abedi was eventually represented at his Old Bailey trial by a public defence team led by then-Queen's Council (QC)—now-King's council (KC)—Stephen Kamlish. Hashem's written denial was read to the court on Day four of the trial.

Not surprisingly, a lot of the prosecution evidence centred on the activities of Salman Abedi rather than Hashem Abedi. Hashem, after all, was in Libya when the Manchester Arena hoax occurred.

Much of the evidence presented to the court specifically relating to Hashem came from anonymous witnesses who could not be named "for legal reasons." The prosecution's physical evidence largely came from the flats (apartments) and the car that the brothers reportedly used at the time they supposedly manufactured the bomb and transported bomb-making materials. This evidence included Hashem's fingerprints found on metal containers that were said to have been used for bomb-making.

Hashem's appearances in court were sporadic. From day seventeen onwards, he wasn't seen in the courtroom again, though he was said to be in the building. By day twenty-three of the trial, Hashem wasn't even attending the courts. Instead, he remained in his cell at Belmarsh Prison. His "defence" team confirmed that their only communication with their client was restricted to a short daily phone call.

The prosecution concluded on day twenty-four. It was revealed that no defence argument would be offered. Hashem Abedi's "defence" consisted of his written statement being re-read to the jury. The trial judge, Mr Justice Jeremy Baker, asked Hashem's lead council, Stephen Kamlish QC, to confirm that Hashem had been properly advised. Kamlish said he had.

Consequently, in light of the fact that Hashem was not in court and had apparently chosen not to present any evidence in his own defence, the judge concluded that "the jury may draw such inferences as will be proper from his [Hashem Abedi's] failure to do so."

On day twenty-five, a discussion took place between the Crown's lead prosecutor, Duncan Penny QC, Stephen Kamlish QC, and the judge. The conversation revolved around the defence' decision not to offer any concluding defence arguments to the jury.

Mr Justice Jeremy Baker said this was "fairly unusual" and asked Stephen Kamlish QC if he felt he was acting "in accordance" with his "professional duties" as a defence barrister. Mr Kamlish said he was.

Duncan Penny QC said that offering a no-defence argument wasn't unheard of but agreed it was a rare occurrence in shorter, less complex trials. Penny also said the fact the defence had waived its right to make closing remarks to the jury would not deter him, as the state's prosecutor, from making a final appraisal of the state's evidence to the jury.

Stephen Kamlish QC, "defending" Hashem Abedi, said the decision to offer no defence had been made. He added that not offering any meaningful defence was "the only proper course." On day twenty-six, Hashem Abedi apparently sacked his defence team for the second time and reportedly made another written statement that was read to the jury:

I have withdrawn my instructions from my legal representatives. I do not wish to participate in the trial. It follows I do not wish to exercise my right to appoint new lawyers to represent me in court. I will not be participating in the proceedings any further.

Hashem Abedi was found guilty of 22 counts of murder, and one of attempted murder, and sentenced to 55 years in prison. While it was said during his sentencing that he was "just as guilty" as his brother, it is a fact that Hashem Abedi wasn't even in the UK when the 22 people he was convicted of murdering were reportedly killed by another individual—Salman Abedi.

Hashem Abedi attended neither the reading of the verdict nor the sentencing. Other than a couple of written statements, his conviction was based entirely on the evidence offered by the state's prosecution. No defence was offered by or on behalf of Hashem Abedi.

There were three Abedi brothers. Hashem was the youngest. Like Hashem, Salman's older brother, Ismail Abedi, was also found guilty in his absence. Ismail was convicted of failing to give testimony at the Saunders Inquiry when legally ordered^[15] to do so under the 2005 Inquiries Act.

Hashem Abedi is the only person to have been convicted of any involvement in the Manchester Arena alleged bomb plot. It would be putting it mildly to say his trial and conviction were "unusual."

Hashem Abedi's sentencing marked another passage of British justice, and another associated with the alleged Manchester Arena bombing, in which no meaningful defence was heard.^[16] To claim his sentencing as "proof" that the Manchester Arena bombing occurred as described by the state may be acceptable in the High Court, but a reasonable person could be forgiven for harbouring doubts.

In his summary judgment—which, not incidentally, excluded *all* of Hall's evidence—High Court Master Davison said the ruling in the Hashem Abedi case proved that “22 innocent people were murdered in a bomb explosion carried out by a terrorist at the Manchester Arena.” Consequently, Davison felt confident in stating:

[A]lthough his [Richard D. Hall's] beliefs may be genuinely held, his theory that the Manchester bombing was an operation staged by government agencies in which no one was genuinely killed or injured is absurd and fantastical.

On all “the Issues,” the High Court of Justice denied Hall the opportunity to present any of his evidence. Master Davison ruled everything reported by Hall inadmissible and worthless. Hall could not demonstrate that he is an investigative journalist working on an important story. Thus, unless the summary judgment was overturned on appeal, it would be almost impossible for Hall to offer his PfH 1997 defence.

Davison struck out Hall's evidence without once directly referencing any of it. In his ruling, Master Davison ultimately determined:

I find that the Defendant [Richard D. Hall] has not discharged the evidential burden which rests on him. He has no real prospect, indeed no prospect at all, of success on the Issues and I will resolve them in the claimants' favour. [. . .] I will list the case for a further hearing to decide consequential orders, costs and directions to take the claim forward to a final determination.

It is not implausible to suspect that the Manchester Arena bombing was yet another state-orchestrated false flag operation. To call the mere suspicion “fantastical” and “absurd” is simply to be ignorant of history. Davison appeared to demonstrate his ignorance when he said:

I have already referred to the inherent implausibility of the Defendant's “staged attack” hypothesis. Whilst acknowledging that issues as to the claimants' presence at the attack and the attack itself are separate and distinct, once the defendant's general hypothesis has been rejected (as I have rejected it) it is unrealistic to maintain that the claimants were not there and were either not severely injured at all or acquired their injuries earlier and by a different mechanism than the bombing. Indeed, the latter points are simply preposterous.

Of course, it is *not* “unrealistic to maintain that the claimants were not there”—unless you summarily dismiss, as Davison did, all the evidence Hall accumulated during his years of research.

Davison's use of the word "preposterous" again points to his ignorance of history—especially the history of documented government-sponsored false flag terrorism. Is he oblivious of NATO's decades-long campaign of domestic false flag terror attacks? Has he never read the Stevens report? Similarly, he seems to know very little about the history of WWI or the history of the Vietnam War—and all the other wars where *casus belli* were manufactured using false flag attacks, including hoaxes.

Davison doesn't seem to understand that staged terrorist attacks are commonly conducted by the state. He is probably unfamiliar with the multinational companies, such as UK-based CrisisCast, that provide crisis actors to governments and other clients to simulate terrorist attacks.^[17] Based on those facts, it is as “absurd” for Davison to claim Manchester was *not* a hoax as it is for him to denounce Hall for drawing the inescapable conclusion that Manchester *was* a hoax.

Indeed, the evidence reported by Hall clearly shows that what most people believe was a real bombing of the Manchester Arena was actually another staged terrorist attack that used crisis actors. Davison evidently doesn't comprehend that Hall's suspicion is perfectly reasonable—and that his own *lack* of suspicion is highly unreasonable. One could say that Davison's failure to find out about the historical events called false flags is what caused him to rule out the evidence Hall presented.

Richard D. Hall has been summarily judged, without a trial, by the British High Court of Justice. His work will almost certainly be censored, and he could lose his livelihood and be effectively barred from working as an investigative journalist.

It is perhaps difficult for many of us to believe that such a state of affairs could possibly persist in a UK High Court of Justice trial in the 21st century. It may be easier to simply report Hall's flabbergasted response made during the subsequent case management hearing held on 13th March 2024:

I have come to this court under a misconception, because I thought trials were primarily about presenting evidence. That is what I used to think. A court order for the CCTV evidence has been rejected. A court order for the medical evidence has been rejected and my 90 pages of first hand crime scene evidence, the detail of which were not referred

to or challenged in the judgment at all, has effectively been ignored and waved aside. Now in the recent judgment it was stated: “I do not propose to engage with the detail of the defendant’s evidence.” So it appears to me that this court is, is not interested in any relevant evidence.

One of the claimants, Martin Hibbert, has become something of a minor celebrity and has given countless interviews to legacy media. For example, he has consented to share his story in many articles and has appeared on numerous legacy media radio shows and on state broadcast television.

In an interview aired on ITV’s Good Morning Britain (GMB), Martin Hibbert spoke about his relationship with Andy Burnham,^[18] the mayor of Manchester. Mr Hibbert said if he wins the case against Hall, he and Burnham and his legal team will seek to use the ruling to push for the creation of a new criminal offence.

Mr Hibbert and his supporters want to make it illegal to question the account given by any victim of an alleged terrorist attack. Referring to the summary judgment, Mr Hibbert told the legacy media.^[19]

This is the first judgment. I am going to be getting together with my legal team now and we’ll have another hearing and then there will be a trial. The judgment yesterday stops him [Hall] from being able to use it as a platform to talk about his conspiracy theories.

The “platform” Mr Hibbert referred to was, it is worth repeating, created by him and his legal team. The summary judgment prevented Hall from presenting any evidence in his own defence.

Mr Hibbert continued:

I spoke with Andy [Burnham] probably a couple of years ago about it. I’ve also spoke[n] to my legal team as well. [. . .] If we are successful, then, if we can make it a criminal offence, for people that are in terrorist attacks, [. . .] to turn up at someone’s house uninvited, to put video cameras outside their house and in their garden.

Should such a law be enacted, it will severely hamper, if not end, any prospect of investigative journalists scrutinising the claims the UK state makes about terrorist incidents. Seeing as how the state either orchestrates or is complicit in false flags, the proposed law sounds like one of a number of possible motives for staging the Manchester hoax. In other words, it seems the UK state’s prospective “Hibbert’s Law” may be a piece of

legislation that was all along *intended* to result from the Manchester hoaxed false flag. For reasons explored in the concluding chapter, this remains within the realm of possibility.

It may not be the only legislation the state set its sights on creating and passing in the wake of the Manchester event. Other legislative moves are allegedly justified in response to the Manchester Arena bombing.

We read in Chapter 7 that Operation Gladio terrorists Vincenzo Vinciguerra, Yves Guérin-Sérac, and others admitted that the purpose of the “strategy of tension”—psychological warfare conducted through the state’s use of false flag terror—was to convince the public to seek refuge from the state. Put another way: The strategy of tension enables the state to enact draconian enforcement measures that people living in an ostensible democracy would otherwise reject.

So far, the terrorist attack, so-called, at Manchester Arena has already been used to “justify” the introduction of The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill^[20] (called Martyn’s Law). Once enacted, this legislation will compel venue and event management companies to introduce “counter-terrorism” measures. It calls for attendees of events at major venues to be scanned, monitored, and surveilled by the state—thus improving the state’s ability to monitor our whereabouts and control our behaviour.

In many ways, it’s ironic that Mr Hibbert wants to protect from scrutiny the epistemic authorities’ stories about terror events. Consider that he has provided the legacy media with a number of *different versions* of his story about what happened to him and his daughter. Which of those versions is he seeking to protect? Surely not all of them, since they contradict one another.

In July 2017, just two months after the Manchester Arena hoax, Mr Hibbert told journalists at the Times:^[21]

I remember everything. [. . .] We had come out of the box and gone into the main auditorium. But I brushed shoulders with him, the terrorist, and the trajectory of that took me thankfully away from him. He was going in as we were coming out. We got about half-way down the auditorium, going towards the exit and that’s when the bomb went off.

It doesn’t appear Mr Hibbert did “remember everything.” That account was incongruous with the official narrative. According to the official narrative,

Abedi detonated his bomb in the foyer (the City Room), *not* in the main auditorium (the Arena).

Consequently, Richard D. Hall reported:

He [Mr Hibbert] is clearly implying here that he was inside the auditorium and that the bomb went off in the auditorium. This is not where the device went off. [. . .] It is clear that [in July 2017] Martin Hibbert believed that the blast had occurred inside the auditorium. Which is patently untrue.

In May 2018, Martin Hibbert's story, reported in yet another legacy media interview,^[22] had changed again. He still maintained that he had “brushed shoulders” with Abedi, but this time the alleged location had shifted to the City Room:

Heading out early meant we were in the foyer just as the bomber detonated himself. I bumped into him, actually. The police told me afterwards. Apparently as I rushed through some doors, you see us on CCTV coming together. A shame I didn't chin him, isn't it? A few moments later the explosion happened. It's hard to describe. The world just shook and boomed, and then there were screams, and you were no longer at a concert; you were in hell, really, a horror movie.

Mr Hibbert recounted being told by police there was CCTV footage of him “coming together” with the terrorist. No one else has ever seen this footage, though, if the official account is true, it is impossible that such footage exists.

In this version of his account, Mr Hibbert was referring to the doors between the City Room and the Arena concourse, which circumferences the main Arena. The subsequent Saunders Inquiry reported that Salman Abedi did *not* approach those doors at any point. If the Saunders Inquiry findings are accurate, Mr Hibbert *cannot* have “bumped into” Salman Abedi and would have had no opportunity to “chin him.”

Martin Hibbert is often reported to be the person closest to the alleged shrapnel bomb to have survived.^[23] In a UK Guardian article, Mr Hibbert and his daughter Eve were reportedly five meters—approximately sixteen and a half feet—away from the device when it exploded.^[24] It should be noted that this distance has varied from “right next to” to ten meters to two to five meters, depending on *when* Mr Hibbert gave his account or *which* legacy media outlet reported it. In a Daily Mail article, Mr Hibbert and his daughter were reportedly “just a few feet” away from the alleged bomber.^[25]

No one other than the people we've already mentioned has ever seen the CCTV video or still images showing Martin and Eve Hibbert inside the Arena. Mr Hibbert has provided the last "infamous" image of his daughter and himself captured prior to the Manchester Arena hoax. Supposedly taken a few hours before the purported bombing, the image shows Martin and his then-fourteen-year-old daughter Eve in a restaurant approximately half-a-mile away from the Arena.

In sworn testimony before the Saunders Inquiry, Mr Hibbert spoke about that photo, which he snapped at the San Carlo restaurant:^[26]

I remember looking across and she looked beautiful [. . .] she looked stunning [. . .] which is why I took that infamous picture, because I never used to share Eve on social media, but [. . .] I wanted to embrace it and, in a way, celebrate it, if that's the right word, and that's kind of why I took that picture of us, which is obviously the infamous picture of us at San Carlo [restaurant].

Mr Hibbert told the Saunders Inquiry panel that he and his daughter had VIP tickets and that "it was the first time Eve had been in a box." As noted by Master Davison, an invoice was later produced as "proof" that the claimants attended the concert. The "infamous" photograph shows that Eve and her father each had a mobile phone. If we are to believe them, it seems neither Mr Hibbert nor Eve took any other photographs in or from the VIP suite to capture more memories of their night together inside the Manchester Arena.

In another legacy media article, published in December 2020, Martin Hibbert referenced that photograph. He said it was "the last picture, you know, before, that's why everybody knew we were at the concert."

The photograph does *not* provide evidence that he and his daughter attended the Ariana Grande concert. Nor does it show they were in the City Room at approximately 22:31.

Hall discussed the posting of this photograph on social media and the absence of any observable physical evidence placing Martin and Eve Hibbert in the City Room of the Manchester Arena that night.

In the section beginning at 12:20 in his report, Hall noted:^[27]

The image was posted on Twitter on the 22nd May 2017 at 6.53pm. [Martin] Hibbert posted the image again four years later. And this time felt the need to state the exact time the photograph was taken. [. . .]

He has used the Twitter post to claim that the photograph is why everybody “knew” they “were at the concert.” [. . .] I am not aware of any photographic evidence that places them at the actual Arena that night.

In the GMB interview, Mr Hibbert said he is taking legal action against Hall “for Eve firstly.” With regard to his daughter, Mr Hibbert claimed:

We don’t get to talk about it, it’s something that he [Hall] said, that because we don’t talk about Eve in the media and we don’t put her on social media, we’re trying to hide something, we’re not.

Unlike many of the other purported victims of and witnesses to the Manchester Arena hoax and its consequences, Eve’s mother, Sarah Gillbard, has maintained almost total legacy media and social media silence about Eve and the alleged bombing. Gillbard’s silence is one of the reasons Hall’s inquisitiveness about Eve Hibbert was piqued in the first place.

The number of articles and TV and radio appearances Mr Hibbert has agreed to, where he openly discusses his daughter’s injuries and medical history, are too numerous to list. In the GMB interview, Mr Hibbert disclosed to a national TV audience that his daughter had suffered multiple seizures and was “really struggling.” Perhaps Eve, now a twenty one year old adult, gave her father her consent for him to talk about her personal medical problems again.

Martin Hibbert’s persistent efforts to keep himself—and Eve—at the centre of the Manchester story contrasts notably with Eve’s mother’s attempts to keep Eve out of it. It is hard to see how Mr Hibbert could have done more to keep Eve in the media spotlight.

Martin Hibbert has now written and published a book where he again reportedly discusses Eve’s injuries in detail. With regard to the timing of Hibbert’s civil action—although it isn’t entirely clear what he is referring to and I have not read his book—in a recent [Daily Mail article](#),^[28] Mr Hibbert, as usual, talked openly about Eve’s reported injuries but also said:

Following a Panorama documentary investigating these ‘disaster trolls’ I went on TV to discuss it and all the publicity led to action. Hall’s YouTube channels and the market stall in Wales where he sold books and DVDs expounding his theories were closed down, and a group of us survivors have started legal action to ensure that he can no longer defend his poisonous claims. Hopefully, by this summer the case will

have concluded completely. [. . .] At 6.53pm on the night of the bombing, with less than four hours to go before Salman Abedi detonated his homemade explosive device, I posted to Twitter a photo of the two of us having a pizza at our favourite Italian restaurant, not far from Manchester Arena.

Quite clearly, “the case” that he says will be concluded by this summer is the claim that Martin and Eve Hibbert—*not* “a group of us survivors”—have brought against Hall. Mr Hibbert seems to be inferring that “the action” that followed “Disaster Deniers” included “the case.”

It is notable that Mr Hibbert once again cites the specific timing of the “infamous” photo, inferring that it serves as indisputable evidence placing Eve and him in the City Room at 22:31 on 22nd May 2017. It is *not* evidence of their presence—any more than an image of someone driving their car toward Manchester, at some time or another, proves they spent the night in Manchester on the 22nd May.

Again, in the GMB interview, Mr Hibbert alleged that Hall had “attacked” his daughter (with words, not physically). This did not seem a reasonable claim.

During the course of his investigation, Hall tried to interview Sarah Gillbard about her daughter, then sixteen years old. When Hall was unable to secure an interview, he remained sceptical that Eve had sustained injuries as described at the time and location described.

Therefore, Hall placed a dashcam in his vehicle, which he legally parked in the road a couple of doors down from Gillbard’s house. The car was clearly visible as was the dashcam, had anyone cared to look. Hall left the vehicle for a couple of hours, leaving the camera on to record the street. When he returned, he viewed the CCTV footage and later reported his observations:

[29]

While I was away three people came out of the house. They were Sarah Gillbard, a carer, and a girl in a wheelchair. They helped the girl from the wheelchair into the back seat of the car, then put the wheelchair in the boot and drove off. My camera was not close enough to see any injuries, nor make a definite identification. But from this evidence I suspect Eve Hibbert is in a wheelchair.

Hall wiped the footage soon thereafter. Every image Hall included in his subsequent reports, such as X-rays of Mr Hibbert’s injuries, was subject to

fair use, having already been published in the public domain by the legacy media,^[30] presumably with Mr Hibbert's permission.

In addition to alleging, during the GMB interview, that Hall had put a camera in his daughters' garden, Mr Hibbert went on to make other false claims about Hall. He claimed that Hall:

- uploaded video of his daughter to the internet,
- called his daughter an actress,
- reported that neither he nor Eve had sustained any injuries, and
- spoke for ninety minutes in the High Court.

The ITV legacy media “journalists” did not challenge any of these claims, yet none of them were true. On the contrary, these claims about Hall were provably false.

The GMB interview in question was aired by the legacy media during the ongoing trial. ITV did not ask Hall for comment. ITV reported none of the evidence Hall presented. ITV didn't present any of that evidence to Mr Hibbert, either. Instead, ITV simply reported that “a conspiracy theorist claims that night's tragic events didn't happen.”

It seems at least possible that Mr Hibbert may have gotten the idea to make some of these charges from the BBC—perhaps from the BBC's first ever social media and disinformation correspondent: Marianna Spring.

Chapter 8: Sources

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Chapter 9: The Persecution of Richard D. Hall

As we discussed in Chapter 2, Marianna Spring is the de facto “conspiracy theorist” expert for the multibillion-pound BBC media operation. She is supposedly an investigative journalist. She is presumably aware of how the modern interpretation of “conspiracy theorist” has been weaponized and how it is deployed for propagandist purposes. When Spring persistently uses the “conspiracy theorist” label as a disparaging epithet, she is employing it precisely as recommended by the CIA.

This raises the suspicion that Spring may be some sort of state “propaganda asset” whose designated role, as a member of the epistemic authorities, is to “negate and refute the attacks of the critics.” While there is no firm evidence to categorically state that she is, there is considerable evidence suggesting the possibility.

It seems likely that the establishment has been aware of Marianna Spring since she was a child. At the age of eleven, Spring, who attended Sutton High School, won an award for best article from the Newsquest Young Reporter Scheme.^[1] At age fourteen, she met Queen Elizabeth II after being selected as a Wimbledon Ball Girl^[2] (BBG).

The selection process^[3] to become a BBG is arduous and involves academic, physical, and psychological tests. The focus of the subsequent BBG training is on discipline. The young athletes have to be resilient and fearless.^[4] Marianna Spring was clearly a high achiever, and her hard work as a young journalist helped her win a place at Pembroke College-Oxford, where she studied French and Russian.

While at Pembroke, Spring’s Master was Dame Lynn Brindley, who was also a serving Ofcom board member.^[5] As an undergraduate, Spring wrote for a number of outlets, including the *Moscow Times*, a pro-NATO Russian-based legacy media outlet largely funded by the Dutch government.^[6] It seems Spring had just one article picked up by the *Moscow Times*, published in November 2018.^[7]

Spring’s Wikipedia page suggests that she initially had a hard time getting the BBC job. Given the publication date of her *Moscow Times* article, her Wikipedia entry doesn’t make any sense.^[8]

After graduation, she applied for various journalism programmes including at the BBC but was not successful. Senior news reporter for

The Guardian Alexandra Topping suggested that Spring contact various BBC journalists that she admired. Emily Maitlis replied to Spring and gave her an opportunity to work on Newsnight. By the end of 2018, Marianna had co-produced a video for Newsnight, about protesters from across the French political spectrum joining the gilets jaunes.

Wikipedia isn't a reliable source. It is notorious for being edited and "washed" by all kinds of dodgy actors. Among them is Philip Cross.

Possibly one man, perhaps an editorial team, Cross is well known for prolific Wiki-edits attacking the reputation of journalists and media personalities who express anti-establishment views.^[9] Cross is also known for safeguarding the profiles of pro-establishment members of the epistemic authorities, and the Cross digital fingerprints are all over Marianna Spring's Wikipedia page.^[10]

Spring's Linked-in profile^[11] lists her as a producer and journalist for BBC News and BBC Newsnight from September 2018. The 22-year-old seems to have gone directly from writing for the *Moscow Times* to being a co-editor on the BBC's flagship news program with the full support of some heavy hitting legacy media journalists, like Emily Maitless. Contrary to the claims on her Wikipedia page, she appears to have been fast-tracked into the BBC.

The BBC's enthusiasm in taking Spring onboard is perhaps surprising. In 2018, when she was 22, she reportedly sent her CV to Natalia Antelava, the editor-in-chief of US-backed Moscow news site *Coda Story*. Antelava checked Spring's claimed work history and discovered she had lied on her CV.^[12] Spring has never denied Antelava's allegation.

Other legacy media outlets have downplayed the revelations. For example, the Telegraph^[13] pointed out that we all do stupid things when we are young. While this is true, still, by the age of 22 we are expected to be responsible adults, and not many of us would lie on a CV presented for a high-flying job application.

What is most striking about Antelava's account is Spring's apparent reaction when confronted with her deceit. In an audacious emailed response to Antelava, Spring maintained that she was a "brilliant reporter." In her rejection email to Spring, Antelava wrote:

Telling me you are a brilliant reporter who exercises integrity and honesty when you have literally demonstrated the opposite was a terrible idea.

A willingness to lie, combined with an apparent arrogance and evident lack of any genuine sense of guilt, are certainly desirable attributes for a paid propagandist. As pointed out by Grayzone journalist Kit Klarenberg, who was detained by UK counter-terrorism police for being an independent journalist,^[14] there are some other conspicuous aspects to Marianna's meteoric rise that warrant scepticism.^[15]

Amil Khan,^[16] Reuters' former Middle East correspondent, BBC journalist, and an adviser to both the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office and the UK Ministry of Defence, is also a former associate fellow of the globalist think tank, the Royal Institute of International Affairs—Chatham House. Khan formed the counter-disinformation government contractor Valent Projects in late 2019.^[17]

Grayzone reported apparently leaked emails showing exchanges between Khan and the well-known British journalist and author Paul Mason. Mason and Khan were evidently discussing how to use counter-disinformation media assets and their government and social media contacts to “deplatform” and censor the Grayzone for its stance on the Ukraine war.^[18]

In setting up a prospective public-private disinformation and censorship operation, Khan appears to have recommended Marianna Spring as someone who would be amenable to supporting their propaganda campaign:

I would only suggest the BBC's Marianna Spring, Nick Waters from Bellingcat, maybe Martin Bright [BBC, the Guardian, News Statesman and Tony Blair Faith Foundation, among others].

Khan undoubtedly has close ties to the British government and the UK intelligence agencies. If the Grayzone reporting of the leaked emails is legitimate—and there is little reason to think it isn't—then clearly Khan considers Spring a useful media “propaganda asset.”

The pseudopandemic^[19] was declared by the World Health Organisation (WHO) on 11th March 2020. The WHO is a specialist agency of the United Nations (UN), and its primary concern, announced before it formally declared a pandemic, was what the WHO called the “infodemic.”

Speaking at the Munich Security Conference in February 2020, WHO Secretary General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus said:^[20]

[. . .] we're not just fighting an epidemic; we're fighting an infodemic. Fake news spreads faster and more easily than this virus, and is just as dangerous. [. . .] We call on all governments, companies and news organizations to work with us to sound the appropriate level of alarm.

For the global public-private partnership (G3P), anti-establishment public opinion that questioned the pandemic diktats of the epistemic authorities was just as “dangerous” as an alleged global pandemic disease. The UN “partnered” with the legacy media gatekeepers of information and news to control the pandemic narrative.

Assigned as the BBC's specialist social media and disinformation reporter in May 2020, just a couple of months after the UN raised concerns about the “infodemic,” Spring wrote:^[21]

A BBC team tracking coronavirus misinformation has found links to assaults, arsons and deaths. And experts say the potential for indirect harm caused by rumours, conspiracy theories and bad health information could be much bigger. [. . .] [T]he WHO has called it an “infodemic.”

Being a virtual stenographer for the UN certainly hasn't harmed Spring's career. She was elevated to the role of BBC's inaugural disinformation “correspondent” in August 2021.

These days Spring's place in the establishment has been ramped up even beyond her BBC job. Her opinion was considered in the UK government's planning for the Online Safety Act.^[22] Her views have also been submitted to the UN—ironically, on the subject of press freedom and freedom of opinion.^[23] She has even been selected as a moderator for international panel discussions on “countering-disinformation” by the UN.^[24]

In short, Marianna Spring is much more—or much less, depending on your point of view—than just a jobbing journalist. We can't be certain that she is a propaganda asset for the public-private intelligence partnership. But, to use her own vernacular, she has all the hallmarks of an intelligence-linked propaganda asset.

In October 2022, Spring wrote:^[25]

In a video shared with his followers online, Mr Hall demonstrates setting up a camera to film Eve [Hibbert]. [. . .] Online abuse describing

terror attacks as hoaxes, and those who were injured as so-called “crisis actors”, appear to be on the rise. [. . .] [P]eople I have spoken to say they fear for their safety because the abuse has also begun to affect their lives offline.

According to Spring’s propaganda, it is a form of online abuse to describe any terror attack as a hoax, regardless of the wealth of evidence pointing toward the possibility. Anyone who suggests some people involved in the likely hoax may have been crisis actors is, she asserted, placing them at some sort of risk of physical harm and causing these people to “fear for their safety.”

Why they allegedly carry this fear, Spring didn’t say. No one has ever been assaulted because their assailant suspected they were a crisis actor. There is no foundation for the “fears” Marianna Spring reports.

Spring continued:

[. . .] Research from BBC Monitoring found [. . .] dozens of videos promoting false claims about the Manchester attack. After the BBC flagged this to YouTube, the company removed Mr Hall’s channel and one other that had promoted his content. [. . .] Martin Hibbert first became aware of Mr Hall’s tactics when police alerted the family to allegations that he had put a camera outside the home of his daughter Eve.

Any questioning of the state’s Manchester Arena account amounts to “false claims,” according to Spring and the BBC. Neither she nor the BBC have ever mentioned any of the evidence that indicates it was a hoaxed false flag. Spring added:

Mr Hall had shared a video of himself preparing a small camera strapped to a stake which he said he would use to check whether Eve really was hurt in the Manchester Arena bombing. “I’ve sharpened the spike on the end so I can just stick that into the ground in order to surveil our subjects,” he told his viewers, holding up a camera attached to a stick with fake foliage wrapped around it.

Spring’s insinuation was clear. It is somehow illegitimate for an investigative journalist to secretly film a subject. This is an odd observation for a so-called journalist to make. The BBC guidelines on secret recordings make no such claim. On the contrary, they state:^[26]

The subject to be secretly recorded should normally be the target of any investigation, against whom there is prima facie evidence of wrongdoing or intended wrongdoing. Any attempt to secretly record people who are not involved in committing the behaviour under investigation, especially vulnerable people or innocent victims of the behaviour, will need a strong public interest justification – the ends should justify the means. [. . .] Secret recording will normally involve an infringement of privacy and, when it does, we must therefore ensure it is editorially justified.

It is perfectly acceptable for the legacy media to engage in secret “surveillance” and recording. Most investigative television documentaries would never have been produced without it. Providing it is justified, it does not contravene journalists' code of conduct in any way.

Richard D. Hall had accumulated and reported a significant body of evidence strongly suggesting the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag. As a result, the alleged victims of the apparently fake bombing naturally became targets of his ongoing investigation.

If crimes have been committed by the state, or agents acting for the state, and if the victims' accounts are false, then, wittingly or not, they are potentially complicit in multiple crimes of monumental “public interest.” This doesn't necessarily mean the alleged victims are guilty of any wrongdoing. As Hall wrote in his book:

[. . .] if participants have lied in their media interviews, due to being subject to an agreement, they may believe that what they are doing is ethically justified. They may have been given reasons by the organisers why a mock exercise was necessary. [. . .] We are not making any accusation that the participants have done ‘wrong’ or broken the law. We are just expressing an opinion based on available evidence about whether we believe what they said is true or false.

In the course of his investigation there was a very clear “public interest justification,” and the ends most certainly did justify Hall's secret recording in his attempt to ascertain if the victims' accounts were true. Some “infringement of privacy” was unavoidable. All of this is standard investigative journalist practice, though Spring wanted her readers to think otherwise.

Marianna Spring did acknowledge that Hall “spied on Eve from a vehicle parked outside her home.” Presumably, when the BBC or other legacy

media outlets conduct undercover^[27] investigative journalism, their actions are not deemed to be spying in Spring's eyes.

Hall's initial Manchester investigative was conducted in 2019 and concluded in early 2020. In his original *Manchester: the Night of the Bang documentary*,^[28] at the 01:18:22 mark Hall delivered a short piece to video where he discussed fashioning a surveillance camera to look like the branch of a bush. He demonstrated his camera by sticking it in his mother's garden. At no point did Hall say that he placed a camera in anyone else's garden.

It seems at least possible that legacy media reports, such as the one written by Spring, led people to incorrectly believe that Hall had put a camera in Eve Hibbert's garden. One of the claimants, Martin Hibbert, was given free range to level that false allegation against Hall on national television.

Hall is not an NUJ member and does not carry a state-recognised press card. The only advantage such "press accreditation" provides is that it enables the carrier to access, in his capacity as a journalist, certain sometimes-restricted institutions or areas. Card-carrying journalists in the UK also have some additional libel protections and can sometimes store personal information—deemed to be of public importance—that other journalists can't. Other than these limited press "privileges," the accredited journalist has the same right to freedom of speech and expression as everyone else.^[29]

By education and professional training, Richard D. Hall is an engineering graduate and chartered electrical engineer. He could be described as a "citizen journalist," but that does not preclude him from undertaking investigative journalism in a professional capacity.

"Professional" means^[30] undertaking work that requires special training. Vocational training includes "on-the-job" training. The training involves the necessary acquisition of the knowledge and skills we need to perform a paid role.^[31]

While Hall's degree is not specifically journalism-related, there are no minimum educational requirements nor is there any fixed training route to become a professional journalist. The UK state's National Career Service notes that people can become journalists by "working towards this role." That describes vocational training, in so many words.^[32]

Hall certainly “work[ed] towards this role.” He wrote a weekly column in the Hartlepool Mail and started producing TV programs for Edge Media Television in 2009. Between 2009 and 2015, he researched, wrote, produced, and presented over 200 TV programmes, all of which were aired on national TV via the Sky satellite TV network. He has a wealth of experience, knowledge, and skills as a journalist.

Hall has earned a living as a professional independent media journalist since 2015. He has published two books and written, produced, directed, and broadcast a number of investigative documentaries. His written investigative work and his documentary journalism reach a large international audience. The BBC reported that his YouTube videos alone had garnered more than sixteen million views.^[33]

Most legacy media journalists, including many working for the BBC, couldn’t possibly hope to achieve such a wide reach. In terms of breaking a major story that is “overwhelmingly in the public interest,” few individual journalists in either the UK legacy or the independent media are better equipped and placed to do so than Richard D. Hall. Perhaps *that* is the state’s problem with him?

The legacy media’s insinuation that Hall has already lost the case is not true. While his prospects of success seem extremely remote, Hall has not given up and will continue to fight to have his evidence heard. He sent this evidence to everyone with the authority to officially investigate the matter.

Hall’s first appeal against the summary judgment was summarily rejected. Hall was then denied the right to appeal the rejection. He appealed against the denial of the right to appeal, and that was rejected.

Hall has pursued every possible legal avenue to have his evidence examined. The fact is, the High Court epistemic authorities simply refuse, point blank, to allow it to be heard.^[34]

Avoiding any mention of the evidence Hall has reported, the legacy media covered the court’s initial denial of Hall’s appeal. This article written by the UK Independent—which now only exists as an online publication—makes intriguing reading.^[35]

A self-styled journalist who claims that the Manchester Arena bombing was staged by government agencies has been denied a chance to challenge a ruling that his theory is “absurd and fantastical”. [. . .] In a ruling last month, Mr Hibbert and his daughter were successful in a bid

for summary judgment – a legal step to decide parts of the case without a trial.

The word “self-styled” is used to convince the public that Hall is not a *real* journalist. But, as we have just discussed, there are no specific qualifications needed to work as a journalist. So, to that extent, *all* journalists are “self-styled.”

Working in the legacy media or holding an NUJ press card no more makes one a journalist than does earning a living working as a journalist in the independent media. In fact, it could be argued that Hall is more of a true journalist than are most so-called journalists in the legacy media.

Some of the greatest journalists in history never had any notable “qualifications” to be journalists. For example, the late John Pilger (October 1939–December 2023) learned his trade through vocational training. He did an apprenticeship with the Australian Consolidated Press. Famed investigative reporter and *New Yorker* contributor Seymour Hersh graduated with a history degree, not a “journalism” degree. Pilger’s and Hersh’s accomplishments as journalists have been established by the stellar quality of their journalism and by nothing else.

The Independent article added:

Mr Hall claimed that “Nato countries” had carried out hoax events “to fool the public into thinking they are under attack”, adding: “It is very concerning that the judiciary does not seem to be aware of it.” He subsequently claimed the inquiry into the Manchester Arena attack was “corrupt” and that the legal claim against him “is being used for an ulterior political purpose”. “It is the real bomb attack hypothesis that is implausible because the evidence does not point to it,” Mr Hall continued in the hearing attended by more than 120 people.

Why didn’t the Independent tell its readers about Operation Gladio instead of reporting that Hall “claimed” NATO has engaged in false flag terrorism? Why not mention the “strategy of tension”? Once again, the legacy media gave the impression that Hall had no evidence to back up his “claims.”

Seeing as how the Independent reported Hall’s observation that it is the official Manchester Arena account that is “implausible,” why didn’t the Independent also report, or at least mention, some of the evidence Hall has presented to substantiate his “hypothesis”?

The Independent went on:

Judge Davison denied Mr Hall permission to bring an appeal against his previous judgment. He said: “Nothing that you have said amounts to, in my view, an argument that would have a real prospect of success in an appeal.”

Davison’s “in my view” comment is worth noting. Davison judged Hall had no prospect of success, and therefore rejected the possibility of testing Hall’s evidence in court, based upon his own opinion. And, as we have already ascertained, that opinion, at least with regard to false flag terrorism, does not appear to be very well informed.

While the Independent’s article was standard legacy media state propaganda, it correctly identified that Hall suspects the claim has been brought against him for “ulterior political purposes” and that the Saunders Inquiry was corrupt. As usual, though, the article, like the rest of the legacy media, didn’t bother to tell readers *why* Hall holds these views.

There is every reason to believe that the BBC at least influenced the claimants’ decision to bring the case against Hall. He reported what the BBC did to him between August 2022 and mid-November 2022. Everything we have recounted thus far proves what he said to be a genuine account:

I suffered a litany of harassment and smear campaigns by the BBC. [. . .] They sent me a barrage of eleven emails, in which I made it clear that I did not wish to appear in any BBC program; they sent a letter, making false allegation; they harassed me at my market stall with a film crew, after being specifically told not to contact me; they then contacted the local council, who subsequently closed down my market stall which was selling perfectly legal merchandise; they contacted YouTube, and were instrumental in shutting down my YouTube channel, even though it did not contain any material about the Manchester incident; they then aired a BBC Panorama program followed by eleven [BBC] Radio4 programs and wrote articles, in which I was the main target of their propaganda. The claimant [Martin Hibbert] took part in some of these programs and articles.

The NUJ code of conduct clearly states that it may not be possible for investigative journalists to obtain evidence “by straightforward means.” On that basis, we can say that Marianna Spring, having failed to secure an interview with Hall, made a legitimate attempt to obtain a comment from Hall when she doorstepped him at his market stall. Spring did not contravene the journalists’ code.

The journalists' code also states that journalists should do "nothing to intrude into anybody's private life, grief or distress unless justified by overriding consideration of the public interest." Clearly, Hall's case is a matter of public interest. Again, the BBC and Spring were not in contravention of the NUJ code.

The irony is that Hall has not been afforded the same rights. Like Spring, he hasn't broken the journalists' code, yet he is being prosecuted for alleged harassment. Interestingly, the BBC and Spring went much further than Hall has ever gone in pursuit of a subject.

In a 2015 documentary Hall made about a mass shooting in Cumbria in the UK, Hall said, "[W]hen you're trying to get witnesses to speak to you, [. . .] if they say 'no', you cannot then come back to them and say well why are you saying "no," [. . .] that is kind of harassment. So as soon as they say 'no', that's it – the door is closed." Hall abides by the NUJ code of conduct by choice, not out of a desire to maintain any state-approved accreditation.

The same cannot be said for the BBC. The BBC evidently harassed Hall by applying pressure to his local council to shut down his legal place of business and by leaning on YouTube to remove outlets for his work. We don't know its exact motives, but the BBC seemed to go after Hall's livelihood. Its actions essentially threatened him. Thus, the BBC's treatment of Hall certainly *does* contravene the journalists' code of conduct.

Hall reported the following sequence of events:

— March 2020: Hall published his Manchester hoax evidence.

— July 2021: Martin Hibbert became fully cognisant of Hall's work when it was described to him at the Saunders Inquiry.

— 10th August 2022: Marianna Spring first contacted Hall with an emailed^[36] interview request. Spring informed Hall that the BBC was preparing an "upcoming documentary & podcast series, which we're aiming to broadcast in a few months' time." There followed a lengthy email exchange—eleven BBC emails in total—where Hall repeatedly declined an interview. In each of his email replies, Hall clearly reiterated that he did not wish to discuss anything with the BBC.

— 22nd December 2022: Seventeen months after being made aware of Hall's work by the Saunders Inquiry, the claimants sent a letter before claim notifying Hall of their intention to file a claim against him.

— 5th March 2023: In a “Disaster Troll” podcast episode titled “Remember My Name,” Marianna Spring said she first met Martin Hibbert [claimant] “back in the summer of 2022.”

— 31st March 2023: The BBC informed Hall of the claimants’ filing of their claim. Spring wrote, “Mr Hibbert’s legal team have told us they have now filed a claim against you.”

— May 2023: Nine months after first being contacted by the BBC and five weeks after being informed by the BBC that the claimants’ case had been filed with the High Court, Hall received official notification of the claim.

A couple of podcasters appear to have been roped in by the legacy media to discredit Hall. They have worked with the BBC and in particular with Spring. The podcasters’ anecdote about their involvement with Spring and the BBC evidently corroborates Hall’s account and supports his suspicions^[37].

Spring suggested that the podcasting duo continue their discussion with a 7/7 survivor called Paul and arranged a formal interview between them. Spring intended to use the recording as part of her own podcast series. These discussions occurred in July 2022. The podcasters reported:

[T]hey [the BBC] keep mentioning Richard Hall’s name. [. . .] She [Spring] keeps mentioning Richard Hall.

In a *Bolton News* article, published on 31st October 2022 to promote Spring’s podcast series “Disaster Deniers,” it was reported^[38] that “Mr Hibbert is preparing to bring libel action against Hall.” This information can only have come from Martin Hibbert or his legal representatives.

But the claim against Hall that was later finalised, probably in December 2022, was for harassment and GDPR breaches, not libel. The timing suggests that in late October 2022 the claim was in the early stages of preparation. This further explains why Hall did not receive any kind of notification from Hibbert’s team until December 2022.

Spring says she first met Mr Hibbert in the summer of 2022. If the *Bolton News* report is accurate, Mr Hibbert had not started pursuing any sort of claim against Hall at that time. Indeed, the claimants took no action for more than a year after reportedly first learning about the full extent of Hall’s journalism at the Saunders Inquiry in July 2021. Evidently, the claimants started putting their claim together after working with the BBC and

Marianna Spring on the podcast series, the documentaries, and the articles that genuinely “attacked” Hall.

It is reasonable to suspect the proceedings were engineered by the biased pluralist UK state and its epistemic authorities, especially the BBC and Marianna Spring, to ensure that Hall’s evidence would not be heard during the legal process and that, as a result, his evidence would almost certainly be censored, banned, and destroyed. The only remaining matter for the state is to set the damages and define the terms of the injunction it will impose on Hall. It also seems likely the case will be used as the basis for future censorship legislation.

It was not without justification that Hall observed:^[39]

I think a reasonable person would suspect that the claimants may have been influenced by the BBC or even some other party, to take legal action against me. And, therefore, the claimant may not be the true instigator of the claim. [. . .] The BBC were, and still are, trying to shut my work down which is exactly what the claim is seeking to do.

It should be noted, however, that the full trial is yet to convene. It is possible that Hall could yet mount some sort of defence, though his options have been severely limited by the High Court.

Once again, we are confronted by the standard tactics of the biased pluralist state and the establishment’s epistemic authorities, of which Master Davison, the BBC, and Marianna Spring are undoubtedly members. These tactics include evidence being dismissed without being first examined—or even acknowledged—and the circulation of false stories to discredit those who report the evidence.

The trial is now virtually a *fait accompli* for the claimants and the state. It is hard to see how Richard D. Hall can mount any kind of substantial defence. Hall continues to try to defend himself, but, as things currently stand, the state’s High Court has barred him from submitting the evidence that would provide his best chance of doing so.

Master Davison ruled on the basis of the state’s law, not on the basis of morality or on the equally crucial basis of justice. This kind of ruling was made in Southwark Crown Court in 2018 by Judge Nicholas Lorraine-Smith during the appalling prosecution of David Noakes.^[40] Lorraine-Smith minced no words in saying that UK courts were *not* courts of morality but, rather, courts of law.

Clearly, law does not equate to justice. Justice is apparently a matter for society, not the judicial system, to decide. If a defendant is seeking justice, the UK state's courts are not the place to look for it. It will not be found in them.

Now we get to the crux of the dismissal of Hall's defence and of the evidence he has reported. If his "staged attack"—false flag—hypothesis can be proven, then all the Manchester Arena victims' accounts, including those of the two claimants, are doubtful. By ruling that Hall's evidence was "absurd and fantastical" and, therefore, could not possibly prove his hypothesis, Master Davison ensured that the Manchester hoax evidence need never be examined.

If an injunction is served on Hall, compelling him to remove all his work on the Manchester Arena from the public domain—effectively a "book burning"—the biased pluralist UK state will have succeeded in destroying all the evidence without ever having admitted its existence into the record. And, since the legacy media gatekeepers will not report any of Hall's evidence—at least not until it is a distant historical memory—the Manchester hoaxed false flag can thus be consigned to the memory hole.

The British public will have been convinced the evidence doesn't exist. The biased pluralist UK state and its epistemic authorities will have achieved this desired end by shooting the messenger, Richard D. Hall.

Chapter 9: Sources

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Chapter 10: The Observable Physical Evidence

“My conclusion is simple. [. . .] The CCTV image evidence shows that the event was far more consistent with a staged attack than it was with a real terrorist attack where people were injured and died.”

The uncompromising investigative journalism of Richard D. Hall uncovered the evidence that led him to this “simple” conclusion.

High Court Master Davison called Hall’s conclusion a “staged attack hypothesis” and rejected it because he found it “implausible,” “fantastical,” “absurd,” and “preposterous.”

There can be only one of two reasons Master Davison rendered this decision: either he completely ignored the observable physical evidence that Hall had provided or he looked at a portion of it and decided he did not wish to accept it. In his summary judgment, Davison said he had watched some of the video evidence Hall gave him. So, the latter explanation seems more likely.

The CCTV image evidence Hall referred to as “consistent with a staged attack” was presented at the “public” Saunders Inquiry. That inquiry supposedly showed the observable physical evidence that the state claimed substantiated the official narrative of the “Manchester Arena bombing.”

CCTV video taken inside the City Room and shown at the inquiry was restricted to footage taken before the purported bombing occurred. All City Room CCTV evidence that was said to have shown the scene inside the City Room after the “bombing” was provided only in the form of still images. These frames taken from the CCTV video were heavily redacted, hidden by black rectangles. The CCTV stills showed no observable evidence that supported the state’s account.

Consequently, there is no observable physical evidence to sustain the story we have been told about a shrapnel bombing in the City Room on the night of 22nd May 2017. Therefore, we will adopt Hall’s terminology and refer to the pyrotechnic explosion—for which there is evidence—as “the bang.”

The observable physical evidence is highly compelling. This is the same “primary” evidence that Hall provided to the judiciary branch of the state’s epistemic authorities, but which they chose to for the most part ignore.

This evidence consists of photographic, video, and audio recordings that clearly reveal Salman Abedi did not detonate a large TATP, shrapnel-packed bomb inside the City Room of the Manchester Arena foyer at 22:31:00 on 22nd May 2017. Therefore, the evidence shows that Salman Abedi did not commit suicide.

In addition, we have witness testimony, including expert witness testimony, and official reports, all of which either completely undermine or thoroughly contradict the official narrative, especially when we consider the testimony and reports in light of the indisputable observable physical evidence.

There is unequivocal evidence of foreknowledge and of both the withholding of evidence from the official inquiry and the fabrication of evidence presented to the official inquiry. The obvious use of crisis actors is unmistakable. On the basis of all this evidence, we can conclude it is highly likely that state crimes have been committed.

Importantly, none of the evidence exposing the Manchester hoax has been kept “secret” or concealed. Due in no small measure to Hall’s investigative journalism, all of this evidence is in the public domain.

The epistemic authorities’ refusal to acknowledge and report the evidence is irrelevant. From an epistemic perspective, the biased pluralist state’s insistence—and the economic-elite-led establishment’s insistence—that the official narrative is unquestionably true is meaningless. They have no more “authority” to define the truth than anyone else. Truth is found by examining the actual evidence that establishes the facts. There is no other legitimate method of inquiry.

Further evidence that could be made available, such as the moving CCTV footage—that is, the CCTV video—taken inside the City Room either at or after the alleged time of the explosion, has been withheld from the public. Sir John Saunders issued a directive at the inquiry declaring the City Room CCTV video to be too graphic to be viewed either at the inquiry or at any other time in the future and thus should remain sealed. Public scrutiny of the CCTV captured immediately before, during, and after the bang has been denied by the Saunders Inquiry. The CCTV video could not even be viewed in Hall’s High Court trial following Master Davison’s summary judgment denying Hall’s application for the video to be entered into evidence.

Consider that what Davison called Hall's "staged attack hypothesis" could potentially be proven false if the CCTV video were released. In Volume One of the inquiry report, Saunders wrote:^[1]

I have seen the terrible footage from the CCTV and body-worn video cameras of the scene of devastation in the City Room. The description of that area as being like a "war zone" was used by a number of witnesses. That is an accurate description.

In response to Saunders' observations, Hall raised some important questions:^[2]

Sir John Saunders may be being truthful, in that he has been shown some CCTV and body-worn camera footage of an 'aftermath'. [. . .] The CCTV images from the City Room are all from low definition cameras, situated a considerable distance away from concert goers. If the event was a staged attack, using mock victims [. . .] images from CCTV and body-worn cameras could look very realistic, especially to someone who is already convinced that people were seriously injured and died.

It would be far better if Sir John Saunders released this evidence instead of just speaking about it.

The same applies with post mortem evidence. The public has not been shown photographs from post mortem evidence, where victims can be clearly identified.

Sir John Saunders' statement suggests that he may not have seen any high definition crime scene photographs? Why does Sir John Saunders not refer to the far more evidentially important professionally taken high definition crime scene photographs? In a proper investigation there would be several crime scene photographs taken of each deceased victim, in situ, where they died. To date, I have found no convincing evidence has been produced by the inquiry, or other sources, which proves beyond doubt that deaths occurred due to a bomb blast in the City Room on 22nd May 2017.

The moulage kits used by CrisisCast and other similar terror attack simulation services are very realistic. Companies such as "BloodyRealistic" offer moulage training. Fake wounds showing exposed bone fragments and deep tissue damage are made to look highly plausible.^[3]

The official inquiry relied extensively on timestamped CCTV images. These images are useful in establishing the timing of events—the events the official narrative said happened. But, as Hall observed, Saunders' statement that he based his appraisal of the aftermath on "CCTV and body-worn video cameras," when detailed crime scene photographs should have been available, seems strange.

We have already discussed how compartmentalised hierarchical authority, by restricting information to a need-to-know basis, can limit the number of people who know the full breadth of a conspiracy. During Operation Gladio, for example, only a few people would have known the attacks were acts of false flag terrorism. Some senior officials in SHAPE and the intelligence agencies knew, as did the Gladio terrorists themselves. Beyond that number, the campaign remained entirely covert for decades.

Legacy media propagandists, who were willing to write whatever they were told to write or were happy to pass on press releases without question, almost certainly knew nothing about Operation Gladio. As we related in Chapter 7, Operation Gladio involved a tiny group of core conspirators who were able to deceive millions of people, across generations, that they were under attack from far-left terrorists.

If we consider how the Manchester hoax was perpetrated, it's clear that no more than 150 or so people—both in-the-know and in-the-dark—would have been needed to pull it off. Indeed, the hoax was so convincing that even individuals who are highly ranked among the epistemic authorities, such as Sir John Saunders, could have easily been fooled by what they were shown and told. As we'll see, there were moments in the inquiry where it seemed that the barristers forming the inquiry panel were directing the chair, rather than the other way around.

Saunders is among the tightly restricted number of people who were allegedly allowed to see the "terrible footage." But there is no reason the CCTV video cannot be shown to the media. It would not be the first time.

After 7th October, for example, Israeli officials provided previously "unseen" graphic video evidence to select journalists.^[4] The footage purported to show Hamas terrorist attacks and atrocities. It reportedly included detailed video and still images of the mutilated corpses of Israeli citizens, including babies and children.

While many Western legacy media journalists were distressed by the gruesome scenes they were shown by Israeli officials, some expressed

reservations^[5] about the claims those officials were making. French television journalist Nicolas Coadou, for one, was aware that the footage had been carefully edited by the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and was presenting only “what they [the IDF] want to show,” as he put it.

We have already demonstrated that the legacy media act as gatekeepers of information and news for the biased pluralist state and the establishment. Suffice it to say, then, that in the extremely unlikely event the Manchester CCTV is ever shown to the media, we would have little reason to believe whatever the legacy media “journalists” subsequently report about that footage.

If Hall’s “hypothesis” based on the CCTV video is ever to be truly disproven, the only way to do that would be for the British public (and not the state) to select independent media journalists (and not legacy media “journalists”) and ask them to study the contents of that video. Only then could an unbiased audience confirm whether the Manchester Arena CCTV video shows what the state contends.

In order to examine the evidence, we are going to discuss the anatomical damage caused by shrapnel bombs. This will include the description of injury details. Given that 22 people were allegedly killed in the City Room, this may cause readers some distress. It is not a pleasant subject, but we cannot avoid it. Reader discretion is advised.

As we’ve already discussed, the legacy media and the epistemic authorities consistently report that “hundreds” of people were injured by Salman Abedi. This statement is categorically false. Yet even some supposedly independent journalists maintain this falsehood.^[6]

The legacy media reported^[7] that after the Manchester event hospitals “were on the brink of being overwhelmed by the extraordinary number of people with critical injuries.” The truth is, the vast majority of people treated in hospital were injured in the stampede from the Arena, not by a bomb (much less a non-existent bomb!).

This notion of hundreds being injured “by the bomb” has been subsequently inserted into the official narrative, primarily by the legacy media. All the initial reports and statements on the subject from top officials—Prime Minister Theresa May, for one—were consistent. Refer to Chapter 1 for details on what Theresa May and other UK leaders said at the time.

There were 22 people said to have died and a maximum of fifty-nine people (sixty including Abedi) who were said to have been directly injured by a

shrapnel bomb. But those numbers total eighty or so—nowhere near “hundreds.”

While we can all appreciate why there are no graphic images of dead people shown by the BBC or by any other legacy media outlet, and while we can also understand why such video and images would not be shown—if they existed—to bereaved family members at the public inquiry, it is not clear why no such images can be viewed anywhere on the internet. Not a single Arena witness has posted any video or images showing anything plausibly corroborating a shrapnel-laden bomb blast in the City Room on any social media platform or anywhere else online. If the official account is true, this is hugely surprising.

We live in the age of high-definition mobile phone cameras. People post everything from photographs of their dinner to homemade porn online. There were more than 14,000 concert-goers present in the Arena that night. While there are plenty of personal videos and images taken by concert goers *outside* of the City Room, these do not provide any convincing evidence to corroborate the official narrative of what went on *inside* the City Room.

Arena witnesses such as Jordan Kenney and Abbey Mullen posted the videos and images taken inside and outside the Arena, but not in the City Room. There is no evidence that the authorities intercepted any of the external video^[8] or images before people were able to post them on the internet. There are no reports of any mass seizure of people's phones nor of images being wiped from the internet. None of the external images or video provide any evidence of a massive suicide bomb detonated inside the City Room.

Abbey Mullen has been criticised online for her posted account of events. She wrote:

Just out of the Ariana Grande Concert in Manchester, I thought we would leave second[s] before the last song finished in order to get home quicker instead of waiting longer for a taxi. As we where [sic] leaving a bomb or explosion went off centimetres in front of me. Peoples skin, blood & feces where [sic] everywhere including in my hair & on my bag, I'm still finding bits of god knows what in my hair. [. . .] That sound, the blood & those who were running around clueless with body parts and bits of skin missing will not be leaving my mind any time soon or the minds of those involved.

Mullen posted some related images that showed some slight red staining on her bag and in her hair.^[9] But considering that the alleged bomb supposedly detonated shortly after Arianna Grande concluded her set, if Mullen left early, it is likely she would have been clear of the City Room before the bang.

Mullen did raise—if unintentionally—a most important point, though. She wrote that people with “body parts and bits of skin missing” were “running around.”

If the account of a massive suicide bomb detonated inside the City Room were true, unfortunately, you would expect to see people with those types of injuries both inside and outside of the City Room—outside because the injured victims who were able to flee would have run away. The fact that not a single one of the external images or video posted by Mullen, Kenney, or anyone else recorded anyone with injuries even remotely like those described by Mullen contradicts the official narrative.

As I was writing this chapter, the open or “surface” internet was awash with the most horrendous images of death, mutilation, and suffering emanating from Gaza. If you wanted to see hundreds of images and video of children’s mutilated corpses, you could have searched “Gaza” on Elon Musk’s^[10] ‘X’ platform.

There are some sick websites, especially on the dark web,^[11] where snuff film enthusiasts search for—and find—horrific images to satisfy their depravity. Yet there aren’t any images of the alleged Manchester Arena victims on the deep web or on its prolific “gore sites.” Sadly, if images of Manchester bomb victims existed, it is practically a certainty that they would have been shared somewhere online. The total absence of any such images strongly supports Hall’s contention that none exist.

Hall conducted deep and extensive research into an alleged bombing that supposedly killed 22 people and reportedly injured at least thirty-eight more. (We’ll clarify the figure of thirty-eight shortly.) He could not find any images or video footage to corroborate the official account anywhere, either online or off, and neither can I.

No one is suggesting that the absence of distressing images of physical injury and death on daytime television or in newspaper reports constitutes reason to suspect the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoax. But the lack of any corroborating images of plausible victims anywhere is certainly reason for suspicion. When we also consider that no such images have

been produced in any official report or investigation of the alleged bombing, that suspicion only deepens.

It is important to consider how evidence is evaluated. Different types of evidence carry more weight than others.

Broadly speaking, in a court of law, there are several types of evidence.

Primary evidence consists of physical objects, original documents, or original statements that can be proven to be accurate accounts or depictions of *real* evidence.

Secondary evidence consists of a copy of, or a statement about, the existence of primary evidence. It is deemed less reliable.

Forensic evidence is based upon any further verifiable testing done on primary evidence—that is, on any real evidence.

Real evidence can be defined as.^[12]

Physical (“real”) evidence [is evidence] that can be produced in court and is used by the judge and/or the jury to reach a decision. Such evidence could include photographs [or video], a knife or some other weapon, a document, or audiotapes.

Real evidence is observable, audible, or forensically testable. Its existence is an established, verifiable fact, and it can be—indeed, should be—presented in a court of law wherever it is available and relevant to the case.

Opinion is not evidence because it is not *observable, verifiable fact*. The exception is “expert opinion,” which can be used as evidence if the court accepts that the expert witness offering their opinion is able to accurately advise the jury about complex issues that may be beyond the jury’s collective knowledge or expertise but that are relevant to the case. It is hoped that an expert witness is unprejudiced and honest—not able to be bribed.

Another kind of testimony that provides potential evidence is witness testimony. It can be written or oral. The oral can be given in person or in video or audio form. After witness testimony is heard, it is either believed or rejected. There are many factors that contribute toward either the plausibility—the credibility—or implausibility of witness testimony.

Witness testimony is more plausible if it is substantiated by physical (real) evidence—that is, by *observable fact*. Though it is considered less credible than is testimony supported by *observable fact*, witness statements that

correspond with secondary evidence or that attest to the existence of *real* or physical evidence (that is, primary evidence), is more credible, obviously, than witness testimony supported by neither secondary evidence nor primary evidence.

To review: Primary evidence is observable, physically real evidence that can be considered objective fact. Objective facts can be verified in any number of ways—presumably in all possible ways. A person seen lying on the ground in a photograph or in a video establishes the objective fact that a person was lying on the ground at the time and location captured by the photograph or footage. This assumes, of course, that the image hasn't been manipulated.

Fortunately, while AI manipulated images and video—deepfakes—are now practically undetectable to the human eye, they are easily discernible using computer software. As deepfake technology has improved, so has the ability to detect it.^[13]

Primary evidence of shrapnel damage is only plausible evidence of a bombing if the provenance of that primary evidence can be established. If it is shown that the alleged shrapnel damage was not present in the immediate aftermath of an alleged bombing, we can deduce the “bomb damage” was not caused by the bomb. Such evidence then becomes primary evidence of fabrication.

Secondary evidence is a report or account attesting to the existence of primary evidence. A police report that shrapnel debris was found lying on the floor attests to the existence and location of shrapnel debris when it was found, but not when it was put there. It is less convincing than a reliable photograph of that shrapnel demonstrably taken at a known time and location. It could have been planted afterwards by anyone, including police.

Witness testimony alone is not strong evidence of anything. The relative strength of witness testimony is dependent upon the degree to which it comports with primary and secondary evidence. The reputation of the witness for honesty and for an eye for detail can help, but it is not conclusive evidence.

Unlike Master Davison, who said he did not “propose to engage with the detail of the defendant's [Hall's] evidence,” if we ourselves “bother,” and consider the Manchester hoax evidence initially revealed in Hall's investigation, what can we deduce?

Before we deduce anything, we need to establish what evidence we have at our disposal.

Firstly, we have legacy and independent media reports. I have cited many such reports in this book. Like any account, the strength and weakness of these reports depends upon our critical evaluation of the primary and secondary evidence they offer to back up their stories. We can certainly glean information from them, such as witness statements, but we need to be acutely aware of agenda bias. On the whole, we are likely to find more verifiable evidence in independent news reports than in legacy media reports.

Secondly, we can look at official reports, such as the Kerslake Report^[14] and the Saunders Inquiry reports. The Saunders Inquiry official website was removed a while ago.^[15] All that remains now are the three volumes of Saunders' main findings—actually four, because volume two is split into two parts. They are available via the government's official website.

But the more detailed daily OPUS2 records of proceedings, and PDF files of CCTV images, etc., cited as evidence in those Saunders' volumes, have since been expunged from the internet—that is, “memory-holed.”

Thankfully, independent researchers had the presence of mind to archive many of the OPUS2 and other records.^[16] There are also accounts of autopsies and the official investigation into events and so on, all of which we can still read in the archived records.

The OPUS2 records and other archived documents, which otherwise would no longer be available, provide a significant body of witness testimony that we can consider as part of the evidence. Again, credibility can only be established by assessing the primary and secondary evidence offered to substantiate the testimony. Without either kind of evidence, witnesses don't offer much more than opinion, which is relatively worthless. The exception, as we said before, is “expert opinion,” though it must comport with the observable physical evidence.

Expert opinion about tests conducted on explosive residue tells us that explosive residue was “found” and tested. It does not tell us how or when that residue was deposited. If the primary real evidence rules out that a bombing occurred, we can only presume that any explosive residue, if found, was deposited by some other means.

Among the archived material, we still have the observable physical—real—evidence served up at the Saunders Inquiry. This includes the 806 CCTV

still images that supposedly provide evidence proving the state's account. Some of the images taken before and all the images potentially showing victims taken after the bang were blacked out. None of the images show any physical, primary evidence of any injuries or deaths. The redactions of the images taken before the bang are completely inexplicable and raise further doubts about the official account.

Hall created a [video guide](#)^[17] for viewers who might want to use his [image database software](#)^[18] to examine all of the CCTV stills presented at the official Saunders Inquiry. I have found that database extremely useful and recommend you make use of it—before it, too, is memory-holed.

There is also some evidence that was reported at the inquiry in an unwarranted dismissive manner. There was considerable evidence of the police's preoccupation with the vehicle that night—evidence that was very quickly brushed aside at the inquiry.

Other evidence wasn't discussed at all. For example, there are audio recordings of police reporting witness statements that described a man matching Salman Abedi's physical description getting out of a vehicle, putting a large rucksack on his back, and running toward the Arena.

There are police accounts of witnesses reporting a man with the same physical description as Abedi fleeing the City Room after placing a device against a wall adjacent to the merchandise stand. This is primary evidence of the police statements but only secondary evidence of the witness accounts. That said, the reported witness statements are highly plausible because they are congruent with observable, physical evidence.

Then we come to the primary, observable physical evidence that was excluded from the state's account. With two limited exceptions, none of it has been reported by the legacy media, and the epistemic authorities have not acknowledged it. This evidence has not been examined to a notable extent in any official proceedings. Master Davison is among those who refused to admit it into a High Court trial.

One photograph, reportedly taken by a man called Chris Parker, shows the scene inside the City Room. We'll refer to this as "the Parker photo." At first glance it appears to show the aftermath of the bombing. For all the reasons we'll discuss, it is entirely inconsistent with that claim.

The original image of the Parker photo—shown in [this article](#)^[19]—is in colour and is much clearer than the copy shown below for your reference:



Only one video that shows observable physical evidence exposing the Manchester hoax has been reported by the legacy media. We'll call it the Bickerstaff video^[20] because it was shot by Mr Nick Bickerstaff as he recorded himself in the concourse of the Manchester Arena—outside of the City Room—supposedly searching for his daughter, Ellen. The Bickerstaff video was covered by the UK Mirror and The Sun tabloid newspapers.^[21]

The Sun reported:

A dad, 25ft from the suicide blast, recorded a harrowing video of the aftermath as he howled for his daughter. [. . .] In the 137-second clip, he repeatedly calls 16-year-old daughter Ellen's name. Other concert-goers brush past, unaware of the massacre.

There are very good reasons why no one else was aware of the "massacre." Not only was there no suicide bombing that night, but Mr Bickerstaff evidently filmed the footage at some point in the 20-minute period before the bang occurred.

The Parker photo is also shown in the Sun article, and it was reproduced in many other legacy media reports. The Sun's caption for the Parker photo provides a good example of how it was used to support the official narrative. The caption suggests the Parker photo supports the idea that people were "blown apart in the attack."

The Sun, like many other legacy media outlets, chose to pixelate the image to blur out any observable details of injuries. If this is not done, the Parker photo evidently does not show anyone who was "blown apart."

We can be reasonably certain the Parker photo was taken within the first five minutes after the bang. It captures some of the same observable physical evidence seen in the Barr footage.^[22] The only other footage we have from inside the City Room has unknown provenance and was shown in the BBC documentary “Manchester: The Night of the Bomb.” The same warning siren, heard in the Barr footage, is also audible in the BBC clip.

The BBC video appears to show more debris than is *seen* in the Barr footage, but the heavy blurring and poor video quality makes this difficult to establish. As we shall see, we cannot be certain when this debris was possibly “added.”

Hall interviewed Mr John Barr and asked him when he had recorded the footage. Mr Barr reportedly said:

That was around er, after the explosion, probably about 2 or 3 minutes after the explosion. [. . .] the explosion was about 10.32, so that [filming] was probably about 4 minutes after that [the bang].

Hall confirmed with Mr Barr that both he and his son were inside the City Room when Salman Abedi detonated his suicide bomb. Mr Barr estimated they were fifteen to eighteen metres away from the explosive epicentre of a reportedly massive TATP bomb packed with approximately 3,000 individual pieces of shrapnel. Mr Barr told Hall that neither he nor his son suffered any injuries at all.

The Parker photo precisely matched the scene filmed in the forty-three-second Barr footage. Therefore, Hall determined that the Parker photo was shot in the same time frame as the Barr footage.

According to Mr Barr, the footage was captured at the scene of a large-scale deadly terrorist attack—the largest ever in Northern England—less than five minutes after it occurred. Despite being an obvious key witness in possession of vital observable physical evidence, Mr Barr was not invited to provide testimony to the official inquiry, and his video evidence was excluded from proceedings.

The Barr footage also shows the movements of one of the reported injury victims, Ruth Murrell. She is seen walking across the city room after reportedly sustaining a severe injury to her right leg. After Mr Martin Hibbert and his daughter Eve—both claimants—Ruth Murrell is perhaps the most well-known of the people purportedly injured inside the City Room.

Murrell's injury, seen in the Barr footage, is the only detailed observable physical evidence we have of any injury allegedly sustained by any "victim" inside the City Room in the immediate aftermath of the bang. Her injury, as seen, is not consistent with a shrapnel wound nor with the reports of her injury by the legacy media.

Other observable physical evidence can be seen in the numerous videos and images captured by concertgoers and on CCTV in and around the Arena, but not inside the City Room. We will collectively refer to this video and photographic evidence as the external video.^[23]

The Barr footage, the Parker photo, and the CCTV still frames presented at the Saunders Inquiry provide the only observable physical evidence of the scene inside the City Room before and immediately after the bang. There is no observable physical evidence, captured inside the City Room, of the bang itself—though, as we shall see, it purportedly exists.

According to the official account, the bang occurred at 22:31:00 precisely. There is observable physical evidence that brings this stated timing into question. The possible missing period, of approximately thirty seconds, requires explanation.

The external videos and images do not provide convincing observable physical evidence to indicate that a shrapnel bomb detonated inside the City Room. They do provide evidence suggesting injury. But we can say that the absence of the types of injuries one would expect to see following the bombing described by the state and its epistemic authorities is conspicuous—and striking.

Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. However, following a major terrorist bombing that supposedly killed 22 people and directly injured at least thirty-eight more, any reasonable person would expect to see some physical evidence that a bombing had, in fact, occurred. Put bluntly, one might expect to see people with missing limbs or flesh hanging off them. No such evidence has ever been presented.

There is no publicly available observable physical evidence of a large TATP bomb packed with metal shrapnel detonating in the City Room. To ignore this and maintain that the official story is beyond doubt is utterly ridiculous.

The observable physical evidence reported by Hall has not been explained by anyone who claims the Manchester Arena bombing happened as described by the state and the epistemic authorities. It seems likely this evidence has been ignored because it completely contradicts and wholly

undermines everything that we are being asked to believe about the Manchester Arena bombing.

The primary, physically real evidence establishes the objective facts. The only clearly observable primary evidence we have seen and heard is found in the Parker photograph, the Barr footage, the Bickerstaff video and the external video. The primary evidence establishes, as objective fact, that there was a loud bang that caused the crowd in the Arena to panic and stampede.

The CCTV stills presented at the Saunders Inquiry also provide some primary, physically real evidence but they do not support the state's account. Redacted images, black blocks in CCTV stills and indistinguishable pixilated or blurred blobs are not evidence of anything other than redaction.

From CCTV, legacy media and official reports we can be relatively sure about some claimed numbers and can make reasonable estimates of others. A major caveat with all the numbers from the epistemic authorities is that they are contradicted by the observable physical evidence. That evidence shows there were far fewer people—even than initially claimed by the authorities—who remained in the City Room directly after the event.

From more reliable CCTV captured before the bang, we can say that approximately 150 to 160 people were in the City Room beforehand. Of these, according to Hall's investigation, an estimated thirty with relatively minor injuries exited the room immediately after the bang, and another forty or so, including five members of the Arena security staff, exited with no injuries. This leaves around eighty people inside the City Room after the bang.

We are told that 22 people lay dead or dying and we know thirty-eight were said to have been injured and unable to walk. All thirty-eight reportedly remained inside the City Room. In addition, Hall found that an estimated twenty members of the public reportedly stayed to assist the injured in the City Room after the bang.

For our purposes, we'll focus on the people said to have been most severely injured. That includes the 22 dead and dying and the thirty-eight injured—sixty in total—who allegedly suffered the brunt of the claimed shrapnel bomb blast. These include Martin and Eve Hibbert. Ms Ruth Murrell also remained in the City Room for some time, but was among those able to walk out, which she eventually did.

Based on rational analysis of the accumulated real physical evidence, we can deduce, as objective fact, that a powerful TATP shrapnel bomb did not explode inside the City Room of the Manchester Arena on the night of 22nd May 2017. We can further deduce that nobody was killed or harmed in the City Room because the device, whatever it was, was incapable of causing any significant damage.

Hearing the contention that no one died is what leads people to tune out and dismiss the observable physical evidence. It is simply beyond the imagination of most citizens to consider that the state could perpetrate such a monumental deception. Of course, incredulity is not evidence of anything.

We should understand the specific nature of Hall's conclusions and suspicions. In *Manchester: The Night of the Bang*, Hall explicitly stated:

There are no publicly available photographs that I have been able to find, taken by concert goers which show any of the deceased victims, taken after the bang (either dead or alive), and situated in or immediately outside the arena. [. . .] There is a lack of reliable photographs showing 'deceased victims' inside the arena, at the concert, or in the foyer [the City Room], either before or after their 'death'. [. . .] I suspect that no deaths occurred in the foyer.

Among the 22, one young child and nine teenagers were reportedly murdered. Obviously, this narrative elicits powerful emotions. But regardless of how we might *feel* about a reported murder and maiming of children and young people by a suicide bomber, if the evidence suggests that the bombing did not occur—and I am among many who agree with Hall that the evidence resoundingly supports that contention—then it is not immoral to try to find out *what happened* to those people.

It is, therefore, important to stress what the observable physical (primary) evidence and secondary evidence demonstrate—and what they do not demonstrate. This evidence reveals only that Salman Abedi did not detonate a large suicide bomb inside the City Room. It shows that the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing is false to the extent that there was no bomb—meaning nobody was killed or injured inside the City Room at 22:31:00 on 22nd May 2017.

We do not know what happened to the reported “victims.” We do not know and cannot know, without further investigation, if the reportedly deceased are dead or not. Some, or all, may be. All we know is that they were not killed inside the City Room.

Based on what Hall has uncovered about the true nature of the bang and its perpetrators and victims—all so-called—we are clearly talking about the likely commission of conspiracy and state crimes. This does not mean that all the people involved, including perhaps a proportion of the alleged victims, are fully cognizant of what happened inside the City Room. There are a variety of explanations that could account for their lack of awareness, which we will cover.

It should be noted that only a handful of the people who supposedly lay dead and dying in the City Room are identifiable in the CCTV still images showing the final moments before the bang. Furthermore, only a further four or five of the reportedly deceased are potentially identifiable in the observable physical evidence showing the scene in the City Room after the bang—i.e., the Parker photo and the Barr footage.

Martin and Eve Hibbert were said to be among the reported victims unable to walk. According to official accounts, after thirty-five minutes, the process of carrying these thirty-eight people—including Martin and Eve Hibbert—out of the City Room began. They were taken one by one along a raised walkway leading from the City Room and down a set of stairs to the Victoria Station concourse, where a temporary “Casualty Clearing Station” was set up.

The first to be taken along this route arrived at the “clearing station” at 23:07 and the last at 23:42. Probably due to what can only be seen as a bizarre emergency response—we’ll cover this shortly—they apparently remained there for some time before reportedly being taken to various hospitals.

Most people inside the City Room fled almost immediately after the bang occurred.

Only a small group of first responders, mainly consisting of British Transport Police and arena medical staff, entered the City Room in the first few moments after the bang. Allegedly, the remaining thirty-eight injured victims were subsequently assisted in leaving the City Room by these first responders and by a small contingent of police officers, who started arriving at about 22:45.

Counter-terrorism investigators arrived in the City Room and sealed it off early in the morning—at 01:19 on 23rd May 2017. At some stage, limited structural damage, suggesting that a shrapnel bomb exploded, was added. While some senior commanders and other personnel must have been

aware of the fabrication of evidence, many of the investigators who subsequently reported this evidence wouldn't necessarily have known anything about the fabrication.

The City Room was controlled, apparently in the moments before and certainly very quickly after the bang. Standard response procedures were not followed. Emergency services were obstructed or misdirected—seemingly on purpose. The typical kind of emergency response that would be expected in such circumstances did not transpire.

Furthermore, the normal investigation of suspicious deaths did not happen. The Saunders Inquiry did not examine all the available evidence. It either dismissed or glossed over some key contradictory evidence that was presented.

Richard D. Hall found evidence that possibly accounts for some of the victims who were supposedly killed or injured by the bang. Ultimately, though, as he has clearly stated, he was only able to speculate about what may have really happened to these people either before or after (but certainly not during) the bang. Obviously, we cannot rule out that some of the injured are wittingly deceiving the public. If they are, we don't currently know what their motives might be.

We know the accounts of the injured are false. But we do not know why they have created and maintained these falsehoods. For reasons we will discuss in the final chapter, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that they genuinely believe their own stories.

Possibly they believe that lying is the right thing to do under the circumstances. They may think that by promoting the fake narrative they are serving the public good in some way. Perhaps they are obliged under contract or have been coerced or manipulated to go along with that narrative.

It is important to appreciate that some or all of the bereaved families could have experienced real loss. They may be absolutely convinced that their loved ones died in the City Room that night or as a result of injuries sustained in the City Room. Autopsies were reportedly performed, funerals were held, and death certificates were eventually issued six years later, in 2023. But it is also not out of the question that some or all of the families are aware of the hoax and are being forced, for whatever reason, to play along and remain silent.

The state's account of the Manchester Arena bombing and the reporting of it by the epistemic authorities has convinced an estimated seventy-two percent of people in the UK that they know what happened that night. Research done by Kings College suggests that the other twenty-eight percent are less certain. Those who are convinced of the state's narrative, who believe they know what happened, may well include the families of the deceased.

Thus, in writing this book, I have to accept that if the bereaved—or the injured, for that matter—read it, or are made aware of its contents, they may say they are offended by it. If so, all I can do is express my regret. I hope they recognise it is not my intention to deliberately offend anyone.

Whatever happened to their loved ones, or whatever the injured believe, I am aware of the observable physical evidence that shows that no one was killed or injured in the specific circumstances described by the state. I cannot know what Richard D. Hall thinks or believes, but I suspect we share the same hope. Like him, I want to see “further investigation and inquiry” to establish what really happened to the reported victims.

The official account, formally established in the Kerlake Report and by the Saunders Inquiry, is extremely detailed.

For example, on Day 150 of the inquiry, it was stated.^[24]

Footage taken by a member of the public within the City Room is available approximately 34 seconds after detonation. Marcin and Angelika can be seen in some of this footage, which shows that, at 22.31.34, Marcin was lying on his side and appeared to be motionless.

This is possibly a reference to the Barr footage or perhaps to similar footage shown by the BBC. We cannot know, because the footage referred to was not presented or examined at the inquiry.

The inquiry went on to discuss the claimed CCTV evidence that no one was shown:

At 22.38.02, CCTV captured Marcin and Angelika again. Both were lying on the floor and neither of them appeared to have moved position since they were last observed nearly 6 minutes before. Sarah Burke, a member of the public, leant over Angelika at this time. [. . .] Travel Safe officer Philip Clegg entered the City Room just before 22.33. As he walked around the City Room his body-worn video shows that Marcin was lying on his side, motionless, at 22.36.10. Angelika was behind

him. [. . .] He [Clegg] moved away from Angelika at 22.38.04. [. . .] At 22.45.10, BTP Police Constable Jessica Bullough stood over Marcin. [. . .] By 22.53.15, Marcin's body had been covered with a poster. By 22.59.35, his head had been covered with a poster. [. . .] At 23.38.20, Police Sergeant John Whittaker was sitting next to Marcin. At 23.38.25, Sergeant Whittaker lifted the poster that was covering Marcin and appeared to check his pulse. [. . .] At 23.39.35, NWS [North Western Ambulance Service] paramedic Patrick Ennis knelt down between Marcin and Angelika. He turned first towards Angelika and then towards Marcin. At 23.39.40, Mr Ennis attached a label to Angelika to identify her as deceased. At 23.40.09, Mr Ennis appeared to be attaching a label to Marcin.

This degree of complexity and the reported minutia paints a convincing picture. However, the witness testimony, the official reports, and the accounts of investigations, all laid out across months of inquiry and all describing a horrific scene, are thoroughly contradicted by the observable physical evidence.

Intricate and detailed as the official narrative may be, ultimately, it is just a story. Tolstoy's *War and Peace* has nearly 600,000 words in it. It provides us with a lot of descriptive detail and a complex narrative. But the story Tolstoy tells, though interwoven with some actual historical events and facts, is a work of fiction. Tolstoy never pretended otherwise, so we are not fooled into believing that the characters are real or that the plot really happened.

Many of us were convinced by the Manchester Arena narrative because we were told tragic stories about murdered children and young people. These emotional accounts were drilled into our brains by propagandists from the outset.

To establish that people were killed or injured by a bomb, you first have to *know* there was a bomb. The account of the Manchester Arena bombing, as given by the state and its epistemic authorities, did not result from any kind of logical investigatory process.

In the aftermath of the crime, virtually no one examined the evidence to substantiate whether a bombing had actually happened. For numerous reasons we'll discuss, the official investigation at the scene and the subsequent Operation Manteline,^[25] the counter-terrorism investigation led by Greater Manchester Police, were not credible. In the absence of any investigation by the legacy media, it was left to independent researchers,

like the pseudonymous UK Critical Thinker (UKCT)—whose work Hall referenced and catalogued^[26]—to look at the available evidence that supposedly substantiated the official story of a suicide bombing.

Richard D. Hall is the only journalist to have put his name to a significant body of investigative journalism that exposes what actually happened in the City Room that night. He is now being hounded and apparently punished for daring to challenge the very sad stories we were told.

Though they are, undoubtedly, very sad stories, they do not provide any reason to reject the evidence reported by Hall. Any claim that they do is untenable.

Like Hall, I do not know what happened to the people who reportedly died and who were said to have been injured at the scene. But neither does anyone else, other than those involved in the hoax.

Hall presented considerable circumstantial evidence that may indicate what happened to some of the reportedly deceased victims. Without further investigation, the real circumstances of their deaths, or their possible whereabouts if they are not dead remains unknown.

The vast majority believe the official account because it touches them emotionally, because it is complicated and detailed, and presumably because they cannot accept that the UK state would ever commit the crime of hoaxing a terror attack and passing it off as real in order to deceive the public. It is much easier to believe the official account and simply ignore the mounds of evidence that shows—that proves—the official account is not true.

Richard D. Hall has reported nearly all of the evidence we are about to explore in detail. We can deduce, based on all this available evidence, that Hall is correct: The Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag, and no one was killed or injured in the circumstances described by the state.

Chapter 10: Sources

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Chapter 11: Foreknowledge

The intelligence agencies and security services gave a lot of the evidence against Salman Abedi behind closed doors. When High Court Justice John Saunders issued a Restriction Order under Section 19 of the Inquiries Act 2005, he denied public scrutiny of that evidence on the grounds of national security.

Behind those closed doors, Saunders concluded:^[1]

None of those working for the Security Service or Counter Terrorism Policing [. . .] intended to assist SA [Salman Abedi] in slipping through the net. [. . .] [I]f the Security Service or Counter Terrorism Policing make mistakes then these need to be identified and steps taken to put them right. While the Director General of the Security Service has said that he considers it inevitable that terrorists will get through the measures they put in place in their work to protect the public, he did not mean that it was acceptable for that to happen due to mistakes being made.

Saunders also decided that none of the reported surviving “victims,” who were the key witnesses to the so-called terrorist attack, should be considered “core participants” of the public inquiry into the said terrorist attack. This ruling allowed Saunders to deny any called “witnesses” legal representation.^[2] Thus, he ensured that none of the witnesses could, for example, formally request the disclosure of evidence that the Inquiry panel did not wish to disclose.

The official account of the purported Manchester Arena terrorist attack makes it clear that the security services could have perhaps done more to stop Abedi. The fact that they didn’t was the result of error rather than any deliberate action on their part.

Consequently, if the observable physical evidence shows that anyone other than the terrorists allegedly involved had direct foreknowledge of the Manchester Arena attack, then the official account is definitely not true. The Bickerstaff video^[3] provides that evidence.

In his selfie phone footage, Mr Bickerstaff claimed he had just seen the horror in the City Room. He is heard to clearly state that people behind him—indicating people in the City Room—were “bashed into bits and half their bodies are everywhere.”

On [Day 44](#)^[4] of the Saunders Inquiry, expert testimony was provided by Mr Robert Gallagher, a counter-terrorism forensic and digital investigation manager who was effectively the crime scene manager *after* the bang.

Gallagher said investigators couldn't precisely determine the size of the TATP bomb used but estimated it was in the "low kilograms." Over 3,000 shrapnel pieces were allegedly found, consisting of 29.26kg of metal nuts plus 1.47kg of screws and cross dowels. With the addition of the TATP and bomb mechanism, the combined weight of the large black rucksack bomb Abedi was said to be carrying was well in excess of 30kg—66lbs.

To put that weight into perspective: if you have ever bought a large bag of cement in the UK, it typically weighs 20kg–25kg. Abedi was young and fit, but the large black rucksack bomb he was supposedly carrying certainly would have weighed him down.

Later, at the trial of Hashem Abedi, Crown prosecutor Duncan Penny QC told the jury, "Such was the ferocity of the explosion that Salman Abedi was dismembered in the process." The jurors were shown a graphic depicting the discovered location of Abedi's head and torso—both found near "Victoria Station ticket hall," according to [The Telegraph](#).^[5] This is more than 160 feet—around fifty metres—away from where Abedi is said to have detonated his suicide bomb.

Abedi's upper torso and head were initially reported by The New York Times to have been blown through the doors between the City Room and [the concourse](#).^[6] The UK legacy media, likewise, claimed that an official investigation diagram had been leaked showing that Abedi's upper body was blasted through the doors and landed "outside the foyer"—[the City Room](#).^[7]


But by the time of the inquiry, the discovered location of Abedi's body was said to be "close to the Arena box office."

Frankly, whether his dismembered corpse was blown through the doors—which would place it "close to the Arena box office"—or blown to the "ticket hall" doesn't matter. The reason it is irrelevant is because there is no observable physical evidence to suggest a shrapnel bomb exploded in the Arena. Yet, despite their lack of evidence, the epistemic authorities reported that the blast was immense.

It is worth noting that if a suicide bomber detonated a powerful triacetone triperoxide (TATP) bomb packed with more than 30kg of shrapnel—metal

nuts, cross dowels, and screws—in a crowd of people, you would expect to see their bodies “bashed to bits” and body parts “everywhere.”

The Arena has been remodelled since the bang, but the A-plan shown below depicts it as it was in 2017. The concourse is a wide walkway that surrounds the main Arena. We can see that the doors between the City Room and the concourse, where Mr Hibbert claimed he brushed shoulders with Salman Abedi, are located at the section marked 206. The doors are indicated in grey.



The numbered sections running around the outer circumference of the concourse, as shown on the plan, are actually inside the main Arena. The concourse is underneath the upper tiers, but the numbered seating blocks can serve as reference points for our purposes.

Mr Bickerstaff filmed himself on the concourse in the area outside the concourse bar, near the sections marked 108 and 109. The bar is marked on the plan with two black circular symbols.

In the Bickerstaff video, a number of people can be seen carrying pink balloons. These were released on the Arianna Grande concert crowd during her song “Sometimes.” This was song number eighteen in the set list; it started some twenty minutes before the end of the gig.^[8] Therefore, we know that Mr Bickerstaff shot his phone footage sometime *after* that song.

It is not unusual for people to leave a concert before the end in order to avoid the rush. As noted in the Saunders Volume One report:^[9] “[S]hortly before 22.30, the concert began to draw to a close and people started to leave. Many did so through an area called the City Room.” Other witness accounts, such as that of Abbey Mullen and Jenny Brewster, also attest to people leaving the concert early.

The mere presence of the people seen in the Bickerstaff video does not indicate he filmed it *after* the bang. In fact, their observed behaviour proves he didn’t.

True, none of us know how we would react in moments of extreme stress. Our behaviour in such circumstances is not predictable. Still, as we briefly alluded to in the previous chapter, Mr Bickerstaff acted in a highly unusual way.

As you might expect, people are seen gathered around the bar. The passing crowd is heard mocking Mr Bickerstaff’s loud wails and moans. It didn’t apparently occur to him to grab one of the passing stewards to help him with his search for Ellen. Presumably Ellen had a phone, but Mr Bickerstaff apparently didn’t think to call her. Instead of phoning her, he used his phone to film himself looking for her.

Mr Bickerstaff later offered an explanation^[10] as to why he did this:

I started filming on my phone because I thought, if another bomb goes off, and my phone is found, at least my family would know that I tried to save Ellen.

As heard in both the Barr footage^[11] and similar BBC footage following the bang, a loud warning siren and public address were broadcast. In the external video,^[12] the Tannoy addresses audibly began as soon as the panicked crowd started stampeding out of the main Arena.

Perhaps the most widely reported video footage shown by the legacy media is seen in the external video [at 01:03 minutes]. It shows panicked

people fleeing from the City Room and running down the stairs to the Victoria Station concourse.

Among those seen in the external video was reportedly injured survivor Amy Barlow. The legacy media reported Amy's account.^[13]

I just came out of the arena, and I was with my friend and my mum [in the City Room], and then I felt something hitting my legs and then I ran. I saw the blood pour down my legs and had to sit down. When she got outside, we realised how bad it was.

In his investigation, Hall correctly observed that when she was running down the stairs there is no sign that Amy had sustained the injury she described. She is seen again—in footage said to have been captured by a man called Andrew Yuill—standing in the street outside Victoria Station. In the Yuill video, Amy had no observable injury, nor was she seen bleeding in any of his footage. There are no blood drips observable either near Amy or along the path she took.

Amy is first seen “bleeding” sometime later—outside the Arena. In the external video, she is the girl who was advised to raise her legs. We can estimate this moment occurred more than a minute after the bang. It is the first time Amy’s apparent bleeding can be observed. It is possible that Amy’s clothing soaked up “all” the blood from her wound prior to this point. But, for reasons that will become clear, it seems unlikely that this would have been the case if Amy sustained a “shrapnel” wound. Her unhindered ability to run as she did casts further doubt on the claim she was struck by shrapnel from a bomb.

Nonetheless, Amy stated that she and her mother ran out of the City Room immediately after the bang, reportedly when Amy was struck with shrapnel. Amy’s mother, Kathy, said it felt like “someone had thrown a massive firework.” This notion of something akin to fireworks is common to many witness statements. Please bear this in mind.

It would have taken Amy and her mother no more than thirty seconds to reach the bottom of the steps, where they were first seen on video. The duration of the Bickerstaff video is one minute and forty-seven seconds. The duration is *not* one minute thirty-seven seconds, as was reported by the Sun newspaper and other legacy media outlets.

In the footage of concertgoers—including Amy Barlow and her mother—who are fleeing down the steps away from the City Room, the loud public safety announcement and warning siren can be heard. This is also audible

in the Barr video and in similar BBC footage. Therefore, we can deduce that the audible warning address began broadcasting on the Arena's public address system no later than thirty seconds after the bang.

This audible warning can also be heard in the footage of people running through the Trinity Way exit and is heard as well in footage taken outside of the Manchester Arena building.

Safe to say, then, that no more than thirty seconds after the bang the public address warning was audible everywhere in and around the Arena complex. In the [Kerslake Report](#),^[14] some eyewitnesses said the loud warning address made it hard for them to communicate with one another as they fled to safety.

In the Bickerstaff video, the public address speakers are clearly visible. But because the public address system is not audible in that video, we can conclude he must have filmed himself *before* this alarm was set off.

If we accept, for the moment, that the bang occurred at 22:31:00 exactly, we can be all but certain that the public service announcement started broadcasting no later than 22:31:30. Given the length of the Bickerstaff video, we can calculate that he started filming himself, at the latest, at 22:29:43—that is, approximately one minute and seventeen seconds *before* the bang. And since, as we said, no bang is heard in the Bickerstaff video, this suggests his recording commenced no later than 22:29:13, closer to two minutes *before* to the bang.

Later, we will discuss the many problems with the official timing. But regardless of when it occurred, from the official timing alone we can say it seems likely Mr Bickerstaff filmed himself *before* the bang.

Further evidence demonstrating the Bickerstaff video was recorded before the bang can be observed in the casual demeanour and movement of the other people captured by Mr Bickerstaff's phone. As the [external video](#)^[15] shows, the crowd inside the main Arena, which was already leaving, panicked and began to stampede almost immediately after hearing the bang.

The panic is corroborated in the Kerslake Report. One concertgoer said:

The sheer stampede after the explosion was scary because everyone was just running to the exit and no one really knew what had actually happened.

Another said:

We were on our way out of the Arena when the explosion went off, [. . .] everyone rushed to leave and there was a lot of panic around. Me and my friends were scared running down the stairs as there were so many people.

This account of a panicked stampede triggered by the bang was confirmed by Mr Jordan Kenney. Mr Kenney is clearly observable in the Bickerstaff video. He was recorded by Mr Bickerstaff heading toward the bar outside section 108.

Mr Kenney said he was seated inside the main Arena with a friend called Laura when the bang went off. Mr Kenney recorded his own separate footage and filmed the crush at the exits from his vantage point inside the auditorium of the Arena. He later posted his video on social media with the comment.^[16]

Everybody in Manchester arena rushing to get out after a[n] explosion!! I've never been so petrified in my life.

Independent researcher UK Critical Thinker (UKCT) later contacted Mr Kenney online and asked him for more details. Mr Kenney told UKCT:

We stayed like a few minutes after the bang and then realised something wasn't right. And so did everybody else and everybody started panicking. I was pulling my friend over the seats towards the top of the Arena, because she had heels [sic] on. [. . .] There was smoke everywhere. People were screaming and crying. [. . .] It [the smoke] was all coming from the foyer [City Room]. [. . .] There was smoke from a bomb, a bomb creates smoke and mess. It smelt really bad, people were running. People had lost family members and friends in the crowd because 22 thousand [sic] people were trying to get out at once. People were running, people were falling over and getting stamped on. We saw blood[.] [W]e saw heaps and heaps of ambulances and police cars.

How long Mr Kenney and Laura stayed in their seats before joining the evacuation is not clear. It was during this time that he filmed the panic. As seen in other external video footage and as reported in other witness statements, upon hearing the bang the crowd started screaming and rushing for the exits almost instantaneously.


Doubtless it was an extremely distressing and frightening experience for Mr Kenney and for everyone else in the Arena that night. Seeing smoke coming from the City Room, smelling something "really bad," and seeing

blood and “heaps and heaps” of emergency vehicles would certainly have convinced Mr Kenney and everyone else that they were in an arena where a bomb had just exploded. Yet what Mr Kenney reported was largely inconsistent with the official narrative—a point we will cover later.

Based on Kenney’s own video, we can deduce that if Mr Bickerstaff had filmed the video of himself *after* the bang, as he claimed he had, the concourse where he was filming would have been full of terrified people surging toward the exits. We see no evidence of this in the Bickerstaff video. The people he filmed are calm, even laughing and joking. Some, including Mr Kenney, are seen queuing for the bar.

If the official account is plausible, there were around eighty people who were directly harmed by a bomb, and they were all inside the City Room. Others who fled the City Room—including some of the reportedly injured, such as Amy Barlow—ran for the nearest exits. If you were already in the City Room, these exits would have been your immediate escape route.

The diagram below shows the foyer (City Room) of the Manchester Arena as it was at the time. You will note the exits to the car parks and Victoria Station lead away from the Arena concourse. If you were in the concourse on the side of the Arena closest to the City Room, one of the main routes out was via the City Room.



The officially reported location of the bomb blast is marked, as is the suspected location of what was likely a pyrotechnic device that was meant to simulate a bomb. We'll discuss the evidence for pyrotechnics and their placement shortly.

The blood Mr Kenney saw was outside the City Room. It seems highly likely that most if not all the blood came from people who were injured in the stampede, not in the purported bombing. As can be seen in the graphic above, if you were inside the City Room when the “bomb” exploded it is unlikely you would have run toward the Arena concourse.

Mr Kenney clearly stated that he was inside the main Arena when the bang was heard. He posted video on social media evidencing this fact. He remained inside the Arena and then fled in panic with everyone else because he had “never been so petrified” in his life. He did not go to the bar.

Yet, in the Bickerstaff video Mr Kenney can be seen heading toward the bar. He was recorded reaching for what looks like his wallet as he calmly walked across the concourse, presumably to buy drinks. He later confirmed he bought drinks that night, though he couldn't remember precisely when. Prior to her encore, Ariana Grande left the stage for three minutes and twenty seconds. So, there was a short interval just before the end of the concert. Perhaps Mr Kenney visited the bar during this period.

Mr Kenney certainly did not casually saunter to the bar *after* the bang. He and his friend Laura rushed to the exits along with the rest of the crowd.

From Mr Kenney's location—as seen in the Bickerstaff video—his two possible exits were more or less equidistant. He could have left the Arena by running toward either the City Room or Trinity Way exit closest to him. If he wanted to access the car park, Mr Kenney's quickest route would have been through the City Room. Yet, as seen in the Bickerstaff video, he is not heading toward either the City Room or the Trinity Way exit. He isn't in any sort of panic, he shows no sign of being “petrified,” and he isn't running anywhere.

Nor does anyone else seen in the Bickerstaff video appear remotely concerned that a bomb has just exploded. Instead, they are all calmly walking around. None of them are rushing toward any exits. For example, we see two men and a young woman in a wheelchair who are standing and sitting, respectively, beside a wall. They seem to be doing no more than

watching the passersby. The only people screaming or crying out are Mr Bickerstaff and the few people heard briefly mimicking him.

Mr Kenney clearly recounted that he was in the main Arena, filming the stampede and the panic, *after* the bang. Therefore, it is not possible that he could have been captured in the Bickerstaff video, nonchalantly strolling to the bar, if Mr Bickerstaff made his video *after* the bang, as he claimed. Mr Bickerstaff filmed Mr Kenney going toward the bar sometime *before* the bang.

It is glaringly obvious that Mr Kenney is among the many people *seen* in the Bickerstaff video who were not evacuating the building *after* the bang when Mr Bickerstaff filmed them. There is no observable unease, no one is rushing to get away and there are nowhere near enough people seen in the concourse to substantiate any suggestion that Mr Bickerstaff filmed his video *after* the bang.

The Bickerstaff video could have been recorded at any point in the twenty-minute period after the pink balloons were released. The evidence clearly shows Mr Bickerstaff recorded his footage at some point in the twenty-minute period *before* Salman Abedi allegedly detonated his claimed suicide bomb.

It is not possible that people were "bashed to bits" behind Mr Bickerstaff, as he claimed, because, even if the official account of the bomb itself is true, the bomb had not yet detonated. Hence, Mr Bickerstaff, or someone instructing him, had to have had foreknowledge, even if only limited foreknowledge, that something was about to happen.

Mr Bickerstaff had no cause to howl as he "desperately" searched for his daughter and filmed video of his own highly unusual behaviour. Thus, we can only conclude that Mr Bickerstaff was acting out some sort of scripted scene. All the evidence suggests that Mr Bickerstaff was performing in the role of a crisis actor.

The Bickerstaff video was reported by the legacy media as alleged evidence supporting the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing. Actually, the Bickerstaff video does *not* support the official account. On the contrary, his video is quite conclusive evidence that what we have been told about the purported bombing is false.

Mr Bickerstaff runs a [butcher shop](#).^[17] There is no evidence to suggest that he was involved in the planning of the Manchester hoax or even that he knew what was about to transpire. Of course, he knows about the hoax

now. Later we will discuss some of the possible explanations for his continuing silence on the subject.

Whatever motivation he may have had at that time, Mr Bickerstaff was almost certainly acting on the instructions of the core conspirators who planned the Manchester hoax. The core conspirators obviously *did* have foreknowledge of the purported “attack”—and the Bickerstaff video demonstrates that fact.

As compelling as the Bickerstaff video is, if it was the *only* evidence of foreknowledge, it could perhaps be more easily dismissed. But it is not the only evidence we have of foreknowledge.

There is also witness testimony of two concertgoers who reported that they were turned back from entering the City Room by Arena security before the bang was heard. Hall highlighted them in his work. They were Jenny Brewster and a girl who we know only as Freya.

Now, what of security in the Arena that night? Security was provided under commercial contract to the owners—SMG Europe Holdings LTD—by a private contractor called Showsec.^[18] The Saunders Inquiry report criticised the training provided to Showsec employees, noting they did not know how to identify or react when confronted with a potential terrorist situation. It was found that Showsec presented itself as having counter-terrorism expertise. But its claim to expertise was disingenuous; Showsec was unable to reliably advise SMG on counter-terrorism preparedness.^[19]

Ultimately, the failure to intercept Abedi was not considered to be the fault of Showsec alone. Instead, poor training and limited communication between Showsec, SMG, British Transport Police (BTP), and Greater Manchester Police (GMP) were all identified by Saunders as factors that contributed to Showsec’s “mistakes.” Saunders findings probably came as a relief to Showsec. It subsequently won a lucrative five-year contract to manage security at Wembley Arena.^[20]

Here is what Jenny Brewster said, as reported by Hall:

We went to the bathroom and then we said let’s go now before the rush. So we walked towards where the MEN [Manchester Arena] car park is where we were parked and there was a row of [Showsec] stewards stood in a line stopping us getting through but they were very friendly and they said, ‘This isn’t your best way girls, you’re best turning around you can get to your car park that way’, As I turned around, BOOM, one loud noise.

In 2017, if you were leaving the Arena via the concourse located near the City Room, the NCP car park^[21] was best accessed by going through the City Room. Miss Brewster and her friends, intent on leaving early to avoid the rush, were heading toward the City Room but were turned away from the City Room *before* the bang by people who appeared to be Showsec stewards.

Jenny's account was corroborated by an account by Freya, who said:

We was waiting to be let out to walk down to the foyer area [City Room] and while we was waiting they wouldn't let us past, and all of a sudden we heard like a massive explosion.

The "they" to whom Freya refers are quite possibly the same line of stewards who would not let Jenny Brewster through.

Why were these stewards evidently stopping people from entering the City Room *before* the bang?

According to the official Kerslake Report, Showsec stewards turned concertgoers away from entering the City Room *after* the bang:

Within the first few minutes after the explosion, the duty manager instructed Showsec stewards in the Arena bowl to close the aisles nearest to the foyer exit and for the stewards on the concourse to position themselves to divert concert goers in order, as far as possible, to avoid the public having to witness the scenes in the foyer.

The Kerslake Report didn't even mention, let alone account for, the witness testimonies of Jenny and Freya. It would be reasonable if the conclusion of an official report differed from the accounts of some eyewitnesses, providing that conclusion offered evidence to justify its findings. But it is *not* reasonable for an official report to simply ignore contradictory eyewitness testimony.

This ignoring of evidence certainly seems suspicious. It led Hall to write, in his initial investigation, published in *Manchester: The Night of the Bang*:

According to first hand witnesses the Kerslake Report is incorrect. Showsec stewards diverted concert goers away from the foyer before the bang, not after the bang. [. . .] Was the Kerslake Report merely an attempt to re-enforce an official, pre-agreed narrative?

In the course of his investigation, Hall also reported other witness statements that contradicted the Kerslake Report. Again, these discrepancies suggest foreknowledge of a planned event.

For example, the Kerslake Report noted that the “[f]irst armed police arrive[d] in the foyer [City Room]” at 22:43hrs. The anecdote outlined by Kerslake ran as follows:

Following the first call reporting a possible explosion at the Arena, which was received into the Force Control Room at 22:33hrs, a log was created and sent to the Force Duty Officer, a GMP Inspector. Initially the Force Duty Officer was not clear of the type of incident occurring but alerted Armed Response Vehicles to make their way toward the Arena. [. . .] [T]he first Armed Response Vehicle arrived at the Trinity Way entrance to the Arena (22:41hrs). [. . .] Within eleven minutes of the initial call, six Armed Response Vehicles, containing twelve Authorised Firearms Officers, had arrived on scene.

Hall was sent a recorded audio interview conducted with an Arena roadie who preferred to remain anonymous. Hall did not disclose who recorded the interview, but it was a third party. While the roadie's and the interviewer's decision to maintain their anonymity is understandable, given the risks involved in questioning the official narratives asserted by the biased pluralist state, it leaves us unable to verify who made the recording.

The roadie, a witness to the hoax, was very familiar with the backstage area, as you might expect. If we accept his account as legitimate and accurate, we can be confident about the timing of the events he reported. The roadie was not *guessing* when events occurred. Rather, his intimate knowledge of the Arena enabled him to *calculate* the timings.

In the recorded audio of his interview, the roadie states:

When the concert ended and we walked onto the stage to start taking the drum kit down,[. . .], and then the stage managers radio started going ballistic [. . .]. And there was panic there was pandemonium in the arena. No-one knew what had gone on, and the stage manager said “right everyone out of the building.” As you come off the stage of the arena, probably a 50 yard walk to the loading bay and then out to the back staff entrance, so it would take, what? A minute? And as we come out of the loading bay there was 8 armed police come running past which is where I think they had some sort of intelligence about this 'cos the armed response were that quick. For coming off the stage

to get to there, there's 8 armed plod coming in so they must have knew something.

The external video evidence shows that the crowd started panicking almost immediately, and a full stampede ensued very quickly thereafter. At this point, the roadie was alerted by the stage manager to evacuate. He remembers it was just *after* the bang was heard. And he *knows* how long it takes to get from the stage to the loading bay and the staff back entrance.

The police the roadie claims to have seen weren't just ordinary officers. They were armed police. If the roadie's statement is accurate, the police entered the Arena nine minutes before the Kerslake Report claimed any armed response arrived. Unless a squad of armed officers just happened to be hanging around outside a pop concert, the roadie's statement is yet another witness account that suggests foreknowledge. It is also another statement that was neither formally investigated nor mentioned in any official report.

Another witness is Darron Coster, who was collecting his son from the concert. Mr Coster gave testimony at the Saunders Inquiry that seemed to corroborate the roadie's account. He said he entered the City Room after hearing the bang and, shortly after entering, saw armed police at the City Room doors, "[T]his was well within the ten minutes," Mr Coster said. Then he questioned the officially stated arrival time of the armed police. Sir John Saunders, rather than responding to Mr Coster's testimony, made no further comment and appeared somewhat disinterested.

Sadly, Mr Coster, an experienced motorcyclist, died in a head-on collision while riding his motorcycle just three months after giving his testimony to the Saunders Inquiry. A month after his death, the police were still investigating the accident and appealing for witnesses. Nearly three years later, just before Hall's High Court trial, a woman named as Jacqueline Higson was charged with causing death by dangerous driving.^[22]

Irrespective of what evidence the state and the epistemic authorities choose to acknowledge or not, we have primary observable physical evidence of foreknowledge shown in the Bickerstaff video. We also have eyewitness testimony from Jenny Brewster and Freya and the roadie and Darron Coster, all of which is consistent with the primary evidence and all of which appears to corroborate likely foreknowledge.

Tellingly, perhaps, the Bickerstaff video has been used by the legacy media to supposedly substantiate the state's account. Yet it has never been

referenced in any official investigation, official inquiry, or official report. Its absence from the official record is almost certainly because anything more than superficial analysis of the Bickerstaff video quickly reveals that the official story we have been told about the Manchester Arena bombing is not true.

Evident foreknowledge indicates that the state, or elements working within the state, planned the alleged “terrorist” attack. As we’ve already discussed, this would be nothing new; the state has been surreptitiously behind such attacks repeatedly throughout human history. Add to that evident foreknowledge the state’s apparent relationship with the Abedi family and the likelihood of Salman Abedi being some kind of intelligence asset becomes very high.

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Chapter 12: The Gist of It

We have just discussed the evidence revealing that some people had foreknowledge of the Manchester Arena bombing. Mr Bickerstaff was evidently a crisis actor operating in the Arena that night. There is considerable evidence of other crisis actors active in the Arena before, during, and after the bang. We'll get to that in subsequent chapters.

Foreknowledge is also suggested by the apparent choice of Salman Abedi as the purported "suicide bomber." The evidence clearly indicates that Abedi was an asset of the UK intelligence agencies.

At the Saunders Inquiry, for reasons of "national security" and to protect the anonymity of agents and assets, a lot of testimony relating to the activities of the counter-terrorism police and the intelligence agencies was heard behind closed doors.

To maintain the impression of openness and transparency, on Day 194 of the Saunders Inquiry Paul Greaney QC entered what was called the "gist" of the hidden testimony into the record.^[1]

The "gist" was introduced as follows:

[S]ome parts of this gist may not fit neatly into the general themes identified below because further detail or explanation has to remain in closed [session]. This gist does not contain findings of fact but simply summaries of aspects of the oral evidence provided during the closed hearing.

The "gist" was presented as self-contradictory—which indeed it was, because much of what it revealed was "secret" and therefore could not be known. The "gist" was supposedly based upon testimony from counter-terrorism and intelligence officers. Yet the "oral evidence provided" was not deemed factual.

According to the gist, the UK domestic intelligence agency MI5 first became aware of Salman Abedi in 2014. Yet, on Day 166 of the inquiry, a reportedly senior MI5 officer called "J" said "we first received information on Salman Abedi on December 30th 2010." "J" then described how Salman had come to MI5's attention again in 2013.^[2]

In other words, despite being known to the intelligence agencies in 2010, Salman ostensibly didn't become a "subject of interest" (SOI) to them until 2014.^[3] The designation "SOI" meant Salman was among a tiny group of individuals who officially "merited further examination."

On 6th May 2015, MI5 sent a formal letter to the counter-terrorism police claiming that they (MI5) were opening a fuller investigation into Salman Abedi. Apparently, this was a ruse, for no such investigation happened. Instead, Salman was designated a "Tier 2 SOI." What this means is not entirely clear.

"J" proceeded:

[T]he concept of a de facto Tier 2 subject of interest was imperfect because although there were some advantages in terms of practical intelligence gathering, it meant that the formal closure process and assessment of risk presented by the person would not take place.

In October 2015 Salman Abedi was temporarily elevated to the status of a direct "first level contact." That was the result of a "misunderstanding," according to "J." But, he added, the mistake "was quickly identified and he was then closed"—meaning Salman Abedi was returned to the status of a "second level contact."

It seems possible, if not likely, that a "Tier 2 SOI" designation means the intelligence agencies have their eye on someone but do not want to go down the road of any formal risk assessment or unnecessary paperwork. Such a person, known to be part of terror networks but not too closely observed, would appear to be an ideal candidate to be groomed as a potential informant or an asset.

Former MI5 agent and author David Shayler (aka Delores Kane) revealed that Salman Abedi's father, Ramadan Abedi, was a known intelligence asset. Ramadan Abedi and his family settled in the UK in 1993. He remained until his eventual return with his family to his Libyan homeland in 2008.

Ramadan Abedi was a member of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) —"Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya," or just "al-Muqatilah"—which was linked to al Qaeda. Following 9/11 in the US in 2001 and 7/7 in the UK in 2005, the UK state listed the LIFG as a proscribed terrorist group. The listing was lifted in 2011 as unrest was growing in Libya.^[4]

Two German intelligence officers—husband and wife Silvan and Vera Becker—were murdered by LIFG terrorists in Libya in 1994. Because of the LIFG's association with al Qaeda, the Libyan government became the first to issue an international arrest warrant for Osama bin Laden. Interpol agreed to issue the warrant, which MI6 protested.^[5]

It seems Ramadan Abedi was part of an LIFG proxy force—almost certainly deployed at the behest of MI6—that had attempted a failed assassination attempt on then-Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 1996. There is no doubt that LIFG members were involved in that plot.^[6] The LIFG used what would soon become the familiar al Qaeda tactic of placing a roadside bomb (Improvised Explosive Device, or IED) ahead of Gaddafi's motorcade. They targeted the wrong vehicle, though, so Gaddafi escaped. But in the ensuing gun battle, "several" known LIFG terrorists were killed.

Following 9/11, the LIFG were listed by the UN Security Council as a proscribed terrorist organisation.^[7] Patrick O'Brien, the US Treasury's Assistant Secretary for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crime, said of them.^[8]

The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group threatens global safety and stability through the use of violence and its ideological alliance with al Qaeda and other brutal terrorist organisations.

In their book *Forbidden Truth*, two French intelligence experts, Guillaume Dasquié and Jean-Charles Brisard, reported that shortly after 9/11 Libyan Head of Intelligence Musa Kusa personally carried to MI6 officials a list of al-Muqatila (LIFG) terrorists known to be living in London. Nothing came of it, though: The UK security and intelligence agencies didn't apprehend or question any of them.^[9]

In 2011, the British and French militaries provided air support for Islamist terrorist groups, including the LIFG, who violently overthrew^[10] and brutally executed Colonel Gaddafi. Consequently, the country rapidly broke apart and became a failed state.^[11] Today it is both a centre for the training of Islamist extremists and a main staging post for human trafficking into Western Europe.

Despite being a known terrorist, Salman Abedi's freedom of movement appeared to represent the continuation of the "open door policy"^[12] the UK government had with the terrorist members of the LIFG and other Islamist extremist groups. In a 2018 parliamentary written statement, Alistair Burt MP wrote.^[13]

During the Libyan conflict in 2011 the British Government was in communication with a wide range of Libyans involved in the conflict against the Qaddafi regime forces. It is likely that this included former members of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and 17 February Martyrs' Brigade, as part of our broad engagement during this time.

The Saunders Inquiry's Volume Three report states:^[14]

[Photographs] show Ismail Abedi, SA [Salman Abedi] and HA [Hashem Abedi] in the company of Abu Anas al-Libi's sons carrying large guns, and in military uniforms with weapons. During the 1990s, Ramadan Abedi was friends with Abu Anas al-Libi. Abu Anas al-Libi was an Al-Qaeda commander linked to the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. He was captured by the US authorities in 2013 and died of natural causes while awaiting trial.

The Saunders Inquiry report definitely missed—intentionally avoided?—mentioning some important details about Abu Anas al-Libi and his relationship with both the Abedi family and, evidently, the UK intelligence agencies.

Abu Anas al Liby was a prominent member of the tight-knit LIFG community, which lived in and based their operations in the UK. This is the same community in which both Salman Abedi and Abdalraouf Abdallah—who said he was trained by NATO—grew up. Abu Anas al Liby was also part of the UK-based LIFG “circle.”

According to the US Department of Homeland Security, during the 1990s al Liby travelled throughout East Africa in the company of Ali Mohamed.^[15]

Ali Mohamed was a highly educated, multilingual Egyptian Army Major who was attached to a Special Forces training program at Fort Bragg in North Carolina in the US in 1981. Members of his Egyptian army unit were involved in the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Concerns were raised by his commanding officers that Ali Mohamed was “too religious.” After being forced to resign in 1984, he immediately offered his services to the CIA, which welcomed him with open arms.^[16]

A truly remarkable character who was deeply enmeshed with Western intelligence agencies, Ali Mohamed is a key figure in the long history of the working relationship between Western intelligence and Islamist terrorist groups.^[17] He trained terrorists around the world, including many linked to 9/11, 7/7, the rise of al Qaeda, the emergence of Islamic State, and the development of the Islamist terrorists' evolving methodology.

Finally prosecuted in 2000, Ali Mohamed struck a deal with US prosecutors, the details of which remain a state secret to this day.^[18] Prior to his trial, Ali Mohamed's defence attorney, David Ruhnke, said:

I think the most likely thing that will happen is he'll be released[,] and he'll be given a new name, a new identity, and he'll pick up a life some place.

Speaking in 2006, six years after his trial, Al Mohamed's wife, Linda Sanchez, told reporters:^[19]

He's still not sentenced yet, and without him being sentenced I really can't say much. He can't talk to anybody. Nobody can get to him. [The US government has [. . .] got Ali pretty secretive. [. . .] It's like he just kind of vanished [into] thin air.

In 1998, Abu Anas al Liby and Ali Mohamed reportedly scouted targets for Mohamed's associate, Osama bin Laden. They apparently identified the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and the former Tanzanian capital of Dar es Salaam as targets. Hence Saunders statement that Abu Anas al Liby was linked to those 1998 bombings.^[20] Two hundred and twenty-four people were murdered and thousands wounded in a series of coordinated attacks on the two US embassies.

As a result of the US embassy bombings in Africa, the FBI placed Anas al Liby on a wanted list.^[21] Less than a year later, in 1999, the British arrested Anas al Liby but didn't charge him. Then, despite the fact that he was wanted by the FBI, the UK police let him go.^[22]

Anas al Liby continued to run his operations from his home in the UK. He lived among other LIFG terrorists, including the Abedi family, until his home was raided in 2000. The raid uncovered an allegedly "important" al Qaeda training manual, which came to be known as the "Manchester Manual." Before the raid, however, al Liby himself had been tipped off and so evaded capture.

Following 9/11, Anas al Liby was immediately placed on the FBI's most wanted list, and a \$5M reward was offered for information leading to his capture. The international warrant stated that he was wanted in connection with the 1998 US embassy bombings and that he had been living in England.

Having supposedly died in custody in 2015,^[23] Abu Anas al Liby is one of several terrorists associated with the reported Manchester Arena plot who

either died, never stood trial, didn't appear in court, or offered no defence in their absence. By one means or another, they have all now "disappeared." All the indications are that Abu Anas al Liby was another asset of the intelligence agencies.

The UK-based Islamist terrorist community Salman grew up in was no "secret." For example, the Telegraph reported:^[24]

A group of Gaddafi dissidents, who were members of the outlawed Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), lived within close proximity to Abedi in Whalley Range. Among them was Abd al-Baset Azzouz, who left Britain to run a terrorist network in Libya[.] [. . .] Azzouz, 48, an expert bomb-maker, was accused of running an al Qaeda network in eastern Libya. The Telegraph reported in 2014 that Azzouz had 200 to 300 militants under his control and was an expert in bomb-making.

We are informed by the UK Guardian that intelligence sources revealed Salman Abedi was also close to the expert bomb-maker Abd al-Baset Azzouz.^[25] By the age of 22, Salman Abedi was a trained terrorist. He had been known to the British intelligence agencies for years and had close links to a notorious bomb-maker who schooled terrorists in Libya. Salman Abedi regularly flew between the UK and Libya, yet he was never detained or questioned.

All the evidence suggests that Salman Abedi's family, Abu Anas al Liby, Abd al-Baset Azzouz, and many other members of the UK's Islamist terrorist community, while pursuing their own political objectives, were members of proxy forces used by the biased pluralist UK state. Where their interests align, terrorists such as Salman Abedi benefit from the state assistance. The air support they received in Libya in 2011 is a prime example.

Salman Abedi was floating around the SOI "Tiers" until September 2014. At that point, his SOI Tier 2 status was suddenly rescinded, enabling him and his brother Hashem to be entered on a list of "standard citizens" rescued from Tripoli by the British Royal Navy.^[26] Presumably, had Salman's SOI designation remained, security officers on HMS Enterprise might have questioned why they were ferrying terrorists about.

Salman grew up in Fallowfield, Manchester, among UK-based Islamist terrorists.^[27] As a teenager, Salman joined terrorist operations in Libya during the school holidays. A very frequent flyer, he arrived back in the UK from Libya, via a stopover in Germany, just four days^[28] before the alleged

Manchester Arena attack. As usual, no one questioned him upon his 18th May 2017 arrival.

One of the purported Arena victims, who was said to have been very close to the "bomb" and was injured when it "detonated," was considered a valuable witness at the inquiry due to her experience working in counter-terrorism. Andrea Bradbury, who "retired" just six weeks *before* the Manchester hoax, was a security adviser who had worked for North West Counter Terrorism Unit and the Security Services for eight years. She survived the blast because she was reportedly protected by her handbag.^[29]

Ms Bradbury was captured on CCTV at 21:54, thirty-seven minutes before the bang, conversing with Showsec stewards. She said at the inquiry that she had been "talking to them [Showsec stewards] all night about what time things were finishing. [. . .] We ascertained from the stewards that it [the concert] was definitely going to carry on 'till half past ten." Ms Bradbury reportedly left the City Room at 22:04 to move her car but told the inquiry she failed to move her car.

Despite reportedly being blown off her feet^[30] by the blast, Ms Bradbury told the inquiry that she contacted her "former" employer, the counter-terrorism unit, at 22:36. She then caught a taxi to GMP headquarters, where the counter-terrorism unit is situated.^[31]

Prior to the bang, the counter-terrorism police had unusually frequent contact with SMG. Greater Manchester Police (GMP) counter-terrorism security advisers like Andrea Bradbury (before she retired) act as counter-terrorism liaison officers for various regions of the city. The liaison officer covering Manchester Arena was Ken Upham. He did not give testimony at the inquiry because he was said to be suffering from Covid-19.

During the inquiry it was made known that in the months leading up to the "attack" Mr Upham had gone "above and beyond what was required of him" as a counter-terrorism security officer. He had visited the Arena "more than was mandated." He had also told SMG staff that "if an attack is going to happen, it is going to happen"—and he had highlighted the particular vulnerability of the City Room.

This does not mean that either Andrea Bradbury or Ken Upham had any foreknowledge of a hoaxed false flag. But Hall's investigation certainly suggests unusual attention paid by counter-terrorism units to Manchester Arena in the months leading up to the hoax. The presence of a "retired" but

relatively high-ranking counter-terrorism officer in the City Room on the night is also an interesting coincidence.^[32]

Given everything we have discussed, the “gist” of the story told by the intelligence agencies at the Saunders Inquiry is genuinely “fantastical,” “implausible,” and “absurd.” Any suggestion that Western intelligence agencies weren’t fully aware of Salman Abedi, his movements, and his active operations is, frankly, rather silly.

Based on rational analysis of the accumulated real physical evidence observable in the Bickerstaff video, we can deduce, as objective fact, that Mr Bickerstaff filmed the footage *before* the bang. We can deduce that some people involved in the events of that night had foreknowledge. We can also deduce that crisis actors—Mr Bickerstaff, at the very least—were operating in the Arena that night.

In addition, the overwhelming weight of evidence points toward the alleged suicide bomber, Salman Abedi, being some form of intelligence asset. Obviously, this suggests clear foreknowledge of the Manchester Arena hoax by some members of the state’s epistemic authorities.

We are told that 22 people were murdered and another fifty-nine injured by Salman Abedi, who, it is alleged, also killed himself in the process. Salman Abedi was undoubtedly a terrorist and had extensive familial and personal links to the LIFG and, through them, to an international network of terrorists that has a close working relationship with states in the West.

In 2019, two years after the reported Manchester Arena bombing, the biased pluralist UK state, having temporarily relisted the LIFG as a proscribed terrorist group, removed the LIFG^[33] from that list following “receipt of an application to deproscribe the organisation.” That one of the terrorists closely linked to the LIFG was supposedly responsible for the murder of 22 people just two years earlier was no reason for the UK state to consider the LIFG a terrorist organisation.

As Vincenzo Vinciguerra of Operation Gladio infamy rightly observed:

[T]he state cannot condemn itself.

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Chapter 13: Fabrication

Think of a hoaxed false flag attack as the set of an action movie. The “bombs” that go off on the set look and sound terrifying, but they’re just pyrotechnic devices. Likewise, the deaths and injuries look real, but they’re created by applying moulds or casts—called moulage—to crisis actors.

In other words, a hoaxed attack is pure fabrication. “Fabrication” means^[1] “the act of inventing false information in order to deceive someone.” The objective of inventing a fabricated event is to sell a story to the public. The official account that’s presented is what the epistemic authorities call “disinformation”—information purposely designed to deceive the audience.

Biased pluralist states are well-versed in staging hoaxed terror attacks. That is, in peddling disinformation. We’ve already mentioned the fake suicide bombing in Manchester’s Trafford Shopping centre on 10th May 2016. Reporting that training exercise, The Telegraph noted.^[2]

800 volunteers [were] recruited to play the dead and wounded. Victims smeared in fake blood were seen running for their lives during the mock-up, while scores more were forced to play dead.

As the Trafford exercise approached, Rebekah Sutcliffe, the Assistant Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (GMP), warned the public about what they could expect to see and hear:

This exercise is part of a national programme that has been planned extensively for five months. [. . .] Residents in the area may hear loud noises and see emergency services activity around the Trafford Centre during the exercise and I can reassure people that there is no cause for concern.

In January 2024, the local legacy media in York, a city in the north of England, reported another frightening terror attack.^[3]

As the government minister stepped from his official car outside York Minster [. . .] the scene turned to one of horror, shock and panic. [. . .] A terrorist launched an acid and knife attack. [. . .] As part of what was clearly a coordinated attack, a lorry had been driven into a group of people walking along the Minster piazza. The victims lay crying in agony under the wheels of the HGV. [. . .] The terrorists were already

inside York Minster — starting a siege in which all 300 people gathered inside for a candlelit concert were taken hostage.

The newspaper account then added:

[N]one of this was real. Instead[,] it was Exercise Obtundity, a multi-agency operation to test the joint response of the emergency services to a series of terrorist incidents. But often it felt real enough. The gunfire, the screams, the limbless figures under the wheels of the lorry were all too close to reality.

The hoaxed terrorist attack in York certainly was “all too close to reality,” but not for the reasons suggested by this newspaper journalist.

The York journalist suggested the training exercise was “too close to reality” because he thought it convincingly emulated a “real-life” terror attack. In actuality, some so-called “real” terrorist attacks are hoaxes. The Manchester Arena bombing is an example of a hoaxed false flag terror attack. Such hoaxed attacks are indistinguishable from training exercises like the York terror drill—Exercise Obtundity. Therefore, the York training exercise was even closer to the alleged “reality” of some terror attacks than the journalist realised.

The 2017 Manchester attack was fake through and through, but the state has insisted from day one—from minute one—that it was real. That the deaths arising from the event were real. That the injuries suffered were real.

When a hoaxed false flag is reported as a real terrorist attack it stirs up public panic, just as any reported terrorist attack would. It is as much a psychological operation—psyop—as are MIHOP and LIHOP false flags. The strategy of tension engendered by a hoaxed false flag is used, just like MIHOPs and LIHOPs, to convince the public to seek refuge in the arms of the state. In the case of a hoax, the only thing required to achieve that end is that the people “believe” the attack to be real.

Ironically, even attacks that are openly reported as drills, or “training exercises,” can be used to generate a similar degree of tension, if to a lesser extent than the tension created by a full-blown hoaxed false flag.

Unlike the City of Manchester, which suffered a genuine terrorist attack^[4] in 1996, the City of York has never experienced a “real” terrorist attack. So, when it was announced in 2022 that a counter-terrorism urban control and surveillance system was going to be permanent, the people of York

expressed their angry disapproval.^[5] But, in the absence of any reason to fear terrorism, this year's "Exercise Obtundity" overrode those objections and served as a timely reminder to York citizens of why they *must* accept the state's restrictions and intrusions.

According to the state, the names for terror training exercises are largely chosen at random. If that is the case, then, given that the people of York were so resistant to the surveillance and urban control "counter-terrorism" measures foisted upon them, the naming of the York terror training drill two years after the protests began is "ironic." Obtundity, a word rarely used in the modern English, means^[6] "the state of having the senses numbed."

During a hoaxed terror attack, witnesses taken by surprise are naturally terrified and automatically assume it is real. Undoubtedly, many of "the screams" in Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017 were uttered by defenceless people who were taken off guard and who panicked. They were petrified by everything they saw, heard, felt, and smelled *outside* the City Room. The loud bang, the panic, the stampede, the blood, the smoke, the sirens and alarming messages broadcast, and the armed figures roaming around all contributed to convince them that they were under attack by actual terrorists.

But *inside* the City Room it was a different story. The crisis actors who were operational in the City Room knew there was no bomb. They knew the suicide bombing was a fabrication from start to finish.

The subsequent investigation and inquiry not only fabricated evidence but meticulously maintained the illusion of being actual evidence. Even now, seven years later, the legacy media and other members of the epistemic authorities insist that the fabricated, illusory evidence concocted by the state reveals what *actually* happened. The state continues to make it very clear that no one is allowed to question any of the very sad stories of the victims and witnesses. Challenging the authenticity of what the victims and their families and eyewitnesses say they experienced is deemed heartless, disloyal, and thus unacceptable.

Of course, *real* terrorist attacks can and do happen. During his investigation, Richard D. Hall highlighted the *real* Omagh bombing and the *real* Admiral Duncan pub bombing for reference.

Counter-terrorism preparedness training exercises make perfect sense. Drilling the security services, law enforcement, and emergency services so

they can prevent or at least respond effectively to terrorist attacks—in the hope of saving lives—is a sensible precautionary measure.

But those same training drills can also be used by the state to practice and execute false flag attacks, whether MIHOPs, LIHOPs, or hoaxes. As we have already discussed, we can't be sure about the extent to which elements within the state are complicit in terrorist attacks.

For example, the terrorists who conducted the 1993 World Trade Center bombing were so heavily infiltrated by the FBI and the CIA that the CIA later admitted it was “partly culpable” for killing six innocent people, including a seven-months pregnant woman.^[7] Counting the unborn baby, many would argue that seven innocent people were killed in that bombing.

The mere fact that biased pluralist states have used hoaxed attacks in the past does not imply that Manchester was also a hoax. But it does mean that suspecting it of being a hoax is by no means “fantastical.”

In fact, as we have seen in the previous chapters, the observable physical evidence confirms our suspicions that Manchester was indeed a hoaxed false flag. Going a step further, what the state and the epistemic authorities produced as physical evidence substantiating a suicide bombing inside the City Room is so unbelievable that it only *further* confirms our conclusion that the state is lying.

The state's alleged evidence was explored, in exacting detail, at the Saunders Inquiry. All the ostensible facts laid out in that inquiry were provided as a result of Operation Manteline, which was the official police investigation into the Manchester suicide bombing. As we shall see, there is no reason to believe a single piece of so-called evidence produced by Operation Manteline.

The Operation Manteline investigation provided most of the evidence used in the trial of Salman's younger brother, Hashem Abedi. It consisted primarily of written investigation reports, forensic analysis, and photographic evidence of bomb-making paraphernalia “found” at the flats supposedly used by Salman and his accomplices. At the Saunders Inquiry it was said that the Nissan Micra car allegedly used to transport bomb-making materials was “key in the investigation.”

A tiny Nissan Micra is a strange choice for transporting anything, let alone drums packed with triacetone triperoxide (TATP). Yet the Micra is apparently a popular vehicle among terrorists. The 7/7 alleged bombers also supposedly used a Nissan Micra to transport their explosives.^[8]

The odd vehicle selection isn't the only surprising similarity investigators found in these two separate large-scale terrorist attacks in the UK.

During the 7/7 investigation, for example, the driving licence and bank card of one of the alleged 7/7 terrorists, Hasib Hussain, were “found” at Tavistock Square after he was said to have blown himself up on a bus. Likewise, all the other reported 7/7 bombers who supposedly blew themselves up were quickly identified by the personal documents said to have been found among their remains. The devices they used were generally reported to be massive TATP suicide bombs, though the official story about the explosive used in the 7/7 attack changed over time.

To give readers a sense of just how ludicrous the 7/7 investigation was, the ID papers of suicide bomber Mohammad Sidique Khan were “found” in three separate locations: Aldgate, Edgware Road, and Tavistock Square. Shehzad Tanweer's documents were “found” in his wallet at Aldgate. The driving licence, passport, and a certificate of phone insurance all identifying Germaine Maurice Lindsay (aka Abdullah Shaheed Jamal) were “found” at or near the scene of the Piccadilly Line explosion.

(Aside: Similar identification documents of suspected terrorists were “found” during the investigation of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Twin Towers. The New York Times quoted Barry W. Mawn, head of the FBI's New York office, as saying^[9] that “the passport of one hijacker was found today several blocks from the World Trade Center.”)

Back to Manchester: Regardless of the fact that Salman Abedi's TATP suicide bomb was supposedly so powerful it blew him apart and tossed his entire upper body hundreds of feet through the air, it did not entirely destroy his plastic bank card, which was legible enough for investigators to identify him as the culprit.

In fact, during the Saunders Inquiry, an animation^[10] presenting Operation Manteline “evidence” showed Salman Abedi's bank card—badly damaged but displaying his name and Halifax bank account number—resting “close to his body.” Well, close to his torso—specifically, in a corner of the City Room, between the box office and the doors to the concourse. So, while the precise location of the Abedi's torso—entire upper body—has never been clarified, the Manteline video comports with other reports that attest to the scale of the purported detonation.

Needless to say, the on-the-spot identification of Salman Abedi and his financial details made it a snap for Operation Manteline to “investigate” and

“prove” Abedi’s involvement. The Manteline findings bring into question his terrorist training, showing him to have been neither well-versed in operational tradecraft^[11] nor possessing any common sense.

Abedi allegedly made other incautious decisions—all of which would have risked his being detected before he even reached the Arena. For instance, he supposedly enticed his cousin to try to buy a large quantity of hydrogen peroxide online through Amazon. Salman’s cousin apparently tried to do so, using an Amazon account in his own name.

As we discussed in Chapter 11, on Day 44 of the Saunders Inquiry,^[12] testimony was provided by Mr Robert Gallagher, the forensic and digital investigation manager for the North-West Counter-Terrorism Police. Upon his arrival at approximately 01:35 on 23rd May, Mr Gallagher took over as crime scene manager from the lead investigator at the scene, Detective Chief Superintendent Simon Barraclough. We know from his testimony and CCTV evidence that Mr Gallagher entered the City Room at 01:50. In his testimony, he said Salman Abedi was formally identified by police at 10.35 hours on 23rd May based on fingerprints taken from the left hand.

Mr Gallagher also testified that the blast was enormous and that it shattered the glass ceiling panels some 10 meters above the epicentre of the blast. He said that one of the panels collapsed on the morning of the 23rd and that the City Room had to be made safe before investigators could continue. His testimony was “confirmed” in numerous legacy media reports, such as this one.^[13]

When the device was detonated it was so powerful it caused a crater in the arena’s concrete floor and a 23 sq metre (250 sq ft) glass skylight shattered.

Repairs to the Arena were able to begin only after Operation Manteline had concluded its investigation of physical evidence at the scene. More than a year later, in July 2018, “significant works” to repair the damage were still supposedly underway.^[14] Yet photographs published on 23rd May, the day after the Manchester Arena attack, showed completely undamaged glass panel doors leading directly from the City Room. It seems the reportedly immense blast wasn’t capable of cracking even a single pane of glass.^[15] Indeed, a few weeks after the bombing, drone footage of the City Room glass ceiling confirmed no evidence of any shattered or missing glass ceiling panels or any sign of repairs having been made.

Though Hall did not consider it significant at the time, during his initial investigation he was contacted by a Manchester resident who told him:

The Manchester Arena event was fake. I have visited the Arena numerous times and still no blast damage to be seen, no tradesmen and skips on site [. . .] and the council cannot tell us who won the contract to repair a blast damaged building. Physical evidence is missing.

At the Saunders Inquiry, images were presented purporting to show a shrapnel-strewn floor, blast-damaged doors, and other signs of structural damage consistent with a shrapnel bombing. The inquiry accepted these images as evidence that a TATP suicide bomb had blown up inside the City Room.

The inexplicable discrepancy between the official evidence and reality only emerges when we realise that none of the claimed damage is observable in either the Parker photo or the Barr footage.^[16]

The Parker photo and the Barr footage both show the immediate aftermath of the alleged Manchester Arena bombing. They provide an indisputable record of the observable physical evidence *inside* the City Room no more than five minutes after the “bomb” supposedly exploded. They show—within the field of view—all the structural damage that can possibly be attributed to a shrapnel bomb detonated by Salman Abedi.

When we look at the Parker photo and the Barr footage it is abundantly clear that there is no observable structural damage. There are eight key aspects of the physical evidence which collectively prove that a TATP bomb did not detonate inside the City Room.

(1) A bright bank of lights is observable over the doors between the City Room and the concourse. The physical evidence shows that the lights closest to the so-called epicentre of the blast were still working after the bang. In fact, all the lights were *still* working. This would make no sense if a massive, shrapnel-laden TATP suicide bomb had exploded about ten metres away from those lights. After all, what bomb of this size and type *cannot* damage a single light no more than ten metres away in an enclosed room?

(2) The Operation Manteline cartoon doesn't show the merchandise stall located near the wall opposite the City Room mezzanine. Perhaps the animators thought it was damaged in the blast? If so, they were misled by someone. In the Barr footage, the flimsy merchandise stall—probably made

from lightweight aluminium or some other insubstantial construction material—is clearly visible and entirely intact.

This merchandise stall was supposedly just six to eight metres from the epicentre of a devastating shrapnel bomb blast—that is, *even closer* than the bank of lights. Abedi's suicide bomb should have blown the stall to smithereens four or five minutes before Mr Barr videoed the scene.

One has to wonder *why* the merchandise stall is depicted as missing or destroyed in the Operation Manteline cartoon.



Please take a look for yourself. In the image above—recorded by Mr Barr—we can see an objective fact: The merchandise stall was *not* struck by any shrapnel or blast from a bomb. All its cardboard and paper presentation boards and bags and T-shirts lie undisturbed, neatly folded and lined up on their little pin fixings, still attached to pristine presentation stands on the feeble merchandise stall.

This frame is proof that, *after* the bang, the merchandise stall was as intact as it was *prior* to the bang. The merchandise stall was within the ten-metre blast radius, where destruction from the reported bomb should have been most devastating. No shrapnel bomb capable of killing 22 people and seriously injuring at least another thirty-eight could have gone off anywhere near this merchandise stall.

It is curious why City Room eyewitness David Lambert said of the scene:^[16]

As we were going out, we looked to our left, and we saw half a body, or a torso or something. [. . .] We walked past where the merchandise

stand had been earlier on [. . .] and as we walked out there was police and ambulances.

In an interview recorded by the BBC, Mr Lambert spoke about how he and his son were among the last to leave the main Arena and head toward the exits. He gave account of people leaving the main Arena, going on to the concourse and seeing “body parts everywhere.” If that were true, as all bomb damage was confined to the City Room, then it meant that people lost body parts in the stampede. But there is no CCTV evidence of any body parts on the concourse.

According to Mr Lambert, he entered the City Room from the concourse shortly after the “bomb” had exploded. At that time the merchandise stall was still in situ and completely undamaged. Thus, regardless of what Mr Lambert thinks he saw, the observable physical evidence thoroughly disproves his account.

It is notable that Mr Lambert also said he saw “a torso or something.” The location of these remains would later become a highly contentious issue. We’ll discuss it in a moment.

Similarly, Josie Howarth—sixty-one years old at the time—was said to have suffered multiple shrapnel injuries and reportedly spent five weeks in hospital following the attack. She recounted:

We’d been sat waiting for the concert to end on some steps near the entrance. When the music stopped we stood up and went towards the foyer. Then the next thing I know, there was an explosion and the merchandise stand blew to pieces.

Evidently, like David Lambert’s, her account cannot possibly be true either.

(3) In the Barr footage, we see no notable volume of shrapnel debris visible anywhere. Had a shrapnel bomb gone off, a considerable proportion of Abedi’s 29.26kg of metal nuts and 1.47kg of screws and cross dowels would have been evident. Nothing of the sort is observable in Mr Barr’s video.

What looks like scraps of black cloth can be seen in the Barr footage, possibly from a shredded rucksack. This material is as consistent with a large pyrotechnic device exploding in said rucksack as it is with a shrapnel bomb exploding in the same black rucksack.

While we cannot see the whole of the City Room, the view in both the Parker photo and the Barr footage is directed toward the epicentre of the

“blast.” The entirety of the ten-metre blast radius is observable. We should see within that radius the most significant proportion of the damage caused by the alleged bomb. But we don’t see any.

(4) In the BBC “Manchester: The Night of the Bang” documentary, a witness named Darren Buckley spoke of seeing Abedi’s lower body in the City Room:

We seen the bomber he were just erm literally ripped in two cos I remember seeing his guts on the floor and stuff, do you know what I mean, but there was no top part of a body.

The grisly details Buckley described are what we would expect to see in the Parker photo and the Barr footage. But no gruesome carnage fitting his description can be seen in either.

Granted, the BBC footage, while blurred, looks a bit like a bomb scene, in that there is certainly some visible debris. However, the same debris is not present in the Barr footage. This additional debris suggests that the BBC footage was shot shortly *after* the Barr footage.

(5) There are large undisturbed posters hanging on the walls shown in the Barr footage. Whether they are made of thin plastic or perhaps even paper, they are frail. Yet none of them have been damaged or even disturbed—not a single mark or an inch of movement is evident.

(6) Since there is no observable physical evidence of any structural damage—to the lighting or to the lightweight merchandise stall or to the thin posters or to the floor or to anything else—in either the Parker photo or the Barr footage, how is it possible that Mr Gallagher told the Saunders Inquiry that he recollected having seen apparent shrapnel damage on a box office window?


Mr Gallagher was asked, “[T]o your eye, it bore the resemblance of gunshots?” To which he replied, “[From] experience in other crime scenes that I’ve attended over my career, it looked like gunshots had hit that window because of the fragmentation and the view of it.” This is an interesting observation, considering we know from all the observable physical evidence that there could *not* have been a TATP shrapnel bomb detonated by Salman Abedi.

(7) In the Barr footage, taken less than five minutes after the bang, the white double doors with the blue kick plate that lead to the hospitality suite can clearly be seen. They had sustained no damage and looked as pristine

as the merchandise stall, the lights, the floor, the walls, and the posters—all captured by Mr Barr's video camera.

Yet, as you can see in the image below, by the time we got to the Saunders Inquiry, the same doors to the hospitality suite were, according to Operation Manteline investigators, somehow peppered with holes allegedly caused by shrapnel. How is this possible?

This proves that evidence of a shrapnel bombing was fabricated. No more than five minutes after the alleged “blast” there was no primary evidence of any damage sustained to the hospitality suite doors. That “damage” was manufactured at a later stage and then presented to the official inquiry as if it were caused by a TATP shrapnel bomb.



(8) Similarly, physical evidence of shrapnel-damaged walls was entered into evidence at the Saunders Inquiry. Yet none of that damage—to the same walls—can be seen in either the Parker photo or the Barr footage. Again, this constitutes observable physical proof of the fabrication of evidence.

Taking these eight points into consideration, we don't know how or when all of the apparent structural damage occurred. But one thing we can say with certainty is that none of it was present within the first five minutes *after* the bang.

Thus, we can confidently deduce that the so-called observable physical evidence that supposedly proves the biased pluralist state's official account of the Manchester Arena bombing is fake.

We can further deduce that someone (or several someones) had the task of creating the false impression that a shrapnel bomb had exploded inside the City Room. We can say, too, based on what the *real* observable physical evidence reveals, the pretend damage was manufactured sometime *after* the bang.

In sum, what the Operation Manteline evidence actually shows is that the Manchester Arena bombing was fabricated—proof of a hoaxed false flag that was planned, executed, and covered up by the elements within the state.

Many witnesses reported smoke and a bad smell in the arena near the City Room. Jordan Kenney was among those who noted, “[T]here was smoke from a bomb, a bomb creates smoke and mess.” Certainly, if you want to convince people that a bomb has exploded, then you need to provide the smoke they would expect to see. Never mind that the TATP explosive allegedly used at the scene doesn’t create any smoke! But that’s not the point. Smoke was probably considered necessary to complete the illusion.

Hall later identified where that smoke was apparently coming from. And another excellent independent researcher, the pseudonymous Pighooey, conducted some further analysis^[18] of said “smoke.”

Both Hall and Pighooey noted, using solely the official CCTV record presented at the inquiry, the “smoke” was evidently not emanating from the so-called blast site. Something on the opposite side of the City Room, near the mezzanine stairs—unerringly redacted from every relevant CCTV frame shown at the inquiry—appears to be the single source of the “smoke.”

Whether it was smoke or not, something was continually emitting fumes of what looked to be smoke for more than two hours. Needless to say, the source of this fake “smoke” (from a fake “bomb”) is not mentioned anywhere in the official account.

It is plausible, even likely, that a smoke machine or similar device was placed in the City Room to artificially create the impression of smoke from a bomb. Once more, the observable physical evidence is more consistent with a hoax than a real bomb.

One of the reported victims of the hoax, Ruth Murrell, said she experienced the “horrible smell of fireworks.” This was reminiscent of Mr Kenney’s observation of a “bad smell.” For the record, TATP smells nothing like fireworks. It has a fruity, acetone like smell. Pyrotechnic devices, on the other hand, often *do* smell like fireworks.

That said, it is entirely possible that the same machine emitting some vapour that looked like smoke was also emitted a nasty smell.

The physical evidence that Operation Manteline investigators provided of a bombing inside the City Room must have been fabricated *after* the “bomb” had supposedly exploded. Therefore, there is no observable physical evidence of any TATP explosion. Explosive samples taken later and subsequently analysed, along with alleged discoveries of bomb-making equipment in the following days, are all utterly irrelevant, not to mention suspicious. These discoveries and forensic analysis reports *do not* confirm that a TATP shrapnel bomb exploded inside the City Room.

Even so, plenty of alleged secondary evidence was discussed at the inquiry. It supposedly revealed that Salman Abedi had participated in the manufacture of the said TATP shrapnel bomb. But this secondary evidence did not comport with any of the observable primary evidence at the scene. Instead, the primary evidence shows a large pyrotechnic device was used.

Expert witness testimony was provided by Ms Lorna Philp, the principal case officer at the UK forensic explosive laboratory. She said that Abedi’s alleged suicide bomb caused “a large explosion.” Ms Philp, who also testified in the Hashem Abedi trial, said in no uncertain terms:^[19]

TATP [. . .] was the explosive used at the Manchester Arena.

Ultimately, Ms Philp’s testimony was immaterial. Not only was the bombing fabricated but the primary observable physical evidence demonstrates that the explosive used was not TATP. Verified dash cam footage taken from a vehicle parked nearby shows the bright flash^[20] of a device exploding. Bright flashes are wholly inconsistent with a TATP explosion.

TATP is an entropic explosive^[21] that emits no heat, light, or smoke when it explodes. Nearly all its energy is converted into a loud shock wave. This is confirmed by Ehud Keinan,^[22] professor of chemistry at Haifa Technion, Israel:

Although TATP does burn when it is set alight, releasing large volumes of [colourless] carbon dioxide and water, it appears that very little heat is created when it explosively decomposes.

Not only do we have primary observable physical evidence of the bright flash, we also have numerous witness accounts describing blinding light, intense heat, fireballs, smoke, and many other aspects of an explosion—all of which rule out the possibility that TATP was used.

Here are just a few of the witness testimonies, some of which were provided at the Saunders Inquiry:^[23]

And then, a massive flash of light. And I mean, it was like, you know sheet lightening? It was like that. Filled the whole room. [. . .]

And the heat, was just unbelievable. [. . .]

I just remember feeling really hot. All of a sudden, I was like really, really hot and I felt loads of heat. [. . .]

This warm gush of air hit me and I remember that it just felt really warm. [. . .]

I could only see orange in my field of sight. It felt like a flash. [. . .]

A crack bang, and a flash, and of course the impact and the energy, gave you knock. And smoke, like a pinky smoke. [. . .]

I would describe it, if you seen the film Backdraught, it was a big white flash. [. . .]

The first thing I remember was a bright flash, really bright. [. . .]

A bang, the loudest I have ever heard and a flash. [. . .]

The brightest flash I have ever seen in my life. [. . .]

An orange flash, like a firework gives off, a bit like a firework kind of colour. [. . .]

A wash of orange light, surrounding the room. [. . .]

Flames, rolled. [. . .]

Thick black smoke. [. . .]

My initial thought was that it was a thunderflash, which is a pyrotechnic device used in the army to simulate explosions.

All these descriptions of the explosion are consistent with the observable physical evidence seen in the dash cam video. They all largely corroborate each other. They all describe what you might expect to see and feel if a large “pyrotechnic device” was set off.

None of these corroborated witness accounts are consistent with the use of TATP. As the shrapnel damage was fabricated, it is a practical certainty that the TATP samples were fabricated too. There is no physical evidence of a

TATP shrapnel bomb exploding inside the City Room at 22:31:00 on 22nd May 2017. Even the official timestamp for the bang is contradicted by the observable physical evidence.

In short, the idea—promoted in official written accounts and inquiry reports and legacy media stories and by the claims of witnesses—that a massive TATP shrapnel bomb exploded inside the City Room—is not only unsupported by any primary evidence but all the primary evidence refutes it.

It is possible that the compartmentalized, hierarchical nature of this state conspiracy prevented the majority of Operation Manteline investigators from knowing they were participating in a hoax. After all, there were an estimated 1,000 police officers, National Crime Agency officers, and other staff working on Manteline. A small number of people must have been involved in the conspiracy—must have planted the fabricated evidence within the first hour or so after the bang. But we have no idea exactly *when* that was done—or by whom.

We can surmise that since the shrapnel damage was fabricated, every other piece of evidence reportedly “found” in the City Room that night was probably planted at the same time. We may even be talking about planted human remains, for all we know.

Think about it: After the “victims” were removed from the scene, the investigators who entered the City Room could have encountered what looked to them like bomb damage, even if it was surprisingly minimal damage. Similarly, the investigators who “discovered” the flats where the bomb was allegedly manufactured and who “found” the Nissan Micra could only *assume* that the evidence they “found” was related to terrorist activity.

The bomb factory evidence was probably planted by another agency of the state. Another possibility is that the terrorists themselves were state assets and were party to the fabrication of evidence. Certainly, Abedi knew he wasn’t going to be detonating a TATP shrapnel bomb at the Arena. He and his fellow terrorists could have agreed to create a mock bomb factory for investigators to find.

For all these reasons we can safely reject the Operation Manteline evidence. As secondary evidence, it was wrong. It contradicted the most important evidence—the primary evidence, the crime scene evidence. The subsequent “crime scene” evidence discussed at the inquiry was obviously fabricated. Thus, the entire Operation Manteline investigation was

fundamentally flawed from the outset. But that fact in no way suggests the majority of investigators involved were “in on” the hoaxed false flag conspiracy.

In the course of his investigation, Hall received a “leaked” audio recording of police communications.^[24] This primary audio evidence covers from approximately 22:44 on 22nd May to around 00:02 on 23rd May. We’ll call this leaked audio the “police chatter” recording.

At approximately 23:06—22 minutes into the police chatter—Inspector Mike Smith, who arrived in the City Room at 22:47, said:

I think we may well have found our er, our, er bomber. [. . .] He’s very dead, completely er, complete explosion on his body. There’s plenty of bolts and nuts and things around where he was. So, he’s actually outside Block 106 in the Arena foyer. [. . .] I’ll seal the doors that are open, that’s probably where the explosion has gone in to there.

How does the police chatter compare with other evidence? If we look at the CCTV camera stills provided at the inquiry, we can see that each image was accompanied by text that was written by investigators. The CCTV image captured at 22:49 in the concourse, close to the City Room doors, is accompanied by the following text:

A large number of people have gathered at one of the entrances/exits from the Arena concourse into the City Room. This is the location GMP Insp Michael Smith was seen walking towards a few moments ago.

The “large number of people” the text refers to were stood at the precise location where Insp Smith claims he found Abedi’s disembodied torso. The CCTV image describes Smith approaching that location at least seventeen minutes before he reported finding Abedi’s alleged remains.

Here is where the apparent confusion about Abedi’s body placement begins. We heard Insp Smith state in the leaked audio that the torso was in the Arena foyer, i.e., *inside* the City Room. But in that *same* audio he said the body was outside Block 106. His second statement places the body in the concourse, suggesting it was blasted through the doors between the City Room and the concourse.

It is possible that Smith was incorrectly referring to the concourse as “the Arena foyer.” The other possibility is that he was suggesting that Abedi’s upper body was lying in an open doorway, still inside the City Room (foyer)

but opposite Block 106. Either way, Insp Smith's account is not supported by the observable physical evidence.



The image above is of the City Room doors that were referenced by Insp Smith in the leaked audio. It was captured on CCTV from the concourse at 22:42—approximately eleven minutes after the bang and around twenty-four minutes before Insp Smith reported finding Abedi's mangled torso. The area where the remains were said to have been found is highlighted with the oval white line.

As you can see, there is no sign of Abedi's upper body at that spot. Let's compare it to a second image—taken of the opposite side of the same doors—captured by the [BBC footage](#)^[25] below. This BBC image was taken inside the City Room shortly after the bang. Granted, the video still image quality is poor but, again, there is no sign of Abedi's torso.



Other witnesses, such as Darron Coster, a former military policeman with 22 years of service behind him, claimed to have seen Abedi's torso lying in or near the same doorway. A few months before Mr Coster lost his life in a motorcycle accident, he told the Saunders Inquiry:

I tried to close the doors because I could see the suicide bomber's body. I didn't want anyone seeing that. [. . .] His torso was through the doors and he had no legs. I couldn't see a rucksack.

Imagine the gore and blood splatter caused by a disembodied human torso being hurled through the air, being spun through a doorway, and landing in a gruesome, bloody heap of flesh. And as you picture it, remember the witness testimony of Darren Buckley, who said that when Abedi was ripped apart, his innards flew out.

One would think, based on the statement of Insp Smith, the CCTV footage, the BBC footage, and Darren Buckley's remark, that blood splatter would be observable where the torso was reportedly found. Yet there is not a drop of blood to be seen in that spot. The doors are clean, sans splatter or smears.

Moreover, if a mangled human head and torso were lying outside Block 106 or, more precisely perhaps, in the open doorway opposite Block 106, the people queuing for the bar at Block 108 and the people wandering along the concourse outside Block 106 (as seen in the [Bickerstaff video](#)^[26]) would have noticed.

The passersby would have reacted visibly and volubly to the presence of a bloody torso. If the original intention was to maintain both the alleged discovery location of Abedi's torso and the story of Mr Bickerstaff filming himself *after* the bang, a mutually exclusive contradiction would have been inserted in the official account.

This may perhaps explain why Mr Bickerstaff's video has been all but ignored by the biased pluralist state. It should be key evidence. Mr Bickerstaff is a crucial eyewitness. Yet, as with the evidence provided by the Barr photos, no state official or investigator has ever shown any notable interest either in Mr Bickerstaff's testimony or in the observable physical evidence he captured on video.

As we discussed in Chapter 11, a number of legacy media outlets, perhaps most notably The New York Times, also reported Abedi's body being blown through the doors. It seems feasible the police chatter was also "leaked" to them.

According to the official account, some of the white doors with the blue kick plates were already open. Concert-goers—Mr Hibbert for example—were said to have passed through the doors either immediately before or at the time of the explosion. However, there are credible witness testimonies contradicting the official account and saying that people were stopped from going through those doors *before* the bang. It seems these eyewitness accounts were deliberately ignored in the Kerslake Report.

Nevertheless, according to Insp Smith and others, Abedi's torso was found either in or near an open doorway. Later, the reported location for the discovery of Abedi's torso seemed to shift around quite a lot, but let's stick with Smith's earliest account for a moment.

The UK biased pluralist state was acutely sensitive on the subject of the stated location of the torso. After The New York Times article reported Insp Smith's claims^[27] and wrote that Abedi's "upper torso was heaved outside," that article—along with the release of other evidence reportedly "found" at the scene—caused a diplomatic spat. The UK legacy media said there was "fury in Whitehall" over the revelation from the US-based newspaper—a revelation that was picked up and churned by some UK outlets.

The kerfuffle caused the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing organisation to issue a statement:^[28]

We greatly value the important relationships we have with our trusted intelligence, law enforcement and security partners around the world. [. . .] When that trust is breached it undermines these relationships, and undermines our investigations and the confidence of victims, witnesses and their families.

UK Home Secretary Amber Rudd was reportedly furious. Prime Minister Theresa May, too, expressed her anger.

It appeared the "leak" could only have come from UK investigators at the scene—unless US intelligence agencies were involved and were the source of the "leak." The statement issued by the UK National Counter Terrorism Policing organisation seems to suggest that possibility. Why else would the "leak" have been considered a breach of trust between UK and US intelligence agencies?

President Trump felt the need to apologise for the breach. He attacked the reports of the evidence of a "leak," calling them a "grave threat to national security" and adding:^[29]

Innocent little girls and so many others were horribly murdered and badly injured whilst attending a concert. [. . .] It was a barbaric and vicious attack upon our civilisation. [. . .] All people who cherish life must unite in finding, exposing and removing these killers and extremists.

Like Rudd, May, and UK media, Trump's responses didn't confront the actual evidence. Instead, he deployed the propaganda technique of appeal to emotion. He even alluded to Samuel P. Huntington's^[30] "clash of civilisations" theory. The message came through loud and clear: everyone "must unite," wholeheartedly embrace the narrative, identify the "enemy" and never question the "barbaric and vicious attack" story.

All the leaked evidence that was supposedly so upsetting to the UK state was later presented by Operation Manteline during the official inquiry. Even the possibility of a remote detonator was discussed. The only aspect of The New York Times' initial report that was completely excluded—and later obfuscated—from the official inquiry was Insp Smith's report on the location of Abedi's torso.

Despite being the first police officer to purportedly find and precisely locate Abedi's upper body remains, Insp Smith's account wasn't mentioned even once during the inquiry. Instead, details of the body's alleged placement came from Mr Gallagher.^[31] And that was only a question, not a statement. Mr Gallagher was asked to confirm the Abedi's lower body was found "near to the seat of the explosion" and his torso and head "close to the arena box office."

The leak may well have been issued by the state in the early stages in the hope of strengthening the official account. If so, it appears, at least in retrospect, to have been a genuine "mistake." In truth, the notion that Abedi's body was blown outside of the City Room or landed in an open doorway was extremely inconvenient for the state's narrative.

If Abedi's torso lay where Insp Smith said he found it, as the crowd fled the Arena, many hundreds of people would also have seen it. There would have been, at a minimum, tens, possibly hundreds, of eyewitnesses instead of the tiny handful who claimed to have witnessed it.

Smith's body placement story could not be maintained as a credible component of the official account. Hence, the significant muddying of the waters on the issue. The reported diplomatic debacle looks like hasty backtracking and a cover story.

Following an unusual coronial inquest process—we'll cover this in Chapter 16—the Saunders Inquiry concluded.^[32]

The deceased [Salman Abedi] died at 22:31 on 22/05/2017 in the City Room of the Manchester Arena in the Victoria Exchange Complex in Manchester. The deceased died near to the entrance doors to the Manchester Arena.

A final thought on the torso. It is highly likely the alleged initial discovery of Abedi's body by Insp Smith was another element of the fabricated story. There is no reason to rule out the possibility that a human torso was later planted at the scene for investigators to find. But evidently those remains were not where Insp Smith said they were when he made his report.

This obviously raises questions about whether Salman Abedi intended to commit suicide. Once we realise that the evidence provided by the Operation Manteline investigation is wholly untrustworthy and cannot be considered remotely reliable, there is no remaining evidence to suggest Abedi tried to kill himself—or that he succeeded!

There is considerable evidence, on the other hand, suggesting that the City Room was a tightly controlled space for at least an hour following the bang. It appeared that the emergency response to the so-called disaster scene was extremely limited. Even the legacy media described the minimal response as “bizarre.”

Hall diligently pieced together Abedi's movements and found highly suspicious anomalies and contradictions in the evidence offered by the state. These anomalies and contradictions point to the near certainty that Abedi did not kill himself but instead fled the scene.

As ever, the only way to know what happened is to examine the evidence.

Chapter 13: Sources

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- [29] - <https://archive.ph/IJ4lk>
- [30] - <https://archive.ph/ZNKeT>
- [31] - <https://web.archive.org/web/20240326220034/https://files.manchesterarenainquiry.org.uk/live/uploads/2020/12/07182655/MAI-Day-44.pdf>
- [32] - <https://archive.ph/OYPnQ>

Chapter 14: The Movements of Abedi

From the CCTV footage and stills provided at the Saunders Inquiry and from his own investigation, Richard D. Hall provided an accurate account of Salman Abedi's officially acknowledged movements.^[1]

Abedi was seen arriving at the Arena on the Manchester tram service (Metrolink) at 18:31. He was not carrying a large black rucksack and, according to the official investigation, was not seen to enter the City Room. He left the Arena by taxi six minutes later—at 18:37.

Some ninety minutes after that, at 20:06, Abedi was seen getting in a taxi, wearing the rucksack. The taxi took him to the junction of Thomas Street and Shudehill in Manchester City Centre, about 500 yards (450 metres) from Victoria Station. He then caught the Metro at Shudehill and arrived back at the Arena at 20:36, this time wearing the rucksack.

Abedi entered the City Room for the first time at approximately 20:51. At 21:10 Abedi was seen leaving the Arena, rucksack on his back, and returning to Victoria Station, where he was captured on CCTV at 21:13.

Abedi took the lift from the station at 21:31. He crossed the walkway and re-entered the City Room at 21:33. He supposedly concealed himself on the City Room mezzanine. The mezzanine is a raised waiting area accessed by a flight of steps from the City Room. The stairs leading up to the mezzanine are adjacent to the Trinity Way tunnel entrance into the City Room.

Reportedly, Abedi waited on the mezzanine for approximately 57 minutes before re-entering the City Room, walking toward the centre of the room (also called the foyer), and detonating his alleged suicide bomb at 22:31:00 precisely.

Many obvious questions immediately come to mind. If Abedi's intention was to blow himself up at 22:31, why arrive with the "bomb" more than an hour and half earlier than necessary? Why loiter in full view of CCTV in Victoria Station for nearly twenty minutes, thereby increasing risk of detection? Why spend nearly an hour hanging around on the mezzanine, at times in full view of Arena security?

The inquiry panel presented a number of theories to potentially explain Abedi's movements in and around the Arena. These theories included: he

thought he had been spotted by someone; he feared he might be spotted if he remained in the City Room and thus went to the Victoria platform; he had second thoughts and so stood on the platform trying to gather himself; he hid on the mezzanine, out of view of CCTV, waiting for the planned moment to attack.

None of the theories presented at the inquiry explained, or indeed even asked, why Abedi arrived so early. Another possibility—one not discussed at the inquiry—is that Abedi wanted to give himself plenty of time to collect and position a car to be used as a getaway vehicle. We will cover this angle later in the chapter.

Besides being heavily redacted, the City Room CCTV coverage shown at the inquiry was not comprehensive. Though left unsaid at the inquiry, there are noticeable blind spots. If we look at the image below, the shaded area shows where there is no CCTV coverage.



The point marked “P” is directly beneath the camera that looks toward the box office. “P” is the place where the evidence suggests Abedi probably left a pyrotechnic device before fleeing the Arena. The point marked “B” is the officially stated approximate location of the “bomb” or, more accurately, of the bang.

While there was no CCTV moving video showing Abedi’s movements in the last few seconds before the bang, extracted CCTV still images taken two seconds apart were made available. In them, he was seen heading across the City Room toward point P, *not* toward point B.^[2]

The police took written statements from many eyewitnesses in the early days of the investigation. It is not entirely clear how reliable many of these written witness statements were. They may not have all been faithful

records of eyewitness accounts. For example, at the Saunders Inquiry one of the witnesses complained:^[3]

This is what, sort of, obviously, got me really frustrated with the police. Because they continually changed my statement and I refused to sign them. Because they weren't saying what I'd said.

But, assuming that not *all* of these written statements—taken soon after the bang—were “changed” by the police, they at least offered fresh accounts of the event.

One of these witnesses, Suzanne Atkins, said she had noticed Abedi shortly *before* the bang. Reading her account aloud at the inquiry, Mr Cooper QC, a barrister representing the bereaved families, recounted what Suzanne Atkins had reportedly seen of Abedi's movements. Mr Cooper said Ms Atkins' observations were made “very shortly before we know the detonation took place.”

Ms Atkins told investigators that Abedi had “walked off toward the left of the exit doors, in the corner, past the merchandise area.” She reportedly saw him head toward point P—not point B.

During his own investigation, Hall interviewed someone who claimed to have been in the City Room in the immediate aftermath of the bang. Hall was sceptical of this man's account because, unusually, the source had approached him rather than being sought out by Hall. Nevertheless, when Hall showed him the Parker photo, this potential witness said:

[I]t's not a suicide bomber because there was a massive scorch mark up the wall, and there's nothing there. There was no torso, no legs, no anything. No blood up the wall, there was just a massive scorch mark up the wall.

Sure enough, a sizeable scorch mark is observable in the Barr footage.^[4] It is located above point P on the corner of the wall that faces the main doors to the concourse. That is to say, the scorch mark is “in the corner, past the merchandise stall,” which is exactly where Ms Atkins said she saw Abedi heading.

Therefore, from the inquiry, we have primary CCTV evidence of Abedi heading toward point P. We also have eyewitness testimony, corroborated by the primary evidence, of Abedi heading toward point P and not point B.

From the Barr footage—not examined at the inquiry—we have observable physical evidence (primary evidence) of a scorch mark on the wall above

point P—see image below. This primary and secondary evidence is congruent and suggests the placement of a pyrotechnic device at point P.



As discussed in the previous chapter, a considerable amount of witness testimony—some heard at the inquiry—and dash cam footage of a bright flash (taken from a nearby parked car) further demonstrate the use of a pyrotechnic “bang” rather than a TATP “bomb.”

A mixture of redacted and unredacted CCTV images were presented at the inquiry, showing the movements of people in the City Room and in the concourse up to the last second *before* the bang. In Chapter 16, we’ll discuss some of the inexplicable redactions of CCTV captured during this time frame.

The most relevant CCTV images of the scene inside the City Room, taken *after* the bang, were all redacted with black rectangles. No observable physical evidence showing the immediate aftermath of the bang was presented at the Saunders Inquiry.

A “point of blast” image said to show the moment Abedi blew himself up is apparently available. You would think, therefore, that even if this “point of blast” CCTV image were not shown, it would have at least been discussed in some depth at the inquiry. After all, it would confirm the precise location, inside the City Room, where Abedi supposedly triggered his “bomb.” Yet it was barely mentioned.

We know this image is said to exist, thanks to a legacy media interview conducted with one of the most senior police officers at the scene. British Transport Police (BTP) Chief Inspector (Ch Insp) Andrea Graham spoke to the BBC for the documentary “Manchester: The Night of the Bomb.” Ch

Insp Graham's account is important, because she is one of a tiny handful of members of the epistemic authorities who have reportedly seen the CCTV image of Abedi detonating his device.

The BBC reported that Ch Insp Graham left her "home" and drove straight to the Arena, arriving at the Arena around 23:00.^[5] Ch Insp Graham told the BBC about her immediate priorities upon her arrival:

What evidence can we have a look at now to make sure that we were safe? So that was about CCTV retrieval very, very quickly.

The BBC handed Ch Insp Graham an image, which she discussed with the BBC journalists:

So, yes, we can see that is the point of blast. That person . . . and we can track that person back to make sure we knew what we were dealing with.

The BBC next asked Ch Insp Graham if the police managed to identify who the likely suicide bomber was at that point. She replied:

Yes. [. . .] Purely by the description of what we can see on the CCTV, the person before the blast and the person after the blast.

The Ch Insp Graham interview is a highly dramatised segment of what is generally an emotionally charged BBC documentary. Tense music and mood-enhancing lighting combine to thrilling effect as Ch Insp Graham recounts events.^[6]

The story told by the BBC is one of quick-time thinking in a difficult situation. The police acted swiftly to secure the CCTV footage. Rapid analysis was conducted and the point of blast was identified. This enabled BTP officers to track back the movements of the bomber, enabling a physical description of the terrorist to be made, thus greatly assisting in the fast identification of Salman Abedi.

If evidence, rather than drama, remains our focus, the most important part of the BBC's interview with Ch Insp Graham was her clear recollection of seeing the "point of blast" image. This was perhaps the single most vital piece of evidence in the whole investigation. It was, supposedly, observable physical evidence showing Salman Abedi in the act committing mass murder.

However, by the time of the Saunders inquiry, where Ch Insp Graham gave testimony under oath, the BBC's story about the fast-paced forensic

analysis of the “point of blast” image was unrecognisable. Far from being an exciting tale of police prowess unearthing crucial evidence under extreme pressure, it had become a garbled and seemingly inconsequential episode. The “point of blast” CCTV image was barely worthy of any exploration.

It turns out that Ch Insp Graham did not rush directly from her home to the scene of the crime, as the BBC claimed. She actually left her office at 23:42 to head to the Arena. This placed her arrival at the Arena closer to 23:45, not 23:00. She was first seen on CCTV on the Victoria Station concourse at 23:56. That was nearly an hour and a half after the bang.

At 00:59 on 23rd May, a man described at the inquiry as an “unknown white male” is seen on CCTV discussing the presumable “point of blast” image with Ch Insp Graham. The man’s identity was not disclosed at the inquiry.

Having been shown the crucial evidence by the anonymous man, Ch Insp Graham immediately went to talk with BTP Ch Insp Mark Dexter. She is captured on CCTV in discussion with Ch Insp Dexter at 01:00.

Ch Insp Graham was asked by the inquiry panel what she remembered about her conversation with Ch Insp Dexter. She told the panel:

From the evidence that has been presented to me, it’s in relation to CCTV and him asking me to have somebody assist with the viewing of the CCTV for his officers. [. . .] I remember going to try to find him [. . .] and I don’t remember the content of the conversation we had. Until obviously the evidence has been taken from his body-worn [Dexter’s body-worn camera] or his Dictaphone.

When Ch Insp Graham spoke about “the evidence that has been presented to me,” she was presumably referring to the “point of blast” image. The further evidence she spoke about was footage captured by Ch Insp Dexter’s body-worn camera.

At the inquiry, Ch Insp Graham’s recollection of seeing perhaps the most important individual piece of evidence in the whole investigation was rather ambiguous. She could not remember if she mentioned that evidence to Ch Insp Dexter. Instead, she could only recall the evidence from her colleague Dexter’s camera footage—and then, only *after* it was shown to her sometime later.

The enthralling account of the discovery of the “point of blast” image, as reported by the BBC, had vanished completely. Instead of exploring the

provenance and chain of custody for this critical piece of evidence, the inquiry panel deemed Ch Insp Graham's fuzzy recollections satisfactory. The "point of blast" image was all but forgotten and the inquiry moved on to other matters.

It is not unreasonable to ask what the "point of blast" image—if it exists—actually shows. Does it show a TATP bomb exploding at point B? Or does it show a pyrotechnic device going off at point P? Or does it show something else? It seems that only those of us who question the state's account are sufficiently interested to want to find out the answer.

We do not know why this question wasn't given greater prominence either in the Operation Manteline investigation or by the inquiry panellists. All we know is that there is no evidence of a bombing at the time when—and in the location where—it is said to have occurred.

The Force Duty Officer (FDO) who had overall command of the emergency response to the Manchester Arena Bombing was FDO Ch Insp Dale Sexton. Sexton was coordinating the response from GMP control room, which was said to be "some distance from GMP Headquarters." GMP HQ is also the HQ of the counter-terrorism police and is located 2.7 miles by road from Manchester Arena.

Inside the City Room of the Arena, two Operational/Bronze Commanders, Insp Mike Smith and Operational Firearms Commander (OFC) Edward Richardson, were in charge. Smith had overall command and Richardson was leading the armed response.

During the inquiry, a Dictaphone recording^[7] of Greater Manchester Police (GMP) communications with FDO Ch Insp Sexton was entered into the evidence. The recording makes it clear that the situation at the Arena on 22nd May 2017 was "confused."

Some important information revealing what happened that night is evident from the Dictaphone recording. In part, it corroborated evidence reported by investigative journalist Richard D. Hall of witness accounts of Abedi fleeing the Arena. This subject was not broached at the inquiry.

Discussion at the inquiry of Sexton's Dictaphone recording also exposed evidence which, while at least briefly mentioned, was hastily skirted over. It revealed the police's preoccupation with a suspicious vehicle which was dealt with only fleetingly at the inquiry.

Heard in the Dictaphone recording at 22:47, Greater Manchester Police (GMP) Control Room operator Christopher Charlton said:

Just had er confirmation from a member of the public saying that an individual has detonated a device er attached to his back and blown himself up inside the venue.

This report contributed toward establishing the idea of the lone suicide bomber. It also indicated that the “bomb” was worn by the bomber. From this early point onward, therefore, the police investigation was focused upon a single suicide bomber wearing a bomb concealed in a rucksack.

As it had already been decided that the terrorist was a suicide bomber who died in the blast, any contradictory information that was received about a man seen fleeing the scene or a man seen after the bang was thought to indicate that the bomber possibly had accomplices.

For instance, the Dictaphone recording revealed that at 23:16 Ch Insp Sexton was informed:

I've got an Asian male wearing glasses, with a black baseball cap and a large black rucksack, that's all we've got.

Sexton sought to confirm if this was a description of the deceased bomber or of another suspect still at large. To clarify the situation for Sexton, at 23:17, Operational Firearms Commander (OFC) Edward Richardson relayed a report from an “Area Sergeant” that a “second male” apparently “left the scene” following the bang:

OFC Richardson told Ch Insp Sexton:

He [the Area Sergeant] has basically stated that the second male who was in company with our er bomber shall we say and we believe he left the scene when the male blew himself up.

By this time, Insp Mike Smith had already reported finding Abedi’s body inside the City Room. The body was later identified from Abedi’s fingerprints.

The police radio chatter^[8] leaked to Hall—discussed in the previous chapter—indicates the origin of the eyewitness account relayed to Sexton by OFC Richardson of the “second male” who was reported by the “Area Sergeant.”

The eyewitness report in question was provided by British Transport Police (BTP) Sergeant 2202—meaning collar number 2202—at some point before

23:01. As heard in the police chatter, the report from BTP Sergeant 2202 was relayed by the GMP Control Room as follows:

BTP Sergeant 2202 has been approached by a male, and [he] said it was an Asian male, [who] put down a rucksack, and ran out of the area. Can I give you a description? It's [. . .] an Asian male, described as wearing glasses, black baseball cap, and it was a large, black rucksack, which he said was hidden by the wall.

This, then, is the witness statement referenced by OFC Richardson in his message to Ch Insp Sexton.

It is important to stress that the police chatter recording was not entered into evidence at the Saunders Inquiry. The *only* way we know that OFC Richardson was referring to the report from BTP Sergeant 2202 is because Hall pieced this together from Sexton's Dictaphone recording, which was submitted as evidence to the inquiry.

The witness account reported by BTP Sergeant 2202 is extremely telling. It supports all the primary observable physical evidence and secondary evidence. The primary evidence showing there was no TATP bomb can be seen in the Parker photo and the Barr footage. (These two crucial pieces of evidence, like the witness account report by BTP Sergeant 2202, were not examined at the Saunders Inquiry.) The other relevant primary evidence—Abedi's appearance—is a key component of the official account.



If we look at officially released images of Salman Abedi showing what he looked like that night—see above photos taken in the lift from the Victoria

Station platform—we realise that the witness gave almost an exact description of Abedi to BTP Sergeant 2202. The only difference was that Abedi was wearing a dark grey, not a black, baseball cap. The colour of the cap was dark enough to make that slight error entirely understandable.

We can be certain from the police chatter recording that this sighting was reported to BTP Sergeant 2202 prior to 23:01 on 22nd May 2017. At that time there were no publicly available official descriptions of Salman Abedi. Also, at that time none of the evidence, such as CCTV images, had yet been released.

We also know from the CCTV evidence that Salman Abedi was the only person matching the description given by the witness in the City Room that night. For one thing, he was the only person in the City Room carrying a “large black rucksack.”

Therefore, when the witness reported his account to BTP Sergeant 2202, there was no possible way that either the witness or this sergeant could have known what Salman Abedi looked like. Nor could either of them have known that someone matching Salman Abedi’s description would later be formally identified as the Manchester Arena suicide bomber. At that exact time in that exact location, the accuracy of the description precludes the witness from having seen anyone *other* than Salman Abedi.

When OFC Richardson confirmed the witness sighting to Ch Insp Sexton, he changed the details of the report from BTP Sergeant 2202. In the sergeant’s original report, he clearly stated that the witness told him that the Asian male had “put down a rucksack and ran out of the area.” But that is not what OFC Richardson reported to Ch Insp Sexton.

OFC Richardson said that the witness had seen a “second male who was in company with our er bomber.” Nothing in BTP Sergeant 2202’s report suggested that the Asian male was in anyone’s “company.” Richardson omitted the witness’ account of seeing the Asian male put a rucksack by a wall. Also, Richardson added that the Asian male had reportedly “left the scene when the male [suicide bomber] blew himself up.” That was not what BTP Sergeant 2202 reported.

It is possible that OFC Richardson changed the original witness account because he was working on the assumption that the suicide bomber was already dead. Nevertheless, the marked differences between the account reported by BTP Sergeant 2202 and the re-interpretation of that account by OFC Richardson—as he relayed it to Ch Insp Sexton—are conspicuous.

As only the Dictaphone recording, including OFC Richardson's version of the witness statement, was heard at the inquiry, the impression given was that the police were concerned about potential accomplices. Consequently, the fact that BTP Sergeant 2202 had reported a witness account of Salman Abedi placing his rucksack by a wall before fleeing the Arena was not acknowledged and was not examined at the inquiry.

Thanks to Hall's investigative journalism, we are aware of this highly credible witness sighting of Salman Abedi hiding his "large black rucksack"—almost certainly at point P—before running out of the Arena. His hiding of the rucksack would not have been captured on CCTV, because point P is in a CCTV blind spot.

There was another account from a different police officer, who also reported a separate eyewitness statement about the so-called "suicide bomber" discarding his bag before running out of the City Room. That police officer was BTP PC Dale Alcock—collar number 2032. Alcock told the BBC:

There was a gentleman, family man he was with his daughters. I asked him, I said what's happened. [. . .] He said he [the bomber] threw his bag and there was a large explosion and he ran off. I'm thinking right he's at large.

PC Alcock's account was broadcast by the BBC to the entire nation in "Manchester: The Night of the Bomb." The witness sighting he reported corroborates the similar sighting reported by BTP Sergeant 2202. Yet PC Alcock's report, like Sergeant 2202's report, wasn't examined at the Saunders Inquiry.

During the testimony of the explosive expert Ms Philp, the inquiry noted that some witnesses "indicated that they saw Salman Abedi with the rucksack off his back." This would have been while he was waiting on the mezzanine, because that is the only place and time, in the state's version of events, that Abedi was observed to have removed the pack from his back. The official account is that he walked across the City Room and blew himself up while wearing the rucksack bomb. Though the CCTV evidence actually shows him walking toward point P, rather than point B, the state's narrative maintains that he did not remove the rucksack while in the City Room.

After Ms Philp testified, the inquiry heard from a Sierra Control Room operator called Jade Duxbury. The Sierra Control room, located in the Arena, is the CCTV monitoring station for the whole Arena complex. Miss

Duxbury said she recalled seeing Abedi^[9] *before* the bang. She was asked, "Did you see that he was wearing a heavy backpack at the time? Is that something you can remember?" Miss Duxbury replied, "No, I can't remember, sorry [. . .] no."

If she saw Abedi, the fact that Miss Duxbury could not recall if he was wearing a large rucksack does not prove that Abedi wasn't wearing it when she saw him. But since it was such a conspicuous rucksack—very large and very black—this suggests that Miss Duxbury may have seen Abedi after he had taken it off, in the City Room, shortly *before* the bang.

Let's recap the evidence we have so far regarding the movements of Salman Abedi. Some of this was discussed at the Saunders Inquiry and some of it wasn't.

We have CCTV images showing Abedi moving toward point P in the final moments before the bang. This was entered into evidence at the inquiry.

We have at least one witness account from Ms Atkins attesting to the same. This was also heard at the inquiry.

We also have two reports from two different police officers of separate witness sightings of the bomber discarding the rucksack before running out of the City Room. Of these two eyewitness accounts, one clearly identified Salman Abedi. Neither was explored at the inquiry, though Ch Insp Sexton's Dictaphone recoding corroborates the sighting of Abedi reported by BTP Sergeant 2202.

We also have a report from a CCTV operator—Ms Duxbury—suggesting that Salman Abedi was not wearing the rucksack when she saw him in the City Room shortly before the bang. The inquiry noted this but did not highlight its possible significance because the inquiry did not cover any of the evidence suggesting Abedi fled the City Room.

We also have, as we discussed in the previous chapter, a large body of witness testimony^[10] describing some sort of pyrotechnic device. This was not recognised at the inquiry. All such accounts, heard at the inquiry, though utterly contradicting the state's version of events, were deemed supportive of the story about a TATP bomb.

We also have primary evidence—dash cam footage—that is consistent with a large pyrotechnic explosion.^[11] This was not mentioned at the inquiry.

Furthermore, we have primary observable physical evidence of a large scorch mark on the corner of the wall above point P. This is seen in the Barr footage, but the inquiry did not submit it into evidence.

The state insists that Abedi blew himself up while wearing the rucksack and standing at point B. Yet not only does the primary, secondary and witness evidence contradict this assertion, but the state has not presented any observable physical evidence to substantiate its story.

The clearest possible evidence that could prove the state's version of events would be the "point of blast" CCTV image reportedly seen by Ch Insp Graham and other "unknown" individuals. But rather than examine this evidence at the Saunders Inquiry, the purported "point of blast" image was practically ignored.

If we consider the weight of evidence, it consistently suggests that Salman Abedi placed a pyrotechnic device by the wall at point P and that it exploded as he fled the scene. If you were intending to hoax a terrorist bombing, you would hide your pyrotechnic "bang" device at point P, a CCTV blind spot.

Ch Insp Sexton's Dictaphone recording played at the inquiry also corroborated other evidence heard in the police chatter, though the police chatter was *not* played at the inquiry. Communications between police officers and their control room that night revealed that they spent a considerable amount of time and effort surveilling, pursuing, and then stopping a grey Audi A6 car—registration FV05OPO.

Armed response units eventually stopped the Audi A6 at gunpoint and apprehended the driver. The identity of the driver has never been disclosed.^[12]

In the Dictaphone recording relayed to Sexton at 00:00 on 23rd May 2017 by GMP officer Andrew Gore, Gore is heard telling Sexton that the suspicious Audi was being pursued. He tells Sexton, "Boss, this Audi has been sighted [. . .] it's being followed by Xray Delta."

The police kept the Audi A6 under constant observation. They said they were observing it from "Blackfriars Road" and "Delamere Road." At 00:01, Ch Insp Sexton is heard to ask why the Audi was considered suspicious. GMP Officer David Herrington replied, "Asian male with a rucksack."

At 00:02 a transmission from an unnamed officer informed Sexton, "Boss[,] it's [the Audi has] been dealt with now —junction of Blackfriars Trinity

Street[.] I'll come off the air." The Dictaphone recording confirmed that an "ARV" (Armed Response Vehicle) was "diverted to the Audi." Following the stop, it was stated that "firearms are with the vehicle."

The Dictaphone recording makes it clear that pursuing the Audi was one of a number of additional concerns for the police that night. As we'll see, the issue of the Audi was briefly acknowledged by the inquiry panel, but the panel never discussed the serious and significant "complication" that the post-bang Audi chase presented to the police.

Hall ascertained the movements and pursuit of the Audi A6 from police chatter. The eventual armed stop of the Audi was posted on social media by a witness at 23:59 on 22nd May 2017. It is important to note that the timings given in the Sexton's Dictaphone recording tell us when he was informed about events, not when they happened. Hence, in the Dictaphone recording, discussions about the Audi were ongoing after it had already been stopped.

The police chatter recording commenced at around 22:44 on the night of the Manchester attack. We can calculate the approximate timing of events from there.

At 23:02 approximately, the police stated:

[. . .] reading the log we've had a call from a member of the public saying a short while ago he saw an Asian male get out of a grey Audi, get a rucksack on his back and run off in the direction of the Arena.

This statement explains why, in Sexton's Dictaphone recording, GMP Officer Herrington said the Audi was under observation due to "Asian male with a rucksack."

From the police chatter it is evident the "Asian male with a rucksack" account was read "from the log" at 23:02. Without access to the police log, it is not possible for us to know either when the log entry was made or when the witness reported their account to the police. We can say with certainty, however, that the witness reported seeing the "Asian male with a rucksack" running from the Audi "a short while" before 23:02.

We might speculate that the witness reported seeing the Asian male run from the parked Audi toward the Arena as soon as he realised that what he had seen could be important. So, that was probably shortly after the bang.

Here again, we are confronted by a less detailed but highly pertinent witness sighting that is supported by the observable physical evidence.

Just like the witnesses who reported seeing the “bomber” flee the City Room, when the Audi witness gave his account to police of an Asian male taking a rucksack from the car and running toward the Arena, he could not have possibly known that an Asian male with a rucksack would later describe the alleged Manchester Arena bomber.

Clearly, having received the report of the Asian male running from the Audi toward the Arena, the police then placed the Audi under observation.

The Audi was parked on Cheetham Hill Road. This placed it about 250 metres away from the City Room if you ran to that room via the Trinity Way tunnel.

The police closed access to Cheetham Hill Road inbound traffic at 23:09. Suspecting a possible car bomb, they sought to create a “sterile area” around the Audi. This included locking down a large hotel on Cheetham Hill Road to prevent any guests from approaching the Audi.

As can be heard in the police chatter audio, the routine is that whenever police report a vehicle, number plate checks are performed. Shortly thereafter, the reporting officer usually receives details back about the keeper of the vehicle—for example, if they have any outstanding warrants, etc. Apparently, no such details were provided for the Audi.

At approximately 23:53, with the road closed and the Audi under police observation, the report came in, “I think it’s just being driven off at the moment.” This triggered the pursuit and eventual armed stop of the Audi at 23:59 approximately.

Hall’s reported full account of the Audi-related events is significant.^[13]

The grey Audi was parked on Cheetham Hill Road, just 250 metres from the foyer. After sighting the vehicle, the police do not report that anyone else was inside it. They did not go too close to the vehicle in case it was booby trapped. Some time later, the same Audi vehicle was pursued by armed police, so it is likely that the same Asian male left the Arena in the grey Audi. [. . .] The vehicle turned left onto Lord Street then left again onto Southall Street and then right onto Bury New Road, left onto Broughton Lane, right onto Great Clowes Street, then headed south towards Broughton Bridge.

Hall suggests, with good reason, that the Audi could have been used by Abedi as a getaway vehicle. False flag operations are always covert, so avoiding detection must have been a concern for Abedi. His otherwise-odd

decision to arrive at the Arena so early makes more sense if collecting the Audi was part of the operation.

William Drysdale, an Arena security employee tasked with observing the crowd to spot possible black-market ticket and merchandise sellers, told the inquiry that he ascended to the mezzanine at 21:42. He said he first saw Abedi on the mezzanine about ten minutes later, at approximately 21:52.

Many other eyewitnesses, such as Mr Neal Hatfield, also said they saw Abedi on the mezzanine with the large black rucksack propped against the wall next to him. But none of them gave any witness account of seeing Abedi before 21:52. This means there is no eyewitnesses and no CCTV evidence placing Abedi anywhere in the Arena between 21:33 and 21:52.

Hall contends the nineteen-minute period Abedi was not seen anywhere in the Arena gave him more than enough time to collect the grey Audi A6 and park it on Cheetham Hill Road, ready to serve as a getaway vehicle. If so, this could account for his early arrival on the mezzanine.

There is an inexplicable gap in the record of the CCTV focused on the Trinity Way tunnel. This is the route Abedi would have taken if he ran from Cheetham Hill Road back to the City Room mezzanine. The closest time-stamped image, which was taken from the tunnel prior to the bang, was recorded at 22:10. This would have been after Abedi arrived back on the mezzanine if he had collected the car and parked it on Cheetham Hill Road.

The Audi was observed driving off at 23:53. If Abedi was the driver, this suggests he hid somewhere near the Arena for around an hour and twenty minutes *after* the bang. We might therefore consider it *less* likely that he was the person who drove the Audi either to or from Cheetham Hill Road.

It would be tempting to dismiss Hall's contention outright, were it not for the strange manner in which the entire subject of the Audi was broached at the inquiry.

The Dictaphone recording revealed that the police were dealing with a number of other "complications" in addition to managing their emergency response to the "bombing." These included reports of a suspicious but "confused" male at Manchester Cathedral and a discarded jacket left on top of an object that was briefly thought to be another possible bomb. It is fair to say, however, that these relatively minor complications paled into insignificance compared to the observation and pursuit of the Audi.

It was mentioned at the inquiry that Ch Insp Sexton was informed by “radio transmission” that the driver of the Audi was “not a suspicious male” at 00:10 on the 23rd May. It was added in the anonymous radio transmission that the Audi driver was “just a regular (inaudible something).” Paul Greaney QC then offered a summary of the noted “complications”—evident in the Dictaphone recording—for Sexton to confirm.

Greaney said:

From 11:16pm the situation you were dealing with became more complicated, perhaps even confused, because you were, from that point, faced with a report, or even reports of another suspicious character or characters that needed to be dealt with. So there’s the person spoken about near the Cathedral, there’s a thought that someone is going towards Piccadilly, and you were also confronted with a discarded jacket, near to the Cathedral which was thought to be on top [of] something. And therefore thought to be suspicious. Those were the matters you were dealing with that complicated the situation. Is that correct?

This prompted Sir John Saunders to interject. Saunders added, “[A]nd a person in an Audi car?” Mr Greaney scarcely acknowledged this question in his response:

And a person in an Audi car. [. . .] Although I think that was quite short lived, was it not?

This is one among many examples of the inquiry panel legal team seemingly directing proceedings, or at least guiding the proceedings, quite artfully. Clearly, it had occurred to Sir John Saunders that the “Audi car” was a major “complication” for the police. He intervened to remind Greaney that he had entirely omitted any mention of the most significant “complication” outside the Arena that night. Greaney’s response was simply to brush it aside.

The inquiry panel appeared eager to downplay the significance of the Audi. It is notable that the official [transcript](#)^[14] of the Dictaphone recording—entered into evidence at the inquiry but subsequently “memory-holed”—has its highest concentration of “irrelevant and sensitive” and “inaudible” redactions at the point where the armed stop of the Audi is under discussion. While we cannot know if Abedi used the Audi, and while the time frame of the pursuit after the bang perhaps suggests this is unlikely, there was clear sensitivity about the Audi at the inquiry.

While it is speculative, it is worth considering that if Abedi was an asset who was stopped by police while attempting his getaway from the Arena in the Audi, his arrest could easily have been concealed by the intelligence agencies or counter-terrorism police.

All this combined evidence further supports Hall's contention that the so-called Manchester Arena bombing was actually the Manchester Arena hoax. His "hoaxed attack hypothesis" is strengthened considerably when we examine the otherwise completely unfathomable emergency response to the largest terrorist attack ever to occur in the North.

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Chapter 15: The Bizarre Emergency Response

The training exercise that took place in Manchester's Trafford Centre in May 2016, where more than 800 crisis actors participated in a simulated suicide bombing, was codenamed "Winchester Accord." In July 2017, shortly after the Manchester Arena "bombing," a written parliamentary question was made to then-UK Minister of State for Security and Economic Crime Ben Wallace about UK terror preparedness.

In response, Wallace wrote:^[1]

The Home Office's National CT [Counter Terrorism] Exercise Programme plays a vital role in ensuring that Government, blue light responders, military and other agencies are prepared to respond to terrorist attacks throughout the UK. Exercise WINCHESTER ACCORD was delivered in Greater Manchester in May 2016. The exercise tested the emergency service and military response to a suicide bomb and firearms attack on a crowded place.

There was no suggestion that Winchester Accord was a flop. The Minister indicated it played its part in the "vital role" of response training. He said it "tested" the response to a terrorist attack.

Nothing more was written about the Winchester Accord training exercise until the Saunders Inquiry. Suddenly the legacy media was full of reports about all the mistakes that were made during Winchester Accord.^[2]

These "mistakes" included:

- Greater Manchester Police's (GMP's) failure to pass on information about the nature and active status of the attack to other emergency services.
- The fire and ambulance services being misdirected and failing to respond appropriately, if at all, for more than ninety minutes.
- The failure to establish an agreed-upon forward command and an agreed-upon rendezvous point, thus leading to a disjointed and uncoordinated response.

The whole point of training exercises is to expose and iron out problems and thus reduce—and hopefully eliminate—future mistakes. Winchester Accord highlighted numerous failings and errors. The factors that combined

to create an uncoordinated, unsuccessful response to “a suicide bomb and firearms attack on a crowded place” were clearly identified.

Yet all these same “mistakes” were repeated in the emergency response to the Manchester Arena “bombing.” None of them had been addressed in the interim. Unbelievably, they all happened just as they had during the simulated suicide bombing terror attack in Manchester’s Trafford Centre conducted only one year earlier.^[3]

As we have already discussed, terror training exercises can also be used to practice false flag attacks, including hoaxed attacks. Given that the emergency response to the Manchester Arena attack was practically identical to the “botched” response to the Trafford training exercise, it is not unreasonable to surmise that Winchester Accord was used as a deliberate botched job to make sure Manchester Arena would be equally bungled.

In other words, far from being the “disaster” described by the UK legacy media, Winchester Accord looks like it was a highly effective dry run for the Manchester Arena hoax.

The primary evidence offered at the Saunders Inquiry to supposedly prove the precise timing of the blast is contradictory, to say the least. The CCTV still images entered into evidence presented adjusted Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) timestamps for every camera. These timestamps were used to establish the official sequence and timing of events.

There are notable anomalies.

For instance, at the inquiry, British Transport Police (BTP) PC Bullough testified that she was stood next to the War Memorial on Victoria Station concourse when she heard the bang. Upon hearing it, she said she immediately ran to the City Room. Yet at 22:31:09, nine seconds *after* the alleged time of the bang, she is seen on CCTV chatting to colleagues at the War Memorial. None of the officers nor anyone else seen in this CCTV image *show* any sign of responding or reacting to a loud bang.

At 22:31:37, PC Bullough was caught on CCTV again, no more than thirty meters away from her starting position at the War Memorial—but this time running across the platform. If you ran at four mph, it would take you seven seconds to cover thirty metres. Sure enough, she was seen arriving in the City Room seventeen seconds after she started running—at 22:31:47.

There appears to be an approximate thirty-second discrepancy between the stated detonation time and the recorded timestamped CCTV of PC

Bullough's movements. This potential missing thirty seconds in the official CCTV record is extremely important.

If approximately thirty seconds of CCTV taken inside the City Room have been omitted, as the observable physical evidence suggests, this missing half-a-minute likely would have enabled Abedi to run out of the City Room without apparently being seen in the released CCTV.

Also, other people could have entered or left the City Room in that thirty-second period without being, for all intents and purposes, "observed." We will discuss the further primary physical evidence that raises this possibility in the next chapter.

Let us assume for a moment that you are in the City Room—but are not a crisis actor—when a large pyrotechnic device explodes. You are not in the least bit likely to hang around. On the contrary: you are shocked, terrified, disorientated. For all you know, there could have been more than one "bomb" set to go off. Your instinctive reaction is to get away as fast as possible.

The [external video](#)^[4] provides primary observable evidence of people running away from a bright flash and a loud bang inside the City Room. But it does *not* provide any observable physical evidence of anyone running away from a massive TATP shrapnel bomb detonated inside the City Room.

Now let's assume you are a crisis actor. For whatever reason—we'll also explore this shortly—you are willing to participate in a hoaxed bombing. For you, the flash and the bang are not a reason to run away. You know there is no real danger. The flash and the bang are your cue to enter the scene and start acting.

When those not involved in the hoax run for their lives, what are the chances they will observe the scene being set up? Will they have the wit or the will to look for and spot the alleged suicide bomber amidst the panicked crowd rushing out of the City Room alongside them? May I suggest: the chances are slim to none.

As I say, this is speculative, but it is not baseless speculation. Far from baseless, the Manchester Arena bombing was evidently a hoaxed false flag. In it, the thirty-or-so missing seconds would have easily been sufficient time to stage the scene observed in Parker photo and the Barr footage.

If you recall our discussion in Chapter 6 about the Baghdad hoaxed false flag that reportedly killed ten people and injured thirty-four, the observable physical evidence in that scene shows that, from the point of the bang onward, it took thirty-two seconds for nineteen crisis actors to enter the scene and feign death and injury and for another four actors to assume the roles of fake first responders.

Thus, to complete the deception taking place in the City Room, all that would be required would be to lock it down and isolate it from anyone but the crisis actors and state personnel who were in on the plot. And that appears to be precisely what occurred.

As we said, all the same “mistakes” that happened during Winter Accord preparedness and training exercise occurred again. If anything, the Manchester Arena emergency response to “a suicide bomb and firearms attack on a crowded place” was notably worse than the poor response at Winter Accord.

From Volume 2 Part 1^[5] of the Saunders Inquiry report, we are given to understand that Ch Insp Sexton, who was in overall command of the response, rapidly became “overburdened” with the number of tasks before him. This resulted in him making the “significant mistake” of not declaring a “Major Incident.”

To be clear, and to repeat: reportedly the largest terrorist attack in the UK since 7/7 and the most devastating ever in Northern England was *not* officially recognised as a “Major Incident” by the chain of command. Declaration of a “Major Incident” always sets in motion a series of predetermined protocols. This didn’t happen in Manchester because no one remembered to make the required identification. This was considered a mere “mistake.”

Compounding that woeful oversight, the emergency response to the Manchester incident was extremely unusual. It is fair to say that chaos reigned. And yet we are asked to believe that letting everything get out of control was a mere “mistake.”

North West Fire Control (NWFC) alerted Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) that there had been an “explosion in the city centre.” The Fire Service was put on standby, ready to mobilise in anticipation of the order to send them to the correct location. That order never arrived. Apparently, this was due to the intervention of an unnamed NWFC “supervisor.” This was another mere “mistake.”

The British Transport Police's (BTP's) Force Incident Manager (FIM), Inspector Benjamin Dawson, assumed temporary incident command of the emergency response. At 22:41, he told North West Ambulance Service (NWAS) that he had declared a "Major Incident." Yet he informed neither the fire service (GMFRS) nor Greater Manchester Police (GMP) that he had done so. The Saunders inquiry pointed out that this was a mere "mistake."

The Saunders Inquiry noted that "METHANE is a mnemonic, with each letter standing for a different piece of information to be gathered and relayed" at the scene of an attack.

By sending a METHANE message, any of the emergency services personnel at the scene could have declared a Major Incident.

The first formal emergency service responders to arrive in the City Room were BTP officers, including PC Bullough. The Saunders Inquiry report added:

None of the BTP officers in the City Room provided a METHANE message. This was due to a failure by BTP to prepare them adequately for the situation they were confronted with.

This was a very significant "mistake."

By 10:44 the BTP officers at the scene were said to be helping the SMG and Showsec staff and an Arena medical team from Emergency Training UK (ETUK) to treat "victims" at the scene. Like Showsec, ETUK was contracted to SMG. The standard ETUK procedure involved providing situational awareness reports to NWAS—North West Ambulance Service. They didn't do this. This was deemed another mere "mistake."

Seniority in emergency response command structures is denoted using bronze, silver, and gold demarcations. Bronze is the lowest and gold the highest rank. Bronze is usually assigned to the operational commander at the scene, silver to coordinating commanders, usually located in the control room, and gold to the overall operational commanders. Police, ambulance, and fire services all use this emergency response ranking system.

Operation control at the Arena was subsequently taken by GMP Insp Mike Smith. Designated an operational/bronze commander, Insp Smith established an emergency services Rendezvous Point (RVP) at the "Cathedral City car park." But he did not communicate the RVP to any other service, nor did he declare a Major Incident. Later, though, Insp Smith

changed his mind and made Manchester Arena the new GMP RVP. In so doing, he didn't tell anyone other than his GMP colleagues. His was deemed a mere "mistake."

The ambulance service (NWS), not knowing about the car park RVP, set its own RVP as the Manchester Central Fire Station. Despite NWS telling BTP about their RVP, BTP established a different RVP—at Fishdock car park. As the result of these numerous "mistakes," the Saunders Inquiry report noted that "there was substantial confusion over the location of an RVP."

Having an unspecified, unclear RVP is another big "mistake." That is because, in response to a terrorist attack, the RVP is supposed to be "the single place to which all responding agencies should travel and co-locate."

The Forward Command Post (FCP) may be established at or near the RVP. But regardless of where it's situated, setting up an FCP is another essential step in the emergency response. It is "the place where commanders at the scene from each responder agency meet as soon as possible."

Due to this catalogue of consequential "mistakes," the Saunders Inquiry found "there was no clear multi-agency RVP and there had been no discussion about an FCP."

When dealing with an emergency situation involving casualties, rapid treatment is essential in the first "golden hour," according to the Saunders Inquiry report. It added:

Halfway through the golden hour, there was still no common RVP and not one person involved in the response had even mentioned an FCP. [. . .] The failure to set up an FCP [. . .] was principally the responsibility of GMP.

This responsibility ultimately lay with Ch Insp Sexton, who was supposedly coordinating things from the control room and also with the operational/bronze commanders at the Arena—namely, Insp Mike Smith and OFC Edward Richardson.

Following a conversation with GMP FDO Ch Insp Sexton, North West Fire Control (NWFC) Station Manager Andrew Berry still thought the RVP was "Cathedral City car park." No one had told him that Insp Mike Smith had changed the location. Seeing as how Insp Smith hadn't communicated his arbitrary relocation of the GMP RVP to Ch Insp Sexton, Sexton's "mistake" can at least be understood.

Regardless, Station Manager Berry—who was told gunmen were active in the area—considered the Cathedral RVP unsafe and instead directed NWFC to send Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service (GMFRS) to Philips Park Fire Station, three miles from the Arena. So, the fire crews, waiting impatiently at Manchester Central fire station—one mile from the Arena—for the order to attend the scene of a reported bombing, were sent two miles further from the Arena.

The Saunders Inquiry report stated that this mix-up “set in motion a series of events that resulted in GMFRS not arriving at the Victoria Exchange Complex until over two hours after the Attack occurred. [. . .] No one in command roles in the other emergency services had recognised that GMFRS had decided to mobilise to a fire station three miles from the Victoria Exchange Complex.”

This is another point worth reiterating. Following the alleged bombing, no fire service response was forthcoming. Despite being fully prepared to attend the scene of the Manchester Arena terrorist attack and despite being specifically trained to deal with both bombings and marauding shooter events, every available fire crew was sent to a distant car park to sit twiddling their thumbs for two hours. This was half-an-hour *longer* than they had spent twiddling their thumbs during Winchester Accord.

At the inquiry, an experienced fire crew manager, Michaela Turner, expressed the bewilderment she and her colleagues felt:^[6]

There was a lot of confusion and I remember [. . .] the crews were asking “what’s going on”? [. . .] I said to my crew at the time, “there must be something else that we don’t know about. There’s got to be something else.”

At 22:47, FDO Ch Insp Sexton declared “Operation Plato.” Of that declaration, the Saunders Inquiry wrote:

Operation Plato was the emergency services’ designation for the response to an attack by a marauding terrorist with a firearm. Although, as it turned out, there were no armed terrorists within the Arena or wider area, this was a reasonable decision. There had been some reports of gunshots. [. . .] The next step for Inspector Sexton was crucial. He should have ensured that the declaration of Operation Plato was communicated to the other emergency services. The GMP plan required this. Inspector Sexton failed to do this. The burden of his responsibilities as FDO meant that he overlooked it. [. . .] The failure to

communicate the Operation Plato declaration had significant consequences. It affected the ability of the emergency services to work together by jointly understanding the risks.

Was this yet another catastrophic “mistake”?

At the same time—22:47—Insp Mike Smith entered the City Room for the first time. It was noted that firearms officers, under the command of OFC Richardson, who was the other operation/bronze commander at the Arena, had secured the City Room by 22:50. By 22:55 “the City Room was secured against armed attackers by a significant number of well-organised firearms officers.”

Less than twenty minutes after the bang, the City Room was firmly locked down. All the way up to that point, the frankly unbelievable string of “mistakes” left fire and ambulance crews in the wrong places, left BTP and GMP officers not knowing which RVP to attend, and—given the reported scale of the “attack”—left the City Room in the hands of an unusually small group of first responders.

But the “mistakes” didn’t end there.

Neither Insp Smith nor OFC Richardson informed their GMP colleagues that the City Room had been declared an Operation Plato “cold zone.” Had the other officers known of this designation, it would have told them that there were *no* active shooters and that the City Room, at least, was safe to enter. This “mistake” meant that the majority of GMP officers stayed away from the City Room.

Fire Station Manager Berry, who had been informed by NWAS that there was a Major Incident, received unconfirmed reports of “marauding terrorists” with guns but was not told that this report had been ruled out by the operation/bronze commanders at the Arena. Consequently, believing that the situation was still dangerous, FSM Berry continued to hold his Marauding Terrorist Firearms Attack specialist fire crews at Philips Park Fire Station.

As we discussed in Chapter 5, perhaps this was all just the result of what the philosopher Karl Popper referred to as the *unintentional* consequences of *intentional* human actions. Nonetheless, if you were planning to stage a hoaxed false flag, the net effect of all these “mistakes” was perfect.

Not only had the City Room been effectively sealed and most emergency services personnel kept away from the Arena, but chain-of-command

communication from operation/bronze commanders in the City Room was practically nonexistent. At 23:10, temporary operation/silver commander Superintendent Nawaz, who was heavily criticised by Saunders, arrived at GMP headquarters. He had received no previous communication from bronze commanders at the scene and wouldn't establish communication with any of them until 23:35—more than an hour after the bang.

At the inquiry, Insp Mike Smith was asked to confirm that there was no line of command between him, as an operational/bronze commander inside the City Room, and the senior tactical commanders outside of the City Room. Insp Smith confirmed that there was not.

Investigative journalist Richard D. Hall pointedly reported:^[7]

British Transport Police were kept out of the City Room until after the blast, despite it being standard practice for them to be there to help manage the egress from the concert. Greater Manchester Police, who arrived fifteen minutes after the blast, did not establish any chain of command with the senior officer at the scene throughout the emergency response period and did not declare a major incident. [. . .] This means that the chief guy at the scene, the Inspector, who was there, at the scene in the City Room, wasn't communicating with anyone from the control rooms, back and forth. He was managing the whole situation, isolated from any control outside.

According to the inquiry witness testimony of BTP Officer Stephen Corke, normal BTP procedure would have placed at least one BTP officer in the City Room prior to the bang. But, contrary to all standard protocol, none were present. The first to arrive was PC Bullough at 22:31:47.

Subsequently, the epistemic authorities blamed this alleged “mistake” on PC Bullough and her colleagues, claiming they took a two-hour meal break. These officers, including PC Bullough, have reportedly received official reprimands.^[8]

The issue of the extended BTP officer meal break seems irrelevant. PC Bullough and her colleagues were seen standing by the War Memorial when the bang occurred. They had clearly returned to their posts from dinner. Thus, the meal break story does *not* explain why none of them were stationed in the City Room.

Similarly, Ch Insp Sexton, who retired shortly after giving evidence at the Saunders Inquiry, faced censure for his “mistakes.” At the inquiry, Sexton claimed that he deliberately didn't tell any other services that he had

declared Operation Plato because he didn't want to deter those services from attending to the City Room.

While there was no record of Sexton ever making this decision, it would have been an absurdity if he had. It is not a good idea to send more unarmed people into an area where you supposedly believe terrorist gunmen are actively engaged in mass murder.

Following the internal GMP review that followed the inquiry, it was "leaked" and subsequently reported that Sexton could face possible criminal negligence charges.^[9] Ultimately, he did not face any prosecution.^[10]

These kind of legacy media reports serve as distractions from the most salient issues and divert public attention away from the evidence. We might also wonder if those who may have been involved in the conspiracy were also willing to play the role of sacrificial lambs in order to assist the ongoing deception and further convince an unsuspecting public that the official account is plausible.

Ch Insp Sexton was singled out for criticism for his "mistakes" in the inquiry reports. Yet Insp Mike Smith, who apparently also made a number of mistakes, was praised by Sir John Saunders, who wrote^[11] that Insp Smith "performed his role to a high standard."

At this juncture, it is worth recapping what we know about Abedi's movements and other events that transpired that night and into the early hours of the morning of the 23rd:

21:29 (22nd May) — Abedi is seen leaving the Victoria Station Metro platform walking towards City Room wearing the rucksack.

21:31 — Abedi is seen on CCTV in the lift while wearing the rucksack.

21:33 — Abedi is seen on CCTV entering City Room wearing the rucksack. He disappears from CCTV onto the mezzanine, wearing the rucksack.

21:52 — Abedi is seen by eyewitness William Drysdale on the mezzanine level of the City Room. Therefore, Abedi is not seen by any witness nor captured on CCTV for an approximate nineteen-minute period.

22:30 — Abedi is seen on CCTV and by eyewitnesses with the rucksack walking across City Room towards point P.

22:31:00 — At approximately 22:31:30, a pyrotechnic type device apparently goes off, causing no building damage but leaving a scorch mark up a wall above point P.

22:47 – GMP report a witness statement from a member of the public who said an individual had detonated a device attached to his back and committed suicide in the City Room.

22:47 — GMP Inspector Mike Smith arrives in the City Room.

22:50 — The City Room is secured by firearms officers under the command of OFC Richardson.

22:55 — The City Room is locked down “by a significant number of well-organised firearms officers.”

23:01 — BTP Sergeant 2202 reports an eyewitness account of an Asian male, precisely matching Salman Abedi’s appearance, who was seen putting down a rucksack and running out of the City Room.

23:02 — The GMP Control Room reports a log entry of an eyewitness, who says an Asian male took a rucksack out of an Audi, parked his car on Cheetham Hill Road, and ran toward the Arena. The grey Audi was placed under observation as a result.

23:06 — Insp Mike Smith reports finding Abedi’s body outside Block 106, near—or possibly in—an open doorway. But this suggestion is rapidly dropped from the official investigation and never mentioned again. The leak of evidence, including the audio recording of Smith, triggers an international diplomatic incident.

23:16 — Ch Insp Sexton is informed of the report given by BTP Sergeant 2202.

23:17 — GMP OFC Edward Richardson reinterprets the account reported by BTP Sergeant 2202, asserting that it related to a *second* male suspect.

23:45 — BTP Ch Insp Graham reportedly arrives at the Arena.

23:53 — It is reported on police radio communications that the Audi has driven off and that police are pursuing it.

23:59 — The Audi is stopped by armed police and the driver is apprehended. The driver’s identity remains unknown.

00:58 (23rd May) — BTP Ch Insp Graham is shown an image by an unknown white male. The image, which purportedly showed the point of blast, supposedly enabled the physical description of Abedi to be confirmed and Operation Manteline investigators to later identify his body somewhere *inside* the City Room “near the box office.”

It is obvious that evidence of an alleged suicide bombing was fabricated. The suspicious anomalies in the CCTV timestamps clearly suggest that an approximate thirty-second window was created to set up the scene recorded in the Parker photo and the Barr footage.

This likely missing period could have given Abedi time to escape, conceal himself, and later attempt a getaway in the grey Audi. None of this has been satisfactorily explained. All of it has been glossed over in the official narrative.

We know from the [Bickerstaff video](#)^[12] and other corroborating witness statements that some people had foreknowledge of the planned hoax. We can also deduce, from the history of the UK state's partnerships with terrorist organisations like the LIFG and from the otherwise inexplicable freedom of movement that Abedi and his alleged accomplices enjoyed, that Salman Abedi was almost certainly some sort of intelligence asset.

In addition, we can now add that the emergency response to the claimed suicide bombing was [bizarre](#).^[13] The City Room was evidently a tightly controlled space and the official response was effectively hobbled, ensuring that only a very limited number of first responders entered the City Room.

Fabricated evidence of the discovery of Abedi's torso was "leaked" by mistake. When it was recognised that this aspect of the deception could not possibly be maintained, a diplomatic argument cover story was concocted.

The Winchester Accord training exercise in the Manchester Trafford Centre would later be precisely mimicked by the Manchester Arena suicide bombing attack. All the "mistakes" made during Winchester Accord were repeated on 22nd May 2017. Winchester Accord appears to have been a training exercise to stage a hoaxed false flag.

Yet, despite all this evidence, we are still left with the one remaining aspect of the state's account that most people—including many of us who question the official narrative—find impossible to reconcile. Namely: we are told that 22 people died and that thirty-eight were seriously injured.

Many of the injured have spoken about their trauma and the terrible events they experienced. The bereaved have publicly mourned the loss of their loved ones. The majority of the public assume it is simply impossible that all these victims and their families are providing false accounts.

For this reason, in the eyes of most of the public, no matter how airtight the observable physical evidence is, the Manchester Arena bombing simply *cannot* have been a hoax.

This conviction by the public is why we must also look at the primary physical evidence relating to the deceased and the injured.

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Chapter 16: The Deceased and the Injured

At least sixty people were allegedly struck by a large shrapnel-laden bomb blast inside the Manchester Arena City Room on the evening of 22nd May 2017.

Following the bang, 22 of those sixty lay either dead or dying and another thirty-eight were severely injured and unable to leave under their own power, according to the biased pluralist state's account.

It must be noted that no primary observable evidence has ever been offered to substantiate any of these purported facts, figures, timings or any aspect of the accounts related to the deceased and the injured that we are about to discuss.

According to the official account, the following people were identified and tagged as deceased inside the City Room on 22nd May 2017. The time each death was *declared*, not the time of death, is shown:

Philip Tron (22 nd May)	23:28
Alison Howe	23:34
Courtney Boyle	23:38
Angelika Klis	23:39
Lisa Lees	23:39
Marcin Klis	23:40
Chloe Rutherford	23:40
Saffie-Rose Roussos	23:40*
Nell Jones	23:41
Liam Curry	23:44
Martyn Hett	23:44
Wendy Fawell	23:44
Eilidh MacLeod	23:45
Elaine Mclver	23:45
Kelly Brewster	23:45
Olivia Campbell-Hardy	23:45
Sorrell Leczkowski	23:46
Jane Tweddle	23:47
John Atkinson	23:47**
Michelle Kiss (23 rd May)	00:32***
Georgina Callander	00:05****
Megan Hurley	01:02*****

*The youngest of the deceased victims, eight-year-old Saffie-Rose Roussos, was carried out of the City Room to Trinity Way at 22:58—twenty-seven minutes after the stated time of the “blast.” She was triaged and treated in an ambulance that took her to Royal Manchester Children’s Hospital at 23:17. She was declared dead at the hospital at 23:40. Saffie-Rose was the first to be taken out of the City Room.

**John Atkinson remained in the City Room for 47 minutes after the explosion. He was one of the people removed to the “Casualty Clearing Station.” At 23:47 he went into cardiac arrest and did not recover.

***Michelle Kiss was tagged as deceased inside the City Room at 00:32 on 23rd May 2017.

****Georgina Callander was carried to the Casualty Clearing Station at 23:28, and an ambulance took her to Manchester Royal Infirmary at 23:40. Her death was confirmed at 00:05 on 23rd May.

*****Megan Hurley was not tagged as deceased until after her father left her side in the City Room at 01:02 on 23rd May 2017. Attempts to resuscitate Megan Hurley ceased at about 23:06 on 22nd May. Megan Hurley’s post-mortem examination confirmed that her death was caused by multiple injuries.

The Barr footage and the Parker photo captured the scene inside the City Room before the first of the deceased—Saffie-Rose Roussos—was reportedly carried out. As the Parker photo and the Barr footage are both looking toward the epicentre of the blast, most of the 22 victims should be observable.

Since all the CCTV images were redacted, the only observable physical evidence we have to possibly substantiate the state’s narrative is the Parker photo, the Barr footage,^[1] and the somewhat different BBC footage. Of these records of the immediate aftermath of the bang, the Barr footage—never entered into evidence or examined in any official proceeding—provides by far the clearest evidence.

Without wishing to belabour the point, I think it is worth stressing the importance of the Barr footage. Its clarity provides a documented record of the observable physical evidence inside the City Room in the first few minutes after the bang.

Even if what it shows is deemed too upsetting for people to see, the fact that Mr Barr wasn’t even asked to give his first-hand recorded eyewitness

account at the Saunders Inquiry is laughable. Hall sent this evidence to the inquiry panel and its chairman before proceedings began. They were informed about both Mr Barr's footage and his eyewitness account.

As we discussed in Chapter 10, Sir John Saunders said he relied on unredacted CCTV still frames and body cam footage instead of high-resolution crime scene photographs. The inquiry panel and Sir John Saunders may have considered this sufficient evidence to substantiate the official account. We can only take their word for it; all the CCTV showing this evidence was redacted in the "memory-holed" inquiry files.

The Barr footage shows the "blind spot" area of the City Room not covered by CCTV. This makes its omission from the inquiry even more unfathomable. That said, CCTV blind spots were barely mentioned at the inquiry.

In fact, the inquiry's derisory decision to omit any examination of Mr Barr's footage, the clearest primary evidence revealing the direct consequences of the purported Manchester Arena bombing, *alone* renders the Saunders Inquiry a farce.

The observable physical evidence seen in the Barr footage completely contradicts the official narrative. This almost certainly explains its exclusion from the evidence examined by the inquiry team. Evidently, the state's account is nothing more than a sham of a story, unsupported by any primary evidence.

At the inquiry, expert testimony explaining the kind of injuries inflicted by shrapnel bombs was provided by Professor Anthony Bull from the UK's Centre for Blast Injury Studies. He described the primary and secondary injuries that shrapnel-laden bomb blasts inflict on the human anatomy.^[2]

The primary blast is the initial shock wave. Prof Bull described its impact upon physiology:

[T]he first material that it [the primary blast] comes into contact with, let's say the skin, the muscle, the tissues, have the pressure wave transmitted through it. But where the tissues have a margin between them, so let's say between muscle and bone, or let's say between air and the tissues of the lung, then, [. . .] there is disruption at the interface, the pressure wave goes through and then where you have an interface, there is shearing, a separation of the materials at that interface. That's particularly significant where you have materials of very significant density such as bone and air, fluid and soft tissues.

They have different densities and so you end up with disruption at those interfaces, so that disruption is a primary blast injury. [. . .] If the person is close to the seat of the explosion, then that pressure wave is transmitted through the person and at the interfaces there is disruption and shearing of the tissues.

To be stomach-churningly clear: people standing within the initial ten-metre blast radius of the alleged TATP bomb—supposedly detonated by Salman Abedi in the City Room—would have had tissue, limbs, heads, and organs blown off, out of, or through their bodies. In that primary blast damage, tissue would have been ripped from bone by the sheer force of the shock wave. It is almost impossible to imagine how anyone could survive such a bombing within that lethal ten-metre blast radius, even if he were standing behind another body. Each body in that range would have been obliterated beyond recognition.

The secondary anatomical blast damage is caused by shrapnel propelled by the primary blast. The shrapnel would have added to the physical injuries of anyone within the ten-metre radius, though it is highly likely that the blast wave alone would have killed them.

Prof Bull also outlined the type of injuries that would have been sustained by people who stood within a twenty-metre radius. The shrapnel would cause specific types of injuries, but they would be exacerbated by the "blast wind"—the primary blast—which both propels and accompanies the shrapnel when it enters the body.

Prof Bull continued his explanation of the secondary shrapnel damage:

They [shrapnel fragments] come into contact with the person and they disrupt the anatomy: they tear the anatomy, they push holes through the anatomy. This is like being hit by — being shot, but it's typically worse than that because the fragments don't only contain energy going in a straight line, they also contain rotational tumbling energy, which is a function of the shape of these fragments, and that tumbling energy causes more significant tearing of the anatomy that it comes into contact with. [. . .] If we just refer back to the concept of energy being deposited into an object, there are injuries that occur when someone themselves has the energy deposited, almost like a blunt deposit, so they are then displaced by the blast wind. And that displacement can be very rapid in some instances and therefore, as they are displaced, they can have accelerative injuries that could be due to internal accelerations or they can have crush injuries.

Note that the only similarity between being shot with a bullet and being hit by shrapnel from a bomb is that in both instances metal punctures the flesh and causes internal damage. But, within the significant first twenty-metre blast radius of a supposedly large TATP suicide bomb, being hit by shrapnel would cause significantly more tissue damage than a bullet would, for all the reasons explained by Prof Bull.

If there were any truth to the state's narrative, the scene captured in the Barr footage would have been one of unimaginable horror and bloody carnage. Entrails, severed limbs, and considerable blood pooling, smearing, and splattering would be observable. What little carnage there is in the Parker photo and the Barr footage falls a *very* long way short of what would have been present were the state's account true.

Notably, the Parker photo shows what appears to be a long blood trail across the floor, as if a bleeding person has crawled or been dragged across the City Room. The same trail is observable in the Barr footage. Yet in the footage there does not appear to be a bleeding body at the end point of the trail. It is just an isolated red streak across the City Room floor.

The Barr footage also shows a few small lines of blood splatter and smears. But they are hardly consistent with a shrapnel bomb blowing a crowd of people to pieces. They look more like someone has cast drips off a paint brush in a few spots.

There is also some indistinct debris in the Barr footage, but nothing consistent with the official account of the bombing, which, if true, would have left not only disembodied human remains but approximately thirty kilograms of shrapnel scattered across the floor. There is no observable dust in the air and no smoke. The white doors are all pristine. And, as we have already discussed, there is no observable structural damage seen anywhere in the Barr footage.

There appears to be fewer people in the City Room than the official version enumerates. Some of the reported victims are notably missing. CCTV shows that there were three individuals wearing red T-shirts who appeared to be working at the merchandise stall in the last few minutes before the bang. It seems unlikely that they would have suddenly left the stall as concertgoers exited the building—a peak sales opportunity. According to the official account, anyone working at the stall should have been killed.

It is strange that, despite its said proximity to the epicentre of the blast, the merchandise stall was nowhere near a shrapnel bomb, nor were its

supposed salespeople ever identified—much less mentioned. No account describes what happened to them. None of them are seen in the Barr footage.

In the previous chapter we noted that the Barr footage provides us with a view toward the epicentre of the blast. The BBC footage provides an even wider perspective. Surely somewhere in the Parker photo, the BBC footage, and/or the Barr footage there should be a scene consistent with 22 people being murdered and another thirty-eight—including Hall's High Court adversaries Martin and Eve Hibbert—being severely injured by a TATP shrapnel bomb.

Even if we combine the different viewpoints of each of these three records of observable physical evidence, we don't see *anywhere near* fifty—much less sixty—severely injured, dead, or dying people.

While the blurring in the video makes it difficult to be certain, if we add the prone figures seen in the BBC footage to the estimated seventeen seen in the Barr footage, the casualties appear to number around thirty. This is half the officially stated number and notably fewer than we should be able to see in the recordings.

When GMP Inspector Mike Smith first entered the City Room, he was heard to say on the police chatter recording,^[3] “It looks to be like a bomb's gone off here[.] I would say there's about thirty casualties.” Similarly, one of the first paramedics to enter the City Room, Lea Vaughan, told the legacy media that she was “faced with twenty-six patients to deal with.”

In Lea Vaughan's case, this may have been the number of priority casualties she and her colleague, paramedic Christopher Hargreaves, “triaged.” Nonetheless, both Vaughan and Insp Mike Smith were trained to make rapid, accurate assessments of casualty numbers.

None of the people lying on the floor appear to have been hit by either a bomb blast or shrapnel. All the supposed bodies appear completely intact. No severed limbs, disembodied flesh, nor significant blood splatter or pooling are apparent.

The primary evidence observable in the Barr footage does not show anything that looks remotely like the aftermath of a shrapnel bombing in a crowd of people. It looks far more like a staged scene one might expect to see in a drill or exercise. The visual similarity between the scene inside the City Room and the scene inside the Trafford shopping centre during exercise Winter Accord is marked.

It is also worth considering the psychological impact a real bombing would have had. (We'll get to the "bizarre" medical response in a moment.) If the official account were true, even highly trained first responders would have found it extremely difficult to cope psychologically with the bomb scene.

It is anecdotal but, regrettably, I have seen traumatic injury and death at close quarters. I can only tell you that I was barely able to function after witnessing these horrors face-to-face. I also know a police officer who was at the scene of the Harrods' bombing.^[4] Despite his training, the officer's recollection of his experience was very similar to my own.

As we discussed in Chapter 11, none of us know how we would react in such circumstances. Every individual is likely to cope in a different way. That said, the behaviour of the first responders seen in the Barr footage is certainly unexpected and atypical.

In the Barr footage, Showsec stewards are wearing yellow T-shirts, BTP police officers are wearing black T-shirts and yellow bibs, and the Arena's ETUK medical team is dressed in green (making them look like paramedics).

None of these "first responders" show any sign of frenetic activity. Most appear to be standing around, amiably chatting amongst themselves. Some are nonchalantly strolling around. A few are crouched next to people lying on the floor. No one is making any kind of observable lifesaving or resuscitation effort, such as CPR compressions.


There also doesn't appear to be any first responder using a phone to call for emergency advice or assistance. We know from the Saunders Inquiry that the ETUK staff did not provide North West Ambulance Service (NWS) with any kind of situation report, as they were required to do.

No CCTV images of any deceased or injured people inside the City Room have ever been seen by anyone, other than a few who were authorised by the state to allegedly view them. Every single image that could possibly show this evidence was redacted with black rectangular blocks in the inquiry files. The redactions, offered to ostensibly provide evidence that supported the state's account, fail to provide any primary evidence.^[5]

Many of the 22 reported deceased victims were in the CCTV blind spot when they were said to have been killed or fatally wounded. The presence of the blind spots was not acknowledged at the Saunders Inquiry.

Eight of them—John Atkinson, Jane Tweddle, Lisa Lees, Alison Howe, Courtney Boyle, Philip Tron, Kelly Brewster, and Michelle Kiss—should all have been observable on the pre-blast CCTV images, based on the reported locations of their bodies.

A number of CCTV still images showing the movements of some of the first responders in the first couple of hours after the bang were displayed at the inquiry. While all images showing the reported deceased were redacted, Richard D. Hall created composite images of the City Room from the CCTV still frames shown below.



Over an approximate two-hour period, these CCTV images show people either walking through or standing at the locations inside the City Room where most of the aforementioned deceased supposedly fell. For example, we can clearly see the position on the steps where Michelle Kiss is said to have died.

Following the initial emergency response, the scene should have been preserved by the authorities for evidence-gathering. Yet there is no sign—including any official markings—indicating that any shrapnel victims had been lying on the floor in the spots where the inquiry later claimed they had fallen.

The use of selected still images instead of video suggests the inquiry cherry-picked the “evidence” in an attempt to prop up the official narrative. If that is the case, the effort was unsuccessful in the eyes of anyone who studied the evidence critically.

At the Saunders Inquiry, the circumstances of the death of one of the reportedly deceased victims, Michelle Kiss (45), were provided.^[6]

At 22.29.24, Michelle [Kiss] and Ruth [Murrell] walked up the steps that led towards JD Williams. At 22.29.41, Michelle is [standing] at the

top of the steps with Ruth just standing to her left. Michelle was approximately 20 metres away from the bomber at the time of detonation. [. . .] At 22.31, Michelle fell to the ground following the explosion. In her statement dated 1 June 2017, Ruth states that after the explosion, she turned to her left to ask Michelle what had happened, but Michelle was lying on the floor. Ruth believed Michelle was dead at that time.

Having determined the circumstances of her death, the inquiry described the confirmation of Michelle's medical cause of death.

Mr Ennis [NWS paramedic] has confirmed [. . .] that he placed a label upon Michelle Kiss to identify her as deceased at 00.32.10. [. . .] Dr Lumb [a pathologist] provides a medical cause of death as 1A, head injury. The written conclusions of the blast wave experts are that Michelle's injuries were unsurvivable. [. . .] Following the review by the forensic pathologists, Dr Philip Lumb and Professor Jack Crane, they state that death would have been immediate as a result of the head injury.


Accordingly, we are told that Michelle Kiss stood to the left of Ruth Murrell on the steps leading up to the JD Williams store. Both Michelle and Ruth were said to have been approximately twenty metres from the blast, and both were facing toward Salman Abedi when he supposedly blew himself up.

The image below is taken from the Operation Manteline animation. I have added three locations to the image: (1) the position of Ruth Murrell, (2) the fourth box office window (it will become relevant shortly), and, for reference, (3) the merchandise stall as it was depicted by Operation Manteline investigators.

If we look at the distance marking rings radiating from the epicentre of the blast, and contrast these to the CCTV images shown at the Saunders Inquiry, it is evident that Ruth Murrell was stood approximately eighteen to nineteen metres away from the "blast." Ruth Murrell was notably closer to the bottom of the steps.

Consequently, in comparison to the twenty metres the official account places her away from the Abedi's "bomb," the shorter distance would have marginally increased the physical impact from the alleged shrapnel.

The Manchester Attack



The reported cause and circumstances of the Michelle Kiss' death are made clear in the official report. She and Ruth Murrell were said to be struck by shrapnel from Salman Abedi's suicide bomb. Murrell was hit in the right leg and Michelle Kiss was struck in the head and died instantly. Murrell told investigators that when she turned to her left on the steps, she knew almost immediately that Michelle Kiss was dead.

From the CCTV still images provided at the inquiry, at 22:28:14 Michelle and Ruth are seen together near the bottom of the steps. Yet, at 22:30:18—forty-two seconds before the blast—Ruth and her daughter Emily can be seen standing on the steps (just as described at the Saunders Inquiry) but Michelle Kiss is *not* standing on the steps and is *not* on the left of Ruth Murrell.

Successive still images, captured at 22:30:23, 22:30:28, 22:30:32, 22:30:39, 22:30:41, and 22:30:55 clearly show the movements of Ruth and Emily Murrell. The space where Michelle Kiss was supposedly standing is clearly visible. But Michelle Kiss is not there.

The image supposedly taken one second before the alleged blast, at 22:30:59, captures Ruth and her daughter Emily standing on the steps leading down to the City Room, but Michelle Kiss is *not* standing where she reportedly died. She cannot be seen anywhere else in any of the CCTV still images taken inside the City Room in the final seconds before the “blast.”

Therefore, no matter what was claimed at the Saunders Inquiry, the observable physical evidence shows that Michelle Kiss was *not* standing to

the left of Ruth Murrell when she died. Michelle Kiss was not struck in the head by shrapnel at the time and in the location stated.

It should be noted that Michelle Kiss is one of the few murdered victims who were not standing in a CCTV blind spot. That is why it is possible to determine that the officially reported circumstances of Michelle Kiss' death are not true.^[7]

Despite subsequent written and oral accounts of post-mortem results; and irrespective of the numerous eyewitness accounts—including those of Ruth Murrell, her daughter, Emily, and Michelle's daughter, Millie; and regardless of all the detailed reports of people like Patrick (Paddy) Ennis, who declared Michelle deceased in the Arena that night; and notwithstanding of the issuance of a death certificate, nothing changes the evident, inescapable fact that Michelle Kiss did not die in the circumstances described by the state. The fact that the account of Michelle Kiss' death, given at the Saunders Inquiry and reported by the legacy media, is complex and highly detailed is utterly irrelevant. The observable physical evidence—the primary, real evidence—shows that all accounts claiming that she died on the steps at approximately 22:31 in the City Room of Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017 are wrong.

Therefore, we have absolutely no reason whatsoever to believe any other account of deaths supposedly caused by Salman Abedi's suicide bomb. Further examination of the primary evidence supports this conclusion.

Michelle Kiss is one of eighteen of the 22 reportedly deceased victims who cannot be seen in the alleged final CCTV images. Only three of the 22 deceased can be seen in the CCTV images taken shortly before the bang: Jane Tweddle, Lisa Lees, and Alison Howe. Of these, only Jane Tweddle is seen in the final images that purportedly captured the scene "one second before the blast."

Hall interviewed Kim McKeown, who was reportedly among the injured. Kim McKeown told Hall that she and Izzy Aaron were in the company of Jane Tweddle for about a minute before the bang. But neither Kim nor Izzy are seen standing with Jane Tweddle on CCTV at 22:30:41, just nineteen seconds before the official timing of the blast. Clearly, Kim McKeown and Izzy Aaron had yet to arrive.

This fact corroborates the observable physical evidence, which are seen in the movements of PC Bullough and which suggest that the timing of the

bang was *not* as stated at the inquiry. It is entirely possible the bang occurred approximately thirty seconds later than claimed.

For some as-yet-unexplained reason, the area outside of the lift leading to the City Room was almost entirely redacted from the CCTV stills shown at the Saunders Inquiry. The lift area was shielded from the blast by a wall and a short corridor to the City Room.

Like every other area of the City Room, no damage was caused by a bomb in the lift corridor. Unlike other locations in the City Room, no one ever claimed there was bomb damage in this corridor. Nor were any reportedly murdered or injured victims located or treated in the area outside the lift.^[8]

The last un-redacted image taken in this short corridor was captured twenty-two minutes *before* the bang. From that point onwards, the corridor video was scrupulously redacted, without explanation. It is reasonable to ask why it was hidden from the Saunders Inquiry and the British public.

Shortly before the bang, Jane Tweddle and Lisa Lees repositioned themselves, seemingly to allow better access to and from the mysteriously redacted lift area. This corridor looks like the ideal staging post for crisis actors to enter the scene in the missing thirty seconds.

While we cannot know if hiding the crisis actor staging post explains the redaction, given all the other evidence we have discussed, it is certainly plausible. No rationale has ever been offered to account for the CCTV redaction.

As we mentioned in Chapter 10, there is no observable physical evidence of anyone fleeing the City Room with an injury consistent with a shrapnel bombing. By 23:42, all the remaining injured “survivors” had been taken from the City Room to the Casualty Clearing Station established on the Victoria Station concourse. Only nineteen of the 22 reportedly deceased were left in the City Room.

In the Saunders Volume 2 Part 1 report, it was noted that Inspector Mike Smith and paramedic Paddy Ennis coordinated the evacuation of the injured from inside the City Room. The first of the thirty-eight “casualties” arrived at the Clearing Station at 23:07.

The report stated:

Between 23:12 and 23:42, when the last casualty arrived in the Casualty Clearing Station, 33 casualties were evacuated from the City Room. All but eight of them were evacuated on makeshift stretchers.

This method of evacuation was quite a remarkable feat. Severely injured people need to be immobilised before they can be moved.^[9] They may have undiagnosed neck or other spinal injuries, unidentified internal bleeding, etc. Moving a badly injured person is a delicate procedure.

Yet, somehow, twenty-five bomb blast victims were taken out of the City Room on “makeshift stretchers” and another eight on medical stretchers at an extremely rapid rate of more than one per minute. Why this dangerous, cavalier way of evacuating the injured was deemed necessary is not entirely clear.

If we accept that nineteen deceased remained at the scene, there is no evidence the total number of injured people—thirty-eight—were in the City Room in the first place. Notwithstanding, one of the major criticisms in the Saunders findings was the length of time the injured waited at the Clearing Station. Saying this “must not happen again,” Sir John Saunders wrote:

By 00:01 on 23rd May 2017, two casualties had left the Casualty Clearing Station. [. . .] By the end of the second hour, nine casualties from the Casualty Clearing Station had left. [. . .] It was not until 02:50 on 23rd May 2017 that the final casualty left the Casualty Clearing Station for hospital.

Saunders is suggesting that thirty-eight severely injured people were hastily removed from the City Room, considerably increasing the risk of further injury, for no evident reason. It would have been much safer for these people to have been initially treated in the City Room and then carefully transported to waiting ambulances once the ambulances arrived.

This would have necessitated a far greater number of first responders entering the City Room than were actually present. We might reasonably speculate that the so-called Casualty Clearing Station was established to ensure those not party to the hoax did not enter the City Room.

In light of this inexplicable evacuation, CCTV images of the exits from the City Room, captured between 22:31 and 23:42, should show at least some physical evidence that at least thirty-eight people who were supposedly struck and badly injured by shrapnel from a TATP suicide bomb were moved out of the City Room along the raised walkway and down the steps to the Clearing Station. But the CCTV images show no such evidence of the alleged evacuation scenario.

Instead, there seem to be only four observable, minor blood trails leading from the City Room. They are so faint that, if they are blood splatter, they

are not clearly distinguishable. There are also images of the stairs leading down from the walkway exit of the City Room. But the CCTV still images show *no sign* of thirty-eight severely injured people being moved along this pathway.

If we contrast this bloodless scene to Abbey Mullen's statement—discussed in Chapter 10—of people with “body parts and bits of skin missing,” we realize there is no primary, real evidence to support the official statement that thirty-eight people with these types of injuries were removed from the City Room.

At 23:15:47, in the midst of the evacuation operation, a CCTV image of the stairs leading down from the walkway exit of the City Room shows nothing to indicate that the removal of injured patients is underway. There is no evidence of discarded dressings, sterile packaging or wrapping, or any of the other debris usually tossed aside by first responders during patient treatment and transport during medical emergencies.

Some very minor possible blood splatter can be seen at the bottom of the stairs leading into the Clearing Station. However, at 23:46:14, four minutes after the last of thirty-eight shrapnel bomb victims were supposedly moved down these stairs, the exact same splatter spots are still observable. None have been smeared by any footfalls.

In all likelihood, then, these spots were *not* blood splatter. But even if they were, they in no way corroborate the official narrative about the Kamikaze evacuation of so many injured people.

The accounts of how and where and when each of the 22 alleged deceased died were detailed and exhaustive, similar to the account of Michelle Kiss. For example, the inquiry's written report of the identification, subsequent pronouncement of death at the scene, and covering of the body of Marcin Klis was highly detailed.

Mr Klis was a large white gentleman with a bald head who was photographed wearing a bright red T-Shirt reportedly the day before^[10] the bang. A composite still compiled from the Barr footage is shown below. Although not very clear in the black-and-white image, it is possible that Mr Klis is number 9.^[11]



It was reported at the Saunders Inquiry that husband and wife Marcin and Angelika Klis stood holding hands before being killed by the blast. Yet there are no images of a couple matching their description in any of the “last few seconds” of CCTV still images captured inside the City Room.

True, the Klises could have been standing in a CCTV blind spot. But if they were, how could the inquiry panel have possibly established as “fact” the presence and the behaviour of Marcin and Angelika Klis in the City Room immediately before the bang?

It is worth considering here what the Barr footage actually evidences. It establishes, as objective fact, that people were lying on the floor in the City Room within the first five minutes after the bang. Besides the Barr footage, expert witness testimony describing what the anatomical destruction caused by a shrapnel bombs would look like establishes, as an objective fact, that the City Room scene is *not* in the least consistent with an *actual* aftermath of a shrapnel bomb that has just exploded in a crowd of people.

Put another way, there is no observable evidence in the Barr footage or from the expert witness testimony that any of these people have injuries caused by a shrapnel bomb. The conspicuous absence of any such injuries seems to rule out the possibility that these people were struck by the blast wind from or the shrapnel propelled by a large TATP explosion. Thus, we have no reason to suspect that any of the people who were seen lying on the floor had been harmed by Salman Abedi's supposed suicide bomb.

We know, as another objective fact, that crisis actors play the roles of deceased and injured people in training exercises. We also know that crisis actors play the same roles in hoaxed terror attacks.

We have primary evidence showing what appears to be a missing thirty seconds in the CCTV record. There is also an inexplicably redacted area outside of the lift that could easily have served as a staging post from which

crisis actors could have entered the City Room in the missing thirty seconds.

All the observable physical evidence shows that the bombing was a hoaxed false flag. It also points to the fact that physical evidence creating the *illusion* of a shrapnel bombing was added to the scene *after* the bang.

Therefore, absent any official account of the anomalies in the timestamps and the CCTV redactions, it is reasonable to surmise that the people seen lying on the floor in the Parker photo and the Barr footage—whoever they may be—had not been killed by a bomb but were crisis actors lying on the floor and pretending to have been killed by a bomb.

We know from the Bickerstaff video^[12] that crisis actors were involved in the Manchester hoaxed false flag operation *before* the bang. And we know from direct evidence that crisis actors operated inside the City Room both *during* and *after* the bang.

Other than Martin Hibbert and his daughter Eve, Ruth Murrell, who said she was standing next to Michelle Kiss, is probably the best-known of the Manchester Arena survivors. Just as Mr Hibbert has continued to maintain a high profile in the legacy media, so, at least in the initial weeks and months following the bang, did Ruth Murrell give more interviews than most of the so-called “victims.”

Her account, both of her proximity to and observations of Michelle Kiss, plus her own supposed injury, were widely reported. The story of Ruth meeting the Queen^[13] naturally received lots of attention.

In the Barr footage, Ruth Murrell is seen walking across the centre of the frame.^[14] She was said to have been standing twenty metres from the epicentre of the blast, but she was actually standing approximately eighteen to nineteen metres away. She was reportedly struck by shrapnel in the right thigh. The shrapnel was allegedly travelling at sufficient velocity and carried enough mass and consequent force to enter the front of her thigh, travel through fifteen centimetres of muscle tissue, and exit cleanly out the back of her leg.

The Barr footage of Murrell should show the movements of a severely injured woman who has just been in a massive bomb blast. It should also show a severely traumatized woman who, less than five minutes earlier, reportedly witnessed the deaths of many people, one of whom was allegedly standing next to her.

As described by Professor Bull, the injury Ruth Murrell had supposedly sustained would have caused the “shearing” of tissue, the “separation” of muscle from bone, and the “tearing of the anatomy.” Yet Ruth Murrell can clearly be seen strutting around on high heels. She is not even limping. She is able to bring her full weight to bear on her allegedly injured leg.


We can be certain that Ruth Murrell was not standing next to Michelle Kiss, though she later claimed she was. But let us for a moment consider what we might expect to see if Ruth were in fact next to Michelle Kiss.

Michelle Kiss reportedly died as the result of head trauma caused by bomb shrapnel. This would have been a very messy injury. Having just witnessed the death of Michelle, Ruth was then recorded walking through the midst of, what should have been, a scene of unimaginable carnage. Few of us could even begin to comprehend such an experience or its immense psychological impact.

As she jauntily strolls across the City Room, unhindered by any injury, not only does Ruth seem unperturbed by anything she has supposedly witnessed—and is currently experiencing—but she does not have a single drop of blood on her anywhere, save for the evident patch of moulage applied to her jeans.^[15]

The legacy media reported Ruth Murrell’s “injury” and showed images of her right leg following corrective surgery. We do not know if these images are of Ruth’s leg or not. That said, the hole shown in the images is consistent with the kind of tissue damage you might expect if her injury were genuine and were sustained as described.

The two images shown below contrast the reported picture of Ruth’s post operative leg (on the right), with a negative close-up of Ruth’s leg and jeans (on the left) captured inside the City Room less than five minutes after the bang.



Left: Observable damage to Ruth Murrell's leg and jeans seen in the Barr footage.
Right: Reported damage to Ruth Murrell's leg following corrective surgery.

Compared to the reported size of the entry and exit wounds Ruth allegedly suffered, her jeans do not have any corresponding rips or tears. The negative (on the left) appears to show what could possibly be a pinhole in Ruth's jeans. But this barely perceptible hole in her clothing in no way comports with the significant amount of tissue she supposedly lost when a bolt was reportedly blown 15cm through her thigh and out the other side by TATP shrapnel bomb.

At the inquiry, alleged shrapnel damage was shown on the fourth metal framed ticket window that was, like Ruth Murrell, approximately nineteen metres away from the epicentre of the so-called bomb. Given her position on the steps, Ruth's leg was at approximately the same height as the damage on the ticket window. The metal frame of the 4th ticket window has a large puncture hole at least five centimetres in diameter.

We know this "damage" was added later. Regardless, had Ruth been hit by shrapnel as reported, we would have seen a very similar large hole torn open in her jeans, not to mention her leg.

The Barr footage was posted on social media soon after the bang. Therefore, the tiny minority who researched the evidence were aware of the video showing Ruth striding across the City Room in her high heels shortly after the bang. The stark contrast between the primary evidence and the official narrative were unmistakable.

Ruth Murrell subsequently gave an interview in which she retold her experience:

There was this, just, a really loud bang and a horrible smell of fireworks and I felt something go in my leg. And I looked down and could only see a tiny little hole in my jeans, so I thought "Ooo, something's gone a bit wrong here", so I turned round to Michelle to say "what the hell was that?" and Michelle was dead on the floor at the side of me with blood coming out of her head. [. . .] A PCSO had come up from the station [he] said "are you hurt?" and I said "no." [. . .] I was completely oblivious to my wounds, I didn't really feel them but they say that's adrenaline kicking in.

It seems likely that this account was offered to try to explain the otherwise inexplicable fact that Ruth Murrell was filmed walking around as she did less than five minutes after sustaining her reported injury. The "tiny little hole" in her jeans can possibly be seen, perhaps lending some credibility to Murrell's account. But if we contrast this pinhole to the image of Murrell's

alleged post-operative leg, and the large hole torn in the “metal” surround of the box-office window, this “little hole” is utterly inconsistent with the entry wound she would have suffered if her so-called injury were “real” and as described in the state’s account.

Soldiers in war zones with shrapnel injuries to their legs require medical assistance precisely because they cannot walk.^[16] Tourniquets are commonly applied to reduce the risk of arterial bleeding. Ruth Murrell had no such treatment provided to her either inside or outside the City Room.

Neither shock nor adrenaline explains how Ruth Murrell was able to walk across the City Room without any sign of physical impairment yet with a supposedly large shrapnel-inflicted hole in her leg. Regardless of her awareness of her “injury” and regardless of her mental state, the mechanical disruption to her anatomy would have left her incapacitated.

Based on his observations of Ruth Murrell’s alleged injury, Richard D. Hall reported:

This is the only close up view of any injury, within the City Room, and it appears to be completely fake.

The point Hall makes is worth emphasising. The only identifiable visual record we have of any “injury” sustained by any “bomb victims” taken inside the City Room after the bang is that of Ruth Murrell—and her “injury” was clearly fabricated using a daub of moulage.

It is patently obvious that Ruth Murrell did *not* suffer the described injury inside the City Room at 22:31:00 on 22nd May 2017. All the observable physical evidence strongly suggests that Ruth Murrell was a City Room crisis actor. Her fellow crisis actors likewise all supposedly incurred “injuries” that are completely at odds with the observable physical evidence.

Described as an iconic image, the photograph of “bomb victim” Eve Senior being supported by two female police officers in the street outside the Arena was distributed by nearly every legacy media outlet. Eve can be seen with a bandage on her left knee, some medical wadding on her left shoulder and a trickle of what looks like blood running from an apparent shoulder wound.^[17]

According to the official account, Eve Senior was supposedly just “a few yards” away from a large TATP, shrapnel-packed suicide bomb. She reportedly suffered fourteen separate shrapnel wounds and sustained

nerve damage to her legs, requiring extensive corrective plastic surgery. Yet the reported level of tissue damage is not in the least observable in the “iconic” image of Eve Senior and her policewomen props.

In short, there is no observable physical evidence that Eve Senior was anywhere near Salman Abedi’s purported shrapnel bomb, as described in the state’s narrative. Her observable physical injuries, photographed shortly after the bang, are wholly inconsistent with such claims.

From the list of known injured casualties, Richard D. Hall was able to identify some in the CCTV stills and gave timestamped examples of when they were last seen in the City Room before the bang:

Tom McCallum	22:14:49
Martin McGuffie	22:14:49
Christopher Wild	22:14:49
Barbara Whittaker	22:28:01
Andrea Bradbury	22:28:01
Daniel Perry	22:28:01
Janet Senior	22:30:41
Josie Howarth	22:30:41
Ruth Murrell	22:30:59
Emily Murrell	22:30:59
Mohammed Agha	22:30:59
Jordan Beak	22:30:59
Dave Middleton	22:30:59
Daniel Perry	22:30:59
Sarah Nellist	22:30:59
Kim McKeown	22:30:59
Jo Aaron	22:30:59
Izzy Aaron	22:30:59

Eighteen of the thirty-eight alleged survivors can be placed in the City Room at some point shortly before the bang. Most of these people reported non-life-threatening injuries such as missing fingers, relatively light bleeding and broken bones. All of this is extremely surprising if they were standing within twenty metres of the TATP shrapnel bomb described in the official account.

Among the most seriously injured survivors were said to be Eve Senior, Bradley Hurley, Paul Price, Lisa Roussos, Eve Hibbert, and Martin Hibbert. None of them are seen in any CCTV images and none of them can be placed within the City Room.

Initially, at least sixty dead, dying, and severely injured people were supposedly lying inside the City Room following a major terrorist attack. If North West Ambulance Service's (NWAS's) reaction to the emergency was not deliberately hindered, it was ridiculous. The seemingly unhinged decision to evacuate people to the Casualty Clearing Station was just one instance typifying the extremely weird emergency medical response.^[18]

It was noted by the Saunders Inquiry:

NWAS Control had not deployed to the scene ambulances that were close by. [. . .] NWAS Control did not act immediately to notify all ambulances allocated to the incident that they should go straight to the Victoria Exchange Complex. A number of ambulances had been sent to Manchester Central Fire Station. The message deploying them to the scene was not given until 23:00.

It was further stated in the inquiry:

By 22:50, there were two ambulances on the forecourt of Manchester Central Fire Station. A third ambulance arrived there at 22:53, a fourth at 22:56, a fifth at 22:59 and a sixth at 23:02

As hard as it may be to comprehend, more than half-an-hour after the bang, NWAS ambulances were being directed away from Manchester Arena.

Paddy Ennis was the first NWAS paramedic to arrive in the City Room. He was initially seen on CCTV crossing the walkway toward the City Room at 22:52:48. At the inquiry, his time of arrival was said to be 22:42, but the evidence shows he did not enter the City Room until at least 22:53. This was twenty-two minutes after the bang.

In the intervening twenty-plus minutes, ETUK were providing the only trained medical response inside the City Room. Of the fourteen available first aid trained responders, ten entered the City Room. Eight arrived almost immediately and two entered at about 22:45.

Of the eight who entered the City Room first, only two, Ian Parry and Ryan Billington, were called to give evidence at the inquiry. None of the remaining six people who were the first to reportedly treat City Room casualties were heard at the inquiry, nor were either of the two who entered at 22:45.

Paddy Ennis, the first paramedic on the scene, stayed for approximately seven minutes, then left the City Room. When asked at the inquiry what actions he took in those seven minutes, Mr Ennis said:

It wasn't to treat casualties because that wouldn't have been appropriate at that stage.

Two more paramedics, Christopher Hargreaves and Lea Vaughan, entered the City Room at 23:15, forty-four minutes after the bang. Up to this point, none of the "injured" had received any treatment from any NWS paramedic.

Up to the forty-fourth minute of the "golden hour," only one NWS paramedic responded inside the City Room—for an emergency supposedly involving, by then, fifty-nine dead, dying, and severely injured casualties. That paramedic, Paddy Ennis, said he didn't treat any casualties.

Forty-four minutes after the bang, NWS paramedics Christopher Hargreaves and Lea Vaughan entered the City Room, and it is far from clear that they treated any casualties.

When the paramedic operations/bronze commander Dan Smith arrived, he directed operations but did not enter the City Room. It was said that only Hazardous Area Response Team (HART) trained paramedics could enter because it was an Operation Plato "hot zone."

This is extremely strange because, as we noted on the previous chapter, GMP Insp Mike Smith was inside the City Room. His presence there apparently enabled him to liaise with Paddy Ennis to organise the crazy evacuation of casualties to the Clearing Station. According to the official account, Insp Mike Smith declared an Operation Plato "cold zone" apparently at 22:50 but certainly no later than 22:55, at which point the City Room was secured by a large number of "well-organised," armed GMP officers.

While Insp Smith did not pass on this designation of the City Room to his line commanders, he certainly could and should have told NWS paramedics, especially Paddy Ennis and Dan Smith. They both arrived after Insp Smith reportedly determined that entry into the City Room was safe.

The idea that HART-trained paramedics were the only people allowed to attend "victims" in the City Room doesn't explain why only three did so.

Another four HART paramedics attended the Arena, but none of them treated anyone in the City Room.

This preposterous situation becomes even more ludicrous when we consider that a number of unarmed BTP and GMP police officers did enter the City Room. They were primarily employed in the apparently pointless task of carrying people out of the City Room on railings and other “makeshift” stretchers.

Given how limited the NWS response was, the number of paramedics and doctors who stated they did not treat any patients is very surprising. Paramedics Paddy Ennis, Dan Smith, Joanne Hedges and Helen Mottram, and Dr Edward Tunn, all stated that it was not their role to treat any dying or injured people. They all testified that they did not treat “any.”

While Christopher Hargreaves was said to have treated some casualties, at the inquiry he stated that his sole role in the City Room was to triage patients.^[19] This means he was assessing the medical priority of those inside the City Room in order to sort and allocate them for subsequent treatment. Presumably the absurd plan was they would receive treatment once they were taken to the Clearing Station.

Lea Vaughan said she worked alongside Christopher and indicated that they did not “engage in any treatment.” Therefore, the evidence suggests that not only did a mere three paramedics attend the scene inside the City Room but none of them actually treated any casualties.

From a medical perspective, the idea of triaging casualties inside the City Room then moving them to the Casualty Clearing Station before providing treatment appears to have been a complete nonsense. The excuse, that the City Room was a “hot zone,” has no basis, because it was declared a “cold zone” by operation/bronze commanders inside the City Room before any paramedics arrived.

Indeed, the question arises whether anyone inside the City Room was suffering from any sort of injury. At the inquiry, paramedic Simon Butler, who arrived at the Arena at 23:10 and stayed until approximately 02:30 in the morning of the 23rd, was asked what treatment he provided. He spent more than three hours attending to victims of the Manchester Arena bombing, including at the Clearing Station.

Paramedic Simon Butler said:

I don't remember seeing anybody on the concourse area [Casualty Clearing Station] that had a large, active bleed. [. . .] There had obviously been significant bleeding, from their clothing, and I saw blood on the floor in the concourse area, but I didn't see a patient actually . . . actually actively bleeding.

Simon Buttler saw blood-stained clothes—presumably like Ruth Murrell's moulaged jeans—but he saw no one who was “actually” bleeding. This rather begs the question how what looked to him like blood on the floor got there in the first place if there wasn't anybody “actively bleeding.”

Further doubt about the presence of “any” bleeding casualties arises when we look at the CCTV image of the ETUK “first responders” exiting the City Room nine minutes after the last of the evacuees were taken to the Clearing Station. Supposedly the ETUK medical team had just been working in an extremely bloody, literal bomb site.

It is possible that they all had the opportunity to shower and get changed in those nine minutes and that they all did so to near pre-operative surgical levels of cleanliness. When we look at the image below, what is certain is that none of them had a speck of blood on them anywhere.



The whole story of the medical response to such a major incident, whether it was declared as such or not, is completely implausible. Certainly, mistakes happen, but the string of claimed “errors” stretches credulity beyond breaking point.

Again, had one planned to isolate the City Room and allow a hoaxed false flag operation to proceed, everything that happened that night with regard to both the emergency medical response and the emergency police

response was conducive to that effort. We should also remember there was no fire service response at all for more than two hours.

It is worth repeating: the only observable physical evidence we have of an injury purportedly sustained inside the City Room is that of Ruth Murrell—and her injury was evidently fake.

It is also worth repeating: the official account of the circumstances of Michelle Kiss' death is false.

Registration of a death cannot proceed^[20] until a qualified medical professional has determined and completed the medical certificate of cause of death (MCCD). Where the cause is suspicious, unnatural, or the result of possible violence, it must first be referred to a coroner.

The coroner decides if further investigation is warranted. The coroner also establishes an inquest into the death if it is deemed necessary. The coroner has the power to order a post-mortem examination (autopsy) to determine the precise medical cause of death.

Post-mortems were reportedly conducted for most of the 22 alleged victims within two days of their “deaths.” As there was supposedly a high likelihood of homicide-related criminal proceedings, the autopsies were undertaken by UK government-approved^[21] forensic pathologists.

The purpose of a post-mortem is to establish the medical cause of death, but it cannot attest to where the person died or the circumstances of the death, nor does it record precisely when the person died. It is solely a judgement of the medical cause of death and likely time of death.

As noted by the UK Crown Prosecution Service^[22] (CPS), “[I]nquests are legal inquiries into the cause and circumstances of a death.” Therefore, for the non-medical cause and the circumstances of their deaths to be clearly determined, inquests for all 22 allegedly deceased “victims” were necessary.

In Master Davison's summary judgement ruling in Richard D. Hall's case, where he effectively denied the existence of the evidence we are currently discussing, he stated^[23]

In addition to the inquests into the deaths, these events have been the subject of a public inquiry conducted by Sir John Saunders pursuant to Section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005.

There were no completed inquests into any of the 22 deceased “victims” of the Manchester Arena bombing. Instead, the subsequent government-controlled Saunders Inquiry was set up in October 2019 and convened in September 2020, more than three years after the reported deaths.

From Volume 1^[24] of the Saunders Inquiry report we read the following, written by John Saunders:

After the deaths, inquests had to take place. In August 2018 I was appointed by the Lord Chief Justice and the Chief Coroner to conduct those inquests as the nominated judge to sit as the Coroner.

John Saunders was appointed coroner for the relevant inquests into the deaths of the 22 deceased and also as chairman of the subsequent Public Inquiry that took their place. In September 2019, Saunders ruled that the inquests would not go ahead^[25] but would instead form part of the Public Inquiry he would lead.

In Volume 1, Saunders continued:

Following a ruling I made in 2019 about the relevance of material to which public interest immunity attaches, the Inquiry was established in October 2019 in order to permit me to investigate that material. Evidence within the scope of the inquests will form part of the material I consider in the Inquiry.

The protracted inquiry severely complicated the coronial process. This prompted solicitors representing some of the bereaved families to express considerable concern.^[26]

MI5 and CTP [Counter Terrorism Police] are likely to get their wish that the [inquest] process will become a Public Inquiry at which much evidence will be heard behind closed doors and without the presence or participation of the bereaved or their lawyers or the scrutiny of the media. Open justice and the rule of law protects us all. Candour and transparency are the friends of justice and accountability, and they help prevent future such outrages. Closed hearings, secret justice, may do the opposite.

Since the 2005 Inquiries Act was put on the statute books, every aspect of so-called UK Public Inquiries has been controlled by the biased pluralist state. In addition, with the appointment of state approved pathologists, the post-mortems were controlled by the state and its selected epistemic authorities.

With complete control of the subsequent inquiry, the UK state set the Saunders Inquiry Terms of Reference (ToR):

To investigate how, and in what circumstances, twenty-two people came to lose their lives in the Attack at the Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017 and to make any such recommendations as may seem appropriate.

The purpose of an inquest is, in considerable part, to determine the *circumstances* of a person's death. With this objective in mind, the non sequitur in the inquiry's ToR is obvious.

What need is there for an "investigation" to ascertain the "circumstances" of a person's death if you have already determined they died "in the Attack at the Manchester Arena on 22nd May 2017"? As far as a supposed investigation into the circumstances of 22 deaths, this procedure was abject nonsense. There was no investigation of those circumstances. The "circumstances" had already been decided before any meaningful coronial deliberations commenced.

Without any inquests into the deaths, nothing more than the UK government-decreed ToR for the Saunders Inquiry determined the "circumstances" of those deaths. To substantiate this narrative, autopsy reports were supposedly submitted by the state's epistemic authorities. Secondary written and oral accounts of the alleged post-mortem results were then presented as "evidence" at the inquiry.

Death certificates, based upon evidence examined at the inquiry, could not be released until the inquiry concluded. Consequently, the issuing of death certificates for the alleged Manchester deceased was a complex, lengthy, and wholly unreliable process.

Based on accounts of written post-mortem reports presented at the inquiry, the death certificates were eventually authorised by the inquiry chairman, enabling local registrars to issue the documents. In light of all the observable physical evidence that was not even mentioned during the inquiry, we can be absolutely certain the inquiry's findings, including determination of the circumstances of the 22 "victims" deaths, were horrendously flawed.

As evidence supposedly "proving" the circumstances of someone's death, the issued death certificates could hardly be more unreliable.

In 2023, six years after the 22 people reportedly lost their lives, some of the bereaved families sought to change the law in England and Wales precisely because they could not register their loved ones' deaths. Ultimately, they were unsuccessful.^[27]

The campaign received support in the House of Lords. Baroness Newlove noted that possible future law changes would come^[28] “too late for the victims of the Manchester Arena bombing.”

The vital “independent” legal process of a coroner’s inquest to examine the *real* circumstances of a person’s suspicious death was not a right afforded to any of the 22 alleged Manchester victims.

The legacy media was willing to report the relatives’ anger regarding the issuance of death certificates. The associated stories essentially supported the official narrative. This controversy was inconsequential compared to the effective denial of proper coronial investigations for what we can only call the “alleged” Manchester victims.

Salman Abedi’s so-called inquest was a perfunctory affair. Contrary to all the evidence indicating he triggered a large pyrotechnic device and fled the Arena, it is fair to say the circumstances of his alleged death were simply assumed.

Sir John Saunders pronounced.^[29]

[Salman Abedi died] when he detonated an explosive device that he had made with his brother and carried into the City Room in a backpack as part of a planned terror attack. In detonating the device the deceased murdered 22 innocent victims and injured many others.

In 2022, the biased pluralist state enacted “the Judicial Review and Courts Act,” thereby amending section 9C of “the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.” This enabled coroners to hold written non-jury inquests. Under the new legislation, all the coroner needs to do is open the inquest. But there is no subsequent hearing that anyone can attend. This change in the state’s “law” came just in time for Saunders to use it.^[30]

Despite Abedi’s inquest being a “documentary inquest”—nothing more than a paper exercise—even the legacy media submitted that they should be allowed to attend the hearing. This was denied. There was no inquest hearing. All information was embargoed until Saunders issued his “document.”

Sir John Saunders outlined three reasons for not needing to bother with an inquest for Abedi. Just as in the cases of the 22 deceased “victims,” the circumstances of Abedi’s death had effectively been pre-determined by the ToR of the inquiry. Sir John Saunders was worried that talking about the circumstances of Abedi’s alleged death would glorify terrorism. Having already wrapped up the state’s narrative at the inquiry, Saunders said there was no evidence to contradict the inquiry’s finding which, therefore, automatically determined there was no evidence to bring the circumstances of Abedi’s death into question.

Other than the fact that most of the inquiry was a public hearing, the so-called inquests for the 22 deceased Manchester Arena victims differed little from Abedi’s. While much greater deliberations were given to the reported circumstances of their deaths, it was all essentially a paper exercise.

In the inquiry that replaced coronial inquests, no observable physical evidence was provided or examined. The detailed post-mortem reports were presented as secondary verbal accounts of written documents. No autopsy images were provided, even in closed session.

There is simply no basis for anything reported about what happened to these people other than the fallacious secondary evidence asserted to be true by the biased pluralist state and its epistemic authorities. But this secondary evidence is wholly inconsistent with the true facts established by primary evidence and should be valued accordingly.

While the public has been convinced by the very sad stories told about the deceased and the traumatic accounts of the injured, the observable physical evidence and much of the secondary evidence, including numerous eyewitness accounts, paints a very different picture.

The evidence, putting the lie to the propagandistic appeal to emotion, comprehensively refutes the biased pluralist state’s tale.

The evidence also proves that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoaxed false flag attack in which no one died and in which no one was injured.

Chapter 16: Sources

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Chapter 17: The *Real* Manchester Attack

The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power of our country. We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.

— Edward Bernays, *Propaganda*^[1]

The Manchester Arena hoaxed false flag is revealed primarily by the observable physical evidence. Having said that, even if we know the official account is false, some aspects of the state's account are almost impossible to reject.

At 23:47, in the [police chatter](#)^[2] recording that was “leaked” to Richard D. Hall, a female officer is heard making the following request:

Can you give a general shout out please. I'm with a twelve year old little girl who has seen her mum get caught up in the blast with a head wound and a fourteen year old girl, her friend, has got leg injuries. Mum's name is Michelle Kiss. [. . .] She's about forty five years old.

The female officer is then informed that Michelle Kiss was believed to be among the deceased “inside at the moment.” She asks the children:

Was another female with her called Ruth Malloy, her friend?

This is plainly a reference to Ruth Murrell. The police officer had the surname wrong.

The police chatter recording has been omitted from all official investigations — just like nearly all the other evidence that did not comport with the state's story.

There is a wealth of primary evidence that points to Manchester being a hoax. But because that evidence has been ignored, obfuscated, and ultimately denied by those who prop up the official story, the majority of the populace finds it impossible to believe that the eyewitnesses and victims to this terror event are providing false accounts.

What is hard for us to understand is that, although some of these witnesses and victims have evidently provided false statements, they may actually believe their own accounts.

There are several possible explanations for this contradiction.

In order to attempt to understand this apparent paradox, it is useful to consider the words of former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who, at a news briefing in 2002, said.^[3]

There are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns. That is to say, we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns, the ones we don't know we don't know.

Here is an example of a “known known”: We know that 22 people were *not* killed in the City Room of the Manchester Arena at 22:31:00 on 22nd May 2017. Yet this certainty—this “known known”—does not for a minute suggest that their bereaved families do not believe with all their minds and hearts that their loved ones were killed. Quite simply, they don't know what they don't know, to paraphrase Rumsfeld.

What could be causing these “not knowing” families to believe a lie? The most powerful influencer has been the UK state. Its narrative about the Arena terror attack has been one-sided. It has made the consequences of publicly disagreeing with that narrative severe—witness its persecution and punishment of Richard D. Hall.

Moreover, the state's version has been overwhelmingly endorsed by all its epistemic authorities, including the entire legacy media, which has breathlessly reported every detail about the “bombing.” The subsequent reports and inquiries and court cases are designed to preserve and protect the fanciful, farcical, entirely fraudulent official story.

Family members who were not with their loved ones when they were said to have died in the “bombing” have had no reason to doubt whatever they've been told. They were informed by trusted authority figures that their loved ones lost their lives in the City Room or as a result of injuries sustained in the City Room. Subsequent funerals were held and death certificates were eventually issued. Their loved ones are gone and, probably for many, their passing is deeply mourned.

Hiding the whereabouts of 22 people is not something counter-terrorism police or the intelligence agencies would find particularly difficult.

Take the year 2013 at random. In 2013, just four years prior to the Manchester “bombing,” an estimated 3,000 people^[4] were reportedly in UK witness protection programmes. Their location and identities are not known to anyone except their immediate protection officers.

Run by the UK National Crimes Agency, the UK Protected Persons Service (UKPPS) explains on its website how it operates:^[5]

[The UKPPS removes] people from the area of threat to a new, safe location. Regional protected persons units will then work with the individual to keep this location discreet and rebuild lives in the new area. To do this we need the cooperation and collaboration of the person at risk. Protected Persons Units work discreetly and with a large degree of secrecy. [. . .] Protected Persons Units have dealt with thousands of cases in the last 20 years or so. Protected persons quietly get on with their new lives in the knowledge that they are supported by the authorities, and safe in their new locations.

If thousands of UK families did not know where their loved ones were in 2013, then it is certainly not unthinkable that four years later, in 2017, some—perhaps all—of the families did not know where their loved ones—the alleged Manchester Arena deceased victims—were. These “victims” might well have been given new lives as “protected persons.”

The fact that UKPPS has a working relationship with EUROPOL^[6] suggests some protected persons have been relocated to other countries in Europe. UKPPS has offices in the US,^[7] so relocation to America also seems feasible. Really, a “protected person” could be living anywhere.

I appreciate that suggesting any of the 22 deceased victims are still alive and possibly living “covert” lives is extremely contentious, but I hope my reason for making that statement is now clear. In case it is not, I will repeat again: *all* the observable physical evidence—the primary evidence—demonstrates that Salman Abedi did *not* detonate a large TATP shrapnel bomb inside the City Room.

This irrefutable fact being established, we can deduce that no one was killed by the nonexistent bomb. Therefore, some other explanation *must* account for their absence from their families today. Possibly their absence is being concealed by the state or elements aligned with the state. That is just one of a multitude of possibilities.

Millie Kiss was a twelve-year-old child when her account was reported by the police officer in the chatter recording. We cannot rule out that Millie was

wittingly providing a false statement. There are other examples of children being coerced or threatened into lying to the public—sometimes with horrendous consequences.

In 1990, fifteen-year-old Nayirah Al-Sabah testified before a US congressional hearing committee, claiming to be an eyewitness to the following:^[8]

I saw the Iraqi soldiers come into the hospital with guns. They took the babies out of incubators, took the incubators and left the children to die on the cold floor.

This was false eyewitness testimony. Nonetheless, Nayirah's account was widely reported by the legacy media and was subsequently used as part of the claimed justification for US military intervention in Kuwait and later in Iraq. The 1991 Gulf War, which triggered a US military campaign in the Middle East, ultimately costing millions of lives, began, in no small part, with propaganda based upon the lies of a child.

In 1993, two ten-year-old boys, Robert Thompson and Jon Venables, kidnapped, tortured, and brutally murdered two-year-old toddler James Bulger. When a member of the public saw that James Bulger had a bruised and cut forehead and temporarily intervened to question Thompson and Venables, the two older boys lied, saying that James had stumbled. The passerby was reassured and left the scene. The two boys then carried on with their plot, leading James to his death. Venables later confessed to his crime, but Thompson denied everything and consistently lied.^[9]

When these two child murderers reached adulthood, they were released on parole. The state hid their whereabouts and new identities—ostensibly for their own protection. To date, no one knows where Robert Thompson is. He remains a “protected person.” Venables was reconvicted on various counts of child sexual offences and has served subsequent sentences.

Of course, I am not equating the child Millie Kiss with child murderers or with state propagandists. My point is that children can and do lie, sometimes when they are forced to do so, and sometimes these lies turn out to have immense significance.

Other explanations for Millie's incorrect report of the circumstances of her mother's death are conceivable. Some are more plausible than others.

There is, at least theoretically, the possibility that Millie Kiss had a false memory broadcast directly into her brain. That may sound unlikely, but bear with me; the suggestion is not as crazy as it sounds.

The development of the Brain Computer Interface^[10] (BCI) is touted as a way for humans to communicate with, and thus control, technology. The communication is reciprocal. For example, the advent of Voice to Skull (V2K) technology offers the possibility of using the “Frey effect” to transmit modulated microwave frequencies into the brain, which the receiver experiences as sound.^[11]

As far back as 1998, the US Department of Defence document “Bioeffects of Selected Nonlethal Weapons” noted.^[12]

Application of the microwave hearing technology could facilitate a private message transmission. It may be useful to provide a disruptive condition to a person not aware of the technology. Not only could it be disruptive to the sense of hearing, it could be psychologically devastating if one suddenly heard “voices within one’s head.”

In 2019, the US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) awarded funding to six research teams in the Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology (N3) program. The objective was to develop non-surgical two-way communication technology between computers and the human brain.^[13]

Accompanying DARPA’s N3 funding announcement was this press statement.^[14]

The Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology (N3) program aims to develop high-performance, bi-directional brain-machine interfaces. [. . .] N3 technology would not require surgery and would be man-portable, thus making the technology accessible to a far wider population of potential users. The envisioned N3 technology [. . .] has the precision to read from and write to 16 independent channels within a 16mm volume of neural tissue. [. . .] Each channel is capable of specifically interacting with sub-millimeter regions of the brain with a spatial and temporal specificity. [. . .] N3 researchers are working to develop solutions that address challenges such as the physics of scattering and weakening of signals as they pass through skin, skull, and brain tissue, as well as designing algorithms for decoding and encoding neural signals that are represented by other modalities such as light, acoustic, or electro-magnetic energy.

All this is to say that DARPA openly admitted—two years after the Arena hoax—that it was attempting to construct a portable device potentially capable of transmitting images and sound directly into the human brain.

As we know, if this is what the developers of military nuerotechnology were willing to publicly admit to in 2019, they had already surpassed this capability. Safe to say, such technology is even further advanced today.

Another example: In 2016, US embassy staff in Cuba started complaining of strange symptoms, such as dizziness, headaches, and strange auditory hallucinations. The so-called Havana Syndrome led the US government to accuse the Cuban government of using directed energy weapons.^[15]

The US intelligence agencies denied the allegations made by their own government. A few US officials, notably some of the embassy staff, explored possible litigation in response to the Anomalous Health Incidents (AHI) harm they allegedly incurred. When US legal representatives used freedom of information legislation to access more details about the AHI cases, they learned that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was deliberately obstructing justice.^[16]

So, the idea that children like Millie or any other witness or self-proclaimed victim has had false memories beamed into their heads is not beyond the realm of possibility, even if other explanations for their behaviour are far more likely.

For many years, child testimony was considered particularly unreliable. The common thought was that children had a propensity for providing false statements. Latterly, though, this assumption has been challenged, as further studies suggest that the presumed higher prevalence of “false memories” among children may be incorrect. False memories, it seems, are common throughout life—not just in childhood.^[17]

The online magazine Psychology Today also offers a “respected” bimonthly print journal with articles written by clinicians, qualified experts, and researchers from across the fields of behavioural science and psychology. Formerly owned and published by the American Psychological Association (APA), Psychology Today reflects the prevailing opinion of the epistemic authorities in the field of behavioural research and psychology, including experimental psychology.

In an undated issue, an article in the print edition of Psychology Today reports.^[18]

Human memory is pliable and easy to manipulate. [. . .] Research has found that a child may be especially susceptible to the implanting of false memories by parents or other authority figures. [. . .] But adults can also be tricked into remembering events that never happened, or changing the details of things that really did happen.

This raises the possibility that many of the purported Arena witnesses, including some victims who said they were injured that night, may genuinely believe they saw—or were harmed by—a shrapnel bomb in the City Room.

Memory implantation is a common technique used in cognitive psychology experiments. The objective, when its use is benign, is to help researchers understand how memory functions in the hope of better treating debilitating mental health problems such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Perhaps the most famous memory implant experiment was conducted by a team of researchers from Washington University in 1995. They “distorted” the subjects’ memories by using an unbelievably simple method.

The researchers asked each subject to recall childhood memories. As each subject spoke, the researchers wrote down the accounts in front of the subjects. The researchers then added to the testimony a false account that the subject had supposedly given of being lost in a shopping mall. Next, the researchers read summaries of all the accounts—including the false shopping mall statement—back to the subjects. The researchers asked the subjects to elaborate on what they could remember about each event they heard read aloud to them.

Remarkably, across a number of repeated studies, an average of thirty-seven percent of the subjects offered specific details about their experience of being lost in the mall. In other words, they were remembering an event that had never happened.^[19]

Researchers have found that the use of visual stimuli improves the efficiency of memory implantation. In one study,^[20] Canadian psychologists used doctored images to try to implant the false memory of a childhood balloon ride in the study’s subjects. They were successful half of the time: A full fifty percent of the subjects supplied partial or complete details of those made-up balloon rides.

In 2021, researchers from the Institute of Psychology in Braunschweig, Germany, conducted a comprehensive review of the available literature on memory implantation. They found.^[21]

Free and guided imagery, as well as suggestive statements, could induce false beliefs or false memories in, on average, 20%–50% of the participants who underwent experimental manipulation. [. . .] A false belief induction may occur after dream interpretation or hypnosis in more than 50% of participants.

Memory implantation techniques have improved markedly by combining strategies. Further research was conducted by a team from University of Hagen in Germany later in 2021. They combined “massive suggestion” and “minimal suggestion” to increase the implantation rate. Massive suggestion led fifty-six percent of subjects to develop entirely false memories.

The same researchers went further and mixed massive suggestion—essentially making up an entirely false memory using prolonged exposure to suggestion—with anecdotes of real events that had occurred. By shaping the false narrative to be congruent with real memories and therefore more plausible for the subject, an additional twenty-eight percent of subjects believed they held the false memory and simply assumed they had forgotten the details. That is to say, whether they imagined they could directly recall it or not, eighty-four percent of the subjects believed the false memory they were given by the researchers.^[22]

In a follow-up interview, the lead researcher in the University of Hagen study, Prof Dr Aileen Oeberst, said:^[23]

I find it so interesting, but also scary, that we base our entire identity and what we think about our past on something that’s so malleable and fallible. If people try and search [for a memory] they usually find something. [. . .] Faulty memory may not matter in everyday life [. . .] but very precise memory does matter when we’re talking about [. . .] legal cases. It matters whether the bad guy had curly hair or straight hair or whether the car went through a red light or a green light.

Indeed, it matters if the bomb you “remember” was a TATP shrapnel bomb or a large pyrotechnic device capable of making a loud bang sound but incapable of severely injuring anyone. And it matters if you remember being struck by shrapnel inside the foyer of an arena when you may have instead been injured by some other mechanism somewhere else.

The memory implantation examples we have explored in this chapter were conducted by scientists whose motive is to help people. But the biased pluralist state has no such altruistic motive. It serves the establishment,

which is led by a so-called economic-elite known for its lack of empathy for those it harms.

Unsurprisingly, the state, in country after country around the world, has conducted psychological experiments on human subjects for entirely nefarious purposes. Scientists in the German Nazi regime, Cuban revolutionaries, and the Soviets all researched the potential for weaponising psychology. They subjected individuals to cruel experiments, often as a form of punishment. At the same time, the development of mind control techniques was being widely undertaken.^[24]

Probably the most infamous of government mind control programs was the joint CIA/Department of Defense Project MKULTRA.^[25] Exposed in 1974 by investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, Project MKULTRA was officially acknowledged during the subsequent Rockefeller Commission and Church Committee investigations.

These congressional hearings resulted in US President Gerald Ford issuing an executive order in 1976 that supposedly banned US intelligence and defence agencies from conducting mind control experiments. Professor Alfred McCoy would later describe MKULTRA^[26] as a “veritable Manhattan Project of the mind.”

Project MKULTRA was preceded by Project Bluebird and Project ARTICHOKE. They comprised a sprawling, nationwide, two-decades-long series of covert experimental psychology programs conducted in military bases, universities, hospitals, and prisons across the US and Canada. So far, 149 MKULTRA subprojects have been identified.^[27] Some were so horrible as to be beyond imagination.

Subproject 68, for one, was led by Scottish-born psychiatrist Dr Donald Ewen Cameron, who performed grisly experiments in both the US and Canada. Under the guise of treating schizophrenia, Dr Cameron used psychotropic and paralytic drugs, electroconvulsive shock therapy, and drug-induced comas in his attempts to wipe subjects' memories and reprogram their minds.^[28] The extent to which Cameron's experiments were “successful” remains a matter of debate.

Another MKULTRA program, Subproject 84, was conducted at Harvard University in 1960. Its stated purpose was to “study of the induction of high motivation in individuals by means of specific interpersonal relationships.” It was run under the cover of the Society for Investigation of Human Ecology.

On a related note, Theodore (Ted) Kaczynski gained notoriety after he was finally identified and apprehended for anonymously mailing package bombs to his victims. His bombs killed three and injured twenty-three between 1978 and 1995. Better known as the Unabomber, Kaczynski was, it turns out, unwittingly subjected to the experiments^[29] of Harvard University psychologist Henry A. Murray when Kaczynski was an undergrad majoring in mathematics between his sophomore year (1959) and his graduation (1962).

Henry Murray was a former Lieutenant Colonel in the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War Two. The OSS became the CIA and, alongside the UK's MI6, developed the psychological warfare techniques of the "strategy of tension" to ultimate effect during Operation Gladio.

According to Murray, the experiment he and his team of psychologists conducted on the young Unabomber-to-be, Ted Kaczynski, and a group of other students exposed these subjects to "vehement, sweeping, and personally abusive" attacks.

In an article for Psychology Today,^[30] University of Pennsylvania Professor of Ethics Dr Jonathan D. Moreno wrote that "the Harvard study aimed at psychic deconstruction by humiliating undergraduates and thereby causing them to experience severe stress." Murray's objective, Dr Moreno noted, was to destroy the subjects' egos and belief systems. Kaczynski was bombarded with this stressful treatment for three years.

Though it isn't entirely clear which MKULTRA mind control experiment almost certainly contributed to the creation of the Unabomber, it appears that Subproject 84, which sought to create highly motivated individuals, is a strong possibility.^[31]

Despite the plausible deniability exercised by the political establishment, there is no evidence that mind control experiments have ceased. Rather, there is more evidence that they have instead been enhanced by technology.^[32]

How do the description of MKULTRA and Dr Cameron and the Unabomber relate to Manchester Arena? Well, we know that some people who believe they were victims of the Arena bombing have unclear and confused memories of the event. Martin Hibbert's recollections, for example, have shifted considerably over his years of talking about what he insists was a real terror attack.

During his summary judgment of Richard D. Hall, Master Davison defended Mr Hibbert's inconsistencies.^[33]

Mr Hibbert has explained the alleged inconsistencies in his account of the incident and his injuries. Given the highly traumatic nature of the event and the multiple times that he has recounted his experiences and heard others recount theirs, it would be surprising if there were not inconsistencies.

It is true that Mr Hibbert has recounted his experience many, many times. His interviews are featured in at least 160 legacy media print articles alone. His apparent “false memory” inconsistencies include his belief that the bombing took place in the main Arena, not the City Room; that he saw Salman Abedi walk into the main Arena; and that he brushed shoulders with Salman Abedi. Initially, Mr Hibbert thought the encounter with Abedi happened as he—Mr Hibbert—walked out of the main Arena, but later Mr Hibbert thought this encounter happened as he walked into the City Room.

Then there was the matter of Martin Hibbert's remarks about the Kerslake Report. In an interview given to Channel 4, he said:

You know I was promised the truth in the Kerslake Report, [. . .] it was hard because you're thinking are the thoughts that I've got and the visions that I've got, am I making them up? You know are they make believe because this didn't happen? This stuff that I'm reading like it's a different episode. It's not what happened that night.

His recollection that the account of events given in the Kerslake Report is “not what happened that night” is notable, because the Kerslake Report stuck rigidly to the official state narrative. Here, it seems Mr Hibbert is among the people who are somewhat perplexed by the state's story and by the events that transpired.

The observable physical evidence and even the official account reveal that Mr Hibbert's memory of the Manchester Arena bombing is to a large extent wrong. It seems he has come to accept the official narrative rather than clearly remember it. As we have just discussed, this does not necessarily indicate that he is lying. Mr Hibbert might genuinely believe he was there and was injured by shrapnel from what he has been told was Salman Abedi's TATP suicide bomb.

Other psychological experiments suggest further possible reasons why Arena witnesses, like Mr Hibbert or Ruth Murrell, may have been

susceptible to psychological manipulation and perhaps the implantation of “false memories.”

Many people are familiar with the experiments conducted by Stanley Milgram at Yale University in the 1960s. While legitimate criticism of his scientific method can be made, he nonetheless demonstrated the human capacity to obey orders given by perceived authority figures even when following those orders inflicted serious harm on others.^[34]

Fewer people are aware of the experiments done by Solomon Asch, which preceded and influenced Milgram’s work. Asch demonstrated that people have a deep psychological need to conform to their peers. In one Asch experiment, when confronted with information they knew to be false, up to seventy-six percent of people made it clear, by their answers, that they would rather agree with their peers and claim false information was true than offer a conflicting opinion.^[35]

The psychological need to conform, combined with the conditioned belief that we must obey authority figures, form character traits that are stronger in some than in others. For example, if we consider how crisis actors may have been chosen to perform the Manchester Arena hoax, it is highly likely that psychological profiling would have been a key component of the selection process and that order-following traits would have been desirable.

We know that individuals more prone to conformity and obedience are targeted for recruitment into cults. In a June 2021 article for Psychology Today, cult expert Dr Steven A Hassan observed:^[36]

Cult leaders want people who will be obedient to them and their rules. They look for ways to “break” people; they want people who will work hard and long hours for little or no pay. They want “willing” slaves.

According to Dr Hassan, cult recruiters are on the lookout for people who are psychologically vulnerable. Their vulnerability may be the result of a recent trauma or of other life experiences that lead to emotional instability.

Could the same kind of vulnerable person be inclined toward crisis acting? It certainly appears likely. It is evident that the crisis actor recruitment process is not unlike indoctrination into a cult. Compliant people with a strong belief in authority (in the need for leaders and the need to be led), especially those who have psychological vulnerabilities, appear to be the ideal candidates.

What are the reasons anyone—child or adult—would want to be a crisis actor? Certainly, children are willing to do as instructed by their parents. If their parents believe in a cause, children are likely to follow it, if only until they develop into adults themselves.

The esteemed Prof Dr Alexandra Stein—University of Birkbeck, University of Westminster, University of Minnesota, University of Sussex—specialises in the social psychology of ideological extremism. In an interview published by Psychology Today, Dr Stein noted the factors that lead individuals to embrace cult ideology:^[37]

The same dynamic that occurs in domestic violence also applies to cults. First a person is lured to a group or person who seemingly shares their interests and concerns. They may then be subject to a kind of love-bombing, given extreme amounts of attention. [. . .] Then begins an attempt to isolate the person from friends and family. [. . .] That paves the way for the group to engage in “terror” tactics, arousing a sense of threat, whether it’s fear of the apocalypse, fear of being criticized, fear of the outside world, or some other group-specific fear.

There is no evidence that anyone from CrisisCast—the UK company we have often mentioned in this book—or anyone connected to CrisisCast had anything to do with the Manchester Arena hoax. That said, the insights of one of the CrisisCast lead producers, Brian Mitchell, who was interviewed by The Mackenzie Institute in 2015, gives us a glimpse into the world of crisis actors:^[38]

Trained by behavioural psychologists, our specialist role-play actors – many with SC clearance – are rigorously rehearsed in criminal and victim behaviour. This level of expertise and accuracy is used to help police, government agencies, the military and the emergency services.

Crisis actors who have been granted “SC clearance” have undergone National Security Vetting.^[39] The state has investigated these individuals in order to “understand [their] behaviour in a variety of circumstances.” This enables the state to select crisis actors who present a low risk to the state’s “national security interests,” i.e., those who are the most compliant and subservient to authority and who are, for whatever reason, the most psychologically vulnerable.

Crisis actors are “trained by behavioural psychologists” because the state wants SC-cleared crisis actors whose views are aligned with state interests. The trait of submission to authority enhances the state’s ability to

psychologically mould the crisis actor, thereby easing the task of monitoring and controlling their behaviour.

Speaking further in the 2015 interview, Mr Mitchell said:

We 'cast' our actors in response to intelligence about the specific exercise so that the training we provide reflects the current threat. For example, we have recently deployed actors to represent homegrown extremists, radicalized here in the UK. We work with laser like precision on the behaviours.

As highlighted by Prof Dr Stein, SC-cleared crisis actors share the "interests and concerns" of the state. They are given "extreme amounts of attention." They are vetted and trained by highly qualified professionals. They almost certainly feel special and are told that their role is important. The effect of all this recognition is to "isolate the person" in the exciting and secretive world of the counter-terrorism-trained crisis actor.

Mr Mitchell also spoke of "laser guided" behavioural training that "reflect[s] the current threat." The SC-cleared crisis actor is instructed in advance on the asserted nature of the threat—the alleged threat of "homegrown extremists, radicalized here in the UK," for example. Prof Dr Stein referred to the terror tactics that are used by a cult-like group to arouse "a sense of threat" and to generate a "group-specific fear."

The prospective crisis actor is exposed to the same dynamic of control that the target of domestic abuse experiences. The parallels between the indoctrination of a cult member, the luring of a would-be abuse victim, and the recruitment of an SC-cleared crisis actor are glaring.

In Chapter 6 we pointed out that not every crisis actor is a professional (or even semi-professional) SC-cleared role player. Of the 800 or more who participated in the Winter Accord exercise, most were probably just volunteers and hobbyists who saw it as nothing more than a bit of fun. For instance, when US firefighter Brian Muscatt agreed to be a crisis actor bomb victim,^[40] he said he did so because he thought "it would be a blast."

There is no evidence that any of the crisis actors used in the Manchester Arena hoax were SC-cleared. Still, when the state (or elements within it) prepared the Manchester hoax, they would have vetted select participants, just as they would any SC-cleared crisis actor. Presumably, the Manchester hoax actors would also have undergone psychology-based behavioural "training."

For the Manchester Arena hoax, we are not talking about a very large group of people. The people *outside* of the City Room, who were convinced a real bomb had exploded, were not involved in the hoax. Their eyewitness accounts of the stampede, the injuries caused in the panic, the smoke, the appalling smells, the sirens, and the sight of injury and blood were genuine.

Other than the core conspirators themselves, only the people who remained *inside* the City Room would have known the bombing was fabricated. Given that the numbers of “victims” inside the City Room appears to have been closer to thirty than sixty and given that we have no idea what happened to the 22 reportedly deceased, if we then consider the addition of immediate first responders, who must also have been aware of the hoax, that total is no more than some sixty hoax-aware people *inside* the City Room.

Fifty-nine people claim to have been injured in the City Room. It is safe to assume that the thirty-eight who were supposedly evacuated to the Clearing Station must have had some sort of awareness of the hoax but that the other twenty-one may have been oblivious. The motivations of the latter group are, as Rumsfeld would say, “known unknowns.”

The UK government says that “caveats and/or restrictions” may be placed on SC-cleared crisis actors. Such restrictions may well include the signing of non-disclosure agreements or even signing the Official Secrets Act.^[41] Such binding legal agreements, if enforceable on the Manchester Arena hoax crisis actors, would have assured their compliance with the official narrative after the event.

We cannot rule out simple threats or other means of coercion. Richard D. Hall investigated the personal circumstances of many of the “victims” and their families. His investigation led to the possibility that some of the 22 deceased may have been previously injured in accidents that could have exposed them or their families to potential criminal prosecutions. Were deals made in return for compliance? Again, these are “known unknowns.”

Admittedly, we are fumbling about in the dark here. All we know is that the Manchester Arena bombing was a hoax. Despite that certainty, some people continue to maintain they were inside the City Room and witnessed the bombing. And some of them say they saw loved ones killed or injured or may claim they themselves were injured in the blast.

We know their accounts cannot be true. Nonetheless, in trying to understand their motivations, we should not rule out the possibility that they may honestly believe their own presumably false memories.

Alternatively, or in addition, they may have been brainwashed into a cult mentality and believe that what they are doing is in the interests of national security or serves some other imaginary noble purpose. Still others could have been coerced or otherwise forced to go along with the official deceit.

The argument has already been made that the “obvious” reason why so many witnesses, including children, have given accounts congruent with the state’s narrative is because the state’s account really *is* true. Our search for an alternative explanation is the product of our own cognitive bias and dissonance, some say.

Dear reader, you may have noticed that I am not a big fan of the state. Certainly, I need to recognise my own biases. May I humbly submit that you, too, would be wise to recognise this author’s biases. Perhaps I am “seeing” only the evidence that questions the state and rejecting the evidence that upholds the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing.

Even if I were letting my bias distort my perspective, we still have a problem: we would need to trust all the eyewitness accounts and overlook all the primary evidence that comprehensively obliterates the state’s—and those eyewitnesses’—version of events.

Evidence—observable, verifiable, irrefutable physical evidence—simply doesn’t work like that. Eyewitness accounts that run contrary to the observable physical evidence require rational explanation, precisely because there is nothing substantial or credible to corroborate those accounts.

We do not know what happened to the 22 reportedly deceased. Some or all may have been killed by other means at another time and location. Initially this wouldn’t appear to make much sense. Why not simply run a MIHOP or LIHOP false flag in the City Room and kill whoever was there? This question assumes the core conspirators saw no advantage in running a hoaxed false flag.

If you recall we spoke in Chapter 6 about the potential “honey trap” that hoaxed, as opposed to LIHOP or MIHOP, false flags possibly facilitate. In both LIHOP and MIHOP operations, while the attack is controlled to an

extent, if you kill people using bombs you cannot know exactly how many will die or be injured.

But if the entire event is scripted, as it is in a hoaxed attack, you can control the narrative with precision. This may afford the core conspirators an opportunity to lay said “honey trap” for prospective independent journalists and researchers like Richard D. Hall—and me.

Let’s see how a possible “honey trap” was constructed. We will start by reiterating the official story of the Manchester Arena bombing, which runs as follow:

On **22nd** of May 2017, **22** people were killed by a **22**-year-old Islamist terrorist Salman Abedi who committed suicide when he detonated his TATP bomb at **22.31:00**.

The bomb detonated just after Ariana Grande ended her set, following the conclusion of her **22nd song**.^[42]

Martin Hibbert, the most well-known of the surviving victims, was struck by **22** pieces of shrapnel. Mr Hibbert gave testimony to the subsequent Saunders Inquiry on **22nd** July 2021.

Apparently, the intelligence agencies missed **22 key pieces of information**^[43] in their alleged “failure” to stop Abedi.

Richard D. Hall is due to stand trial on **22nd July 2024**.^[44]

What are the odds that “**22**” appears so frequently simply at random instead of by design? Extremely remote. If we consider that this was a contrived hoax, it seems entirely feasible that “**22**” was deliberately inserted into the narrative.

Now, reflect upon how many other terror attacks in recent years have taken place on the **22nd** of any month:

Norwegian attacks (perpetrator Anders Breivik) — **22/07/2011**

Woolwich attack (Lee Rigby murder) — **22/05/2013**

Brussels bombings (Islamic State) — **22/03/2016**

Munich mass shooting (David S.) — **22/07/2016**

London attack (Westminster Bridge) — **22/03/2017**

Manchester Arena attack — **22/05/2017**

Crocus City Hall Attack (Russia) — 22/03/2024

There is an approximately one-in-thirty chance of a terrorist attack occurring on any given date of the month. Yet in this century there have been sixteen major terror attacks—in which more than ten people were murdered by non-state actors—on the European continent (including Russia). Of these sixteen, five major terror attacks have reportedly happened on the 22nd of the month.^[45]

That represents a statistically significant, nearly one-in-three chance of a major terror attack taking place on the 22nd of the month. That is almost ten times higher than random statistical chance.

Therefore, we are faced with a choice. We can believe that the 22nd of the month just *happens* to present ten times the terrorist attack risk present on any other day. As part of that happenstance, we could accept that the 22nd of March (3/22) is by far the deadliest day of the year in any given year. Or we could consider the possibility that the number “22” and the number “3” both might have some sort of significance.

There are 22 paths^[46] to the Kabbalists’ Tree of Life. If we also consider ten Sephiroth as paths, there are 32 paths in all. There are also 22 major arcana^[47] in the Tarot deck. Therefore 22, 32, and 3/22 (32 or 22 paths) all have occult significance.

I am *not* suggesting for one moment that the Manchester Arena hoaxed false flag was, in any sense, an “occult” ritual. But I *am* suggesting that the excessive repetition of “22” in the state’s narrative could have been Easter Eggs^[48] deliberately inserted into the story to alert independent researchers to the hoax. The core conspirators would have nothing to fear and everything to gain from doing so.

How would tipping off journalists who are not on the side of the state benefit the state? One possible answer: Independent investigative journalists face an uphill battle to overcome the cognitive dissonance of people who simply cannot accept that state-orchestrated domestic false flag terrorism—Operation Gladio, for example—ever happens. If the same investigators and researchers start chattering about the occult symbolism of an attack, the general public will instantly dismiss them as cranks and lunatics—even before anyone bothers to label them as conspiracy theorists.

But, if alerted by the Easter Eggs in the story and if that false flag is a hoax where people were said to have died, independent journalists who are

familiar with the observable physical evidence will inevitably conclude that those deaths did not occur in the circumstances described.

Once the legacy media reports the conclusion of the independent journalists as “hate speech,” the reports of hoaxed deaths can be used by the state to claim that consequent court cases and further oppressive legislation are justified.

Sure enough, as a direct consequence of the Manchester Arena bombing story, the UK government has introduced the “Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill,” affectionately known as Martyn’s Law—a tribute to Manchester “victim” Martyn Hett. Also, the state seems intent on rolling out legislation designed to prevent anyone from questioning the state’s absurd terror attacks stories. The act will perhaps be known as “Hibbert’s Law”—a tribute to “victim” Martin Hibbert. (Or could there be a Martyn’s Law and a Martin’s Law?)

The public is willing to accept amped-up levels of surveillance and censorship that come with new legislation because, like the SC-cleared crisis actors, they have been convinced more terrorist threats are ahead. What they do not realize is that the very same state pretending to save them from terror campaigns is behind many of these so-called threats.

Frankly, it is staggering what the public allows the state to do to them when fear of an unknown threat looms large.

The “Data Protection and Digital Information Bill” has been presented to parliament to allegedly tackle, among other listed crimes, the ostensible scourge of terrorist financing. If enacted, it will amend the Data Protection Act of 2018 to give the state additional powers for the purposes of detecting, investigating, or preventing crimes^[49] “such as fraud, money-laundering, terrorist financing, etc.”

What this effectively means is that the state is asserting its “legal” authority to snoop and monitor our personal bank accounts.^[50] The claim of tackling “terrorist financing” appears to be an excuse to invade each individual’s privacy. Evidently, what the state initially wishes to do is establish its “legal” power to gather data on the personal finances of all welfare payment recipients, including British pensioners.

The state never relinquishes sociopolitical power; it only seizes more. Once on the statute books and under the already-introduced guise of tackling terrorist financing, it is not difficult to envisage how this legislation will be extended to encompass *everyone’s* personal bank accounts.^[51]

But these ever-more-onerous levels of authoritarian dictatorship are likely to be accepted by most people, who are gullible enough to believe the state's fabricated, fear-inducing stories about terrorism. It is crucial that we understand how psychology and propaganda have been weaponised by the state and used against us.

Returning to the mind control projects: Before the US state embarked on Operation MKULTRA, military psychologists in the UK had begun the process of using psychology as means of social engineering. During World War Two, British army psychiatrist Brigadier John Rawlings Rees joined fellow psychiatrists and psychologists from the UK's Tavistock Clinic in the Directorate of Army Psychiatry. Following the war, with financial support from the Rockefellers, Rawlings Rees co-founded the Tavistock Institute.

In 1940, Rawlings Rees, then a Colonel, published a paper titled "Strategic Planning for Mental Health."^[52] In it, he wrote:

Let us then turn our interest and perhaps some of our aggressive qualities, onto this vast problem of mental health, as one of the adventures of the present day, and see what we personally can plan and achieve. [. . .] We can justifiably stress our particular point of view with regard to the proper development of the human psyche. [. . .] We must aim to make it [psychology] permeate every activity in our national life. [. . .] Public life, politics and industry should all of them be within our sphere of influence. [. . .] We have done much to infiltrate the various social organisations throughout the country. [. . .] We have made a useful attack upon a number of professions. The two easiest of them naturally are the teaching profession and the Church; the two most difficult are law and medicine. [. . .] If we are to infiltrate the professional and social activities of other people[,] I think we must imitate the Totalitarians and organize some kind of fifth column activity!

Col Rawlings Rees' hoped-for infiltration has happened. Psychology has been transformed into a weapon against the people and is now habitually used by every biased pluralist state and its public and private partners. No longer can we be said to be autonomous individuals who make independent decisions based on what is best for us and our families and communities. Instead, we have been re-programmed to become what the state calls "situated decision-makers."

In 2010, the UK government's Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), often referred to as the "Nudge Unit," produced a document titled MINDSPACE.

^[53] The report outlined how a government could misuse behavioural change

psychology, commonly utilised as part of psychological talking therapies, to engineer society.

MINDSPACE stressed the importance of the state avoiding any discussion of evidence and recommended that the state focus on overcoming peoples' rational minds, using psychological manipulation. Notably, this manipulation could be achieved, MINDSPACE observed, without the subjects (us) even being aware that they (we) are effectively being programmed:

People's behaviour may be altered if they are first exposed to certain sights, words or sensations. [. . .] People behave differently if they have been 'primed' by certain cues beforehand. Emotional responses to words, images and events can be rapid and automatic. People can experience a behavioural reaction before they realise what they are reacting to. [. . .] This shifts the focus of attention away from facts and information, and towards altering the context within which people act. [. . .] Behavioural approaches embody a line of thinking that moves from the idea of an autonomous individual, making rational decisions, to a 'situated' decision-maker, much of whose behaviour is automatic and influenced by their choice environment. [. . .] Citizens may not fully realise that their behaviour is being changed—or, at least, how it is being changed."

The legacy media stories we were told about the Manchester hoax were part of the priming process. Subsequent stories churned out about brave victims and the legal pursuit of the intelligence agencies' "mistakes" have consistently shifted our "focus of attention away from facts and [away from gathering] information" about the hoax.

The same state-run media has featured tragic accounts and distressing images and reports of Manchester as a way of eliciting emotional, sympathetic responses. Also, they have constantly highlighted the terrorist threat, thus "altering the context" within which we act.

What the state and media psyops have done is create a "choice environment." That is, we are offered the "choice" of either accepting the alleged ever-present risk of terrorist attacks or of embracing the legislation supposedly designed to "keep us safe." We imagine we are making a free choice, whereas, in reality, we have been situated within the state's limited and desired "choice environment."

So successful have the UK state's Nudge Unit psychological programming efforts been that now other countries seek to avail themselves of these

cutting-edge propaganda techniques. The Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) was farmed out to become a thriving global public-private partnership.^[54]

Founded in 2010, the Behavioural Insights Team has grown from a seven-person unit at the heart of the UK government to a global social purpose company of over 200 professionals across many offices around the world.

Partnering with numerous federal governments are the likes of the United Nations, the World Bank, the Bank of England, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Global Innovation Fund, Bloomberg Philanthropies, Meta, Sky, Reach, Santander, HSBC, and Unilever. All these entities are the BIT's "partners." We mustn't forget to mention one all-important partner: Manchester City Council.

These institutions and global corporations support and use the BIT's expertise to turn each of us from autonomous individuals capable of making rational decisions into "situated decision-makers."

Investigative journalist Richard D. Hall, the man most responsible for the information contained in the book you are now reading, has been attacked by the entire British establishment. He faces civil prosecution. The state's judiciary seems intent on censoring the evidence he reported and enforcing an injunction on him to stop any further mention of the Manchester evidence in the "infosphere."

If there can be no further exploration of Hall's evidence; if it is dismissed out of hand as a "conspiracy theory"; if the official narrative is asserted to be true and literally unquestionable—all of these ifs lead us to ask: Why would Hall or anyone else who is familiar with the evidence he has uncovered have *any* reason to believe either the official account of the Manchester Arena attack or the legitimacy of the verdict on the biased pluralist state's behalf?

Why should any of us believe any story the state tells ever again?

The "Manchester Attack" was not a suicide bombing in the Manchester Arena. It was an assault on the psyche of the nation.

Before we meekly accept our fate as "situated decision-makers," why don't we instead insist that the following questions are answered by the state and its epistemic authorities?

#1. Despite investigative journalist Richard D. Hall providing the inquiry with crucial primary evidence, including much of that heard in the police chatter

recording and seen in the Barr footage, why was it not examined by the Saunders Inquiry?

#2. Why was Mr Barr not required to give evidence at the Saunders Inquiry?

#3. Why was the “point of blast” CCTV image not considered important by the inquiry panellists?

#4. How was Mr Bickerstaff able to predict that people would be “bashed to bits” inside the City Room *before* Salman Abedi allegedly detonated his bomb?

#5. Why does the observable physical evidence show that no one inside the City Room sustained an injury consistent with a shrapnel bombing?

#6. Why is there no evidence of people with injuries consistent with a shrapnel bombing, if somehow still mobile, running out of the City Room?

#7. Why is the account of the placement of Salman Abedi’s body so vague when Insp Mike Smith clearly identified its location shortly after the blast?

#8. Why isn’t Salman Abedi’s torso observable in any of the CCTV images?

#9. Why is there no observable shrapnel damage to any of the lighting inside the City Room shortly after the blast?

#10. Why is there no observable shrapnel damage to any of the posters inside the City Room shortly after the blast?

#11. Why was the flimsy merchandise stall not damaged at all when it was well within ten metres of the purported epicentre of the blast?

#12. Why was the merchandise stall depicted as missing at the Saunders Inquiry when the evidence proves it was still in situ and entirely intact?

#13. What explains the shrapnel damage on the walls adjacent to the merchandise stall, which was subsequently entered into evidence at the Saunders Inquiry, when that damage was not visible within the first five minutes after the blast?

#14. What explains the shrapnel damage on the door to the hospitality suite, which was subsequently entered into evidence at the Saunders Inquiry, when that damage was not visible within the first five minutes after the blast?

#15. Why does the footage of Ruth Murrell, taken inside the City Room no more than five minutes after the blast, clearly show that she was *not* injured by shrapnel from a bomb—and why is her testimony that she was injured believed by the state?

#16. Why does the official account say Michelle Kiss was on the steps in the City Room when she was killed, when the CCTV images prove she was not there and could not have died at that time in that spot?

#17. Why has no observable physical evidence plausibly substantiating the official account of the Manchester Arena bombing ever been presented by the state?

#18. Why does all the observable physical evidence—the primary evidence—contradict the state's official account of the Manchester Arena bombing?

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